运输服务采购多属性组合拍卖策略研究
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摘要
在当前竞争日益激烈的市场环境下,企业为了增强自身竞争力不得不把注意力转移到第三利润源泉-物流上,而运输成本又是目前影响企业物流成本的重要因素,占物流成本的35-50%左右,占商品价格的4-10%,从而,有效管理运输成本成为企业提高其竞争力不可缺少的一环。近年来,随着信息技术和电子商务的发展,人们广泛将组合拍卖应用于运输服务采购。组合拍卖的应用完整体现了运输路线规模经济和范围经济特性。目前运输服务采购组合拍卖都只考虑价格一个影响因素,而运输本身作为一种服务,其服务质量、交割期和信誉度等非价格因素与价格同等或更为重要。本文正是基于此,为了解决运输服务非价格因素而引入多属性拍卖理论,将其与组合拍卖理论相结合组成多属性组合拍卖,并对运输服务投标双方策略进行了讨论研究。这不但能解决现实运输服务采购投标问题,而且是对现有研究的补充和拓展,因此,本文的选题具有理论和现实意义。
论文主要由六章构成,主要研究工作如下：
(1)第一章主要介绍了本文的研究背景及研究意义。随后对组合拍卖及多属性拍卖的研究与应用进行了回顾和梳理。在此基础上,提出了本文的主要研究内容。
(2)第二章对本文研究内容相关理论进行了介绍：运输服务经济、拍卖、组合拍卖等理论。本章的介绍为本文的研究奠定了理论基础。
(3)第三章主要研究投标人的投标决策问题。本章根据本次拍卖开始前投标人现有路线状况的不同,将投标人决策问题分为以下两种情况：不存在已有路线和存在已有路线,首先分析该两种情况下投标人决策的异同点,然后分别针对其建立了运输服务采购多属性组合拍卖投标模型。通过该模型的分析、建立,得出的一些结论对投标人决策具有一定的指导意义。
(4)第四章研究的主要内容是拍卖人的竞胜标问题。无论投标人是否存在已有路线,在其完成投标后,拍卖人将面临同样的路线分配问题。区别于单属性组合拍卖,本章研究的重点是,拍卖人面对价格-非价格投标将如何得出各个标的的综合评分值,然后建立优化模型得出投标人最优分配方案。
(5)第五章算例分析。本章针对不存在已有路线和存在已有路线两种情况分别做了算例,以此来验证多属性组合拍卖在运输服务采购中的应用,并将其与单路线拍卖、单属性组合拍卖及现有组合拍卖处理多属性的方法进行了比较分析。
(6)第六章是结论和展望。本章总结了论文所做出的研究成果以及研究存在的局限性,同时提出了一些该领域今后的研究方向。
With the development of information technology and e-commerce, it is becoming more and more common that combinatorial auctions are applied to the allocation and procurement of the transportation service, in which the shippers enable carriers to make full use of economies of scale and scope. In the procurement of the transportation service, the researchers often only consider a single attribute-price, but the non-price attributes are equally or more important to price.
The primary goal of this thesis is to apply the multi-attribute auction to the procurement of transportation service, and conduct a study on the strategies both the bidders and shippers in multi-attribute combinatorial auctions for transportation service procurement. Accordingly, there is theoretical and practical significance for this paper.
The thesis consists of six chapters, the main research works are as follows:
(1) In chapter 1, our research motivation and significance are introduced. The related literatures of research on combinatorial auctions and multi-attribute auctions are classified and reviewed. Meanwhile, the researches which are closely related to our work are presented. Based on the previous studies mentioned above, existing problem which haven't been paid more attention to and contents of our work are presented.
(2) In chapter 2, some relate theories:economic of scope for transportation service, auction and combinatorial auctions are presented. The introductions of these theories in this chapter lay the theoretical foundation for the study of this paper.
(3) In chapter 3, the problem focused on is how to determine the optimal bidding packages and price for the bidders respectively in the absence and presence of pre-existing commitments. Under several general assumptions, we make the bid construction models and the formulas of bidding price for the above two circumstances.
(4) hi chapter 4, the carrier assignment problem (for the shipper) is discussed, In the transportation auction, when the carriers offer the tenders, the shipper should allocate their resources. We consider the strategies of the shipper, and construct the model of carrier assignment problem based on the two-dimensional on price and service quality. It is the key issue in the auction, which directly affects the profits of the shipper and the carriers and efficiency of the whole auction.
(5) In chapter 5, we present the numerical example respectively for the above two circumstances to test and verify the bid construction and carrier assignment models, and make some comparative analysis with the single-line auction and single-attribute combinatorial auction etc.
(6) In chapter 6, the contributions brought by the research and limitations of the thesis are presented. On the other hand, the future research directions in this field are suggested.
论文主要由六章构成,主要研究工作如下：
(1)第一章主要介绍了本文的研究背景及研究意义。随后对组合拍卖及多属性拍卖的研究与应用进行了回顾和梳理。在此基础上,提出了本文的主要研究内容。
(2)第二章对本文研究内容相关理论进行了介绍：运输服务经济、拍卖、组合拍卖等理论。本章的介绍为本文的研究奠定了理论基础。
(3)第三章主要研究投标人的投标决策问题。本章根据本次拍卖开始前投标人现有路线状况的不同,将投标人决策问题分为以下两种情况：不存在已有路线和存在已有路线,首先分析该两种情况下投标人决策的异同点,然后分别针对其建立了运输服务采购多属性组合拍卖投标模型。通过该模型的分析、建立,得出的一些结论对投标人决策具有一定的指导意义。
(4)第四章研究的主要内容是拍卖人的竞胜标问题。无论投标人是否存在已有路线,在其完成投标后,拍卖人将面临同样的路线分配问题。区别于单属性组合拍卖,本章研究的重点是,拍卖人面对价格-非价格投标将如何得出各个标的的综合评分值,然后建立优化模型得出投标人最优分配方案。
(5)第五章算例分析。本章针对不存在已有路线和存在已有路线两种情况分别做了算例,以此来验证多属性组合拍卖在运输服务采购中的应用,并将其与单路线拍卖、单属性组合拍卖及现有组合拍卖处理多属性的方法进行了比较分析。
(6)第六章是结论和展望。本章总结了论文所做出的研究成果以及研究存在的局限性,同时提出了一些该领域今后的研究方向。
With the development of information technology and e-commerce, it is becoming more and more common that combinatorial auctions are applied to the allocation and procurement of the transportation service, in which the shippers enable carriers to make full use of economies of scale and scope. In the procurement of the transportation service, the researchers often only consider a single attribute-price, but the non-price attributes are equally or more important to price.
The primary goal of this thesis is to apply the multi-attribute auction to the procurement of transportation service, and conduct a study on the strategies both the bidders and shippers in multi-attribute combinatorial auctions for transportation service procurement. Accordingly, there is theoretical and practical significance for this paper.
The thesis consists of six chapters, the main research works are as follows:
(1) In chapter 1, our research motivation and significance are introduced. The related literatures of research on combinatorial auctions and multi-attribute auctions are classified and reviewed. Meanwhile, the researches which are closely related to our work are presented. Based on the previous studies mentioned above, existing problem which haven't been paid more attention to and contents of our work are presented.
(2) In chapter 2, some relate theories:economic of scope for transportation service, auction and combinatorial auctions are presented. The introductions of these theories in this chapter lay the theoretical foundation for the study of this paper.
(3) In chapter 3, the problem focused on is how to determine the optimal bidding packages and price for the bidders respectively in the absence and presence of pre-existing commitments. Under several general assumptions, we make the bid construction models and the formulas of bidding price for the above two circumstances.
(4) hi chapter 4, the carrier assignment problem (for the shipper) is discussed, In the transportation auction, when the carriers offer the tenders, the shipper should allocate their resources. We consider the strategies of the shipper, and construct the model of carrier assignment problem based on the two-dimensional on price and service quality. It is the key issue in the auction, which directly affects the profits of the shipper and the carriers and efficiency of the whole auction.
(5) In chapter 5, we present the numerical example respectively for the above two circumstances to test and verify the bid construction and carrier assignment models, and make some comparative analysis with the single-line auction and single-attribute combinatorial auction etc.
(6) In chapter 6, the contributions brought by the research and limitations of the thesis are presented. On the other hand, the future research directions in this field are suggested.
引文
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[2]Ausubel, L.M., P. Cramton, and P. Milgrom (2006), "The clock-proxy auction:a practical combinatorial auction design", in Combinatorial Auctions, Cramton, P. Shoham, Y. Shoham and R. Steinberg (eds.), MIT Press,115-138.
[3]Ball, M., G. Donohue, and K. Hoffman (2006), "Auctions for the safe, efficient and equitable allocation of national airspace systems resources", In P. Shoham, and R. Steinberg, editors, Combinatorial Auctions, chapter 22. MIT Press,507-538.
[4]Bellosta, M.J., I. Brigui, S. Kornman, and D. Vanderpooten (2004), "A multi-criteria model for electronic auctions", ACM Symposium on Applied Computing,759-765.
[5]Bichler, M. (2002), "An experimental analysis of multi-attribute auction", Decision Support Systems (29),249-268.
[6]Bichler, M., and J. Kalagnanam (2002), "Bidding languages and winner determination in multi-attribute auctions", IBM Research Report, RC22478.
[7]Bichler, M., M. Kaukal, and A. Segev (1999), "Multi-attribute auctions for electronic procurement", presented at First IBM IAC Workshop on Internet Based Negotiation Technologies, Yorktown Heights, NY, USA.
[8]Bikhchandani, S., and J.M. Ostroy (2002), "The package assignment model", Journal Economic theory 107(2).
[9]Borndorfer, R., M. Grotschel, S. Lukac, K. Mitusch, T. Schlechte, S. Schultz, and A. Tanner (2005), "An auctioning approach to railway slot allocation", ZIB-Report, Germany,05-45.
[10]Brewer, P.J. and C.R. Plott (1996), "A binary conflict ascending price (BICAP) mechanism for decentralized allocation of the right to use railroad track", International Journal of Industrial Organization 14,857-886.
[11]Caplice, C. and Y. Sheffi (2003), "Optimization-based procurement for transportation services", Journal of Business Logistics 24(2),109-128.
[12]Chen, J., H. Huang, and R.J. Kauffman (2005), "A multi-attribute combinatorial auction approach to electronic procurement mechanism design", misrc. Umn.edu.
[13]Chen-Ritzo, C.H., T. Harrison, A.M. Kwasnica, and D. Thomas (2003), "Better, faster, cheaper:a multi-attribute supply chain auction mechanism", ISBM report No.10, Institute for the Study of Business Markets, The Pennsylvania State University,.1-26.
[14]Che, Y.K. (1993), "Design competition through multidimensional auctions", RAND Journal of Economics 24(4),668-680.
[15]Cohn LPIA, D. Beil, A. Sinha, S. AhmadBeygi, and R.L. Chen (2008), "Using implicit bidding to solve truckload procurement auctions", Proceedings of 2008 NSF Engineering Research and Innovation Conference, Knoxville.
[16]David E., R. Azoulay-Schwartz, and S. Kraus (2002a), "Protocols and strategies for automated multi-attribute auctions", AAMAS 02'conference, Bologna, Italy,77-85.
[17]David E., R. Azoulay-Schwartz, and S. Kraus (2002b), "An English auction protocol for multi-attribute items", Proceedings of AMEC-IVLNCS No.2531,52-68.
[18]David E., R. Azoulay-Schwartz, and S. Kraus (2003), "Bidders'strategy for multi-attribute sequential English auction with a deadline", AAMAS 03'conference, Melbourne, Australia,457-464.
[19]David E., R. Azoulay-Schwartz, and S. Kraus (2006), "Bidding in sealed-bid and English multi-attribute auctions", Decision Support Systems 42(2),527-556.
[20]De Smet, Y. (2007), "Multi-criteria auctions without full comparability of bids", European Journal of Operational Research 177(33),1433-1452.
[21]De Vries, S. and R. Vohra (2003), "Combinatorial auctions:a survey", INFORMS Journal on Computing 15(3),284-309.
[22]Elmaghraby, W. and P. Keskinocak (2002), "Combinatorial auctions in procurement", Technical Report, The Logistics Institute, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, 2002.School of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology.
[23]Fujishjima, Y., K. Leyton-Brown, and Y. Shoham (1999), "Taming the computational complexity of combinatorial auctions:optimal and approximate approaches", In International Joint Conference on Artificial intelligence, Proceedings,548-553.
[24]Guo, Y., A. Lim, B. Rodrigues, and Y. Zhu (2006), "Carrier assignment models in transportation procurement", Journal of Operational Research Society 57(12), 1472-1481.
[25]Jackson, C.(1976), "Technology for spectrum markets", PhD thesis, Department of Elecrical Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA.
[26]Kelly, F. and R. Steinberg (2000), "A combinatorial auction with multiple winners for universal service", Management Science 46(4),586-596.
[27]Klemperer, P. (1999), "Auction theory:a guide to the literature", Journal of Economic Surveys 13(3),227-286.
[28]Krishna, V., and R.W. Rosenthal (1996), "Simultaneous auctions with synergies", Games and Economic Behavior 17(1),1-31.
[29]Lai, K.K., S.L. Liu, and S.Y. Wang (2004), "A method for evaluating bids in the Chinese construction industry", International Journal of Project Management 2(3), 193-201.
[30]Ledyard, J.O., M. Olson, D. Porter, J. Swanson, and D. Torma (2002), "The first use of a combined value auction for transportation services", Interfaces 32(5),4-12.
[31]Lee, C-G, R.H. Kwon, and Z. Ma (2007), "A carrier's optimal bid generation problem in combinatorial auctions for transportation procurement", Transportation Research Part E 43,173-191.
[32]Levin, D. (2000), "A simple approach to easing threshold problems in simultaneous auctions with combined value bidding:contingent bids", Comment on DA 00-1075, "Comment sought on modifying the simultaneous multiple round auction design to allow combinatorial (package) bidding",31.
[33]Liu, S.L., K.K. Lai, and S.Y. Wang (2005), "A method for winner determination under sealed-bids auction based on a new measurement of the bid criteria", International Journal of Operations & Quantitative Management 11(3),229-242.
[34]Martinez-de-Albeniz, V. and D. Simchi-Levi (2007), "Competition in the supply option market", IESE Bussiness School, Working paper 718.
[35]Ma, Z. (2008), "Combinatorial auction for truckload transportation procurement", Ph.D. Department of Mechanical & Industrial Engineering, University of Toronto.
[36]McAfee, R.P. and J. McMillan (1987), "Auction and bidding", Journal of Economic Literature 25(2),99-738.
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