广告竞争与合作决策研究
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摘要
今天的市场竞争变得前所未有的激烈,企业为了生存与发展,必须综合运用价格和非价格竞争手段,并且考虑各种可能的战略联盟以应对这种挑战。广告作为企业在市场营销中最重要的非价格竞争手段,受到了众多企业家的重视和学者们的关注。本文在前人研究的基础上,运用博弈论和产业组织理论的原理和方法,从横向和纵向两个角度深入研究了广告竞争与合作的有关重要问题。
首先,本文引入了广告外部性,建立了双寡头博弈模型,并重点考察了广告竞争、半联盟合作与全联盟合作这三种竞合形式的绩效。研究发现,在广告竞争情形下,“打广告”是每一个企业的占优战略,纳什均衡是(打广告,打广告),但这个均衡不是帕累托最优；全联盟合作下企业获得的利润最大,半联盟次之,广告竞争时企业利润最小；全联盟的社会福利最小,广告影响因子较小时,广告竞争情形下的社会福利大于半联盟情形下的社会福利,广告影响因子较大时,半联盟情形下的社会福利大于广告竞争情形下的社会福利。本文得到的启示是企业可以寻求半联盟或者全联盟合作,以获得企业间的帕累托改善,但在政府规制下,政府会禁止企业间的全联盟合作。
其次,本文将产量作为内生变量,并将零售商扩大到两家,研究了一个供应链上生产商与零售商的广告不合作与合作问题,侧重探讨了生产商广告成本分担比例问题和对比分析了三种竞合模式的市场效率。结果表明,在生产商分担零售商广告成本合作形式下,生产商广告成本分担率的提高将增大零售商广告投入；广告影响因子较小时,生产商分担零售商广告成本,广告影响因子较大时,生产商不分担零售商广告成本。对市场效率的对比中,本文发现生产商和零售商都是在生产商和零售商都打广告的合作方式下利润最高,而且在这种合作方式下,社会福利也最大。显然,政府应该鼓励生产商和零售商都打广告的合作方式。
最后,本文放宽需求确定性的假设,研究了不确定需求下的供应链广告合作问题。本文得到的主要结论是,广告影响因子增加,广告成本分担率降低,零售商广告投入减少,零售商订货量减少；广告壁垒增大时,广告成本分担率提高,零售商广告投入减少,零售商订货量将减少；当需求不确定性降低时,零售商的利润增加。
Market competition becomes unprecedentedly fierce today. In order to survive and develop, firms must wield price and non-price competition means synthetically, and consider possible strategic alliance to answer this challenge. Advertising as the most important means of non-price competition in marketing, has been valued by numerous entrepreneurs and caught a lot of scholars' attention. On the basis of previous studies, this paper applies the theory and methods in game theory and industrial organization theory to study relevant important issues on advertising competition and cooperation from the perspective of both horizontal and vertical.
First, the advertisement externality is introduced into this paper. Then, this paper establishes a duopoly game model and focus on the performance of adverting competition semi-alliance and total alliance. This paper finds that in the advertising competition case, "advertising" is the dominant strategy of each firm, and Nash equilibrium is the (advertising, advertising), but the equilibrium is not Pareto optimal. The firm gains the most profit in total alliance case, the second in semi-alliance case, and the least in advertising competition. The social welfare is smallest in total alliance. When ads impact factor is relatively smaller, social welfare in competition case is larger than that in semi-alliance. When ads impact factor is relatively bigger, social welfare in semi-alliance is larger than that in competition case. This paper obtains the enlightenment that the firms may seek half alliance or entire alliance to improve firms' Pareto Optimum, but under the government regulations, the government will forbid entire alliance cooperation of firms.
Second, this paper takes the output as the endogenous variable, and expands the retailer to two, and studies noncooperative and cooperative advertising in a supply chain. The producer's proportional share of the cost of advertising and market efficiency of three kinds of competition and cooperation models are mainly discussed. The results show that in the cooperation cases that the producer shares the cost of retailer advertising, when the producer shares the cost of advertising, the retailer advertisement will increase. When the impact factor of ads is relatively smaller, the producer will share the cost of retailer advertising, when the impact factor of ads is relatively bigger, the producer does not share the cost of retailer advertising. Comparing efficiency of the market, the results show that when producer and retailers both advertise, producer and retailers obtain most profit, and social welfare is also the largest. It is clear that the Government should encourage producer and retailers both to advertise
Finally, the assumption that the market demand is certain is given up and the cooperative advertising issue in uncertain circumstances in a supply chain is studied. The main conclusions are that when the impact factor of ads increases, the producer's proportional share of the cost of advertising, the amount of advertising and ordering quantity all decline, when advertising barrier increases, the producer's proportional share of the cost of advertising increases, and the amount of advertising and ordering quantity both decline; when the demand uncertainty declines, the retailer's profit will increase.
首先,本文引入了广告外部性,建立了双寡头博弈模型,并重点考察了广告竞争、半联盟合作与全联盟合作这三种竞合形式的绩效。研究发现,在广告竞争情形下,“打广告”是每一个企业的占优战略,纳什均衡是(打广告,打广告),但这个均衡不是帕累托最优；全联盟合作下企业获得的利润最大,半联盟次之,广告竞争时企业利润最小；全联盟的社会福利最小,广告影响因子较小时,广告竞争情形下的社会福利大于半联盟情形下的社会福利,广告影响因子较大时,半联盟情形下的社会福利大于广告竞争情形下的社会福利。本文得到的启示是企业可以寻求半联盟或者全联盟合作,以获得企业间的帕累托改善,但在政府规制下,政府会禁止企业间的全联盟合作。
其次,本文将产量作为内生变量,并将零售商扩大到两家,研究了一个供应链上生产商与零售商的广告不合作与合作问题,侧重探讨了生产商广告成本分担比例问题和对比分析了三种竞合模式的市场效率。结果表明,在生产商分担零售商广告成本合作形式下,生产商广告成本分担率的提高将增大零售商广告投入；广告影响因子较小时,生产商分担零售商广告成本,广告影响因子较大时,生产商不分担零售商广告成本。对市场效率的对比中,本文发现生产商和零售商都是在生产商和零售商都打广告的合作方式下利润最高,而且在这种合作方式下,社会福利也最大。显然,政府应该鼓励生产商和零售商都打广告的合作方式。
最后,本文放宽需求确定性的假设,研究了不确定需求下的供应链广告合作问题。本文得到的主要结论是,广告影响因子增加,广告成本分担率降低,零售商广告投入减少,零售商订货量减少；广告壁垒增大时,广告成本分担率提高,零售商广告投入减少,零售商订货量将减少；当需求不确定性降低时,零售商的利润增加。
Market competition becomes unprecedentedly fierce today. In order to survive and develop, firms must wield price and non-price competition means synthetically, and consider possible strategic alliance to answer this challenge. Advertising as the most important means of non-price competition in marketing, has been valued by numerous entrepreneurs and caught a lot of scholars' attention. On the basis of previous studies, this paper applies the theory and methods in game theory and industrial organization theory to study relevant important issues on advertising competition and cooperation from the perspective of both horizontal and vertical.
First, the advertisement externality is introduced into this paper. Then, this paper establishes a duopoly game model and focus on the performance of adverting competition semi-alliance and total alliance. This paper finds that in the advertising competition case, "advertising" is the dominant strategy of each firm, and Nash equilibrium is the (advertising, advertising), but the equilibrium is not Pareto optimal. The firm gains the most profit in total alliance case, the second in semi-alliance case, and the least in advertising competition. The social welfare is smallest in total alliance. When ads impact factor is relatively smaller, social welfare in competition case is larger than that in semi-alliance. When ads impact factor is relatively bigger, social welfare in semi-alliance is larger than that in competition case. This paper obtains the enlightenment that the firms may seek half alliance or entire alliance to improve firms' Pareto Optimum, but under the government regulations, the government will forbid entire alliance cooperation of firms.
Second, this paper takes the output as the endogenous variable, and expands the retailer to two, and studies noncooperative and cooperative advertising in a supply chain. The producer's proportional share of the cost of advertising and market efficiency of three kinds of competition and cooperation models are mainly discussed. The results show that in the cooperation cases that the producer shares the cost of retailer advertising, when the producer shares the cost of advertising, the retailer advertisement will increase. When the impact factor of ads is relatively smaller, the producer will share the cost of retailer advertising, when the impact factor of ads is relatively bigger, the producer does not share the cost of retailer advertising. Comparing efficiency of the market, the results show that when producer and retailers both advertise, producer and retailers obtain most profit, and social welfare is also the largest. It is clear that the Government should encourage producer and retailers both to advertise
Finally, the assumption that the market demand is certain is given up and the cooperative advertising issue in uncertain circumstances in a supply chain is studied. The main conclusions are that when the impact factor of ads increases, the producer's proportional share of the cost of advertising, the amount of advertising and ordering quantity all decline, when advertising barrier increases, the producer's proportional share of the cost of advertising increases, and the amount of advertising and ordering quantity both decline; when the demand uncertainty declines, the retailer's profit will increase.
引文
[1]中国广告年鉴[M].北京：新华出版社,2001-2004
[2]包一卉.基于分众营销的广告策略研究[D].广东工业大学硕士学位论文,2008
[3]Richard Normann and Rafael Ramirez.From Value Chain to Value Constellation: Designing Interactive Strategy[J].Harvard Business Review,1993,71(7/8).
[4]Sen K. Advertising fees in the franchised channel [M].New York:The Haworth Press,1994:83—102.
[5]Brennan L. How retailers are putting it all together [J]. Sales and Marketing Management,1988, May:62-66
[6]Rigg C.Hard Times Mean Growth for Co-op Ads [J].Advertising Age,1990, 61(47):24-24.
[7]Davis, R.A.Retailers Open Doors Wide for Co-op[J].Advertising Age,1994, 65(32):30-30.
[8]Top 100 Advertisers[J].Advertising Age,1999,16.
[9]Kenneth Roman, J.Maas.The New How to Advertise[M].New York:St.Martin's Press,1992.
[10]Das T K, Teng B S. A resource-based theory of strategic alliances [J]. Journal of Management,2000a,26(1):31-61
[11]Das T K. Risk types and inter-firm alliance structure [J].Journal of Management Studied,1996,33:827-844
[12]Crimmins E C. Cooperative advertising [M].Gene Wolf, New York,1984.
[13]Dorfman,R, Steiner P. Optimal advertising and optimal quality[J]. American Economic Review,1954,44:826-836.
[14]Olsder,Geert J. Some thoughts about simple advertising models as differential games and the structure of coalitions [M],Directions in Large-scale systems, Many-person optimization and decentralized control,1976,New York:Plenum Press
[15]Friedman, Advertising and oligopolistic equilibrium [J].The Bell Journal of Economics,1983.,14,464-473.
[16]Fehr, Nils-Henrik and Stevik, Kristin,1998, Persuasive Advertising and Product Differentiation [J], Southern Economic Journal,65(1),113-126
[17]Piga, C. Competition in a Duopoly with Sticky Price and Advertising[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization,2000,18,595-614
[18]任方旭,邵云飞,唐小我.寡头垄断市场下的广告竟争策略研究[[J]河南科学2002,20(4)320-323.
[19]张玉林等.企业间生产与广告投资分配的竞争分析[J].管理科学学报,2002,(8)：34—38.
[20]汪定伟,叶伟雄,容启亮.两强竞争市场中的企业广告策略分析.控制工程[J]2003年第1期[17]
[21]Prasad, A. and S. P. Sethi (a), Competitive Advertising under Uncertainty:A Stochastic Differential Game Approach [J] Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications,2004,12:1—19
[22]谭德庆等.广告和服务投入及价格选择的多维博弈分析[J].西南交通大学学报,2005.(2)：82—85.
[23]彭树宏,汪贤裕.纵向差异化下的双寡头信息性广告竞争模型[J].产业经济研究,2005(4)：24—29.
[24]左小德.双寡头垄断市场下的企业广告竞争分析[J].暨南大学学报(自然科学版),2006,27(1)
[25]宋铁波等.说服性广告投资博弈分析[J].软科学,2006,20(6)：44—51.
[26]齐洁,汪定伟.广告竞争模型的最优控制策略研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2007(1)
[27]钟艳.企业实施广告营销战略的博弈分析及对策[.J].华东经济管理,2007,21(5)
[28]Chintagunta P K, D Jain. A dynamic model of channel member strategies for
marketing expenditure[J].Marketing science,1992,3:117—134.
[29]Dant R P, Berger P D. Modeling cooperative advertising decisions in franchising[J] Journal of the Operational Research Society,1996;49:1120— 1136.
[30]Bergen M G, John. Understanding Cooperative Advertising Participation Rates in Conventional Channels [J].Journal of Marketing Research,1997; 46:357— 369.
[31]Staelin, Wierenga, Van. The Success of Marketing Management Support System. Marketing Science,1999, Vol.18 Issue 3, p196.
[32]Steffen Jorgensen,Simon Pierre Sigue,Georges Zaccour.Dynamic Cooperative Advertising in a Channel[J] Journal of Retailing,2000,76(1):71-92.
[33]Jorgensen S, Taboubi.Cooperative advertising in a marketing channel[J], Journal of optimization theory and applications,2001,110(1)145— 158.
[34]Z.M Huang,S.X.Li.Co-op Advertising Models in Manufacturer-Retailer Supply Chains:A Game Theory Approach[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2001,135(3):527-544.
[35]Zhimin Huang,Susan X.Li,Vijay Mahajan.An Analysis of Manufacturer-Retailer Supply Chain Coordination in Cooperative Advertising[J]. Decision Sciences,2002,33(3):469-494.
[36]S.Karray, G.Zaccour.Coop Advertising Programs Under Competitive Market Structures, Working Paper, GERAD and Marketing Department HEC Montreal Canada,2003,4.
[37]Prasad, A. and S. P. Sethi (a), Competitive Advertising under Uncertainty:A Stochastic Differential Game Approach [J] Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications,2004,12:1—19
[38]梁棵,余雁.供应链中生产商与代理商广告合作的博弈[J].系统工程理论方法运用,2004(12)：490—494.
[39]王磊等.零售商竞争下的垂直合作广告模型[J].中国管理科学,2005(4)：63—69.
[40]Jinfeng Yue,Jill Austin,Min-Chiang Wang. Coordination of Cooperative Advertising in a Two-Level Supply Chain When Manufacturer Offers Discount[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2006,168(1):65-85.
[41]傅强,曾顺秋.价格折扣下的纵向合作广告博弈分析[J].重庆大学学报(自然科学版),2007(9)
[42]徐峰,盛昭瀚,姚洪兴,陈国华.延迟决策对一类双寡头广告博弈模型的影响分析[J].管理科学学报,2007(10).
[43]傅强,曾顺秋.不确定需求下供应链合作广告与订货策略的博弈[J].系统工程理论与实践,2008(3)
[2]包一卉.基于分众营销的广告策略研究[D].广东工业大学硕士学位论文,2008
[3]Richard Normann and Rafael Ramirez.From Value Chain to Value Constellation: Designing Interactive Strategy[J].Harvard Business Review,1993,71(7/8).
[4]Sen K. Advertising fees in the franchised channel [M].New York:The Haworth Press,1994:83—102.
[5]Brennan L. How retailers are putting it all together [J]. Sales and Marketing Management,1988, May:62-66
[6]Rigg C.Hard Times Mean Growth for Co-op Ads [J].Advertising Age,1990, 61(47):24-24.
[7]Davis, R.A.Retailers Open Doors Wide for Co-op[J].Advertising Age,1994, 65(32):30-30.
[8]Top 100 Advertisers[J].Advertising Age,1999,16.
[9]Kenneth Roman, J.Maas.The New How to Advertise[M].New York:St.Martin's Press,1992.
[10]Das T K, Teng B S. A resource-based theory of strategic alliances [J]. Journal of Management,2000a,26(1):31-61
[11]Das T K. Risk types and inter-firm alliance structure [J].Journal of Management Studied,1996,33:827-844
[12]Crimmins E C. Cooperative advertising [M].Gene Wolf, New York,1984.
[13]Dorfman,R, Steiner P. Optimal advertising and optimal quality[J]. American Economic Review,1954,44:826-836.
[14]Olsder,Geert J. Some thoughts about simple advertising models as differential games and the structure of coalitions [M],Directions in Large-scale systems, Many-person optimization and decentralized control,1976,New York:Plenum Press
[15]Friedman, Advertising and oligopolistic equilibrium [J].The Bell Journal of Economics,1983.,14,464-473.
[16]Fehr, Nils-Henrik and Stevik, Kristin,1998, Persuasive Advertising and Product Differentiation [J], Southern Economic Journal,65(1),113-126
[17]Piga, C. Competition in a Duopoly with Sticky Price and Advertising[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization,2000,18,595-614
[18]任方旭,邵云飞,唐小我.寡头垄断市场下的广告竟争策略研究[[J]河南科学2002,20(4)320-323.
[19]张玉林等.企业间生产与广告投资分配的竞争分析[J].管理科学学报,2002,(8)：34—38.
[20]汪定伟,叶伟雄,容启亮.两强竞争市场中的企业广告策略分析.控制工程[J]2003年第1期[17]
[21]Prasad, A. and S. P. Sethi (a), Competitive Advertising under Uncertainty:A Stochastic Differential Game Approach [J] Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications,2004,12:1—19
[22]谭德庆等.广告和服务投入及价格选择的多维博弈分析[J].西南交通大学学报,2005.(2)：82—85.
[23]彭树宏,汪贤裕.纵向差异化下的双寡头信息性广告竞争模型[J].产业经济研究,2005(4)：24—29.
[24]左小德.双寡头垄断市场下的企业广告竞争分析[J].暨南大学学报(自然科学版),2006,27(1)
[25]宋铁波等.说服性广告投资博弈分析[J].软科学,2006,20(6)：44—51.
[26]齐洁,汪定伟.广告竞争模型的最优控制策略研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2007(1)
[27]钟艳.企业实施广告营销战略的博弈分析及对策[.J].华东经济管理,2007,21(5)
[28]Chintagunta P K, D Jain. A dynamic model of channel member strategies for
marketing expenditure[J].Marketing science,1992,3:117—134.
[29]Dant R P, Berger P D. Modeling cooperative advertising decisions in franchising[J] Journal of the Operational Research Society,1996;49:1120— 1136.
[30]Bergen M G, John. Understanding Cooperative Advertising Participation Rates in Conventional Channels [J].Journal of Marketing Research,1997; 46:357— 369.
[31]Staelin, Wierenga, Van. The Success of Marketing Management Support System. Marketing Science,1999, Vol.18 Issue 3, p196.
[32]Steffen Jorgensen,Simon Pierre Sigue,Georges Zaccour.Dynamic Cooperative Advertising in a Channel[J] Journal of Retailing,2000,76(1):71-92.
[33]Jorgensen S, Taboubi.Cooperative advertising in a marketing channel[J], Journal of optimization theory and applications,2001,110(1)145— 158.
[34]Z.M Huang,S.X.Li.Co-op Advertising Models in Manufacturer-Retailer Supply Chains:A Game Theory Approach[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2001,135(3):527-544.
[35]Zhimin Huang,Susan X.Li,Vijay Mahajan.An Analysis of Manufacturer-Retailer Supply Chain Coordination in Cooperative Advertising[J]. Decision Sciences,2002,33(3):469-494.
[36]S.Karray, G.Zaccour.Coop Advertising Programs Under Competitive Market Structures, Working Paper, GERAD and Marketing Department HEC Montreal Canada,2003,4.
[37]Prasad, A. and S. P. Sethi (a), Competitive Advertising under Uncertainty:A Stochastic Differential Game Approach [J] Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications,2004,12:1—19
[38]梁棵,余雁.供应链中生产商与代理商广告合作的博弈[J].系统工程理论方法运用,2004(12)：490—494.
[39]王磊等.零售商竞争下的垂直合作广告模型[J].中国管理科学,2005(4)：63—69.
[40]Jinfeng Yue,Jill Austin,Min-Chiang Wang. Coordination of Cooperative Advertising in a Two-Level Supply Chain When Manufacturer Offers Discount[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2006,168(1):65-85.
[41]傅强,曾顺秋.价格折扣下的纵向合作广告博弈分析[J].重庆大学学报(自然科学版),2007(9)
[42]徐峰,盛昭瀚,姚洪兴,陈国华.延迟决策对一类双寡头广告博弈模型的影响分析[J].管理科学学报,2007(10).
[43]傅强,曾顺秋.不确定需求下供应链合作广告与订货策略的博弈[J].系统工程理论与实践,2008(3)
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