具有危险源性质的复杂系统安全行为演化研究
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摘要
为解决具有危险源性质的复杂社会技术系统安全行为演化动力机制问题,针对系统生命周期长、影响因素多的特点,以日本福岛核泄漏事故为例,创建扩展型功能共振模型,用于描述系统内安全事故影响因素的作用过程。而后将系统相关主体分为实施方、业主方和第三方共3类,运用演化博弈方法深入研究发现,三方所承担的安全执行成本、安全处罚成本及事故成本之间的数量关系变化是系统安全行为演化发展的动力,3类成本失衡引发的监管机制失效是导致此次核泄漏事故的根源,并据此提出保持政府独立性和权威性、限制业主行为、建立项目责任主体终生追溯机制和采用立体处罚方式的建议。
To find the evolution causes of Complex Socio-Technical Systems as Hazard Source,in view of the fact that the life cycle of the system was long and there were many factors affecting the system,the extended functional resonance model were created for describing the process of interaction among the accident factors from the nuclear accident caused by "3·11" earthquake in Japan.By using the evolutionary game approach with three agents like practitioners,owners and the third one,the conclusion was drew that the cause for the evolution of the system was the variation in implementation costs,security costs and accident costs.The imbalance of the three costs led to the failure of a tripartite monitoring mechanism which caused the nuclear accident in Japan.According to the conclusion above,some suggestions were given to improve the safety management such as to maintain the independence and authority of the government,to restrict the behavior of the owners and to use a variety of means of punishment.
To find the evolution causes of Complex Socio-Technical Systems as Hazard Source,in view of the fact that the life cycle of the system was long and there were many factors affecting the system,the extended functional resonance model were created for describing the process of interaction among the accident factors from the nuclear accident caused by "3·11" earthquake in Japan.By using the evolutionary game approach with three agents like practitioners,owners and the third one,the conclusion was drew that the cause for the evolution of the system was the variation in implementation costs,security costs and accident costs.The imbalance of the three costs led to the failure of a tripartite monitoring mechanism which caused the nuclear accident in Japan.According to the conclusion above,some suggestions were given to improve the safety management such as to maintain the independence and authority of the government,to restrict the behavior of the owners and to use a variety of means of punishment.
引文
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[4]于广涛,王二平.不良安全文化的特征:事故报告再分析[J].中国安全科学学报,2006,16(10):21-26.YU Guang-tao,WANG Er-ping.Characteristics of poor safety culture:exploring with re-analysis of accident reports[J].China Safety Science Journal,2006,16(10):21-26.
[5]Neal A.,Griffin M.A.,Hart P M.The impact of organizational climate on safety climate and individual behavior[J].Safety Science,2000,34(1-3):99-109.
[6]Neal A.,Griffin M.A..Safety climate and safety behavior[J].Australian Journal of Management,2002,27(1):67-75.
[7]Wu T.C.,Chen C.H.,Li C.C..A correlation among safety leadership,safety climate and safety performance[J].Journalof Loss Prevention in the Process Industries,2008,21(3):307-318.
[8]Larsson S.,Pousette A.,Trner M..Psychological climate and safety in the construction industry-mediated influence onsafety behaviour[J].Safety Science,2008,46(3):405-412.
[9]许正权,朱方策.复杂社会技术系统安全事故的成因结构敏感性及预防对策研究[J].中国安全科学学报,2009,19(3):107-115.XU Zheng-quan,ZHU Fang-ce.Structural sensitivity of accident causation for complex socio-technical system and itspreventive countermeasures[J].China Safety Science Journal,2009,19(3):107-115.
[10]付茂林,刘朝明.煤矿安全监察进化博弈分析[J].系统管理学报,2007,16(5):579-584.FU Mao-lin,LIU Chao-min.Evolutionary game analysis on the supervision of colliery safety[J].Journal of Systems&Management,2007,16(5):579-584.
[11]陆玉梅,梅强.高危行业中小企业安全费用的监管博弈[J].系统管理学报,2009,18(4):463-468.LU Yu-mei,MEI Qiang.Evolutionary game analysis of supervision strategy for safety funds from SMEs in highly dangerousindustries[J].Journal of Systems&Management,2009,18(4):463-468.
[12]梅强,马国建,杜建国,等.中小企业安全生产管制路径演化研究[J].中国管理科学,2009,17(2):160-168.MEI Qiang,MA Guo-jian,DU Jian-guo,et al.A study of the evolution route of supervising safety in SME production[J].Chinese Journal of Management Science,2009,17(2):160-168.
[13]Hugo Priemus,Ben Aleb.Construction safety:an analysis of systems failure:The case of the multifunctional Bos&Lommerpleinestate,Amsterdam[J].Safety Science,2010,48(2):111-122.
[14]Hale A.R.,Ale B.J.M.,Goossens L.H.J.,et al.Modeling accidents for prioritizing prevention[J].Reliability Engineer-ing&System Safety,2007,92(12):1 701-1 715.
[15]Friedman D..On economic applications of evolutionary game theory[J].Journal of Evolutionary Economics,1998,8(1):15-43.
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