匿名通信系统可用性技术研究
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摘要
随着Internet在世界范围内的迅猛发展,通过网络实现全社会的信息共享已逐步成为现实,由此带来的信息安全与隐私问题也逐步得到人们的关注。加密技术保护用户信息的机密性,而匿名技术通过一定的方法将通信流中的通信关系加以隐藏,使攻击者无法获知“谁和谁”在通信,它已经成为许多网络应用的基本需求。本论文对如何提高匿名通信系统在网络监管下的可用性问题进行了研究和探讨,主要工作及贡献如下：
·集中式的资源分发模型及其分析：对现有匿名系统对接入节点资源进行集中管理向用户分发的过程进行抽象,提出一个通用的集中式资源分发模型,并对该模型进行了理论计算和实验模拟的量化分析。在非对抗环境下,得出全部资源被枚举到的概率与攻击者枚举次数的关系,分析结果表明,资源分发系统需选取合适的每次请求分发的资源数量,同时资源数量越大,攻击者获取到全部资源的概率越小。在对抗环境下,给出了相应评价资源分发系统服务质量的指标,分别对两种资源更新策略进行了分析,分析结果表明资源可用性检测方法、资源更新速率、攻击者的检测范围是影响资源分发系统服务质量的重要因素。
·基于社会网络的资源分发传播模型及其分析：进一步研究了通过用户及其在现实中信任关系构成的社会网络进行资源分发传播的机制,根据相应资源分发传播的特点,建立了社会网络中的资源分发模型,结合复杂网络中的"small-world"网络模型,采用计算机模拟的方法对该模型进行了分析。在非对抗环境下,攻击者最终会获取到所有资源信息。在对抗环境下,即使不使用资源更新策略,资源分发停止分发传播时,网络中仍会残余少量的可用资源供部分用户使用；在使用资源更新策略的情况下,对抗会达到一个稳定状态。另外我们发现在具有明显小世界特征的网络结构下,资源分发系统在资源传播范围、可用资源比例、资源平均存活时间均达到了较高的效率,具有较强的对抗能力,而攻击者需要选取合适的对抗策略来应对。
·基于Skype覆盖网络的SkyF2F系统：针对现有匿名通信系统接入节点建设面临的一些问题,例如需要大量的投入去建设资源、需要激励机制来吸引更多的志愿者,提出一种能够在Skype覆盖网络中建立通信通道的SkyF2F系统,设计并实现了原型系统,用户可以通过其朋友使用SkyF2F系统建立隐蔽通信通道访问特定的目标服务,该系统能够抵抗多种攻击和提供一定的IP匿名保护,并具有易使用、低投入、低时延的特点。SkyF2F系统应用模式灵活,例如与现有的匿名系统相结合,可作为一种有效的接入节点方案。SkyF2F的思想也适用于现有流行的即时通信工具。
The rapid development of the Internet has made sharing information among all the people within a society a reality. And information security and privacy are gaining increasing attention. Confidentiality of user data is made possible in practice by the techniques of modern cryptography. Anonymity systems seek build an infrastructure running on top of the existing Internet pro-tocols which allows people to communicate with each other without revealing their personal network identities, so the attacker cannot learn who is commu-nicating with whom. Anonymity has been an essential requirement of many network applications. This thesis focuses on the problem of how to improve the availability and reachability of anonymity system under network censor-ship, the main contributions are listed as follows:
·A general model of central resource distribution is proposed by study-ing the design of existing anonymity system and publishing the access-point resources with central-controlled discovery authority. Based on this model, mathematical and experimental analysis of its specialized model with random-choice strategy is given in two scenarios. In the case of non-confrontation, the relationship between the probability of all resources enumerated and the amount of attacker's enumeration. The result shows that the resource distribution service should select the appropriate amount of access points for each user and have a large number of active access points to improve the ability. In the case of confrontation, methods to measure the quality of resource distribution service and analysis of the two distribution strategies are given. Mechanisms for testing whether bridges are available, renewal speed of resources and the number of users attacker monitors and impersonates are important factors to the quality of the ser- vice.
·According to the characteristics of distributing the resources through the social network where links reflects real-world social relationships among users, a resource distribution model is proposed. We analyze this model on the'small-world'network by numerical simulation. In the case of non-confrontation, attacker will discover all resources finally. In the case of confrontation, without renewal of resources, a small amount of avail-able resources still remains for some user on the network when there is no resources distribution between users. With renewal mechanism of re-sources, the confrontation also has a steady state. We find that the small world structure stands out as an efficient architecture for resource distri-bution service in scope of resource dissemination, proportion of available resources and average lifetime. And the attacker should use appropriate strategies to counter.
·Existing anonymity systems are facing the problem that deploying a large number of access points requires significant investment to build resources or necessary incentives to attract more volunteers. We propose a system builds on existing overlay network, called SkyF2F. SkyF2F is a plug-in for Skype client that allows a user to establish a covert communication channel with her friends. We describe the design, a prototype implemen-tation and security analysis of SkyF2F. SkyF2F can successfully circum-vent several sophisticated censoring techniques. In addition, SkyF2F is easy to use, low cost, low latency. SkyF2F is very flexible. For example, it could be used as the access points to existing anonymous communica-tion systems. The idea of SkyF2F can also be adapted to other popular IM overlays.
·集中式的资源分发模型及其分析：对现有匿名系统对接入节点资源进行集中管理向用户分发的过程进行抽象,提出一个通用的集中式资源分发模型,并对该模型进行了理论计算和实验模拟的量化分析。在非对抗环境下,得出全部资源被枚举到的概率与攻击者枚举次数的关系,分析结果表明,资源分发系统需选取合适的每次请求分发的资源数量,同时资源数量越大,攻击者获取到全部资源的概率越小。在对抗环境下,给出了相应评价资源分发系统服务质量的指标,分别对两种资源更新策略进行了分析,分析结果表明资源可用性检测方法、资源更新速率、攻击者的检测范围是影响资源分发系统服务质量的重要因素。
·基于社会网络的资源分发传播模型及其分析：进一步研究了通过用户及其在现实中信任关系构成的社会网络进行资源分发传播的机制,根据相应资源分发传播的特点,建立了社会网络中的资源分发模型,结合复杂网络中的"small-world"网络模型,采用计算机模拟的方法对该模型进行了分析。在非对抗环境下,攻击者最终会获取到所有资源信息。在对抗环境下,即使不使用资源更新策略,资源分发停止分发传播时,网络中仍会残余少量的可用资源供部分用户使用；在使用资源更新策略的情况下,对抗会达到一个稳定状态。另外我们发现在具有明显小世界特征的网络结构下,资源分发系统在资源传播范围、可用资源比例、资源平均存活时间均达到了较高的效率,具有较强的对抗能力,而攻击者需要选取合适的对抗策略来应对。
·基于Skype覆盖网络的SkyF2F系统：针对现有匿名通信系统接入节点建设面临的一些问题,例如需要大量的投入去建设资源、需要激励机制来吸引更多的志愿者,提出一种能够在Skype覆盖网络中建立通信通道的SkyF2F系统,设计并实现了原型系统,用户可以通过其朋友使用SkyF2F系统建立隐蔽通信通道访问特定的目标服务,该系统能够抵抗多种攻击和提供一定的IP匿名保护,并具有易使用、低投入、低时延的特点。SkyF2F系统应用模式灵活,例如与现有的匿名系统相结合,可作为一种有效的接入节点方案。SkyF2F的思想也适用于现有流行的即时通信工具。
The rapid development of the Internet has made sharing information among all the people within a society a reality. And information security and privacy are gaining increasing attention. Confidentiality of user data is made possible in practice by the techniques of modern cryptography. Anonymity systems seek build an infrastructure running on top of the existing Internet pro-tocols which allows people to communicate with each other without revealing their personal network identities, so the attacker cannot learn who is commu-nicating with whom. Anonymity has been an essential requirement of many network applications. This thesis focuses on the problem of how to improve the availability and reachability of anonymity system under network censor-ship, the main contributions are listed as follows:
·A general model of central resource distribution is proposed by study-ing the design of existing anonymity system and publishing the access-point resources with central-controlled discovery authority. Based on this model, mathematical and experimental analysis of its specialized model with random-choice strategy is given in two scenarios. In the case of non-confrontation, the relationship between the probability of all resources enumerated and the amount of attacker's enumeration. The result shows that the resource distribution service should select the appropriate amount of access points for each user and have a large number of active access points to improve the ability. In the case of confrontation, methods to measure the quality of resource distribution service and analysis of the two distribution strategies are given. Mechanisms for testing whether bridges are available, renewal speed of resources and the number of users attacker monitors and impersonates are important factors to the quality of the ser- vice.
·According to the characteristics of distributing the resources through the social network where links reflects real-world social relationships among users, a resource distribution model is proposed. We analyze this model on the'small-world'network by numerical simulation. In the case of non-confrontation, attacker will discover all resources finally. In the case of confrontation, without renewal of resources, a small amount of avail-able resources still remains for some user on the network when there is no resources distribution between users. With renewal mechanism of re-sources, the confrontation also has a steady state. We find that the small world structure stands out as an efficient architecture for resource distri-bution service in scope of resource dissemination, proportion of available resources and average lifetime. And the attacker should use appropriate strategies to counter.
·Existing anonymity systems are facing the problem that deploying a large number of access points requires significant investment to build resources or necessary incentives to attract more volunteers. We propose a system builds on existing overlay network, called SkyF2F. SkyF2F is a plug-in for Skype client that allows a user to establish a covert communication channel with her friends. We describe the design, a prototype implemen-tation and security analysis of SkyF2F. SkyF2F can successfully circum-vent several sophisticated censoring techniques. In addition, SkyF2F is easy to use, low cost, low latency. SkyF2F is very flexible. For example, it could be used as the access points to existing anonymous communica-tion systems. The idea of SkyF2F can also be adapted to other popular IM overlays.
引文
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