电力市场竞争、规制与结构转换
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摘要
目前我国的电力产业的改革与发展正处于非常关键的时期,其成败将直接关系到国民经济的发展与普通百姓的日常生活。电力改革过程实际也是电力产业组织的整合过程,是发电企业、电网企业及用户之间的纵向或者横向的整合过程,它需要政府进行全方位的规制,以保证电力市场改革的顺利进行。电力市场改革实际上是电力市场竞争与规制关系的重新梳理和定位。然而,电力市场极其复杂独特的网络技术特性,这导致传统的经济学理论无法有效研究具有垄断网络市场的电力市场的竞争与规制问题。为此,本文借助应用经济学博弈理论、非线性互补方法、新制度经济学理论等最新研究成果,全面系统地开展具有垄断网络的电力市场竞争与规制及其机构转换的研究。电力市场规制与竞争间的均衡是本文研究的核心。
本文首先从分析电力市场的相关特性开始,分析电力市场的结构与经济绩效,研究电力市场的竞争与规制的相关理论。电力市场是在政府规制下的、以满足电力技术条件的寡头有效竞争市场(而非完全竞争),本文模拟电力市场参与者的动态决策过程,在考虑发电商动态博弈的同时,兼顾用电侧的动态博弈过程,引入供给函数均衡模型,提出了考虑输电网约束的基于供应函数均衡的电力市场动态模型,即一内嵌市场清算优化问题的差分动态模型,实现了市场参与者动态博弈行为和电力系统固有物理特性的结合;同时借助最优化理论中的非线性互补方法,实现了该动态模型向差分-代数形式的转换,为提出相关规制政策提供视角。通过这一部分,本文科学地分析了电力市场均衡的决定和均衡的过程,同时提出了相关有利于电力市场均衡的规制政策。
根据新制度经济学理论,产业的内部经济制度(制度安排)取决于经济代理人之间的“制度安排”(合约关系)。因此,电力市场网络中的关系无非是两种,一种是电力市场网络中企业的横向结合,表现为电力市场的横向结构,一种表现为纵向结构,这两种电力市场结构哪一种更科学合理。本文从电力市场垄断与竞争程度的描述中确定电力市场中电力企业间在联结、数量、规模上的关系以及新企业进入的难易程度,进而界定电力市场结构转化的原则与依据,分析规制约束下的电力市场结构重组,得出,电力市场结构转换的多种途径(横向转换和纵向转换),转换目标决定具体转换的方法。
电力市场结构转换的最终目标可以概括为通过结构转换确定合理的价格机制,达到资源的优化配置,确保电力市场供求均衡并保证适当经济效益和社会福利,还要兼顾电力安全。本文从各企业利益平衡、资源配置的最优化、弹性价格及电力产业经济外部性特征等三个方面分析电力市场价格形成机制,分析得出一个核心的结论,电力资源的综合价值是电力价格形成的理论基础,将发电企业的弹性成本,电力正负外部性,电力资源的产权分解与电力价值再估算不断地引入价格形成机制之中才能逐步地协调电力市场纵向结构间企业之间的利益分配关系。这样,就为电力市场结构转换过程中电力市场价格形成奠定了基础,而这正是电力市场改革的落脚点,也是电力市场规制与竞争改革的关键。
理论研究终归要为实践服务。中国电力行业的发展经历了国有电力企业垄断经营、政府高度统一集中管理的模式,到集资办电、多家竞争、以电力政企分开和引入竞争为核心的市场化改革。面对电力行业垄断的多元化、国有制为主的所有权结构、电力市场结构不合理、电网建设落后等现状,但是中国电力市场竞争、规制与结构转换的绩效到底如何?竞争与规制的“度”的范围怎么样?文章在理论分析的基础上,利用1978-2007年相关数据对中国电力市场竞争、规制与结构转换的绩效进行了全面的实证检验。研究结果表明,改革开放以来,明确的规制框架、独立规制机构和不断成熟的规制对象在统计意义上显著地提高了电力产业总量和效率,降低了价格水平和垄断利润,但在改善服务质量方面尚未发挥有效作用。总体看来,中国电力产业规制效果是明显的,良好的规制设计不仅在理论上有利于电力产业提高绩效,在实践中也是电力产业绩效改善的推动力。
At present, it is a very important period for the innovation and development of electricity industry, which affects the development of the national economy and daylife of ordinary people. The actual reform process of the electricity industry is also a process of organizational integration, which also means the vertical or the horizontal integration process between the power generation, the power grids and the enterprise users between. So it requires the government to carry out monitoring and controlling to ensure that the reform of the electricity market will be successfully implemented. In fact, the electricity market reform is the re-integration and re-positioning the relationship between the market competition and the regulation. However, the competition and regulation problems of power market with monopoly network are unable to be effectively solved by the traditional economics theory due to the very complicated and particular physical characteristics of monopoly network. Therefore, by means of the newest outcomes of the game theory of economics, the nonlinear complementarity method and new system economics, the competition, regulation problems and system innovation of power market with the complex monopoly network are completely and systemically investigated in this paper. The balance between the regulation and the competition of electricity market is the core of this paper.
We first analyse the corresponding characteristic of electricity market, and analyse the constructs and economic performance, then study the corresponding theory of the competition and regulation about electricity market. The reform of the electricity market in fact is a process between the electricity market competition and the regulation of the electricity market scientific. The electricity market is oligarchy effective competition conditions under the government regulation (rather than perfect competition). The article simulates the dynamic decision-making process of the electricity market participants. Taking into account the dynamic game and presenting the supply function equilibrium model, the article puts forward the embedded optimization difference-dynamic model of the market participants, which is constrained by transmission networks and based on the supply constraints function, and achieves the combination of the dynamic game and the power systems with inherent physical properties. At the same time, the conversion from dynamic model to the difference– algebra form is realized using nonlinear complementary methods in the optimization theory. In this part, this article scientifically analyzes the decision process of electricity market equilibrium, at the same time, it presents the regulation policies in favor of the electricity market equilibrium.
According to the economic theory of the new system, the economic system within the industry (arrangement) depends on the "institutional arrangements" (a contractual relationship) among the economy agents. As a result, there are two types of relationship in the electricity network: One is the horizontal structure in which enterprises are combined horizontally, and the other is the vertical structure. Which one is more scientific or rational? According to the relationship among enterprise links in quantity, size and the new enterprises entering difficulty based on the principles from the monopoly of the electricity market and a description of the level of competition in the electricity market, we can define the principles for the conversion of electricity market structure and analyze the reconstruction of electricity market structure under the regulation. As a result, it is obtained that there are multiple ways to convert the electricity market structure (horizontally and vertically), but the specific method is decided by the goal of the conversion.
The ultimate goal of the structure conversion of the electricity market, from which to determine a reasonable price mechanism, can be summed up as follows: to achieve optimal distribution of resources; to ensure the balance between demand and supply in the electricity market; to ensure adequate economic benefits and social well-beings as well as to ensure electric power safety. This article analyzes the price formation mechanism from three aspects in the electricity market: the interests balance among the enterprises, the optimal resources allocation, the price flexibility and the external characteristics of the industrial economy. So, we have reached a core conclusion, that is, the integrated value of the electricity is the basis of the price formation. We can negotiate the benefit distribution among enterprises gradually and vertically by introducing the flexibility cost of the power enterprises, the use of the positive and the negative externalities of electric powers, the property rights decomposition of the power resources and the value re-estimation into the mechanism of the price formation. As a result, the price formation foundation is made for the structure conversion of electricity market, and it is the goal of the electricity market reform and is also the key of the reform of the market regulation and the competition.
The theoretical research is the service for the practice. The power industry in China has experienced from the monopolized state-owned power enterprises, the highly centralized government management model to the raising funds, more competition, separating from enterprises and introducing competition into the electricity at the core market-oriented reforms. Facing the diversity of the monopolized power industry, the ownership structure consists mainly of the state-owned system, the irrational electricity market structure, and the backward construction of the power grid. But how is the performance of the power market competition in China, regulation and the structure conversion? What is the "degree" between the Competition and the Regulation? The article analyzes China's electricity market competition, regulation and the structure conversion performance after the theoretical analysis based on the data of the years 1978-2007. The results show that after the reform and opening, the specific regulatory framework and the independent regulatory agencies and the sophisticated regulatory system significantly improve the volume and efficiency of the power industry, reducing the level of prices and monopoly profits in the statistical sense, but the quality service does yet not play an effective role. Generally speaking, The power industry regulation in China has yielded tangible results, while the good regulatory design system not only improves the performance of the power industry in theory, but also drives the force to improve the performance in practice of the power industry.
本文首先从分析电力市场的相关特性开始,分析电力市场的结构与经济绩效,研究电力市场的竞争与规制的相关理论。电力市场是在政府规制下的、以满足电力技术条件的寡头有效竞争市场(而非完全竞争),本文模拟电力市场参与者的动态决策过程,在考虑发电商动态博弈的同时,兼顾用电侧的动态博弈过程,引入供给函数均衡模型,提出了考虑输电网约束的基于供应函数均衡的电力市场动态模型,即一内嵌市场清算优化问题的差分动态模型,实现了市场参与者动态博弈行为和电力系统固有物理特性的结合;同时借助最优化理论中的非线性互补方法,实现了该动态模型向差分-代数形式的转换,为提出相关规制政策提供视角。通过这一部分,本文科学地分析了电力市场均衡的决定和均衡的过程,同时提出了相关有利于电力市场均衡的规制政策。
根据新制度经济学理论,产业的内部经济制度(制度安排)取决于经济代理人之间的“制度安排”(合约关系)。因此,电力市场网络中的关系无非是两种,一种是电力市场网络中企业的横向结合,表现为电力市场的横向结构,一种表现为纵向结构,这两种电力市场结构哪一种更科学合理。本文从电力市场垄断与竞争程度的描述中确定电力市场中电力企业间在联结、数量、规模上的关系以及新企业进入的难易程度,进而界定电力市场结构转化的原则与依据,分析规制约束下的电力市场结构重组,得出,电力市场结构转换的多种途径(横向转换和纵向转换),转换目标决定具体转换的方法。
电力市场结构转换的最终目标可以概括为通过结构转换确定合理的价格机制,达到资源的优化配置,确保电力市场供求均衡并保证适当经济效益和社会福利,还要兼顾电力安全。本文从各企业利益平衡、资源配置的最优化、弹性价格及电力产业经济外部性特征等三个方面分析电力市场价格形成机制,分析得出一个核心的结论,电力资源的综合价值是电力价格形成的理论基础,将发电企业的弹性成本,电力正负外部性,电力资源的产权分解与电力价值再估算不断地引入价格形成机制之中才能逐步地协调电力市场纵向结构间企业之间的利益分配关系。这样,就为电力市场结构转换过程中电力市场价格形成奠定了基础,而这正是电力市场改革的落脚点,也是电力市场规制与竞争改革的关键。
理论研究终归要为实践服务。中国电力行业的发展经历了国有电力企业垄断经营、政府高度统一集中管理的模式,到集资办电、多家竞争、以电力政企分开和引入竞争为核心的市场化改革。面对电力行业垄断的多元化、国有制为主的所有权结构、电力市场结构不合理、电网建设落后等现状,但是中国电力市场竞争、规制与结构转换的绩效到底如何?竞争与规制的“度”的范围怎么样?文章在理论分析的基础上,利用1978-2007年相关数据对中国电力市场竞争、规制与结构转换的绩效进行了全面的实证检验。研究结果表明,改革开放以来,明确的规制框架、独立规制机构和不断成熟的规制对象在统计意义上显著地提高了电力产业总量和效率,降低了价格水平和垄断利润,但在改善服务质量方面尚未发挥有效作用。总体看来,中国电力产业规制效果是明显的,良好的规制设计不仅在理论上有利于电力产业提高绩效,在实践中也是电力产业绩效改善的推动力。
At present, it is a very important period for the innovation and development of electricity industry, which affects the development of the national economy and daylife of ordinary people. The actual reform process of the electricity industry is also a process of organizational integration, which also means the vertical or the horizontal integration process between the power generation, the power grids and the enterprise users between. So it requires the government to carry out monitoring and controlling to ensure that the reform of the electricity market will be successfully implemented. In fact, the electricity market reform is the re-integration and re-positioning the relationship between the market competition and the regulation. However, the competition and regulation problems of power market with monopoly network are unable to be effectively solved by the traditional economics theory due to the very complicated and particular physical characteristics of monopoly network. Therefore, by means of the newest outcomes of the game theory of economics, the nonlinear complementarity method and new system economics, the competition, regulation problems and system innovation of power market with the complex monopoly network are completely and systemically investigated in this paper. The balance between the regulation and the competition of electricity market is the core of this paper.
We first analyse the corresponding characteristic of electricity market, and analyse the constructs and economic performance, then study the corresponding theory of the competition and regulation about electricity market. The reform of the electricity market in fact is a process between the electricity market competition and the regulation of the electricity market scientific. The electricity market is oligarchy effective competition conditions under the government regulation (rather than perfect competition). The article simulates the dynamic decision-making process of the electricity market participants. Taking into account the dynamic game and presenting the supply function equilibrium model, the article puts forward the embedded optimization difference-dynamic model of the market participants, which is constrained by transmission networks and based on the supply constraints function, and achieves the combination of the dynamic game and the power systems with inherent physical properties. At the same time, the conversion from dynamic model to the difference– algebra form is realized using nonlinear complementary methods in the optimization theory. In this part, this article scientifically analyzes the decision process of electricity market equilibrium, at the same time, it presents the regulation policies in favor of the electricity market equilibrium.
According to the economic theory of the new system, the economic system within the industry (arrangement) depends on the "institutional arrangements" (a contractual relationship) among the economy agents. As a result, there are two types of relationship in the electricity network: One is the horizontal structure in which enterprises are combined horizontally, and the other is the vertical structure. Which one is more scientific or rational? According to the relationship among enterprise links in quantity, size and the new enterprises entering difficulty based on the principles from the monopoly of the electricity market and a description of the level of competition in the electricity market, we can define the principles for the conversion of electricity market structure and analyze the reconstruction of electricity market structure under the regulation. As a result, it is obtained that there are multiple ways to convert the electricity market structure (horizontally and vertically), but the specific method is decided by the goal of the conversion.
The ultimate goal of the structure conversion of the electricity market, from which to determine a reasonable price mechanism, can be summed up as follows: to achieve optimal distribution of resources; to ensure the balance between demand and supply in the electricity market; to ensure adequate economic benefits and social well-beings as well as to ensure electric power safety. This article analyzes the price formation mechanism from three aspects in the electricity market: the interests balance among the enterprises, the optimal resources allocation, the price flexibility and the external characteristics of the industrial economy. So, we have reached a core conclusion, that is, the integrated value of the electricity is the basis of the price formation. We can negotiate the benefit distribution among enterprises gradually and vertically by introducing the flexibility cost of the power enterprises, the use of the positive and the negative externalities of electric powers, the property rights decomposition of the power resources and the value re-estimation into the mechanism of the price formation. As a result, the price formation foundation is made for the structure conversion of electricity market, and it is the goal of the electricity market reform and is also the key of the reform of the market regulation and the competition.
The theoretical research is the service for the practice. The power industry in China has experienced from the monopolized state-owned power enterprises, the highly centralized government management model to the raising funds, more competition, separating from enterprises and introducing competition into the electricity at the core market-oriented reforms. Facing the diversity of the monopolized power industry, the ownership structure consists mainly of the state-owned system, the irrational electricity market structure, and the backward construction of the power grid. But how is the performance of the power market competition in China, regulation and the structure conversion? What is the "degree" between the Competition and the Regulation? The article analyzes China's electricity market competition, regulation and the structure conversion performance after the theoretical analysis based on the data of the years 1978-2007. The results show that after the reform and opening, the specific regulatory framework and the independent regulatory agencies and the sophisticated regulatory system significantly improve the volume and efficiency of the power industry, reducing the level of prices and monopoly profits in the statistical sense, but the quality service does yet not play an effective role. Generally speaking, The power industry regulation in China has yielded tangible results, while the good regulatory design system not only improves the performance of the power industry in theory, but also drives the force to improve the performance in practice of the power industry.
引文
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