制度环境、股权性质与高管变更研究
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摘要
现代企业制度下，公司治理机制是决定企业业绩的关键因素，而科学的聘选则是形成最佳治理结构的前提，通过将公司高管人员的选聘与企业业绩相挂钩，良好的契约设计可在一定程度上约束经理人的懈怠行为。然而，内部治理机制往往需要与外部治理环境相匹配，本文从新制度经济学理论和公司治理理论的角度出发，以交易成本分析为理论基础，结合我国转型经济环境，以理论分析和实证检验相结合的方法，用2001年至2006年的沪深市场上市公司作为研究对象，分析了外部制度环境对公司治理的影响。
实证研究结果发现，经营业绩对我国公司的高管变更具有重要影响，业绩与高管变更之间存在着显著的负相关关系。但业绩与高管变更间的负相关关系会同时受到公司所处外部制度环境的制约，企业所处的环境使得股东无法有效的监督经理的行为或衡量经理的业绩，通过市场对高管人员经营绩效评价的能力较弱，业绩与高管变更之间的相关程度较低。
此外，文章还进一步分析了不同股权性质企业中，制度环境对公司治理影响效果的差异，相对于其他企业，国家股股东给高管更多的社会目标，政府所有的企业存在着复杂的委托——代理关系，政府的效用目标函数应该是社会利益的最大化，既包括经济诉求，也包括政治诉求，因此国有企业所承担的社会目标以及所遭受的干预，会在一定程度上弱化，甚至是消除业绩与高管变更之间的关系。而相反，在非国有上市公司中，外部制度环境对公司治理的积极影响，则要明显高于国有上市公司。
本文的理论贡献在于，提供了一国内部不同地区间制度环境对公司治理影响的经验证据，分析了我国转轨经济特征下公司治理的基本特征，并进一步认识了不同股权性质企业的外部治理对内部治理的作用差异。从本文的研究结果来看，单纯依靠公司内部治理机制改革难以实现经济改革的最终目标，为企业尽快创造独立发展、自我经营的市场经济环境，提高市场化发育水平和竞争程度等外部制度环境，实现股东有效保护自身权益是当前的重要问题。此外，本文也发现，在深化国有企业的改革过程中，必须建立和完善“产权明晰、权责明确、政企分开、管理科学”的现代企业制度，改变国有企业经营目标多样性的状况，通过改善外部制度环境，最终实现国有企业内部治理水平的提高。
Under the modern enterprise system, the corporate governance mechanism is the key factor in determining the enterprise's performance, and scientific recruitment and selection is the premise to form the best governance structure, by linking the recruitment and selection of the company's executives to enterprise's performance, to some extent, the good contract design may restrain the manager to idle. However, the internal governance mechanism often needs to match with the external governance environment.Based on this, from the New Institutional Economics theory and the Corporate Governance Theory points of view, taking the transaction cost analysis as the theoretical basis, and linking the economic environment to the China's transformation, this article analyzes the external institutional environment's impact on the corporate governance by using a empirical method combined with theoretical analysis, taking listed companies from 2001 to 2006 in Shanghai City and Shenzhen City as objects of study.
The empirical study result has found that the operating performance exerts great influence on the position alteration of the company's executives in our country, there is a significant negative correlation between the operating performance and the position change of the company's executives.However, the negative correlation between the performance and the position alteration of the executives will be added the environment restriction from external system simultaneously, In those regions in which the external institutional environment is much worse, the shareholders are at a natural disadvantage of information, and can not supervise the executives or evaluate their performance more effectively, so, it is much difficult to evaluate the performance through the market activities, there is a weaker correlation between the performance and the position alteration of the executives.
In addition, the article has also analyzed in more details the different effects on the corporate governance for the different institutional environment in the different enterprises in which the property of the stock rights is different. Compared with other enterprises, state-owned shares set more social objectives for the executives, there is a complex relation between principal and agent in the state-owned enterprises, the objective utility function for the government should be to maximize the social benefit, including not only economic resorts, but also the political resorts.therefore, the social objectives undertaken by the state-owned enterprises and the intervention has weaken or even eliminated the relationship between the performance and the executive's position alteration to a certain extent. On the contrary, in the non-state-owned listed companies, the positive impact on the corporate governance imposed by the external environment will be significantly higher than it does in the state-owned listed companies.
The theoretical contribution of this paper is to provide the empirical evidence of the impact on the corporate governance imposed by the institutional environment among different areas of a country, and then is to analyze the basic characteristics of the corporate governance under the transitional features in our economy, furthermore is to recognize in more details the different effects on the internal corporate governance for the different external governance in the different enterprises in which the property of the stock rights is also different. Looking from the findings of this article, the reform relying solely on the internal governance mechanism can hardly achieve the ultimate goal, creating a market economy environment for the enterprise's independent development and self-operation as soon as possible, perfecting the external legal environment in order to raise the growth level of the market orientation and the competition degree, and realizing effective self-protection for Shareholder's interests is the important issues at present. On the one hand, we must continue to strengthen the laws and regulations to ensure that the interests of the shareholders shall be inviolable, on the other hand, we must further tight up the system construction, reverse the huge difference in the governance environment in different regions. In addition, the article also found that in the process of deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises, we should establish and perfect the modern enterprise system which is characterized by the "Clearly defining property rights, specifying rights and responsibilities, separating ownership from daily management and adopting scientific management", and change the conditions that the state-owned enterprises have a diverse of operating targets, and then raise the level of internal governance by improving the external institutional environment.
实证研究结果发现，经营业绩对我国公司的高管变更具有重要影响，业绩与高管变更之间存在着显著的负相关关系。但业绩与高管变更间的负相关关系会同时受到公司所处外部制度环境的制约，企业所处的环境使得股东无法有效的监督经理的行为或衡量经理的业绩，通过市场对高管人员经营绩效评价的能力较弱，业绩与高管变更之间的相关程度较低。
此外，文章还进一步分析了不同股权性质企业中，制度环境对公司治理影响效果的差异，相对于其他企业，国家股股东给高管更多的社会目标，政府所有的企业存在着复杂的委托——代理关系，政府的效用目标函数应该是社会利益的最大化，既包括经济诉求，也包括政治诉求，因此国有企业所承担的社会目标以及所遭受的干预，会在一定程度上弱化，甚至是消除业绩与高管变更之间的关系。而相反，在非国有上市公司中，外部制度环境对公司治理的积极影响，则要明显高于国有上市公司。
本文的理论贡献在于，提供了一国内部不同地区间制度环境对公司治理影响的经验证据，分析了我国转轨经济特征下公司治理的基本特征，并进一步认识了不同股权性质企业的外部治理对内部治理的作用差异。从本文的研究结果来看，单纯依靠公司内部治理机制改革难以实现经济改革的最终目标，为企业尽快创造独立发展、自我经营的市场经济环境，提高市场化发育水平和竞争程度等外部制度环境，实现股东有效保护自身权益是当前的重要问题。此外，本文也发现，在深化国有企业的改革过程中，必须建立和完善“产权明晰、权责明确、政企分开、管理科学”的现代企业制度，改变国有企业经营目标多样性的状况，通过改善外部制度环境，最终实现国有企业内部治理水平的提高。
Under the modern enterprise system, the corporate governance mechanism is the key factor in determining the enterprise's performance, and scientific recruitment and selection is the premise to form the best governance structure, by linking the recruitment and selection of the company's executives to enterprise's performance, to some extent, the good contract design may restrain the manager to idle. However, the internal governance mechanism often needs to match with the external governance environment.Based on this, from the New Institutional Economics theory and the Corporate Governance Theory points of view, taking the transaction cost analysis as the theoretical basis, and linking the economic environment to the China's transformation, this article analyzes the external institutional environment's impact on the corporate governance by using a empirical method combined with theoretical analysis, taking listed companies from 2001 to 2006 in Shanghai City and Shenzhen City as objects of study.
The empirical study result has found that the operating performance exerts great influence on the position alteration of the company's executives in our country, there is a significant negative correlation between the operating performance and the position change of the company's executives.However, the negative correlation between the performance and the position alteration of the executives will be added the environment restriction from external system simultaneously, In those regions in which the external institutional environment is much worse, the shareholders are at a natural disadvantage of information, and can not supervise the executives or evaluate their performance more effectively, so, it is much difficult to evaluate the performance through the market activities, there is a weaker correlation between the performance and the position alteration of the executives.
In addition, the article has also analyzed in more details the different effects on the corporate governance for the different institutional environment in the different enterprises in which the property of the stock rights is different. Compared with other enterprises, state-owned shares set more social objectives for the executives, there is a complex relation between principal and agent in the state-owned enterprises, the objective utility function for the government should be to maximize the social benefit, including not only economic resorts, but also the political resorts.therefore, the social objectives undertaken by the state-owned enterprises and the intervention has weaken or even eliminated the relationship between the performance and the executive's position alteration to a certain extent. On the contrary, in the non-state-owned listed companies, the positive impact on the corporate governance imposed by the external environment will be significantly higher than it does in the state-owned listed companies.
The theoretical contribution of this paper is to provide the empirical evidence of the impact on the corporate governance imposed by the institutional environment among different areas of a country, and then is to analyze the basic characteristics of the corporate governance under the transitional features in our economy, furthermore is to recognize in more details the different effects on the internal corporate governance for the different external governance in the different enterprises in which the property of the stock rights is also different. Looking from the findings of this article, the reform relying solely on the internal governance mechanism can hardly achieve the ultimate goal, creating a market economy environment for the enterprise's independent development and self-operation as soon as possible, perfecting the external legal environment in order to raise the growth level of the market orientation and the competition degree, and realizing effective self-protection for Shareholder's interests is the important issues at present. On the one hand, we must continue to strengthen the laws and regulations to ensure that the interests of the shareholders shall be inviolable, on the other hand, we must further tight up the system construction, reverse the huge difference in the governance environment in different regions. In addition, the article also found that in the process of deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises, we should establish and perfect the modern enterprise system which is characterized by the "Clearly defining property rights, specifying rights and responsibilities, separating ownership from daily management and adopting scientific management", and change the conditions that the state-owned enterprises have a diverse of operating targets, and then raise the level of internal governance by improving the external institutional environment.
引文
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