上市公司股东之间的利益冲突研究
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摘要
在股权集中的公司中，由于控股股东拥有对公司的控制权，公司治理面临的主要代理问题不再是传统公司治理理论所研究的股东与经营者之间的代理问题，而是控股股东与小股东之间的利益冲突问题。与大多数新兴市场国家一样，我国上市公司的股权集中程度很高，上市公司通常存在控制性股东。更为特殊的是，长期以来，我国上市公司大股东所持有的股份基本上是非流通股，与持有流通股的小股东的利益不一致，使得股东之间的利益冲突更加突出。近年来，大股东侵占小股东利益、掏空上市公司的案例屡屡出现，研究我国特殊的公司治理问题，探析股东之间利益冲突及其制约途径，具有重要的现实意义。
本文在回顾国内外相关研究的基础上，从我国证券市场功能定位与发行审批制度、公司的改制上市历程、股权分置的制度设计、投资者保护的法律环境等方面，分析了我国上市公司股东之间存在严重利益冲突的根源和制度背景，特殊的制度背景使我国上市公司控股股东与小股东之间的利益冲突更为严重。通过对大股东掏空上市公司典型案例的研究，本文揭示了大股东实施支持行为和掏空行为的动机与实施途径。
在制度背景分析和案例研究的基础上，本文使用我国1009家A股上市公司2001年至2004年数据构成的平衡面板数据，从关联交易、再融资效率角度对大股东与小股东之间的利益冲突进行了实证分析，并检验了股权制衡机制对大股东侵占和公司经营绩效的影响。
首先，对大股东是否利用关联交易实施支持行为与掏空行为进行了检验。研究表明，第一大股东对上市公司的控制力越强，上市公司发生关联交易的概率和金额越大。同时，最终控制人通过间接持股方式对上市公司实施控制的情况下，上市公司发生关联交易的金额大于最终控制人直接持股控制的情况。通过关联交易，大股东既可以实施掏空行为，也可以在上市公司有再融资、扭亏、保牌等动机而需要支持时实施支持行为。
其次，本文检验了上市公司股权再融资后业绩下滑的影响因素。无论以会计业绩还是股票投资收益度量，我国上市公司实施股权再融资后绩效下降明显，上市公司最终控制人对公司的控制方式是影响股权再融资后绩效下降的重要因素，被间接控制的公司再融资后绩效下降更为显著，表明掏空行为是导致股权再融资效率低下的一个原因。
最后，检验了股权制衡对股东之间利益冲突和经营绩效的影响。股权制衡机制可以对大股东的侵占行为产生制约，减轻大股东对公司利益的侵占，有利于保护小股东利益。但同时，股权制衡可能对公司的经营绩效产生显著的负面影响，这种负面影响在国有控股的公司和业绩好的公司中更为明显。
本文的研究结论对于进一步优化股权结构，完善公司治理机制具有借鉴作用。
In a closely-held company, since the controlling shareholder holds the absolutecorporate control, the primary agency problem in corporate governance is no longer theone between shareholders and managers, which is proposed by the traditional corporategovernance theory, but the interest conflicts between the controlling shareholder andminority shareholders. As listed companies in most emerging markets, those in Chinahave high ownership concentration, with controlling shareholders in most cases. Moreextraordinarily, during a long period of time, the shares held by major Shareholders inChinese listed companies are basically non-circulation shares. Thus, major shareholdershave interests, which are not in accordance with minority shareholders, who usuallyhold public circulation shares. In this way, the interest conflicts between shareholdersare highlighted. Recently, major shareholders frequently get involved in cases asinfringement upon the benefit of minority shareholders, or tunneling of the listedcompanies. Therefore, the research on the particular corporate governance problem inChina, i.e. exploring the interest conflicts between shareholders and the solution forrestricting the expropriation behaviors of controlling shareholders has its practicalsignificance.
Based on the review of related international and domestic literature, thisdissertation analyzes the root and system background of the serious interest conflictsbetween shareholders in Chinese listed companies, in respects of the functionalorientation of security market, the approval regulation of security issuance, thereforming and listing process of companies, the mechanism scheme of non-tradableshare reform, and the legal environment of investor protection in China. The particularsystem background aggravates the interest conflict between the controlling shareholdersand minority shareholders in Chinese listed-companies. Examining the typical cases thatmajor shareholders tunnel listed companies, this dissertation reveals the motivations andapproaches of their propping and tunneling behavior.
This dissertation conducts an empirical study of interest conflicts between majorshareholders and minority shareholders in the view of related party transaction andrefinancing efficiency, and tests the effects of the check-and-balance ownershipstructure on the expropriation of major stockholders and those on the corporate operating performance, using the panel data of 1009 Chinese A-shares listed companiesin the fiscal years 2001-2004.
Firstly, this dissertation makes an empirical test on whether large shareholderscarry out propping and tunneling. The empirical results indicate that, the stronger thecontrolling power the first shareholder possesses, the higher probability the related partytransactions occur and the larger transaction amount is involved. In addition, in the casethat the controlling shareholder exerts his influence on the listed companies through anindirect way, the amount involved in related party transactions is larger than that in thecase of a direct one. Through the related party transactions, the major shareholdersmight carry out tunneling, and at the same time, they might carry out propping when thelisted companies need such prompt spurred by refinancing, avoiding loss, and delistingrisk.
Secondly, this dissertation examines the influencing factors of operatingperformance decline after equity refinancing in listed companies. Measured by eitheraccounting figure or investment return, operating performance of listed companies fallsremarkably after equity refinancing, which could be interpreted as how the ultimatecontroller exert his influence on the corporation as a critical factor. Operatingperformance falls further in the case that the listed company is controlled in an indirectway, which shows that the tunneling by large shareholders is an important reason forlow-level efficiency of equity refinancing.
Finally, this dissertation analyzes the advantageous and disadvantageous effects ofthe check-and-balance ownership structure. This paper finds that check-and-balanceownership structure could restrict the expropriation of large shareholders, mitigate theirbenefits extraction, and protect the benefit of minority shareholders. However, thisstructure has significantly negative influences on the corporate operating performance,especially in the state-owned companies and well performed companies.
The conclusions contribute some suggestions regarding the optimization ofownership structure and the improvement of the corporate governance mechanism.
本文在回顾国内外相关研究的基础上，从我国证券市场功能定位与发行审批制度、公司的改制上市历程、股权分置的制度设计、投资者保护的法律环境等方面，分析了我国上市公司股东之间存在严重利益冲突的根源和制度背景，特殊的制度背景使我国上市公司控股股东与小股东之间的利益冲突更为严重。通过对大股东掏空上市公司典型案例的研究，本文揭示了大股东实施支持行为和掏空行为的动机与实施途径。
在制度背景分析和案例研究的基础上，本文使用我国1009家A股上市公司2001年至2004年数据构成的平衡面板数据，从关联交易、再融资效率角度对大股东与小股东之间的利益冲突进行了实证分析，并检验了股权制衡机制对大股东侵占和公司经营绩效的影响。
首先，对大股东是否利用关联交易实施支持行为与掏空行为进行了检验。研究表明，第一大股东对上市公司的控制力越强，上市公司发生关联交易的概率和金额越大。同时，最终控制人通过间接持股方式对上市公司实施控制的情况下，上市公司发生关联交易的金额大于最终控制人直接持股控制的情况。通过关联交易，大股东既可以实施掏空行为，也可以在上市公司有再融资、扭亏、保牌等动机而需要支持时实施支持行为。
其次，本文检验了上市公司股权再融资后业绩下滑的影响因素。无论以会计业绩还是股票投资收益度量，我国上市公司实施股权再融资后绩效下降明显，上市公司最终控制人对公司的控制方式是影响股权再融资后绩效下降的重要因素，被间接控制的公司再融资后绩效下降更为显著，表明掏空行为是导致股权再融资效率低下的一个原因。
最后，检验了股权制衡对股东之间利益冲突和经营绩效的影响。股权制衡机制可以对大股东的侵占行为产生制约，减轻大股东对公司利益的侵占，有利于保护小股东利益。但同时，股权制衡可能对公司的经营绩效产生显著的负面影响，这种负面影响在国有控股的公司和业绩好的公司中更为明显。
本文的研究结论对于进一步优化股权结构，完善公司治理机制具有借鉴作用。
In a closely-held company, since the controlling shareholder holds the absolutecorporate control, the primary agency problem in corporate governance is no longer theone between shareholders and managers, which is proposed by the traditional corporategovernance theory, but the interest conflicts between the controlling shareholder andminority shareholders. As listed companies in most emerging markets, those in Chinahave high ownership concentration, with controlling shareholders in most cases. Moreextraordinarily, during a long period of time, the shares held by major Shareholders inChinese listed companies are basically non-circulation shares. Thus, major shareholdershave interests, which are not in accordance with minority shareholders, who usuallyhold public circulation shares. In this way, the interest conflicts between shareholdersare highlighted. Recently, major shareholders frequently get involved in cases asinfringement upon the benefit of minority shareholders, or tunneling of the listedcompanies. Therefore, the research on the particular corporate governance problem inChina, i.e. exploring the interest conflicts between shareholders and the solution forrestricting the expropriation behaviors of controlling shareholders has its practicalsignificance.
Based on the review of related international and domestic literature, thisdissertation analyzes the root and system background of the serious interest conflictsbetween shareholders in Chinese listed companies, in respects of the functionalorientation of security market, the approval regulation of security issuance, thereforming and listing process of companies, the mechanism scheme of non-tradableshare reform, and the legal environment of investor protection in China. The particularsystem background aggravates the interest conflict between the controlling shareholdersand minority shareholders in Chinese listed-companies. Examining the typical cases thatmajor shareholders tunnel listed companies, this dissertation reveals the motivations andapproaches of their propping and tunneling behavior.
This dissertation conducts an empirical study of interest conflicts between majorshareholders and minority shareholders in the view of related party transaction andrefinancing efficiency, and tests the effects of the check-and-balance ownershipstructure on the expropriation of major stockholders and those on the corporate operating performance, using the panel data of 1009 Chinese A-shares listed companiesin the fiscal years 2001-2004.
Firstly, this dissertation makes an empirical test on whether large shareholderscarry out propping and tunneling. The empirical results indicate that, the stronger thecontrolling power the first shareholder possesses, the higher probability the related partytransactions occur and the larger transaction amount is involved. In addition, in the casethat the controlling shareholder exerts his influence on the listed companies through anindirect way, the amount involved in related party transactions is larger than that in thecase of a direct one. Through the related party transactions, the major shareholdersmight carry out tunneling, and at the same time, they might carry out propping when thelisted companies need such prompt spurred by refinancing, avoiding loss, and delistingrisk.
Secondly, this dissertation examines the influencing factors of operatingperformance decline after equity refinancing in listed companies. Measured by eitheraccounting figure or investment return, operating performance of listed companies fallsremarkably after equity refinancing, which could be interpreted as how the ultimatecontroller exert his influence on the corporation as a critical factor. Operatingperformance falls further in the case that the listed company is controlled in an indirectway, which shows that the tunneling by large shareholders is an important reason forlow-level efficiency of equity refinancing.
Finally, this dissertation analyzes the advantageous and disadvantageous effects ofthe check-and-balance ownership structure. This paper finds that check-and-balanceownership structure could restrict the expropriation of large shareholders, mitigate theirbenefits extraction, and protect the benefit of minority shareholders. However, thisstructure has significantly negative influences on the corporate operating performance,especially in the state-owned companies and well performed companies.
The conclusions contribute some suggestions regarding the optimization ofownership structure and the improvement of the corporate governance mechanism.
引文
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