香港证券市场对我国内地跨境上市公司约束的有效性研究
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摘要
近年来，关于公司跨境上市行为的研究取得了重要进展，出现了若干从公司治理角度研究跨境上市这一资本市场行为的成果。有些学者试图以约束假说作为这类研究的理论基础，但另一些学者则发现境外证券市场对跨境上市公司的监管并非更加有效，因而认为公司选择跨境上市意在规避注册地证券市场的监管。约束与规避假说相互竞争的关键在于公司跨境上市能否加强对投资者的保护。鉴于盈余管理的普遍存在，而投资者保护程度与盈余管理行为密切相关，本文从盈余管理的角度研究境外证券市场对跨境上市公司约束的有效性，试图为约束与规避这两个相互竞争假说之分歧提供进一步的证据。
本文在借鉴国内外相关研究的基础上，结合我国内地公司跨境上市的制度背景和香港证券市场的监管现状，采用实证研究为主、规范与实证相结合的研究方法，研究香港证券市场对我国内地跨境上市公司约束的有效性，并在此基础上深入分析具体约束机制。本文的主要研究结论如下：
第一，AH股公司的操纵性应计显著低于纯A股公司，但是AH股公司线下项目和关联销售比例与纯A股公司并不存在显著的差异。这说明香港证券市场对我国内地跨境上市公司的约束在一定程度上是有效的，但是并非全面有效。
第二，AH股公司的线下项目和关联销售比例与纯H股公司相比不存在显著差异。这说明即使香港证券市场对我国内地跨境上市公司的约束并非全面有效，但是其约束力至少与内地证券市场对其上市公司的约束力相当，规避假说不成立。
第三，AH股公司的公司治理水平高于纯A股公司，这主要体现在AH股公司董事会更加独立、董事更加勤勉、更多地设立了审计委员会以及董事长和总经理两职合一的比例更低。这说明内地公司跨境上市存在治理效应。
第四，董事会的独立性(尤其是真正的独立性)和董事的勤勉能够显著降低操纵性应计，即董事会的独立性和董事勤勉程度的差异能够有助于解释操纵性应计的差异。结论一、三、四说明内地跨境上市公司面临的治理合约约束是香港证券市场实现有效约束的具体机制之一，且治理合约约束主要通过董事会独立性和董事的勤勉来体现。
第五，H股报表采用国际会计准则编制对减少A股报表的操纵性应计有一定的作用，但是稳健性检验没有得出一致的结论。总的来说，会计准则合约约束的效果有限。
In recent years, substantial progresses have been made in the field of research oncompanies' cross-listing. Some scholars attempt to explain the cross-listingphenomenon from the perspective of corporate governance and suggest bondinghypothesis, while some other scholars believe overseas securities markets do noteffectively govern cross-listing companies and they suggest avoiding hypothesis. Thecompeting point between the bonding hypothesis and avoiding hypothesis is whethercompanies' cross-listing can offer better investor protection. Given the pervasivenessof earnings management and closely correlation between investor protection andearnings management, the dissertation examines whether overseas securities marketsbind cross-listing companies effectively from the perspective of earnings management,and provide evidence on the divergence of the two competing hypothesis.
The dissertation studies the bonding effectiveness of Hong Kong securitiesmarket on mainland cross-listing companies and then the specific bonding mechanismon the basis of institutional background of mainland companies' cross-listing and thestatus quo of regulation of Hong Kong securities market. The main findings of thedissertation are as follows:
1. Discretionary accruals of AH-share companies are significantly lower thanpure A-share companies, while items below the line and the ratio of related party salesof AH-share companies are not significantly different from pure A-share companies.This finding suggests Hong Kong securities market's bonding on mainlandcross-listing companies is effective to some extent, but not completely effective.
2. Items below the line and the ratio of related party sales of AH-share companiesare not significantly different from pure H-share companies. This finding suggestsalthough Hong Kong securities market's bonding on mainland cross-listing companiesis not completely effective, it at least has the same power as mainland securitiesmarket. So avoiding hypothesis is not supported.
3. Compared to pure A-share companies, AH-share companies have bettercorporate governance, such as AH-share companies' boards of directors are more independent; AH-share companies' board meetings are more frequent, which meansboard members devote more time to the companies; More of AH-share companies setup audit committee; Less of AH-share companies' board chairs are also the CEOs.This finding suggests mainland companies' cross-listing has governance effect.
4. Independence of board of directors (substantial independence) and diligence ofboard members are negatively related to the discretionary accruals, which means theindependence and diligent of boards of directors can explain the difference ofdiscretionary accruals between pure A-share companies and AH-share companies.This finding suggests governance contract bonding is an effective bonding mechanismand the independence of board of directors and diligence of board members play thekey roles in governance contract bonding.
5. Adopting international accounting standards to prepare H-share financialstatements can help reduce the level of discretionary accruals of A-share financialstatements to some extent, but robust tests do not produce the consistent results. Sothe effectiveness of accounting standard contract bonding is limited.
本文在借鉴国内外相关研究的基础上，结合我国内地公司跨境上市的制度背景和香港证券市场的监管现状，采用实证研究为主、规范与实证相结合的研究方法，研究香港证券市场对我国内地跨境上市公司约束的有效性，并在此基础上深入分析具体约束机制。本文的主要研究结论如下：
第一，AH股公司的操纵性应计显著低于纯A股公司，但是AH股公司线下项目和关联销售比例与纯A股公司并不存在显著的差异。这说明香港证券市场对我国内地跨境上市公司的约束在一定程度上是有效的，但是并非全面有效。
第二，AH股公司的线下项目和关联销售比例与纯H股公司相比不存在显著差异。这说明即使香港证券市场对我国内地跨境上市公司的约束并非全面有效，但是其约束力至少与内地证券市场对其上市公司的约束力相当，规避假说不成立。
第三，AH股公司的公司治理水平高于纯A股公司，这主要体现在AH股公司董事会更加独立、董事更加勤勉、更多地设立了审计委员会以及董事长和总经理两职合一的比例更低。这说明内地公司跨境上市存在治理效应。
第四，董事会的独立性(尤其是真正的独立性)和董事的勤勉能够显著降低操纵性应计，即董事会的独立性和董事勤勉程度的差异能够有助于解释操纵性应计的差异。结论一、三、四说明内地跨境上市公司面临的治理合约约束是香港证券市场实现有效约束的具体机制之一，且治理合约约束主要通过董事会独立性和董事的勤勉来体现。
第五，H股报表采用国际会计准则编制对减少A股报表的操纵性应计有一定的作用，但是稳健性检验没有得出一致的结论。总的来说，会计准则合约约束的效果有限。
In recent years, substantial progresses have been made in the field of research oncompanies' cross-listing. Some scholars attempt to explain the cross-listingphenomenon from the perspective of corporate governance and suggest bondinghypothesis, while some other scholars believe overseas securities markets do noteffectively govern cross-listing companies and they suggest avoiding hypothesis. Thecompeting point between the bonding hypothesis and avoiding hypothesis is whethercompanies' cross-listing can offer better investor protection. Given the pervasivenessof earnings management and closely correlation between investor protection andearnings management, the dissertation examines whether overseas securities marketsbind cross-listing companies effectively from the perspective of earnings management,and provide evidence on the divergence of the two competing hypothesis.
The dissertation studies the bonding effectiveness of Hong Kong securitiesmarket on mainland cross-listing companies and then the specific bonding mechanismon the basis of institutional background of mainland companies' cross-listing and thestatus quo of regulation of Hong Kong securities market. The main findings of thedissertation are as follows:
1. Discretionary accruals of AH-share companies are significantly lower thanpure A-share companies, while items below the line and the ratio of related party salesof AH-share companies are not significantly different from pure A-share companies.This finding suggests Hong Kong securities market's bonding on mainlandcross-listing companies is effective to some extent, but not completely effective.
2. Items below the line and the ratio of related party sales of AH-share companiesare not significantly different from pure H-share companies. This finding suggestsalthough Hong Kong securities market's bonding on mainland cross-listing companiesis not completely effective, it at least has the same power as mainland securitiesmarket. So avoiding hypothesis is not supported.
3. Compared to pure A-share companies, AH-share companies have bettercorporate governance, such as AH-share companies' boards of directors are more independent; AH-share companies' board meetings are more frequent, which meansboard members devote more time to the companies; More of AH-share companies setup audit committee; Less of AH-share companies' board chairs are also the CEOs.This finding suggests mainland companies' cross-listing has governance effect.
4. Independence of board of directors (substantial independence) and diligence ofboard members are negatively related to the discretionary accruals, which means theindependence and diligent of boards of directors can explain the difference ofdiscretionary accruals between pure A-share companies and AH-share companies.This finding suggests governance contract bonding is an effective bonding mechanismand the independence of board of directors and diligence of board members play thekey roles in governance contract bonding.
5. Adopting international accounting standards to prepare H-share financialstatements can help reduce the level of discretionary accruals of A-share financialstatements to some extent, but robust tests do not produce the consistent results. Sothe effectiveness of accounting standard contract bonding is limited.
引文
[1]本小节的文献综述参考了王学军，肖华译，曲晓辉校．盈余管理研究回顾及其对会计准则建设的启示[J]．会计研究，2000(11)：52—60．
[1]参考周正庆．证券知识读本(修订本)[M]．北京：中国金融出版社，2006．
[1]本节对投资者保护机制、发行和上市机制、争议解决机制等问题的描述主要参考王春阁．内地公司香港上市及两地监管合作研究[M]．北京：北京大学出版社，2005．
[1]2002年我国最高人民法院发布的《关于受理证券市场因虚假陈述引发的民事侵权纠纷案件有关问题的通知》，为法院受理证券民事诉讼提供了制度保证，但是要求对此类案件的受理要以证监会已作过行政处罚为前提。而2003年最高人民法院出台的《关于审理证券市场因虚假陈述引发民事赔偿案件的若干规定》虽然增加了司法机关对上市公司已做过刑事判决也可作为法院受理案件的前提，但与香港《证券及期货条例》的规定相比，显示出了较高的民事诉讼门槛，不利于投资者进行民事诉讼。
[2]见《检讨证券及期货市场规管架构运作专家小组报告书》http://www.info.gov.hk/info/expert/expertreport-c.htm
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[1]参考周正庆．证券知识读本(修订本)[M]．北京：中国金融出版社，2006．
[1]本节对投资者保护机制、发行和上市机制、争议解决机制等问题的描述主要参考王春阁．内地公司香港上市及两地监管合作研究[M]．北京：北京大学出版社，2005．
[1]2002年我国最高人民法院发布的《关于受理证券市场因虚假陈述引发的民事侵权纠纷案件有关问题的通知》，为法院受理证券民事诉讼提供了制度保证，但是要求对此类案件的受理要以证监会已作过行政处罚为前提。而2003年最高人民法院出台的《关于审理证券市场因虚假陈述引发民事赔偿案件的若干规定》虽然增加了司法机关对上市公司已做过刑事判决也可作为法院受理案件的前提，但与香港《证券及期货条例》的规定相比，显示出了较高的民事诉讼门槛，不利于投资者进行民事诉讼。
[2]见《检讨证券及期货市场规管架构运作专家小组报告书》http://www.info.gov.hk/info/expert/expertreport-c.htm
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