自然资源资产离任审计与空气污染防治:“和谐锦标赛”还是“环保资格赛”
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摘要
自然资源资产离任审计作为加强生态文明建设的制度创新,是对领导干部受托环境责任的绩效考核,在审计试点中,地方政府可能采取"和谐锦标赛"或"环保资格赛"两种相异的应对策略。本文以2015年开始的自然资源资产离任审计试点作为一次自然实验,采用双重差分模型估计其对空气质量改善的因果效应。本文的研究证实了受传统考核晋升模式影响,地方政府采取"环保资格赛"的逻辑成立。试点城市与非试点城市相比,显著降低了《大气污染防治行动计划》中约束性指标PM_(10)(PM_(2.5))的排放浓度,削减了SO_2等生产性敏感污染物的排放峰值,但并未带来空气质量的全面整体改善。同时,对空气污染临界值(AQI=100)敏感的高污染城市和环保模范城市在试点中会采取更加积极的治理措施改善空气质量,上述异质性分析的结论为"环保资格赛"逻辑提供了进一步的经验证据。本文还利用Logit模型对推广自然资源资产离任审计制度的长期效应进行估计,回归结果显示,在审计试点期间,试点城市官员晋升概率与空气质量改善呈正相关关系,表明该项制度的推行,长期而言有助于扭转GDP导向晋升模式的痼疾,通过"进步学习"实现空气质量的持续改善。本研究为考察自然资源资产离任审计试点的政策效果提供了经验证据。
The accountability audit of natural resource, as a performance assessment of the environmental responsibility entrusted to leading cadres, is a system innovation with Chinese characteristics and serving the construction of ecological civilization. In the audit pilot, the local governments may adopt two different coping strategies: "harmony tournament" or "environmental protection qualification competition". The audit pilot started in 2015, creating a natural experiment to analyze the causal effect of air quality improvement by using the DID model. This paper proves that the logic for local governments to adopt "environmental protection qualification competition" is established under the influence of the traditional assessment and promotion model. Compared with non-pilot cities, in pilot cities, the emission of PM_(10)(PM_(2.5)), a constraint index in the Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of Air Pollution, and the peak emission of production sensitive pollutants such as SO_2 was significantly reduced, but the overall improvement of air quality index was not brought. The conclusion of heterogeneity analysis of high pollution city group and environmental protection city group provides further empirical evidence for the above logic. This paper also predicts the long-term effect of the system of accountability audit of natural resource, and the positive correlation between the promotion probability of officials and the improvement of air quality in the pilot cities explains that, in the long run, the implementation of the system will help to reverse the chronic illness of traditional GDP-oriented promotion model and achieve the continuous improvement of air quality through progressive learning. The findings of this paper could provide empirical evidence for investigating the policy effects of the system of accountability audit of natural resource.
The accountability audit of natural resource, as a performance assessment of the environmental responsibility entrusted to leading cadres, is a system innovation with Chinese characteristics and serving the construction of ecological civilization. In the audit pilot, the local governments may adopt two different coping strategies: "harmony tournament" or "environmental protection qualification competition". The audit pilot started in 2015, creating a natural experiment to analyze the causal effect of air quality improvement by using the DID model. This paper proves that the logic for local governments to adopt "environmental protection qualification competition" is established under the influence of the traditional assessment and promotion model. Compared with non-pilot cities, in pilot cities, the emission of PM_(10)(PM_(2.5)), a constraint index in the Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of Air Pollution, and the peak emission of production sensitive pollutants such as SO_2 was significantly reduced, but the overall improvement of air quality index was not brought. The conclusion of heterogeneity analysis of high pollution city group and environmental protection city group provides further empirical evidence for the above logic. This paper also predicts the long-term effect of the system of accountability audit of natural resource, and the positive correlation between the promotion probability of officials and the improvement of air quality in the pilot cities explains that, in the long run, the implementation of the system will help to reverse the chronic illness of traditional GDP-oriented promotion model and achieve the continuous improvement of air quality through progressive learning. The findings of this paper could provide empirical evidence for investigating the policy effects of the system of accountability audit of natural resource.
引文
[1]曹静,王鑫,钟笑寒.限行政策是否改善了北京市的空气质量[J].经济学(季刊),2014,(3):1091-1126.
[2]陈钊,徐彤.走向“为和谐而竞争”:晋升锦标赛下的中央和地方治理模式变迁[J].世界经济,2011,(9):3-18.
[3]郭峰,石庆玲.官员更替、合谋震慑与空气质量的临时性改善[J].经济研究,2017,(7):155-168.
[4]郭旭.领导干部自然资源资产离任审计研究综述[J].审计研究,2017,(2):25-30.
[5]李树,陈刚.环境管制与生产率增长[J].经济研究,2013,(1):17-31.
[6]黎文靖,郑曼妮.空气污染的治理机制及其作用效果---来自地级市的经验证据[J].中国工业经济,2016,(4):93-109.
[7]刘瑞明,金田明.政绩考核、交流效应与经济发展[J].当代经济科学,2015,(3):8-18.
[8]罗小芳,卢现祥.环境治理中的三大制度经济学学派:理论与实践[J].国外社会科学,2011,(6):56-66.
[9]罗知,李浩然.“大气十条”政策的实施对空气质量的影响[J].中国工业经济,2018,(9):136-154.
[10]吕连宏,罗宏,张型芳.近期中国大气污染状况、防治政策及对能源消费的影响[J].中国能源,2015,(8):9-15.
[11]彭韶兵,周兵.公共权力的委托代理与政府目标经济责任审计[J].会计研究,2009,(6):18-22.
[12]尚虎平.我国地方政府绩效评估悖论:高绩效下的政治安全隐患[J].管理世界,2008,(4):69-79.
[13]史贝贝,冯晨,康蓉.环境信息披露与外商直接投资优化[J].中国工业经济,2019,(4):98-116.
[14]石庆玲,郭峰,陈诗一.雾霾治理中的“政治性蓝天”[J].中国工业经济,2016,(3):40-56.
[15]姚洋,张牧扬.官员绩效与晋升锦标赛[J].经济研究,2013,(1):137-150.
[16]于文超,何勤英.辖区经济增长绩效与环境污染事故[J].世界经济文汇,2013,(2):20-35.
[17]张鹏,张靳雪,崔峰.工业化进程中环境污染、能源耗费与官员晋升[J].公共行政评论,2017,(5):46-68.
[18]中国工程院,环境保护部.中国环境宏观战略研究[M].北京:中国环境科学出版社,2011.
[19]周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究,2007,(7):36-50.
[20]Beck,T.,R.Levine,and A.Levkov.Big Bad Banks?The Winners and Losers from Bank Deregulation in the United States[J].Journal of Finance,2010,65(5):1637-1667.
[21]Chen,Y.J.,P.Li,and Y.Lu.Career Concerns and Multitasking Local Bureaucrats:Evidence of Targetbased Performance Evaluation System in China[J].Journal of Development Economics,2018,133(7):84-101.
[22]Chen,Y.,G.Z.Jin,N.Kumar,and G.Shi.The Promise of Beijing:Evaluating the Impact of the 2008Olympic Games on Air Quality[J].Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,2013,66(3):424-443.
[23]Dasgupta,S.,B.Laplante,N.Mamingi,and H.Wang.Inspection,Pollution Price,and Environmental Performance:Evidence from China[J].Ecological Economics,2001,36(3),487-498.
[24]Dewatripont,M.,I.Jewitt,and J.Tirole.Multitask Agency Problems:Focus and Task Clustering[J].European Economic Review,2000,44(4):869-877.
[25]Drucker,A.G.,and U.Latacz-Lohmann.Getting Incentives Right:A Comparative Analysis of Policy Instruments for Livestock Waste Pollution Abatement in Yucatán,Mexico[J].Environment and Development Economics,2003,8(2):261-284.
[26]Flint,D.The Philosophy and Principles of Auditing:An Introduction[M].New York:Palgrave Macmillan Press,1988.
[27]Ghanem,D.,and J.Zhang.Effortless Perfection:Do Chinese Cities Manipulate Air Pollution Data[J].Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,2014,68(2):203-225.
[28]Heutel,G.,and G.J.Ruhm.Air Pollution and Procyclical Mortality[J].Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists,2016,3(3):667-706.
[29]Huang,R.B.,and D.P.Chen.Does Environmental Information Disclosure Benefit Waste Discharge Reduction?Evidence from China[J].Journal of Business Ethics,2015,129(3):535-552.
[30]Jin,Y.,H.Andersson,and S.Zhang.Air Pollution Control Policies in China:A Retrospective and Prospects[J].International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health,2016,13(12):1219-1241.
[31]Konisky,D.Public Preferences for Environmental Policy Responsibility[J].Publius:Journal of Federalism,2011,41(1):76-100.
[32]Li,P.,Y.Lu,and J.Wang.Does Flattening Government Improve Economic Performance?Evidence from China[J].Journal of Development Economics,2016,123(11):18-37.
[33]Parker,L.D.Social and Environmental Accountability Research:A View from the Commentary Box[J].Accounting,Auditing&Accountability Journal,2005,18(6):842-860.
[34]Wang,H.,and D.Wheeler.Financial Incentives and Endogenous Enforcement in China’s Pollution Levy System[J].Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,2005,49(1):174-196.
[35]Wang,H.,N.Mamigi,B.Laplante,and S.Dasgupa.Incomplete Enforcement of Pollution Regulation:Bargaining Power of Chinese Factories[J].Environmental and Resource Economics,2003,24(3):255-273.
[36]Wu,J.,Y.Deng,J.Huang,R.Morck,and B.Yeung.Incentives and Outcomes:China’s Environmental Policy[J].Capitalism and Society,2014,9(1):1-41.
[37]Zheng,M.,M.E.Kahn,W.Sun,and D.Luo.Incentives for China’s Urban Mayors to Mitigate Pollution Externalities:The Role of the Central Government and Public Environmentalism[J].Regional Science and Urban Economics,2014,47(4):61-71.
(1)参见新华社北京2017年11月28日电，审计署负责人就《领导干部自然资源资产离任审计规定（试行）答记者问》的相关报道（http：//www.gov.cn/zhengce/2017-11/28/content_5242968.htm）。
(1)主要包括中办、国办印发的《开展领导干部自然资源资产离任审计试点方案》（2015）和《领导干部自然资源资产离任审计规定（试行）》（2017），以及国家审计署制定的《“十三五”国家审计工作发展规划》（2016）、《领导干部自然资源资产离任审计试点要点》（2016）和《地方审计机关开展领导干部自然资源资产离任审计试点工作的指导方案》（2017）。
(2)自然资源资产离任审计中，“离任”是相对宽泛的概念，在保证离任必审的前提下，也对领导干部任职期间（任中）开展审计。
(1)实际上，Ⅰ、Ⅱ和Ⅲ各硬性指标之间存在一定联系，例如，实现绩效指标（Ⅰ）的情况下，必然达到基线指标（Ⅱ）的要求并且不会出现问责指标（Ⅲ）所禁止的情形。
(1)在中国334个地级行政区中，剔除西藏自治区和新设立地级市（如三沙市、儋州市），剩余325个地级行政区，包括269个地级市、21个地区、30个州和5个盟，本文统称为城市。
(2)市委书记与市长虽然同样作为地级行政区的首长，但市委书记侧重于党委、人事工作，而市长则主管行政，负责经济、文教、安全、环保等工作。同时，现有法律、法规和规章也要求强化对地方政府主要领导环境质量履责情况的考核。
(1)PM10、SO2和CO主要来源于燃烧的烟尘、工业粉尘、建筑粉尘和扬尘等，NO2来源于机动车尾气排放，O3是一种二次污染物，来自氮氧等污染物的光化学反应。
(1)本文省略了所有稳健性检验的结果，请参见《中国工业经济》网站（http：//www.ciejournal.org）附件。
(1)感谢匿名评审专家的意见和建议。
(1)该部分的检验结果请参见《中国工业经济》网站（http：//www.ciejournal.org）公开附件。
(2)根据《环境空气质量指数（AQI）技术规定（试行）》（HJ 633-2012）：空气污染指数划分为0-50（优）、51-100（良）、101-150（轻度污染）、151-200（中度污染）、201-300（重度污染）和大于300（严重污染）六档，AQI大于100即超标，指数越大、级别越高，说明污染越严重。
(1)感谢匿名审稿人提出的修改意见和提示。
(2)无论是改善值或减排值，统一使用削减程度×（-1），以AAQI改善值为例，DAAQI=(AAQIit-AAQIit-1）×（-1），该值越大、减排（削减）程度越高。该指标估计结果显著为正，说明减排（削减）程度越大、晋升可能性越高。
[2]陈钊,徐彤.走向“为和谐而竞争”:晋升锦标赛下的中央和地方治理模式变迁[J].世界经济,2011,(9):3-18.
[3]郭峰,石庆玲.官员更替、合谋震慑与空气质量的临时性改善[J].经济研究,2017,(7):155-168.
[4]郭旭.领导干部自然资源资产离任审计研究综述[J].审计研究,2017,(2):25-30.
[5]李树,陈刚.环境管制与生产率增长[J].经济研究,2013,(1):17-31.
[6]黎文靖,郑曼妮.空气污染的治理机制及其作用效果---来自地级市的经验证据[J].中国工业经济,2016,(4):93-109.
[7]刘瑞明,金田明.政绩考核、交流效应与经济发展[J].当代经济科学,2015,(3):8-18.
[8]罗小芳,卢现祥.环境治理中的三大制度经济学学派:理论与实践[J].国外社会科学,2011,(6):56-66.
[9]罗知,李浩然.“大气十条”政策的实施对空气质量的影响[J].中国工业经济,2018,(9):136-154.
[10]吕连宏,罗宏,张型芳.近期中国大气污染状况、防治政策及对能源消费的影响[J].中国能源,2015,(8):9-15.
[11]彭韶兵,周兵.公共权力的委托代理与政府目标经济责任审计[J].会计研究,2009,(6):18-22.
[12]尚虎平.我国地方政府绩效评估悖论:高绩效下的政治安全隐患[J].管理世界,2008,(4):69-79.
[13]史贝贝,冯晨,康蓉.环境信息披露与外商直接投资优化[J].中国工业经济,2019,(4):98-116.
[14]石庆玲,郭峰,陈诗一.雾霾治理中的“政治性蓝天”[J].中国工业经济,2016,(3):40-56.
[15]姚洋,张牧扬.官员绩效与晋升锦标赛[J].经济研究,2013,(1):137-150.
[16]于文超,何勤英.辖区经济增长绩效与环境污染事故[J].世界经济文汇,2013,(2):20-35.
[17]张鹏,张靳雪,崔峰.工业化进程中环境污染、能源耗费与官员晋升[J].公共行政评论,2017,(5):46-68.
[18]中国工程院,环境保护部.中国环境宏观战略研究[M].北京:中国环境科学出版社,2011.
[19]周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究,2007,(7):36-50.
[20]Beck,T.,R.Levine,and A.Levkov.Big Bad Banks?The Winners and Losers from Bank Deregulation in the United States[J].Journal of Finance,2010,65(5):1637-1667.
[21]Chen,Y.J.,P.Li,and Y.Lu.Career Concerns and Multitasking Local Bureaucrats:Evidence of Targetbased Performance Evaluation System in China[J].Journal of Development Economics,2018,133(7):84-101.
[22]Chen,Y.,G.Z.Jin,N.Kumar,and G.Shi.The Promise of Beijing:Evaluating the Impact of the 2008Olympic Games on Air Quality[J].Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,2013,66(3):424-443.
[23]Dasgupta,S.,B.Laplante,N.Mamingi,and H.Wang.Inspection,Pollution Price,and Environmental Performance:Evidence from China[J].Ecological Economics,2001,36(3),487-498.
[24]Dewatripont,M.,I.Jewitt,and J.Tirole.Multitask Agency Problems:Focus and Task Clustering[J].European Economic Review,2000,44(4):869-877.
[25]Drucker,A.G.,and U.Latacz-Lohmann.Getting Incentives Right:A Comparative Analysis of Policy Instruments for Livestock Waste Pollution Abatement in Yucatán,Mexico[J].Environment and Development Economics,2003,8(2):261-284.
[26]Flint,D.The Philosophy and Principles of Auditing:An Introduction[M].New York:Palgrave Macmillan Press,1988.
[27]Ghanem,D.,and J.Zhang.Effortless Perfection:Do Chinese Cities Manipulate Air Pollution Data[J].Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,2014,68(2):203-225.
[28]Heutel,G.,and G.J.Ruhm.Air Pollution and Procyclical Mortality[J].Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists,2016,3(3):667-706.
[29]Huang,R.B.,and D.P.Chen.Does Environmental Information Disclosure Benefit Waste Discharge Reduction?Evidence from China[J].Journal of Business Ethics,2015,129(3):535-552.
[30]Jin,Y.,H.Andersson,and S.Zhang.Air Pollution Control Policies in China:A Retrospective and Prospects[J].International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health,2016,13(12):1219-1241.
[31]Konisky,D.Public Preferences for Environmental Policy Responsibility[J].Publius:Journal of Federalism,2011,41(1):76-100.
[32]Li,P.,Y.Lu,and J.Wang.Does Flattening Government Improve Economic Performance?Evidence from China[J].Journal of Development Economics,2016,123(11):18-37.
[33]Parker,L.D.Social and Environmental Accountability Research:A View from the Commentary Box[J].Accounting,Auditing&Accountability Journal,2005,18(6):842-860.
[34]Wang,H.,and D.Wheeler.Financial Incentives and Endogenous Enforcement in China’s Pollution Levy System[J].Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,2005,49(1):174-196.
[35]Wang,H.,N.Mamigi,B.Laplante,and S.Dasgupa.Incomplete Enforcement of Pollution Regulation:Bargaining Power of Chinese Factories[J].Environmental and Resource Economics,2003,24(3):255-273.
[36]Wu,J.,Y.Deng,J.Huang,R.Morck,and B.Yeung.Incentives and Outcomes:China’s Environmental Policy[J].Capitalism and Society,2014,9(1):1-41.
[37]Zheng,M.,M.E.Kahn,W.Sun,and D.Luo.Incentives for China’s Urban Mayors to Mitigate Pollution Externalities:The Role of the Central Government and Public Environmentalism[J].Regional Science and Urban Economics,2014,47(4):61-71.
(1)参见新华社北京2017年11月28日电，审计署负责人就《领导干部自然资源资产离任审计规定（试行）答记者问》的相关报道（http：//www.gov.cn/zhengce/2017-11/28/content_5242968.htm）。
(1)主要包括中办、国办印发的《开展领导干部自然资源资产离任审计试点方案》（2015）和《领导干部自然资源资产离任审计规定（试行）》（2017），以及国家审计署制定的《“十三五”国家审计工作发展规划》（2016）、《领导干部自然资源资产离任审计试点要点》（2016）和《地方审计机关开展领导干部自然资源资产离任审计试点工作的指导方案》（2017）。
(2)自然资源资产离任审计中，“离任”是相对宽泛的概念，在保证离任必审的前提下，也对领导干部任职期间（任中）开展审计。
(1)实际上，Ⅰ、Ⅱ和Ⅲ各硬性指标之间存在一定联系，例如，实现绩效指标（Ⅰ）的情况下，必然达到基线指标（Ⅱ）的要求并且不会出现问责指标（Ⅲ）所禁止的情形。
(1)在中国334个地级行政区中，剔除西藏自治区和新设立地级市（如三沙市、儋州市），剩余325个地级行政区，包括269个地级市、21个地区、30个州和5个盟，本文统称为城市。
(2)市委书记与市长虽然同样作为地级行政区的首长，但市委书记侧重于党委、人事工作，而市长则主管行政，负责经济、文教、安全、环保等工作。同时，现有法律、法规和规章也要求强化对地方政府主要领导环境质量履责情况的考核。
(1)PM10、SO2和CO主要来源于燃烧的烟尘、工业粉尘、建筑粉尘和扬尘等，NO2来源于机动车尾气排放，O3是一种二次污染物，来自氮氧等污染物的光化学反应。
(1)本文省略了所有稳健性检验的结果，请参见《中国工业经济》网站（http：//www.ciejournal.org）附件。
(1)感谢匿名评审专家的意见和建议。
(1)该部分的检验结果请参见《中国工业经济》网站（http：//www.ciejournal.org）公开附件。
(2)根据《环境空气质量指数（AQI）技术规定（试行）》（HJ 633-2012）：空气污染指数划分为0-50（优）、51-100（良）、101-150（轻度污染）、151-200（中度污染）、201-300（重度污染）和大于300（严重污染）六档，AQI大于100即超标，指数越大、级别越高，说明污染越严重。
(1)感谢匿名审稿人提出的修改意见和提示。
(2)无论是改善值或减排值，统一使用削减程度×（-1），以AAQI改善值为例，DAAQI=(AAQIit-AAQIit-1）×（-1），该值越大、减排（削减）程度越高。该指标估计结果显著为正，说明减排（削减）程度越大、晋升可能性越高。
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