退款保证对制造商开通直销渠道的影响
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摘要
研究了退款保证对制造商开通直销渠道的影响及双渠道模式下制造商和零售商各自的退款保证策略及市场均衡。分别建立制造商在直销渠道不同退款保证策略下的决策模型,并于拓展模型讨论零售商提供退款保证的情形。研究发现:任一情形下,制造商总开通直销渠道。直销渠道并非总侵蚀零售商利润,仅当两个渠道均不提供退款保证时,零售商利润被直销渠道侵蚀。双渠道模式下双方的退款保证策略与退货麻烦成本、产品残值及消费者对渠道的满意率有关。消费者剩余的变化仅与直销渠道的退款保证策略有关。
This paper studies the impact of money-back guarantees on manufacturer ' s launching direct channel and their money-back guarantees strategies and market equilibrium in dual channels. It constructs different decision models in each case and expands the model which retailer provides money-back guarantees in traditional channel. Results show that,the manufacturer will always launch direct channel. The profit of retailer is not always eroded by direct channel. Only when both channels do not provide money-back guarantees,the retailer's profit is eroded by direct channel.Under dual-channel models,both sides' strategies are related to the returns hassle,net value of products and consumers' satisfaction rate in the channel. The change of consumer surplus is only related to money-back guarantees' strategy for direct channel.
This paper studies the impact of money-back guarantees on manufacturer ' s launching direct channel and their money-back guarantees strategies and market equilibrium in dual channels. It constructs different decision models in each case and expands the model which retailer provides money-back guarantees in traditional channel. Results show that,the manufacturer will always launch direct channel. The profit of retailer is not always eroded by direct channel. Only when both channels do not provide money-back guarantees,the retailer's profit is eroded by direct channel.Under dual-channel models,both sides' strategies are related to the returns hassle,net value of products and consumers' satisfaction rate in the channel. The change of consumer surplus is only related to money-back guarantees' strategy for direct channel.
引文
[1]李建斌,李赟.无理由退货政策下的在线定价及补偿优化策略[J].系统工程理论与实践,2016,36(11):2811-2819.
[2]Mcwilliams B.Money-Back Guarantees:Helping the Low-Quality Retailer[J].Management Science,2012,58(8):1521-1524.
[3]Rhee B D,Park S Y.Online Store as a New Direct Channel and E-merging Hybrid Channel System[M].Channels of Distribution,2000.
[4]Chiang W Y K,Chhajed D,Hess J D.Direct Marketing,Indirect Profits:A Strategic Analysis of Dual-Channel Supply-Chain Design[M].INFORMS,2003.
[5]但斌,徐广业,张旭梅.电子商务环境下双渠道供应链协调的补偿策略研究[J].管理工程学报,2012,26(1):125-130.
[6]Yan R,Pei Z.Retail Services and Firm Profit in a Dual-Channel Market[J].Journal of Retailing&Consumer Services,2009,16(4):306-314.
[7]刘家国,周笛,刘咏梅,等.搭便车行为影响下制造商渠道选择研究[J].系统工程学报,2014,29(6):813-823.
[8]罗美玲,李刚,孙林岩.具有服务溢出效应的双渠道供应链竞争[J].系统管理学报,2011,20(6):648-657.
[9]聂佳佳,石纯来.规模不经济对制造商开通直销渠道的影响[J].运筹与管理,2017,26(2):68-75.
[10]石纯来.制造商基于规模不经济的渠道选择研究[D].西南交通大学,2016.
[11]Pasternack B A.Optimal Pricing and Return Policies for Perishable Commodities[J].Marketing Science,2008,27(1):133-140.
[12]Ketzenberg M E,Zuidwijk R A.Optimal Pricing,Ordering,and Return Policies for Consumer Goods[J].Production&Operations Management,2010,18(3):344-360.
[13]张霖霖,姚忠.基于顾客退货的风险规避型双渠道供应链最优策略[J].计算机集成制造系统,2015,21(3):766-775.
[14]Yang H,Chen J,Chen X et al.The Impact of Customer Returns in a Supply Chain with a Common Retailer[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2017,256(1):139-150.
[15]孟庆峰,范明,李真.基于返回策略的供应链网络竞争绩效研究[J].中国管理科学,2012,20(5):122-130.
[16]黄宗盛,聂佳佳,赵映雪,等.基于消费者满意的双渠道销售商退款保证策略研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(2):61-68.
[17]Julien Mostard,Renéde Koster,Ruud Teunter.The Distribution-Free Newsboy Problem with Resalable Returns[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2005,97(3):329-342.
[18]Hsiao L,Chen Y.Returns Policy and Quality Risk in E-Business[J].Production&Operations Management,2012,21(3):489-503.
[19]Park S Y,Keh H T.Modelling Hybrid Distribution Channels:AGame-Theoretic Analysis[J].Journal of Retailing&Consumer Services,2003,10(3):155-167.
[20]颜永新,徐晓燕.零售商双渠道适应性及协调研究[J].系统管理学报,2012,21(5):602-608.
(1)National Retail Federation(2014). Consumer returns in the industry.
[2]Mcwilliams B.Money-Back Guarantees:Helping the Low-Quality Retailer[J].Management Science,2012,58(8):1521-1524.
[3]Rhee B D,Park S Y.Online Store as a New Direct Channel and E-merging Hybrid Channel System[M].Channels of Distribution,2000.
[4]Chiang W Y K,Chhajed D,Hess J D.Direct Marketing,Indirect Profits:A Strategic Analysis of Dual-Channel Supply-Chain Design[M].INFORMS,2003.
[5]但斌,徐广业,张旭梅.电子商务环境下双渠道供应链协调的补偿策略研究[J].管理工程学报,2012,26(1):125-130.
[6]Yan R,Pei Z.Retail Services and Firm Profit in a Dual-Channel Market[J].Journal of Retailing&Consumer Services,2009,16(4):306-314.
[7]刘家国,周笛,刘咏梅,等.搭便车行为影响下制造商渠道选择研究[J].系统工程学报,2014,29(6):813-823.
[8]罗美玲,李刚,孙林岩.具有服务溢出效应的双渠道供应链竞争[J].系统管理学报,2011,20(6):648-657.
[9]聂佳佳,石纯来.规模不经济对制造商开通直销渠道的影响[J].运筹与管理,2017,26(2):68-75.
[10]石纯来.制造商基于规模不经济的渠道选择研究[D].西南交通大学,2016.
[11]Pasternack B A.Optimal Pricing and Return Policies for Perishable Commodities[J].Marketing Science,2008,27(1):133-140.
[12]Ketzenberg M E,Zuidwijk R A.Optimal Pricing,Ordering,and Return Policies for Consumer Goods[J].Production&Operations Management,2010,18(3):344-360.
[13]张霖霖,姚忠.基于顾客退货的风险规避型双渠道供应链最优策略[J].计算机集成制造系统,2015,21(3):766-775.
[14]Yang H,Chen J,Chen X et al.The Impact of Customer Returns in a Supply Chain with a Common Retailer[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2017,256(1):139-150.
[15]孟庆峰,范明,李真.基于返回策略的供应链网络竞争绩效研究[J].中国管理科学,2012,20(5):122-130.
[16]黄宗盛,聂佳佳,赵映雪,等.基于消费者满意的双渠道销售商退款保证策略研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(2):61-68.
[17]Julien Mostard,Renéde Koster,Ruud Teunter.The Distribution-Free Newsboy Problem with Resalable Returns[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2005,97(3):329-342.
[18]Hsiao L,Chen Y.Returns Policy and Quality Risk in E-Business[J].Production&Operations Management,2012,21(3):489-503.
[19]Park S Y,Keh H T.Modelling Hybrid Distribution Channels:AGame-Theoretic Analysis[J].Journal of Retailing&Consumer Services,2003,10(3):155-167.
[20]颜永新,徐晓燕.零售商双渠道适应性及协调研究[J].系统管理学报,2012,21(5):602-608.
(1)National Retail Federation(2014). Consumer returns in the industry.
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