政府主导下的公司治理研究：来自我国上市公司CEO更换的证据
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摘要
现代公司制中所有权与控制权分离,导致了委托代理问题的出现。如何从公司治理的角度出发,设立适当的激励和监督机制,限制代理人背离委托人利益行为的发生,减少委托代理成本,一直以来是国内外的研究热点。而能否依据经营业绩对CEO(也即代理人)进行更换是公司治理是否有效的一个标志。本文从我国上市公司CEO更换的实际情况出发,基于政府主导这一制度背景研究我国公司治理的现状和有效性。
我国的证券市场脱胎于转型经济中,其设立初衷是为国有企业改革和解困服务。为保持国家对上市公司的控制力,国有股权在上市公司中占了很大比重,并且这些股权不能上市流通(股改前)。鉴于此,政府的动机和行为会对上市公司产生重大影响,从而影响委托代理问题的各个环节。由于国有股东作为委托人不具有人格化特质,其对代理人的监督激励往往不足。这种激励可能具有不对称性,乃至可能出现逆向激励(如预算软约束)以及“内部人控制”等问题。同时,由于政府股东本身拥有多重目标(如促进就业、实施某种经济战略、维护社会稳定等),使得其控制的上市公司也具有一定程度的多重目标性,从而表现出非市场化的行为,违背股东利益最大化的原则,使得国有上市公司中的委托代理关系极为复杂。
因此,利用1995年至2003年间我国上市公司中CEO更换的数据,本文主要从债权人治理的有效性、不同业绩水平下董事会领导结构与公司治理的关系以及多重目标下不同终极产权中公司治理机制的比较等方面,对政府主导下的公司治理问题进行了实证研究。研究结果表明:
首先,本应该在解决“内部人控制”问题上发挥积极作用的银行债权人没有起到应有的作用,反而进一步导致了预算软约束的出现,降低了经营亏损上市公司的公司治理效率;而作为另一种重要债务融资来源的商业信用债权人由于存在监督激励和监督能力方面的优势,增加了更换业绩不善的CEO的可能性,从而在一定程度上改善了上市公司的公司治理。
另外,在政府主导背景下,当国有控股上市公司处于不同业绩状态时,股东和董事会对CEO有着不同程度的监督激励,从而导致了不同实质的CEO强制性更换。此时,不同业绩水平对应的董事会领导结构与CEO更换之间的关系有所不同,而其对公司治理的意义也不同。在那些发生亏损的公司中,CEO和董事长两职合一有利于企业问责机制的形成,因而并不能降低CEO更换的可能性:而在那些经营盈利能力一般的公司中,两职合一产生了严重的委托代理问题,限制了董事会对CEO监督和约束效力的发挥,不利于公司治理效率的提升;最后,对于经营状况很好的公司来说,两职合一有利于保护经营业绩出色的CEO免受非业绩原因导致的不正常更换的影响,可以看成公司治理效率良好的一个标志。
最后,国有控股和民营控股上市公司的治理结构和目标函数有着很大的不同。国有控股上市公司往往面临“行政干预”而承担一定的社会性负担,具有多重目标的特性,因而有可能偏离利润最大化目标。因此,在国有控股上市公司的绩效考核机制中,资产周转率是一个非常重要的绩效指标。而由于存在非营利目标及缺乏成本控制的激励,利润边际并不是国有控股上市公司考核和决定CEO去留的重要指标。此外,在存在超额雇员或追求机会主义行为等非业绩目标时,国有股东更倾向于基于资产周转率来考核和更换CEO,可这一倾向在民营控股上市公司中并不明显。对于民营控股上市公司而言,对成本控制和经营效率的考虑也即对利润边际的考虑是其对CEO进行绩效考核的主要因素。
对于以上结果,本文认为我国上市公司中很多治理机制失效的根本原因就在于政府主导。因此,考察我国上市公司的公司治理问题必须基于政府主导这一特殊环境进行分析,本文的结束部分对这一问题进行了相应的总结。
The separation of ownership and control leads to the emergence of principal agency problems in modern corporations.In order to reduce the agency costs caused by the divergence of interests between principal(shareholders) and agent(managers), a substantial body of literature has examined the effectiveness of various mechanisms for enhancing the effectiveness of CEO monitoring.And it is also a key indicator of the corporate governance's efficiency that whether CEO turnover decision is linked to his operation performance or not.Thus,this paper try to investigate the current status and efficiency of corporate governance from the view of CEO turnover in China's listed firm under the institutional background of government control.
As we know,China's stock market comes to existence within the transitional economy and its initial objective is to serve the reform of state-owned firm and to relieve their financial burden during this process.TO keep the government's dominance position in these listed firms,there are huge of non-tradable shares owned by the government(before the split-share reform).Hence,the incentives and behaviors of government will definitely have a strong impact on those listed firms they controlled,which will further have influence on each aspect of the principal agent relationship.Due to the phenonmena of absence of owner as principal,there will be deficient incentive of the state shareholder to monitor its agent.And this kind of incentive will bring on an asymmetry structure or even adverse structure(such as soft budget phenomenon),which can further lead to the "insider control" problem.In the meantime,those state-controlled listed firms will also have multi-objectives when their shareholders(government) bear with these multi-objectives(such as increasing the employment level,implementing some special economic strategy and maintaining the stabilization of the society) naturally.Consequently,these listed firms will not follow the market principle all the time and might sometimes do harm to the market value of themselves,while the principal agent relationship in this situation is much more complicated than that in private-controlled firms.
In view of the above background,based on the CEO turnover data in China's listed firms from year 1995 to 2003,this study conducts an empirical research on the corporate governance problem under the government control from the following
three issues:the effectiveness of creditor monitoring,the relation between board leadership structure and corporate governance efficiency with different financial performance and the comparison of different mechanism between state-controlled and private-controlled listed firms with multi-objective functions.The results show that:
Firstly,bank as a creditor does not behave its supposed role to lessen the "insider control" problem and even induces the soft budget problem,which depressed the effectiveness of corporate governance in loss-making listed firms.
However,the provider of trade credit which is another important financing source improves the corporate govemance efficiency when it increases the probability of CEO turnover in poorly performed firms because of its advantage on the monitoring incentive and ability.
Secondly,state shareholders or board of directors have different incentives at different level to oversee CEO under the institutional background of government control when the state-controlled listed firms are experiencing different performance status,which then lead to different nature of forced CEO turnover.Accordingly, there will be different relation between board leadership structure and CEO tumover mechanism under different performance status and the impact of such relation on the efficiency of corporate governance will also be different.Because it is very difficult to find a scapegoat,state shareholders have greater incentive to discipline poorly performing CEOs when the CEO and chairperson is the same person when these firms are making financial losses.There will be severe principal agent problems in the marginal performing firms because the vested position of chairman and CEO into one person can lead to less effective monitoring incentives from board of directors to oversee CEO,which may do harm to the corporate govemance efficiency.However, CEO duality may positively contribute to the corporate governance of out-performing firms by protecting well performing CEOs from being replaced with non-performance reasons,which can be regarded as an indicator of the efficient corporate governance.
Thirdly,there are great differences on the governance mechanism and objective functions between state-controlled and private-controlled listed firms.Some social responsibilities are assumed on the state-controlled listed firms due to govemment's intervention.These state-controlled listed firms will exhibit some non-profit-seeking behavior and might go against the profit-maximization principle in some situation. For state-controlled listed firms,asset turnover is a very important index in the performance evaluation mechanism.Contrary to asset turnover,profit margin is not a key measure of CEO's performance due to the existence of non-profit objectives and lacking of incentive to control the operational cost.Moreover,state shareholders tend to monitor CEOs and evaluate their performance basing on asset turnover when there is an indication of non-profit objective such as over-employment or opportunistic behavior,while this is not the case for those private-controlled listed firms.Actually, the pursuit of higher profit margin,which means the persuit of cost control and operational efficiency,is the main criteria for private-controlled listed firms to assess CEOs' performance.
Overall,the government control can be regarded as the root of the failure of some traditional corporate governance mechanism in China's listed firms.Hence,the special background of government control should be placed into the analysis framework whenever we want to study the corporate governance problem in China's listed firms.Thus,some conclusive words are then presented in the final section.
我国的证券市场脱胎于转型经济中,其设立初衷是为国有企业改革和解困服务。为保持国家对上市公司的控制力,国有股权在上市公司中占了很大比重,并且这些股权不能上市流通(股改前)。鉴于此,政府的动机和行为会对上市公司产生重大影响,从而影响委托代理问题的各个环节。由于国有股东作为委托人不具有人格化特质,其对代理人的监督激励往往不足。这种激励可能具有不对称性,乃至可能出现逆向激励(如预算软约束)以及“内部人控制”等问题。同时,由于政府股东本身拥有多重目标(如促进就业、实施某种经济战略、维护社会稳定等),使得其控制的上市公司也具有一定程度的多重目标性,从而表现出非市场化的行为,违背股东利益最大化的原则,使得国有上市公司中的委托代理关系极为复杂。
因此,利用1995年至2003年间我国上市公司中CEO更换的数据,本文主要从债权人治理的有效性、不同业绩水平下董事会领导结构与公司治理的关系以及多重目标下不同终极产权中公司治理机制的比较等方面,对政府主导下的公司治理问题进行了实证研究。研究结果表明:
首先,本应该在解决“内部人控制”问题上发挥积极作用的银行债权人没有起到应有的作用,反而进一步导致了预算软约束的出现,降低了经营亏损上市公司的公司治理效率;而作为另一种重要债务融资来源的商业信用债权人由于存在监督激励和监督能力方面的优势,增加了更换业绩不善的CEO的可能性,从而在一定程度上改善了上市公司的公司治理。
另外,在政府主导背景下,当国有控股上市公司处于不同业绩状态时,股东和董事会对CEO有着不同程度的监督激励,从而导致了不同实质的CEO强制性更换。此时,不同业绩水平对应的董事会领导结构与CEO更换之间的关系有所不同,而其对公司治理的意义也不同。在那些发生亏损的公司中,CEO和董事长两职合一有利于企业问责机制的形成,因而并不能降低CEO更换的可能性:而在那些经营盈利能力一般的公司中,两职合一产生了严重的委托代理问题,限制了董事会对CEO监督和约束效力的发挥,不利于公司治理效率的提升;最后,对于经营状况很好的公司来说,两职合一有利于保护经营业绩出色的CEO免受非业绩原因导致的不正常更换的影响,可以看成公司治理效率良好的一个标志。
最后,国有控股和民营控股上市公司的治理结构和目标函数有着很大的不同。国有控股上市公司往往面临“行政干预”而承担一定的社会性负担,具有多重目标的特性,因而有可能偏离利润最大化目标。因此,在国有控股上市公司的绩效考核机制中,资产周转率是一个非常重要的绩效指标。而由于存在非营利目标及缺乏成本控制的激励,利润边际并不是国有控股上市公司考核和决定CEO去留的重要指标。此外,在存在超额雇员或追求机会主义行为等非业绩目标时,国有股东更倾向于基于资产周转率来考核和更换CEO,可这一倾向在民营控股上市公司中并不明显。对于民营控股上市公司而言,对成本控制和经营效率的考虑也即对利润边际的考虑是其对CEO进行绩效考核的主要因素。
对于以上结果,本文认为我国上市公司中很多治理机制失效的根本原因就在于政府主导。因此,考察我国上市公司的公司治理问题必须基于政府主导这一特殊环境进行分析,本文的结束部分对这一问题进行了相应的总结。
The separation of ownership and control leads to the emergence of principal agency problems in modern corporations.In order to reduce the agency costs caused by the divergence of interests between principal(shareholders) and agent(managers), a substantial body of literature has examined the effectiveness of various mechanisms for enhancing the effectiveness of CEO monitoring.And it is also a key indicator of the corporate governance's efficiency that whether CEO turnover decision is linked to his operation performance or not.Thus,this paper try to investigate the current status and efficiency of corporate governance from the view of CEO turnover in China's listed firm under the institutional background of government control.
As we know,China's stock market comes to existence within the transitional economy and its initial objective is to serve the reform of state-owned firm and to relieve their financial burden during this process.TO keep the government's dominance position in these listed firms,there are huge of non-tradable shares owned by the government(before the split-share reform).Hence,the incentives and behaviors of government will definitely have a strong impact on those listed firms they controlled,which will further have influence on each aspect of the principal agent relationship.Due to the phenonmena of absence of owner as principal,there will be deficient incentive of the state shareholder to monitor its agent.And this kind of incentive will bring on an asymmetry structure or even adverse structure(such as soft budget phenomenon),which can further lead to the "insider control" problem.In the meantime,those state-controlled listed firms will also have multi-objectives when their shareholders(government) bear with these multi-objectives(such as increasing the employment level,implementing some special economic strategy and maintaining the stabilization of the society) naturally.Consequently,these listed firms will not follow the market principle all the time and might sometimes do harm to the market value of themselves,while the principal agent relationship in this situation is much more complicated than that in private-controlled firms.
In view of the above background,based on the CEO turnover data in China's listed firms from year 1995 to 2003,this study conducts an empirical research on the corporate governance problem under the government control from the following
three issues:the effectiveness of creditor monitoring,the relation between board leadership structure and corporate governance efficiency with different financial performance and the comparison of different mechanism between state-controlled and private-controlled listed firms with multi-objective functions.The results show that:
Firstly,bank as a creditor does not behave its supposed role to lessen the "insider control" problem and even induces the soft budget problem,which depressed the effectiveness of corporate governance in loss-making listed firms.
However,the provider of trade credit which is another important financing source improves the corporate govemance efficiency when it increases the probability of CEO turnover in poorly performed firms because of its advantage on the monitoring incentive and ability.
Secondly,state shareholders or board of directors have different incentives at different level to oversee CEO under the institutional background of government control when the state-controlled listed firms are experiencing different performance status,which then lead to different nature of forced CEO turnover.Accordingly, there will be different relation between board leadership structure and CEO tumover mechanism under different performance status and the impact of such relation on the efficiency of corporate governance will also be different.Because it is very difficult to find a scapegoat,state shareholders have greater incentive to discipline poorly performing CEOs when the CEO and chairperson is the same person when these firms are making financial losses.There will be severe principal agent problems in the marginal performing firms because the vested position of chairman and CEO into one person can lead to less effective monitoring incentives from board of directors to oversee CEO,which may do harm to the corporate govemance efficiency.However, CEO duality may positively contribute to the corporate governance of out-performing firms by protecting well performing CEOs from being replaced with non-performance reasons,which can be regarded as an indicator of the efficient corporate governance.
Thirdly,there are great differences on the governance mechanism and objective functions between state-controlled and private-controlled listed firms.Some social responsibilities are assumed on the state-controlled listed firms due to govemment's intervention.These state-controlled listed firms will exhibit some non-profit-seeking behavior and might go against the profit-maximization principle in some situation. For state-controlled listed firms,asset turnover is a very important index in the performance evaluation mechanism.Contrary to asset turnover,profit margin is not a key measure of CEO's performance due to the existence of non-profit objectives and lacking of incentive to control the operational cost.Moreover,state shareholders tend to monitor CEOs and evaluate their performance basing on asset turnover when there is an indication of non-profit objective such as over-employment or opportunistic behavior,while this is not the case for those private-controlled listed firms.Actually, the pursuit of higher profit margin,which means the persuit of cost control and operational efficiency,is the main criteria for private-controlled listed firms to assess CEOs' performance.
Overall,the government control can be regarded as the root of the failure of some traditional corporate governance mechanism in China's listed firms.Hence,the special background of government control should be placed into the analysis framework whenever we want to study the corporate governance problem in China's listed firms.Thus,some conclusive words are then presented in the final section.
引文
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