网络效应下的比特产品免费模式竞争研究
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摘要
随着人类社会从工业社会向信息社会的转变,比特产品在全球经济中所占有的比重越来越多。在比特经济中,免费模式逐渐成为了企业广泛采用的主流定价模式,但国内外的学术界对比特产品免费模式的研究却刚开始起步。因此,本文对免费模式的规律进行了初步探索。本文将免费模式定义为：厂商向不限定的消费者长期免费提供一种产品或服务,“购买”免费产品的消费者基本不用付出可以感知的价值损失(货币或非货币的),厂商通过相关收费产品的销售以“交叉补贴”获利的行为。免费模式之所以适用于比特产品,是由于比特产品的一些特点正符合采用免费模式的条件所造成的,例如比特产品广泛存在的网络效应。本文认为,免费模式的本质是交叉补贴,但与传统经济中的交叉补贴不同,在比特经济下,企业采用免费模式不属于掠夺性定价,其不但没有妨碍竞争,反而可以提高市场的经济效率。本文把免费模式分为四类,分别为增值产品模式、免费收费版本模式、价值再造模式和平台模式。本文随后对四种模式分别建立了垄断和寡头竞争模型,得出了各模式的采用条件,并给出了企业采用免费模式的竞争策略建议。
With the social evolution from industrial society to information society, bit-products play a more important role in the economy. In the bit-economy, the free pricing pattern has been widely used by enterprises as a mainstream pricing method. However, academic research on free pricing has just started. Therefore, we make a preliminary exploration on the free pricing pattern. In this paper, the free pricing pattern is defined as: the manufacturer provide a long-term product for free, and consumers don't need to pay any value of loss they can feel (monetary or non-monetary), then, the manufacturer make profit from related products to cross-subsidise free products. The reason why free pricing pattern is especially fit for the bit-product pricing is due to some special properties of bit-products, as the network effects which are widely existed in bit-products. This paper argues that the essence of free pricing pattern is cross-subsidization, but unlike the cross-subsidization in the traditional economy, the free pricing pattern in the bit-economy is not a predatory pricing. Adopting free pricing pattern not only does not discourage competition, but can improve the efficiency of the market. In this paper, the free pricing pattern is divided into four categories, which are called: pattern of value-added products, pattern of free and charged versions, pattern of value recreation and pattern of platform. The classify is followed by modeling and analysis. After that, we raise the adopting conditions of the four patterns, and present competing strategy recommendations for enterprises.
With the social evolution from industrial society to information society, bit-products play a more important role in the economy. In the bit-economy, the free pricing pattern has been widely used by enterprises as a mainstream pricing method. However, academic research on free pricing has just started. Therefore, we make a preliminary exploration on the free pricing pattern. In this paper, the free pricing pattern is defined as: the manufacturer provide a long-term product for free, and consumers don't need to pay any value of loss they can feel (monetary or non-monetary), then, the manufacturer make profit from related products to cross-subsidise free products. The reason why free pricing pattern is especially fit for the bit-product pricing is due to some special properties of bit-products, as the network effects which are widely existed in bit-products. This paper argues that the essence of free pricing pattern is cross-subsidization, but unlike the cross-subsidization in the traditional economy, the free pricing pattern in the bit-economy is not a predatory pricing. Adopting free pricing pattern not only does not discourage competition, but can improve the efficiency of the market. In this paper, the free pricing pattern is divided into four categories, which are called: pattern of value-added products, pattern of free and charged versions, pattern of value recreation and pattern of platform. The classify is followed by modeling and analysis. After that, we raise the adopting conditions of the four patterns, and present competing strategy recommendations for enterprises.
引文
[1]克里斯·安德森.免费：商业的未来[M].中信出版社,2009.
[2]马秋楠.比特经济学研究综述[D].北京邮电大学,2009.
[3]钱鲲鹏.比特产品市场形态研究[D].北京邮电大学,2010.
[4]江舫.比特产品定价研究[D].北京邮电大学,2010.
[5]Garrett Hardin. The Tragedy of the Commons [J]. Science,162:1243-1248.1968
[6]Michael Katz and Carl Shapiro. Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility [J]. The American Economic Review,1985, vol.75, No.3:424-440.
[7]Farrell.and Saloner. Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation [J], Rand Journal of Economics,1985, vol.16:70-83.
[8]Liebowitz. S. J., Margolis. S. E. Network Externality:An Uncommon Tragedy [J]. The Journal of Economic Perspectives,1994, Spring:133-150.
[9]夏皮罗,瓦里安.信息规则：网络经济的策略指导[M].中国人民大学出版社.2000.
[10]Michael Katz and Carl Shapiro. Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1986, vol.94:822-841.
[11]Economides. N. Network Externalities, Complementarities,and Invitations to Enter [J]. European Journal of Political Economy,1996, vol.12:211-233.
[12]Neil Gandal, Compatibility, Standardization,& Network Effects:Some Policy Implications [J]. Oxford Review of Economic Policy,2002.
[13]Rochet, J and J. Tirole. Platform competition in two-sided markets[J] Journal of European Economic Association,2003,1:990-10291.
[14]Rochet, J. and J.Tirole. Two-Sided Markets:An Overview [J]. Mimeo, IDEI University of Toulouse,2004a.
[15]Rochet, J and J. Tirole. Defining Two-Sided Markets[J]. Mimeo, IDEI University of Toulouse,2004b.
[16]Armstrong M. Competition in Two-Sided Markets[J]. Mimeo, University College, London, 2005.
[17]Evans. The Antitrust Economics of Multi-sided Platform Markets [J].Yale Journal on Regulation,2003,20:325-381.
[18]Simon P. Anderson, Jean J. Gabszewicz. The media and advertising:a tale of two-sided market [J].IDEI,2005.
[19]Nicholas Economides, Evangelos Katsamakas. Two-Sided Competition of Proprietary vs Open Source Technology Platforms and the Implications for the Software Industry[J].Management Science,2006,52(7):1057-1071.
[20]Hagiu. A., Optimal pricing and commitment in two-sided markets [EB/OL]. IDEI,2004.
[21]纪汉霖,管锡展.双边市场及其定价策略研究[J].外国经济与管理,Vol.28 No.3.2006.
[22]Sulin Ba, Dan Ke, Jan Stallaert, Zhongju Zhang. An Empirical Analysis of Virtual Goods Pricing Strategies in Virtual Worlds[J].2010-aisel.aisnet.org
[23]Belleflamme. Pricing Information Goods in the Presence of Copying [J]. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=333323,2002.
[24]Conner, K.R., Rumelt, R.P. Software piracy:An analysis of protection strategies [J]. Management Science 37,125-139.1991.
[25]Prasad, A., Mahajan, V. How many pirates should a software firm tolerate? An analysis of piracy protection and the diffusion of software [J]. International Journal of Research in Marketing 20,337-353.2003.
[26]Haruvy, E., Mahajan, V, Prasad, A. The effect of piracy on the market penetration of subscription software [J]. Journal of Business 77, S81-S107.2004.
[27]Liebowitz, S.J. Copying and indirect appropriability:photocopying of journals [J]. Journal of Political Economy 93,945-957.1985.
[28]Peitz, M., Waelbroeck, P. The effect of internet piracy on CD sales-cross section evidence[J]. Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues 1,71-79.2004
[29]Gopal, R., Bhattacharjee, S., Sanders, G.L. Do artists benefits from online music sharing [J]. Journal of Business 79,1503-1534.2006
[30]Raghu, T. S., Sinha, R., Vinze, A. and Burton, O.. Willingness to Pay in an Open Source Software Environment [J]. Information Systems Research.20(2),218-236,2006.
[31]Varian, H. Buying, Sharing and Renting Information Goods [J]. The Journal of Industrial Economics.48(4),473-488,2000.
[32]Chellappa, R. and Shivendu, S.. Managing Piracy:Pricing and Sampling Strategies for Digital Experience Goods in Vertical Segmented Markets [J]. Information Systems Research. 16(4),400-417,2005.
[33]Lee K. B.,S. Yu and S. J. Kim. Analysis of pricing strategies for e-business companies providing information goods and services [J]. Computers& Industrial Engineering,2006, Vol.51, No.1,72-78.
[34]Hsing Kenneth Cheng, Qian Candy Tang. Free trial or no free trial:Optimal software product design with network effects. European Journal of Operational Research 205,437-447,2010.
[35]陈渊.产品组合中的互补品定价策略[J].公关世界,1996.
[36]李太勇.网络效应与进入壁垒：以微软反垄断诉讼案为例[J].财经研究,2000.
[37]刘舸.基于网络效应的电信运营商IM市场竞争研究[D].北京邮电大学,2009.
[38]王刊良.数字化产品的经济特征、分类及其定价策略研究[J].中国软科学,2002.
[39]罗东.游戏业的“免费经济学”[EB/OL]. http://www.21cbh.com/HTML/2011-6-21/ONM DAwMDIONTgONg.html.
[40]曲创,阴红星.网络信息产品免费定价策略研究[J].山东社会科学,2010
[41]J. Tirole. Industrial organization [M]. Cambridge and London,1988
[42]Cournot. Augustin Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Weath [M]. Original Paris:L. Hachett. English translation by Nathaniel T. Bacon,1838:189-202.
[43]Bertrand, Joseph. Review [J]. Journal des Savants,1883,23(68):499-508.
[44]Heiman, A.; Zilberman, D,.& McWilliams B.. Demonstration and Money-back Guarantee: Market Mechanism to Reduce Purchasing Uncertainty. Journal of Business Research,54,1, 71-84,2001.
[45]刘滔,徐静.信息商品的拉姆齐定价机制初探[J].情报理论与实践,2006.
[46]吴绪亮.主导企业策略、市场动态性与反垄断法的经济分析[J].财经问题研究,2006.
[47]Wright. J.. Pricing in debit and credit card schemes [J]. Economics Letetsr,2003, 80:305-309.
[48]刘启,李明志.双边市场与平台理论研究综述[J].经济问题,2008.
[49]陈艳莹,原毅军.交叉补贴与网络中介的价格竞争[J].财经研究,2003.
[50]纪汉霖.双边市场定价策略研究[D].复旦大学,2006.
[51]罗伯特·J·多兰,赫尔曼·西蒙.定价圣经[M].中信出版社,2008.
[52]Fazio, R., Zanna,."On the predictive validity of attitudes:the roles of direct experience and confidence", Journal of Personality, Vol.46 pp.228-43,1978.
[53]Kempf, D.& Smith R.E.. Consumer Processing of Product Trial and the Influence of Prior Advertising:A Structural Modeling Approach. Journal of Marketing Research,35,325-338, 1988.
[54]Amir Heiman, Chezy Ofir. The Effects of Imbalanced Competition on Demonstration Strategies [J]. International Journal of Research in Marketing,2010.
[55]陈雯雯.虚拟货币研究——基于注意力本位的新通货理论[J].商场现代化,2009.
[56]Bernard Caillaud, Bruno Jullien. Chicken & egg:Competition among intermediation service providers [J]. Journal of Economics. Vol.34:309-328,2003.
[57]Economides. Network Economics with Application to Finance [J]. Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments,1993.
[58]吴泗宗,蒋海华.对网络外部性的经济学分析[J].同济大学学报(社会科学版),2002.
[59]车雯雯.电子商务C2C平台定价模型及盈利影响因素研究[D].上海交通大学,2010.
[60]陈艳莹,原毅军.交叉补贴与网络中介的价格竞争[J].财经研究,2003.
[61]金雪涛.网络广告定价标准的改进研究[J].江西财经大学学报,2004.
[2]马秋楠.比特经济学研究综述[D].北京邮电大学,2009.
[3]钱鲲鹏.比特产品市场形态研究[D].北京邮电大学,2010.
[4]江舫.比特产品定价研究[D].北京邮电大学,2010.
[5]Garrett Hardin. The Tragedy of the Commons [J]. Science,162:1243-1248.1968
[6]Michael Katz and Carl Shapiro. Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility [J]. The American Economic Review,1985, vol.75, No.3:424-440.
[7]Farrell.and Saloner. Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation [J], Rand Journal of Economics,1985, vol.16:70-83.
[8]Liebowitz. S. J., Margolis. S. E. Network Externality:An Uncommon Tragedy [J]. The Journal of Economic Perspectives,1994, Spring:133-150.
[9]夏皮罗,瓦里安.信息规则：网络经济的策略指导[M].中国人民大学出版社.2000.
[10]Michael Katz and Carl Shapiro. Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1986, vol.94:822-841.
[11]Economides. N. Network Externalities, Complementarities,and Invitations to Enter [J]. European Journal of Political Economy,1996, vol.12:211-233.
[12]Neil Gandal, Compatibility, Standardization,& Network Effects:Some Policy Implications [J]. Oxford Review of Economic Policy,2002.
[13]Rochet, J and J. Tirole. Platform competition in two-sided markets[J] Journal of European Economic Association,2003,1:990-10291.
[14]Rochet, J. and J.Tirole. Two-Sided Markets:An Overview [J]. Mimeo, IDEI University of Toulouse,2004a.
[15]Rochet, J and J. Tirole. Defining Two-Sided Markets[J]. Mimeo, IDEI University of Toulouse,2004b.
[16]Armstrong M. Competition in Two-Sided Markets[J]. Mimeo, University College, London, 2005.
[17]Evans. The Antitrust Economics of Multi-sided Platform Markets [J].Yale Journal on Regulation,2003,20:325-381.
[18]Simon P. Anderson, Jean J. Gabszewicz. The media and advertising:a tale of two-sided market [J].IDEI,2005.
[19]Nicholas Economides, Evangelos Katsamakas. Two-Sided Competition of Proprietary vs Open Source Technology Platforms and the Implications for the Software Industry[J].Management Science,2006,52(7):1057-1071.
[20]Hagiu. A., Optimal pricing and commitment in two-sided markets [EB/OL]. IDEI,2004.
[21]纪汉霖,管锡展.双边市场及其定价策略研究[J].外国经济与管理,Vol.28 No.3.2006.
[22]Sulin Ba, Dan Ke, Jan Stallaert, Zhongju Zhang. An Empirical Analysis of Virtual Goods Pricing Strategies in Virtual Worlds[J].2010-aisel.aisnet.org
[23]Belleflamme. Pricing Information Goods in the Presence of Copying [J]. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=333323,2002.
[24]Conner, K.R., Rumelt, R.P. Software piracy:An analysis of protection strategies [J]. Management Science 37,125-139.1991.
[25]Prasad, A., Mahajan, V. How many pirates should a software firm tolerate? An analysis of piracy protection and the diffusion of software [J]. International Journal of Research in Marketing 20,337-353.2003.
[26]Haruvy, E., Mahajan, V, Prasad, A. The effect of piracy on the market penetration of subscription software [J]. Journal of Business 77, S81-S107.2004.
[27]Liebowitz, S.J. Copying and indirect appropriability:photocopying of journals [J]. Journal of Political Economy 93,945-957.1985.
[28]Peitz, M., Waelbroeck, P. The effect of internet piracy on CD sales-cross section evidence[J]. Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues 1,71-79.2004
[29]Gopal, R., Bhattacharjee, S., Sanders, G.L. Do artists benefits from online music sharing [J]. Journal of Business 79,1503-1534.2006
[30]Raghu, T. S., Sinha, R., Vinze, A. and Burton, O.. Willingness to Pay in an Open Source Software Environment [J]. Information Systems Research.20(2),218-236,2006.
[31]Varian, H. Buying, Sharing and Renting Information Goods [J]. The Journal of Industrial Economics.48(4),473-488,2000.
[32]Chellappa, R. and Shivendu, S.. Managing Piracy:Pricing and Sampling Strategies for Digital Experience Goods in Vertical Segmented Markets [J]. Information Systems Research. 16(4),400-417,2005.
[33]Lee K. B.,S. Yu and S. J. Kim. Analysis of pricing strategies for e-business companies providing information goods and services [J]. Computers& Industrial Engineering,2006, Vol.51, No.1,72-78.
[34]Hsing Kenneth Cheng, Qian Candy Tang. Free trial or no free trial:Optimal software product design with network effects. European Journal of Operational Research 205,437-447,2010.
[35]陈渊.产品组合中的互补品定价策略[J].公关世界,1996.
[36]李太勇.网络效应与进入壁垒：以微软反垄断诉讼案为例[J].财经研究,2000.
[37]刘舸.基于网络效应的电信运营商IM市场竞争研究[D].北京邮电大学,2009.
[38]王刊良.数字化产品的经济特征、分类及其定价策略研究[J].中国软科学,2002.
[39]罗东.游戏业的“免费经济学”[EB/OL]. http://www.21cbh.com/HTML/2011-6-21/ONM DAwMDIONTgONg.html.
[40]曲创,阴红星.网络信息产品免费定价策略研究[J].山东社会科学,2010
[41]J. Tirole. Industrial organization [M]. Cambridge and London,1988
[42]Cournot. Augustin Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Weath [M]. Original Paris:L. Hachett. English translation by Nathaniel T. Bacon,1838:189-202.
[43]Bertrand, Joseph. Review [J]. Journal des Savants,1883,23(68):499-508.
[44]Heiman, A.; Zilberman, D,.& McWilliams B.. Demonstration and Money-back Guarantee: Market Mechanism to Reduce Purchasing Uncertainty. Journal of Business Research,54,1, 71-84,2001.
[45]刘滔,徐静.信息商品的拉姆齐定价机制初探[J].情报理论与实践,2006.
[46]吴绪亮.主导企业策略、市场动态性与反垄断法的经济分析[J].财经问题研究,2006.
[47]Wright. J.. Pricing in debit and credit card schemes [J]. Economics Letetsr,2003, 80:305-309.
[48]刘启,李明志.双边市场与平台理论研究综述[J].经济问题,2008.
[49]陈艳莹,原毅军.交叉补贴与网络中介的价格竞争[J].财经研究,2003.
[50]纪汉霖.双边市场定价策略研究[D].复旦大学,2006.
[51]罗伯特·J·多兰,赫尔曼·西蒙.定价圣经[M].中信出版社,2008.
[52]Fazio, R., Zanna,."On the predictive validity of attitudes:the roles of direct experience and confidence", Journal of Personality, Vol.46 pp.228-43,1978.
[53]Kempf, D.& Smith R.E.. Consumer Processing of Product Trial and the Influence of Prior Advertising:A Structural Modeling Approach. Journal of Marketing Research,35,325-338, 1988.
[54]Amir Heiman, Chezy Ofir. The Effects of Imbalanced Competition on Demonstration Strategies [J]. International Journal of Research in Marketing,2010.
[55]陈雯雯.虚拟货币研究——基于注意力本位的新通货理论[J].商场现代化,2009.
[56]Bernard Caillaud, Bruno Jullien. Chicken & egg:Competition among intermediation service providers [J]. Journal of Economics. Vol.34:309-328,2003.
[57]Economides. Network Economics with Application to Finance [J]. Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments,1993.
[58]吴泗宗,蒋海华.对网络外部性的经济学分析[J].同济大学学报(社会科学版),2002.
[59]车雯雯.电子商务C2C平台定价模型及盈利影响因素研究[D].上海交通大学,2010.
[60]陈艳莹,原毅军.交叉补贴与网络中介的价格竞争[J].财经研究,2003.
[61]金雪涛.网络广告定价标准的改进研究[J].江西财经大学学报,2004.
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