竞争市场互补品两部定价下的场内垄断及规制研究
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摘要
2006年底的开瓶费争端经过媒体报道,引起了社会各界的广泛争论。在争论中,开瓶费问题并未在理论上得到很合理的解释,而是在“消费者权益”和“经营者权益”的角逐和碰撞中,陷入了一种“公说公有理,婆说婆有理”的尴尬境地。开瓶费争端中的一个突出问题是:饭店禁止消费者自带酒水进店消费,否则收取开瓶费的行为到底是不是一种垄断行为?对这种行为的垄断性质的判断符合消费者的感知,但似乎与饭店的竞争性行业特征不相符,消费者这种垄断行为的感知和饭店行业是竞争性行业的事实之间的矛盾和冲突,可能意味着在事实背后存在着尚不被人们了解的经济规律。通过进一步的观察,我们还可以看到,类似的定价现象在现实生活和理论文献中比比皆是。所有这些现象引发了本文从互补品两部定价角度研究和解释这些现象的学术兴趣。
无论是从两部定价理论研究的角度来看,还是从互补品定价理论研究的角度来看,涉及互补品的两部定价现象都没有从理论上得到合理的解释。在两部定价文献中被数次提及的产品互补关系,实际上是一个重要的、但又被忽视的定价影响因素。本文从产品互补关系入手,从消费者对互补品的相对重要性评价差异行为特征和互补品销售中的顾客锁定效应两个维度解释了竞争市场上互补品两部定价法的适用性,并提出在顾客锁定下厂商具备了一定程度的市场势力,这种市场势力可能导致厂商在与消费者交易关系内部的场内垄断行为的发生。这种理论架构可以较好地解释厂商实施两部定价的原因,以及竞争市场上的垄断行为的存在。
论文共分为8章,具体内容如下:
第0章绪论。主要对问题的提出及意义、研究的主要内容和逻辑分析框架、研究方法、创新点与不足之处进行了阐述。
第1章两部定价理论的发展。本章对两部定价理论的发展进行了梳理,指出在两部定价文献中实质上存在着单产品两部定价问题和两产品两部定价两种情形,并强调指出在两部定价理论研究中,对于两产品两部定价问题的忽视。
第2章竞争市场两部定价理论的提出及其原理分析框架。本章比较了两产品两部定价在不同市场结构下的两种情形,区分了垄断市场条件下搭配销售中的两部定价和竞争市场条件下的互补品两部定价这两种类型,指出互补品关系是厂商在缺乏垄断势力的条件下,实施两产品两部定价的必要条件,竞争市场两产品两部定价的实质是互补品两部定价,并提出从消费者行为基础和顾客锁定效应两个维度建立竞争市场互补品两部定价原理的分析框架。
第3章互补品两部定价的消费者行为基础。本章基于文献研究,提出了消费者的互补品购买行为特征——互补品相对重要性评价差异,并尝试提出了互补品相对重要性的成因,指出了互补品相对重要性对消费者和厂商的意义和影响。
第4章互补品两部定价对消费者的互补品相对重要性评价差异行为特征的适应性分析。本章在提出消费者的互补品相对重要性评价差异行为特征的基础上,提出了消费者感知福利概念,基于这一概念建立了互补品两部定价原理分析模型,从对消费者购买行为适应性的角度,解释了竞争市场两部定价的典型定价特征,进而提出,消费者对互补品相对重要性评价差异这一购买行为特征,是竞争市场两部定价的消费者行为基础。之后对这种典型定价特征的作用和两部定价法的适用情形进行了分析。这一分析是对第5章厂商实施顾客锁定策略进行分析的一个铺垫,在第4章末尾做这样一个分析,保持了分析思路的连贯性。
第5章顾客锁定策略。本章在回顾顾客锁定文献的基础上,归纳了顾客锁定的成因、转移成本的类型和顾客锁定的类型,提出了互补品销售中,消费者在购买产品1之后,由于不得不从同一厂商继续购买产品2而带来的顾客锁定情形,指出在这种顾客锁定情形下的厂商定价策略实际上是一种典型的互补品两部定价,并描述了这种典型互补品两部定价策略的实现途径。
第6章场内垄断及其规制。本章讨论了顾客锁定和垄断的关系,提出了场内垄断的概念、成因、特征及其理论和实践意义,指出在缺乏规制的情况下,这种潜在的垄断势力会转化成厂商的现实垄断行为,并尝试提出了对这种场内垄断行为的规制措施。
第7章案例部分。在第7章中,本文列举了两个案例,对互补品两部定价和场内垄断理论分析结果进行了印证。案例一是竞争市场互补品两部定价的典型案例——富于争议的酒店开瓶费问题,以酒店对菜肴和酒水的两部定价,以及在这一定价下,酒店为维护产品2——酒水带来的高利润而禁止消费者自带酒水进店消费,从而引起社会广泛争议、招致“垄断行为”批评的整个案例细节,印证了竞争市场上互补品两部定价下场内垄断的存在;案例二则介绍了吉列公司对剃须刀架和刀片的经典定价案例,以及由此产生的“剃刀加刀片模式”,并简要介绍了国内打印机市场的互补品两部定价案例。
论文提出以下创新点:
1.提出研究“竞争市场互补品两部定价”的命题基于两产品两部定价理论的提出,本文提出了“竞争市场互补品两部定价”这一命题。
尽管没有学者专门说明,但在两部定价理论的研究中,学者们主要对单产品两部定价进行了研究。其中,虽然也有一些研究把涉及两种产品的类似定价也称为两部定价,但这些研究并没有明确提出两产品两部定价理论的存在。本文指出了两产品两部定价在研究工具和研究方法上与单产品两部定价存在的区别,提出了两产品两部定价这一概念,并进一步通过与垄断厂商搭配销售下的两部定价相比较,提出竞争市场上两产品两部定价的实质就是互补品两部定价。这一认识对于解释竞争市场上存在的场内垄断行为具有重要意义,这也是本文在两产品两部定价的基础上,进而提出“竞争市场互补品两部定价”这一命题的原因。
2.基于消费者对互补品相对重要性评价差异,提出消费者感知福利概念,构建数学模型解释了互补品两部定价对消费者购买行为的适应性Manjit S. Yadav(1994)和别传武、陈丽珍(2001)间接或直接地提出了消费者的互补品相对重要性评价差异这一行为特征。在此基础上,本文尝试讨论了互补品相对重要性评价差异的产生原因,提出了消费者在互补品组合的购买决策中的决策依据——感知福利(以消费者剩余表示消费者福利水平),并基于感知福利概念,构建了互补品两部定价原理分析模型,解释了互补品两部定价对消费者行为的适应性。
3.定义并系统分析了互补品销售中的顾客锁定和场内垄断问题
顾客锁定理论文献中提到了在互补资产或互补品销售中的顾客锁定现象,但没有对顾客锁定的形成进行进一步的分析。本文认为,产品之间的互补品关系并不能天然地促成顾客锁定的形成,厂商之所以能够基于互补品关系对顾客进行锁定,是因为在互补品关系的基础上,厂商实施了一些差异化的产品设计或强制性的要求,使得不同厂商之间的产品2无法兼容,从而消费者在购买产品1之后,只能从同一厂商继续购买产品2,因而导致顾客锁定。基于文献,本文指出在缺乏规制和存在厂商机会主义行为的条件下,顾客锁定下的潜在垄断势力能够转化为厂商的实质垄断行为。这种垄断行为发生在消费者与厂商之间关于互补品组合的连续交易过程中,本文称之为场内垄断。场内垄断具有较高的隐蔽性,不易从理论上进行识别,而这也正是在开瓶费问题中,争论双方在饭店收取开瓶费是否是垄断行为这一问题上争执不下的关键原因。
4.从对消费者行为的适应性和厂商的顾客锁定策略两个维度出发,构建了互补品两部定价原理的理论分析框架
竞争市场的厂商互补品两部定价的典型定价特征是,厂商在对互补品组合的两部定价中,降低产品1的价格,而提高产品2的价格。从对消费者购买行为特征的适应性和厂商的顾客锁定策略两个维度来看,互补品两部定价一方面适应了消费者的购买行为,使消费者的感知福利水平提高,促使更多消费者参与消费,并促进了顾客锁定的形成;另一方面基于顾客锁定效应,实现对这些消费者的锁定,并支持产品2较高定价的实现。这样就解释了厂商的互补品两部定价的原理。
从上述两个维度对互补品两部定价原理的理论解释,构成了论文的主体框架。
5.论文提出了规制场内垄断行为的政策建议
论文指出,从国内外反垄断规制案例来看,各国政府反垄断部门一般都能够注意得到在捆绑销售和搭配销售中存在的显性垄断现象,并根据反垄断法规进行规制,但却并没有关注到场内垄断这种隐蔽的垄断行为。
场内垄断的形成需要一些因素共同促成,但其中最主要的因素还是顾客锁定的形成。在顾客锁定条件下,厂商具有了一定垄断势力,它和消费者之间的讨价还价能力以及在交易中的地位并不均衡,消费者在双方的关系中处于弱势,因此对场内垄断的规制原则,就是引入制度干预,使厂商和消费者之间的讨价还价能力和交易地位趋于对等和均衡。
当然,本文还存在一些不足之处,例如,从研究方法上来看,本文对于两产品两部定价理论的研究,以理论推演为主要方法,在理论推演中使用了归纳和演绎、比较研究等方法。而前两者的运用虽然在逻辑上没有缺陷,但未经实证结果的验证,就难免有不严密之处。例如,本文把Yadav(1994)的互补品捆绑估值的实证研究结果解读为,消费者对互补品相对重要性评价的差异来自于互补品关系本身。虽然理论推理过程尽量做到逻辑严密,但毕竟没有实证的支持,这一缺陷使得本文通过对Yadav(1994)的研究结论进行解读,得到消费者对互补品相对重要性评价差异这一结论,显得不是足够严谨。
The controversy on the corkage issue reported on TV and in the newspaper is widely in dispute in nowadays society. Throughout the dispute,the corkage problem is not theoretically reasonably explained yet,and it is an embarrassing result that each side has their reasons for or against charging the corkage but can not persuade the other side in the collision of the viewpoint of consumer’s rights with that of the firm’s rights. A prominent question in the corkage controversy is, is it a sort of monopoly behavior that the restaurant charges the consumers for taking wines into the restaurant for consumption? The viewpoint of monopoly behavior complys with the consumers’perception,while does not seem to correspond to the competitive feature of the restaurant industry,which may imply an unknown economic rule behind the facts. Further observations indicate that there are similar pricings in the theoretic literatures and in our real life. All these phenomena induce my academic interest in the explanation of such pricing phenomena in the angle of two-part pricing of complementary products.
No matter in the angle of two-part pricing theory research,or in the angle of pricing theory of complementary products,the two-part pricing of complementary products is not reasonably explained theoretically. The complemetarity mentioned for times in the two-part pricing literatures is literally an important but neglected influencing factor. This dissertation explains the adaptivity of two-part pricing of complementary products in competitive markets in such two dimentions as the consumers’behavior feature of differentiated relevant importance evaluation of complementary products and the customer lock-in effect,and puts forward that the potential monopoly power under the customer lock-in condition may lead to the inside monopoly behavior in the actually continuous transaction relation between the firm and the consumers. This theory structure can better explain the reason why the firm applys the two-part pricing and the existence of monopoly behavior in competitive markets.
The dissertation includes eight chapters as follows:
Chapter 0 Introduction. This chapter deals with the putting forward and the meaning of the issue、main content of the dissertation、logic framework and research method、the innovation and the insufficiencies.
Chapter 1 The development of two-part pricing theory. This chapter hackles the development of two-part pricing theory,points out the substantial existence of single product two-part pricing and two-product two-part pricing in the literatures, and emphasizes the neglected two-product two-part pricing.
Chapter 2 Putting forward the two-product two-part pricing theory in competitive market and the analysis framework of principle. This chapter compares and distinguishes the two-part pricing in tying of monopoly firm with that of complementary product in competitive markets , points out the complementarity is the indispensible eliment to practice two-product two-part pricing without monopoly power,and the nature of two-product two-part pricing in competitive market is two-part pricing of complementary products,at last this chapter puts forward to establish the analysis framework of principle of two-part pricing of complementary products in two dimensions as the consumer behavior and the customer lock-in effect.
Chapter 3 The consumer behavior basis of two-part pricing of complementary products. This chapter puts forward the consumers’purchasing behavior feature—the differentiated relative importance evaluation of complementary products based on the literature research, tries to find the cause of the behavior feature,and tries to point out the meaning of the behavior feature and the according effect on the consumer and the firm.
Chapter 4 The adaptability analysis of the two-part pricing of complementary products to the consumers’behavior feature of differentiated relavant importance evaluation. Based on the consumers’behavior feature of differentiated relavant importance evaluation,this chapter puts forward the concept of perceived welfare,and grounded on the concept constructs the principle analysis model of two-part pricing of complementary products,explains the typical pricing characteristic of two-part pricing in the competitive market,and advances that the purchasing behavior feature of the consumer mentioned above is the consumer behavior basis of two-part pricing in the competitive market. After that, this chapter analyses the effect of the typical pricing feature of two-part pricing and the applicability of two-part pricing. This analysis paves the way for the analysis of customer lock-in effect in chapter 5.
Chapter 5 Customer lock-in strategy. Based on reviewing the literatures on customer lock-in theory,this chapter sums up the cause of formation in customer lock-in、the type of switching costs and the type of customer lock-in,maintains that when consumers buy product 1,they have to continue to buy product 2 from the same manufacturer , which leads to customer lock-in in the sale of complementary product,and points out the pricing strategy in this situation is actually a typical kind of two-part pricing of complementary products,in the end this chapter depicts the way that this typical two-part pricing of complementary products is carried out.
Chapter 6 Inside monopoly and the regulation. This chapter discusses the relation between customer lock-in and monopoly,puts forward the concept、causes of formation、feature、theoretic and practical meaning of inside monopoly,argues that in the absence of regulation,the potential monopoly power will lead to the real monopoly behavior,and attempts to advance the corresponding regulation measures to the inside monopoly behavior.
Chapter 7 The cases. In chapter 7,two cases are listed to confrm the two-part pricing and inside monopoly theory. Case one is the typical case of two-part pricing of complementary products in competitive market—the corkage problem that abounds in dispute. With this case,the chapter confirms the existence of inside monopoly under two-part pricing of complementary products in competitive markets; Case two deals with the classic pricing of razor and razor blades by Gillette Company,and also“the mode of razor plus razor blades”. In the end,this chapter introduces in brief the two-part pricing of complementary products of printer and ink box in domestic market.
There are such innovative viewpoints as follows in the dissertation: 1.The dissertation puts forward the proposition of“two-part pricing of complementary products in competitive market”.
Based on the two-product two-part pricing theory,the dissertation advances the proposition of“two-part pricing of complementary products in competitive market”.
Although it is not specially mentioned,the two-part pricing theory mainly focuses on the single-product two-part pricing problems. Despite the fact that some researches take similar pricing that relates to two products as two-part pricing,the two-product two-part pricing theory is not yet definitely developed. The dissertation points out the differences in research instrument and research method between the two kind of two-part pricing,then brings forward the concept of two-product two-part pricing theory,and through the comparison with the two-part pricing in tying of monopoly firm,further maintains that the nature of two-product two-part pricing in competitive market is that of complementary products. This viewpoint helps explain the inside monopoly in the competitive market of complementary products,which is also the reason why the dissertation puts forwand the proposition of“two-part pricing of complementary products in competitive market”.
2.Based on the consumers’behavior feature of differentiated relavant importance evaluation to complementary products,the dissertation advances the concept of perceived welfare,and constructs theoretic model to explain the adaptability of the two-part pricing of complementary products to the consumers’behavior feature of differentiated relavant importance evaluation
Based on relevant literatures,this dissertation tries to explain the reasons why the the consumers’differentiated relavant importance evaluation comes into being,and brings forward the concept of perceived welfare to depict the way the consumers draw their decisions in the purchase decision of complementary products,then constructs the theoretic model to analyse the pricing principle of two-part pricing of complementary products in competitive markets,which explains the adaptability of the two-part pricing of complementary products to the consumers’behavior feature.
3.Definition and systematic analysis of customer lock-in effect and inside monopoly in the marketing of complementary products
The theoretic literatures on customer lock-in mentioned the customer lock-in phenomena in marketing of complementary products or assets,while did not further analyse the detailed reason why customer lock-in comes into being. The dissertation argues that complementarity can not naturally cause the formation of customer lock-in,the reason why the firms can exert customer lock-in on the consumers based on the complementarity is that,based on the complementarity, the firms use some differentiated product design or compulsory request,which make product 2 of different firms can not be compatible with each other,so that after the purchase of product 1 form specific firm,the consumers can not buy product 2 from other firms,which finally leads to customer lock-in.
Based on the relevant literatures,this dissertation points out that with the firm’s opportunism and the lack of regulation,the potential monopoly power under customer lock-in can be transformed into substantial monopoly behavior. As such monopoly behavior takes place in the continuous transaction relation about the complementary products between the firm and the consumers,it is defined as inside monopoly. The inside monopoly is highly implicit so that we can not recognize it theoretically,which is the key factor that brought about the fierce dispute on whether there is monopoly behavior in the charge of corkage by the restarant.
4. The construction of theoretic analysis framework of two-part pricing of complementary products in two dimentions
The typical pricing feature of two-part pricing of complementary products in competitive markets is,the firm sets the pricing of product 1 at a relative low level,while set the pricing of product 2 at a relative high level. In such two dimentions as the adaptivity of two-part pricing to the cosumers’behavior feature and the customer lock-in effect , on the one hand , two-part pricing of complementary products is adapted to the consumers’purchase behavior,making the consumers’perceived welfare going up,stimulating the consumers to take part in the purchase of product 1,which finally urges the formation of customer lock-in; on the other hand,the customer lock-in effect helps the firm lock in the consumers and realize the relative high price of product 2. In this way,the dissertation explains the principle of two-part pricing of complementary products in competitive markets.
5. Regulation suggestion of inside monopoly
The dissertation points out that according to the domestic and overseas anti-monomoly cases,the anti-monopoly government sectors can notice the explicit monopoly in bundling and tying and take corresoponding measures to regulate it,but they fail to pay attention to the implicit monopoly of inside monopoly.
The formation of inside monopoly is owing to several factors,among which the most important factor is customer lock-in. Under customer lock-in,the firm has some monopoly power,which mades the inbalance in bargaining power and position of the firm and the consumers in the transaction,and the consumers are in the weaker position in the mutual transaction relation,therefore,the regulation rule is to introduce institutional intervene in the relation to make both sides equal in their bargaining power and transaction status.
There is also some defects in the dissertation,for example,as to research method in two-product two-part pring research,the dissertation mainly uses theoretic reasoning method,including deductive method、inductive method and comparative method. Although thereis no defects in the use of the former two methods,the research can not be rigorous enough with the lack of empirical research. For example,the dissertation interprets the empirical research result of Yadav(1994)as such that the differentiated evaluation of relative importance of complementary products by consumers derives from complementarity itself. Although the dissertation tries to handle the theoretic reasoning with rigorous logic,the lack of empirical research makes the interpretation above is not so religious.
无论是从两部定价理论研究的角度来看,还是从互补品定价理论研究的角度来看,涉及互补品的两部定价现象都没有从理论上得到合理的解释。在两部定价文献中被数次提及的产品互补关系,实际上是一个重要的、但又被忽视的定价影响因素。本文从产品互补关系入手,从消费者对互补品的相对重要性评价差异行为特征和互补品销售中的顾客锁定效应两个维度解释了竞争市场上互补品两部定价法的适用性,并提出在顾客锁定下厂商具备了一定程度的市场势力,这种市场势力可能导致厂商在与消费者交易关系内部的场内垄断行为的发生。这种理论架构可以较好地解释厂商实施两部定价的原因,以及竞争市场上的垄断行为的存在。
论文共分为8章,具体内容如下:
第0章绪论。主要对问题的提出及意义、研究的主要内容和逻辑分析框架、研究方法、创新点与不足之处进行了阐述。
第1章两部定价理论的发展。本章对两部定价理论的发展进行了梳理,指出在两部定价文献中实质上存在着单产品两部定价问题和两产品两部定价两种情形,并强调指出在两部定价理论研究中,对于两产品两部定价问题的忽视。
第2章竞争市场两部定价理论的提出及其原理分析框架。本章比较了两产品两部定价在不同市场结构下的两种情形,区分了垄断市场条件下搭配销售中的两部定价和竞争市场条件下的互补品两部定价这两种类型,指出互补品关系是厂商在缺乏垄断势力的条件下,实施两产品两部定价的必要条件,竞争市场两产品两部定价的实质是互补品两部定价,并提出从消费者行为基础和顾客锁定效应两个维度建立竞争市场互补品两部定价原理的分析框架。
第3章互补品两部定价的消费者行为基础。本章基于文献研究,提出了消费者的互补品购买行为特征——互补品相对重要性评价差异,并尝试提出了互补品相对重要性的成因,指出了互补品相对重要性对消费者和厂商的意义和影响。
第4章互补品两部定价对消费者的互补品相对重要性评价差异行为特征的适应性分析。本章在提出消费者的互补品相对重要性评价差异行为特征的基础上,提出了消费者感知福利概念,基于这一概念建立了互补品两部定价原理分析模型,从对消费者购买行为适应性的角度,解释了竞争市场两部定价的典型定价特征,进而提出,消费者对互补品相对重要性评价差异这一购买行为特征,是竞争市场两部定价的消费者行为基础。之后对这种典型定价特征的作用和两部定价法的适用情形进行了分析。这一分析是对第5章厂商实施顾客锁定策略进行分析的一个铺垫,在第4章末尾做这样一个分析,保持了分析思路的连贯性。
第5章顾客锁定策略。本章在回顾顾客锁定文献的基础上,归纳了顾客锁定的成因、转移成本的类型和顾客锁定的类型,提出了互补品销售中,消费者在购买产品1之后,由于不得不从同一厂商继续购买产品2而带来的顾客锁定情形,指出在这种顾客锁定情形下的厂商定价策略实际上是一种典型的互补品两部定价,并描述了这种典型互补品两部定价策略的实现途径。
第6章场内垄断及其规制。本章讨论了顾客锁定和垄断的关系,提出了场内垄断的概念、成因、特征及其理论和实践意义,指出在缺乏规制的情况下,这种潜在的垄断势力会转化成厂商的现实垄断行为,并尝试提出了对这种场内垄断行为的规制措施。
第7章案例部分。在第7章中,本文列举了两个案例,对互补品两部定价和场内垄断理论分析结果进行了印证。案例一是竞争市场互补品两部定价的典型案例——富于争议的酒店开瓶费问题,以酒店对菜肴和酒水的两部定价,以及在这一定价下,酒店为维护产品2——酒水带来的高利润而禁止消费者自带酒水进店消费,从而引起社会广泛争议、招致“垄断行为”批评的整个案例细节,印证了竞争市场上互补品两部定价下场内垄断的存在;案例二则介绍了吉列公司对剃须刀架和刀片的经典定价案例,以及由此产生的“剃刀加刀片模式”,并简要介绍了国内打印机市场的互补品两部定价案例。
论文提出以下创新点:
1.提出研究“竞争市场互补品两部定价”的命题基于两产品两部定价理论的提出,本文提出了“竞争市场互补品两部定价”这一命题。
尽管没有学者专门说明,但在两部定价理论的研究中,学者们主要对单产品两部定价进行了研究。其中,虽然也有一些研究把涉及两种产品的类似定价也称为两部定价,但这些研究并没有明确提出两产品两部定价理论的存在。本文指出了两产品两部定价在研究工具和研究方法上与单产品两部定价存在的区别,提出了两产品两部定价这一概念,并进一步通过与垄断厂商搭配销售下的两部定价相比较,提出竞争市场上两产品两部定价的实质就是互补品两部定价。这一认识对于解释竞争市场上存在的场内垄断行为具有重要意义,这也是本文在两产品两部定价的基础上,进而提出“竞争市场互补品两部定价”这一命题的原因。
2.基于消费者对互补品相对重要性评价差异,提出消费者感知福利概念,构建数学模型解释了互补品两部定价对消费者购买行为的适应性Manjit S. Yadav(1994)和别传武、陈丽珍(2001)间接或直接地提出了消费者的互补品相对重要性评价差异这一行为特征。在此基础上,本文尝试讨论了互补品相对重要性评价差异的产生原因,提出了消费者在互补品组合的购买决策中的决策依据——感知福利(以消费者剩余表示消费者福利水平),并基于感知福利概念,构建了互补品两部定价原理分析模型,解释了互补品两部定价对消费者行为的适应性。
3.定义并系统分析了互补品销售中的顾客锁定和场内垄断问题
顾客锁定理论文献中提到了在互补资产或互补品销售中的顾客锁定现象,但没有对顾客锁定的形成进行进一步的分析。本文认为,产品之间的互补品关系并不能天然地促成顾客锁定的形成,厂商之所以能够基于互补品关系对顾客进行锁定,是因为在互补品关系的基础上,厂商实施了一些差异化的产品设计或强制性的要求,使得不同厂商之间的产品2无法兼容,从而消费者在购买产品1之后,只能从同一厂商继续购买产品2,因而导致顾客锁定。基于文献,本文指出在缺乏规制和存在厂商机会主义行为的条件下,顾客锁定下的潜在垄断势力能够转化为厂商的实质垄断行为。这种垄断行为发生在消费者与厂商之间关于互补品组合的连续交易过程中,本文称之为场内垄断。场内垄断具有较高的隐蔽性,不易从理论上进行识别,而这也正是在开瓶费问题中,争论双方在饭店收取开瓶费是否是垄断行为这一问题上争执不下的关键原因。
4.从对消费者行为的适应性和厂商的顾客锁定策略两个维度出发,构建了互补品两部定价原理的理论分析框架
竞争市场的厂商互补品两部定价的典型定价特征是,厂商在对互补品组合的两部定价中,降低产品1的价格,而提高产品2的价格。从对消费者购买行为特征的适应性和厂商的顾客锁定策略两个维度来看,互补品两部定价一方面适应了消费者的购买行为,使消费者的感知福利水平提高,促使更多消费者参与消费,并促进了顾客锁定的形成;另一方面基于顾客锁定效应,实现对这些消费者的锁定,并支持产品2较高定价的实现。这样就解释了厂商的互补品两部定价的原理。
从上述两个维度对互补品两部定价原理的理论解释,构成了论文的主体框架。
5.论文提出了规制场内垄断行为的政策建议
论文指出,从国内外反垄断规制案例来看,各国政府反垄断部门一般都能够注意得到在捆绑销售和搭配销售中存在的显性垄断现象,并根据反垄断法规进行规制,但却并没有关注到场内垄断这种隐蔽的垄断行为。
场内垄断的形成需要一些因素共同促成,但其中最主要的因素还是顾客锁定的形成。在顾客锁定条件下,厂商具有了一定垄断势力,它和消费者之间的讨价还价能力以及在交易中的地位并不均衡,消费者在双方的关系中处于弱势,因此对场内垄断的规制原则,就是引入制度干预,使厂商和消费者之间的讨价还价能力和交易地位趋于对等和均衡。
当然,本文还存在一些不足之处,例如,从研究方法上来看,本文对于两产品两部定价理论的研究,以理论推演为主要方法,在理论推演中使用了归纳和演绎、比较研究等方法。而前两者的运用虽然在逻辑上没有缺陷,但未经实证结果的验证,就难免有不严密之处。例如,本文把Yadav(1994)的互补品捆绑估值的实证研究结果解读为,消费者对互补品相对重要性评价的差异来自于互补品关系本身。虽然理论推理过程尽量做到逻辑严密,但毕竟没有实证的支持,这一缺陷使得本文通过对Yadav(1994)的研究结论进行解读,得到消费者对互补品相对重要性评价差异这一结论,显得不是足够严谨。
The controversy on the corkage issue reported on TV and in the newspaper is widely in dispute in nowadays society. Throughout the dispute,the corkage problem is not theoretically reasonably explained yet,and it is an embarrassing result that each side has their reasons for or against charging the corkage but can not persuade the other side in the collision of the viewpoint of consumer’s rights with that of the firm’s rights. A prominent question in the corkage controversy is, is it a sort of monopoly behavior that the restaurant charges the consumers for taking wines into the restaurant for consumption? The viewpoint of monopoly behavior complys with the consumers’perception,while does not seem to correspond to the competitive feature of the restaurant industry,which may imply an unknown economic rule behind the facts. Further observations indicate that there are similar pricings in the theoretic literatures and in our real life. All these phenomena induce my academic interest in the explanation of such pricing phenomena in the angle of two-part pricing of complementary products.
No matter in the angle of two-part pricing theory research,or in the angle of pricing theory of complementary products,the two-part pricing of complementary products is not reasonably explained theoretically. The complemetarity mentioned for times in the two-part pricing literatures is literally an important but neglected influencing factor. This dissertation explains the adaptivity of two-part pricing of complementary products in competitive markets in such two dimentions as the consumers’behavior feature of differentiated relevant importance evaluation of complementary products and the customer lock-in effect,and puts forward that the potential monopoly power under the customer lock-in condition may lead to the inside monopoly behavior in the actually continuous transaction relation between the firm and the consumers. This theory structure can better explain the reason why the firm applys the two-part pricing and the existence of monopoly behavior in competitive markets.
The dissertation includes eight chapters as follows:
Chapter 0 Introduction. This chapter deals with the putting forward and the meaning of the issue、main content of the dissertation、logic framework and research method、the innovation and the insufficiencies.
Chapter 1 The development of two-part pricing theory. This chapter hackles the development of two-part pricing theory,points out the substantial existence of single product two-part pricing and two-product two-part pricing in the literatures, and emphasizes the neglected two-product two-part pricing.
Chapter 2 Putting forward the two-product two-part pricing theory in competitive market and the analysis framework of principle. This chapter compares and distinguishes the two-part pricing in tying of monopoly firm with that of complementary product in competitive markets , points out the complementarity is the indispensible eliment to practice two-product two-part pricing without monopoly power,and the nature of two-product two-part pricing in competitive market is two-part pricing of complementary products,at last this chapter puts forward to establish the analysis framework of principle of two-part pricing of complementary products in two dimensions as the consumer behavior and the customer lock-in effect.
Chapter 3 The consumer behavior basis of two-part pricing of complementary products. This chapter puts forward the consumers’purchasing behavior feature—the differentiated relative importance evaluation of complementary products based on the literature research, tries to find the cause of the behavior feature,and tries to point out the meaning of the behavior feature and the according effect on the consumer and the firm.
Chapter 4 The adaptability analysis of the two-part pricing of complementary products to the consumers’behavior feature of differentiated relavant importance evaluation. Based on the consumers’behavior feature of differentiated relavant importance evaluation,this chapter puts forward the concept of perceived welfare,and grounded on the concept constructs the principle analysis model of two-part pricing of complementary products,explains the typical pricing characteristic of two-part pricing in the competitive market,and advances that the purchasing behavior feature of the consumer mentioned above is the consumer behavior basis of two-part pricing in the competitive market. After that, this chapter analyses the effect of the typical pricing feature of two-part pricing and the applicability of two-part pricing. This analysis paves the way for the analysis of customer lock-in effect in chapter 5.
Chapter 5 Customer lock-in strategy. Based on reviewing the literatures on customer lock-in theory,this chapter sums up the cause of formation in customer lock-in、the type of switching costs and the type of customer lock-in,maintains that when consumers buy product 1,they have to continue to buy product 2 from the same manufacturer , which leads to customer lock-in in the sale of complementary product,and points out the pricing strategy in this situation is actually a typical kind of two-part pricing of complementary products,in the end this chapter depicts the way that this typical two-part pricing of complementary products is carried out.
Chapter 6 Inside monopoly and the regulation. This chapter discusses the relation between customer lock-in and monopoly,puts forward the concept、causes of formation、feature、theoretic and practical meaning of inside monopoly,argues that in the absence of regulation,the potential monopoly power will lead to the real monopoly behavior,and attempts to advance the corresponding regulation measures to the inside monopoly behavior.
Chapter 7 The cases. In chapter 7,two cases are listed to confrm the two-part pricing and inside monopoly theory. Case one is the typical case of two-part pricing of complementary products in competitive market—the corkage problem that abounds in dispute. With this case,the chapter confirms the existence of inside monopoly under two-part pricing of complementary products in competitive markets; Case two deals with the classic pricing of razor and razor blades by Gillette Company,and also“the mode of razor plus razor blades”. In the end,this chapter introduces in brief the two-part pricing of complementary products of printer and ink box in domestic market.
There are such innovative viewpoints as follows in the dissertation: 1.The dissertation puts forward the proposition of“two-part pricing of complementary products in competitive market”.
Based on the two-product two-part pricing theory,the dissertation advances the proposition of“two-part pricing of complementary products in competitive market”.
Although it is not specially mentioned,the two-part pricing theory mainly focuses on the single-product two-part pricing problems. Despite the fact that some researches take similar pricing that relates to two products as two-part pricing,the two-product two-part pricing theory is not yet definitely developed. The dissertation points out the differences in research instrument and research method between the two kind of two-part pricing,then brings forward the concept of two-product two-part pricing theory,and through the comparison with the two-part pricing in tying of monopoly firm,further maintains that the nature of two-product two-part pricing in competitive market is that of complementary products. This viewpoint helps explain the inside monopoly in the competitive market of complementary products,which is also the reason why the dissertation puts forwand the proposition of“two-part pricing of complementary products in competitive market”.
2.Based on the consumers’behavior feature of differentiated relavant importance evaluation to complementary products,the dissertation advances the concept of perceived welfare,and constructs theoretic model to explain the adaptability of the two-part pricing of complementary products to the consumers’behavior feature of differentiated relavant importance evaluation
Based on relevant literatures,this dissertation tries to explain the reasons why the the consumers’differentiated relavant importance evaluation comes into being,and brings forward the concept of perceived welfare to depict the way the consumers draw their decisions in the purchase decision of complementary products,then constructs the theoretic model to analyse the pricing principle of two-part pricing of complementary products in competitive markets,which explains the adaptability of the two-part pricing of complementary products to the consumers’behavior feature.
3.Definition and systematic analysis of customer lock-in effect and inside monopoly in the marketing of complementary products
The theoretic literatures on customer lock-in mentioned the customer lock-in phenomena in marketing of complementary products or assets,while did not further analyse the detailed reason why customer lock-in comes into being. The dissertation argues that complementarity can not naturally cause the formation of customer lock-in,the reason why the firms can exert customer lock-in on the consumers based on the complementarity is that,based on the complementarity, the firms use some differentiated product design or compulsory request,which make product 2 of different firms can not be compatible with each other,so that after the purchase of product 1 form specific firm,the consumers can not buy product 2 from other firms,which finally leads to customer lock-in.
Based on the relevant literatures,this dissertation points out that with the firm’s opportunism and the lack of regulation,the potential monopoly power under customer lock-in can be transformed into substantial monopoly behavior. As such monopoly behavior takes place in the continuous transaction relation about the complementary products between the firm and the consumers,it is defined as inside monopoly. The inside monopoly is highly implicit so that we can not recognize it theoretically,which is the key factor that brought about the fierce dispute on whether there is monopoly behavior in the charge of corkage by the restarant.
4. The construction of theoretic analysis framework of two-part pricing of complementary products in two dimentions
The typical pricing feature of two-part pricing of complementary products in competitive markets is,the firm sets the pricing of product 1 at a relative low level,while set the pricing of product 2 at a relative high level. In such two dimentions as the adaptivity of two-part pricing to the cosumers’behavior feature and the customer lock-in effect , on the one hand , two-part pricing of complementary products is adapted to the consumers’purchase behavior,making the consumers’perceived welfare going up,stimulating the consumers to take part in the purchase of product 1,which finally urges the formation of customer lock-in; on the other hand,the customer lock-in effect helps the firm lock in the consumers and realize the relative high price of product 2. In this way,the dissertation explains the principle of two-part pricing of complementary products in competitive markets.
5. Regulation suggestion of inside monopoly
The dissertation points out that according to the domestic and overseas anti-monomoly cases,the anti-monopoly government sectors can notice the explicit monopoly in bundling and tying and take corresoponding measures to regulate it,but they fail to pay attention to the implicit monopoly of inside monopoly.
The formation of inside monopoly is owing to several factors,among which the most important factor is customer lock-in. Under customer lock-in,the firm has some monopoly power,which mades the inbalance in bargaining power and position of the firm and the consumers in the transaction,and the consumers are in the weaker position in the mutual transaction relation,therefore,the regulation rule is to introduce institutional intervene in the relation to make both sides equal in their bargaining power and transaction status.
There is also some defects in the dissertation,for example,as to research method in two-product two-part pring research,the dissertation mainly uses theoretic reasoning method,including deductive method、inductive method and comparative method. Although thereis no defects in the use of the former two methods,the research can not be rigorous enough with the lack of empirical research. For example,the dissertation interprets the empirical research result of Yadav(1994)as such that the differentiated evaluation of relative importance of complementary products by consumers derives from complementarity itself. Although the dissertation tries to handle the theoretic reasoning with rigorous logic,the lack of empirical research makes the interpretation above is not so religious.
引文
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63王琴.顾客锁定:理论研究与实证分析[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,2003:99
64王琴.顾客锁定:理论研究与实证分析[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,2003:97
65王琴.顾客锁定:理论研究与实证分析[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,2003:145-146格和周期
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69卢宏亮.基于顾客锁定理论的饭店企业经营战略研究[J].桂林旅游高等专科学校学报,2006年6月,第17卷第3期
70 Paul Klemperer. Markets with Consumers Switching Cost. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1987a:375; Paul Klemperer. The Competitiveness of markets with Switching Cost. Rand Journal of Economics, 1987b,Vol.18,NO.1:138
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72王琴.顾客锁定:理论研究与实证分析[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,2003:88
73[美]卡尔·夏皮罗、哈尔·瓦里安.信息规则:网络经济的策略指导[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2000年:103-114
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75王琴.顾客锁定:理论研究与实证分析[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,2003:113-115
76周磊.网络环境下的锁定理论研究[J].台声·新视角,2006,01:241
77 Paul Klemperer. Competition when Consumers have Switching Costs:An Overview with Applications to Industrial Organazation,Macroeconomics,and International Trade. Review of Economics Studies,1995,62:521
78 Alan Beggs and Paul Klemperer. Multi-Period Competition with Switching Costs. Economica,1992,Vol.60,No.3:652
79 Paul Klemperer. Markets with Consumers Switching Cost. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,May 1987:388
80 Nancy Gallini and Larry Karp. Sales and Consumer Lock-in. Economica,1989,56,No. 223:280
89 C.Christian Von Weizsaker.The Costs of Substitution.Econometrica,1984,52,5:1087
90 Paul Klemperer. Markets with Consumers Switching Cost. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1987a:386-378
91 Paul Klemperer. Competition when consumer have switching costs: an overview with applications to industrial organization macroeconomics, and international trade. Review of Economics Studies,1995,62:515-516,534
92 Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro. Optimal Contracts with Lock-In.The American Economic Review,1989,Vol.79,No.1:51
93Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro.Dynamic competition with switching cost. Rand Journal of Economics,1988,Vol.19,No.1:123
94Elzinga,K.G.,Mills,D.E. .Switching cost in the wholesale distribution of cigarettes. Southern Economic Journal,1998,65:282-293
95Kim,M.,Klinger,D.,Vale,B. . Estimating switching costs and oligopolistic behavior. Working paper 01-13 , Wharton Finacial Institutions Center , http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/01/0113.pdf (forthcoming,Journal of Financial Intermediation)
96Chen,P.Y., Hitt,L.M. .Measuring switching costs and their determinants in internet-enabled businesses:a study of the online brokerage industry. Information Systems Research .2002,13:255-274
97王琴.顾客锁定:理论研究与实证分析[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,2003:191
98王琴.顾客锁定:理论研究与实证分析[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,2003:192-193
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101王琴.顾客锁定:理论研究与实证分析[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,2003:23-24
102Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro. Optimal Contracts with Lock-In. The American Economic Review,1989,Vol.79,No.1:51
103作者并没有这样说明,但从其观点暗示了转移成本带来了顾客对厂商品牌的忠诚度。
104 Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro.Dynamic competition with switching cost. Rand Journal of Economics,1988,Vol.19,No.1:123
105王琴.顾客锁定:理论研究与实证分析[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,2003,12:62
106 Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro. Optimal Contracts with Lock-In.The American Economic Review,1989,Vol.79,No.1:51
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128转引自薛兆丰博客:http://xuezhaofeng.com/blog/?p=125
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132[美]卡尔·夏皮罗、哈尔·瓦里安.信息规则:网络经济的策略指导[M].张帆译,北京:中国人民大学出版社,2000年:93-94
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139同上。
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103作者并没有这样说明,但从其观点暗示了转移成本带来了顾客对厂商品牌的忠诚度。
104 Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro.Dynamic competition with switching cost. Rand Journal of Economics,1988,Vol.19,No.1:123
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115李静、于宏伟.行为主义:我国反垄断立法规制对象的取向[J].现代财经,2003,第12期:9
116郭声龙.垄断认定标准的模糊性研究—从美国反托拉斯法到我国《反垄断法》及其实施[J].法制与社会,2008,01(下):277-279
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127李成刚.从AT&T到微软——美国反垄断透析[M].北京:经济日报出版社,2004:48-90.
128转引自薛兆丰博客:http://xuezhaofeng.com/blog/?p=125
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