管理权力、自由裁量性投资与高管薪酬
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摘要
高管薪酬一直以来是一个关注多、争议大的话题,近年来,高管自定薪酬频繁见诸于媒体报道,但中国学者对此鲜有论述。本文基于中国上市公司的制度背景,采用CEO个人薪酬等多个新变量,首次从“管理权力—自由裁量性投资—绩效—薪酬”的动态视角,通过设计管理权力指标,检验“最优契约理论”和“管理权力理论”在中国的适用性,研究高管薪酬是否也成为代理问题的一部分,以及高管是否运用权力和自由裁量性投资自定薪酬的行为过程,以期为中国上市公司激励机制的完善提供经验证据。
本文通过对2005～2007年2840个中国上市公司样本的研究发现,随着薪酬市场化改革以及股权分置改革的逐步推行,高管薪酬与绩效正相关,但涨幅惊人。高管会通过权力自定薪酬,提高盈利时的相关性,降低亏损时的相关性或者与之不相关。此外,民营上市公司高管会迎合股东的偏好发放股利获取高薪,支持股利迎合理论,实际控制人兼任CEO时,他会利用其股东的权力自定高薪,但也会综合权衡现金分红和薪酬的财富替代效应。
并购是高管重构权力和自定薪酬契约的一个有效手段。并购时高管薪酬主要由并购规模决定;此外即使并购后绩效不理想,并购也会提高薪酬。薪酬与并购绩效具有显著的非对称性,如果并购绩效差,高管会因此而受到惩罚,降低并购所提高的薪酬。但是,管理权力型公司高管薪酬与管理权力显著正相关,与是否并购以及并购后市场绩效不相关;而非管理权力型公司高管薪酬与管理权力不相关,与是否并购以及并购后负的市场绩效显著正相关,此时,高管在通过并购重构权力自定薪酬过程中,会因为并购后差的绩效受到降低更多薪酬的惩罚。
随着有关激励法规的推行,高管薪酬与无形资产投资之间的关系逐步由负相关转为正相关,与R&D投资之间显著正相关;但是考虑管理权力后发现,权力大的高管会通过权力转移R&D对薪酬的考核约束,使其薪酬与R&D投资不相关,即使有R&D投资,也会利用权力降低有R&D投资时的薪酬绩效敏感度。
根据上述分析可以发现,近年来的绩效考核、薪酬管理政策逐步有效,薪酬契约具有一定的有效性,然而绩效对薪酬的解释力度较小。此外,高管会运用权力、并购和R&D等隐蔽性的自由裁量性投资行为自定高薪,导致薪酬契约严重无效。未来应密切关注管理权力以及自由裁量性投资行为在激励机制中可能存在的代理问题,进一步完善激励机制,合理引导和考核投资行为,健全公司治理机制,加强高管薪酬的信息披露等。
Executive compensation is a controversial topic over the last few years.In recent years, CEO set a large part of his own compensation frequently found in the media,but Chinese scholars have rarely discussed this popular point of view.This paper based on the background of the China's Listed Companies,firstly followed the route of "Managerial Power-Discretionary Investment-Corporate Performance-Executive Compensation".By constructing several measure of managerial power to test the applicability of Optimal Contract Theory and Managerial Power Theory in China.I try to find out whether executive compensation becomes an agency problem? Whether and how top managers really set their own pay by power and discretionary investment? I hope this study will provide empirical evidences on improving the incentive mechanism of the listed companies in china.
By using the 2840 samples over 3 years from 2005 to 2007,the paper find a positive relation between executive pay and firm performance.But managers can set their own pay by power,whose compensation is more sensitive to profits than its losses,the correlation between compensation and performance in some companies is weak or even not significantly. Furthermore,the executive can achieve high compensation by dividend to cater for the shareholder,which support the catering view of dividends,the founder CEOs can set their own pay,but they also trade-off the wealth between pay and dividend.
M&A is a effective way for executive to restructure power and set their own compensation. Exectutive compensation can be increased after an acquisition even post-acquisition performance is poor.The pay is significantly asymmetric to post-acquisition performance, powerful CEO compensation is positive to power and is not relative to acquisition and post-acquisition performance,but the others' pay is positive to the acquisition and decrease for poor post-acquisition performance.So acquiring executives who is without power would be penalized for poor post-acquisition performance.
Following the code of compensation bring into effect,the relation between executive compensation and intangible investment is from negative to positive,R&D spending are strongly positively associated with CEOs compensation,but powerful CEOs compensation are not relative to R&D spending,they can mitigate the R&D restriction and decrease the sensitivity of executives' pay to performance when investing R&D.
In conclusion,the codes about performance assessment and compensation management have worked in recent years.The compensation contract in Chinese listed companies has certain validity,but the interpretabe power of performance to pay is low,the compensation increased strikingly.This paper also find that executives can affect compensation or even determine theirselves with great power and discretionary investment such as M&A and R&D spending,which make the compensation contract is inefficient and make the compensation incentive as a part of the agency problem.It is suggested that we should pay attention to the agency problem may be caused by managerial power and discretionary investment;improving incentive system;guiding and assessing investment;improving corporate governance; strengthen the disclosure of compensation information etc.
本文通过对2005～2007年2840个中国上市公司样本的研究发现,随着薪酬市场化改革以及股权分置改革的逐步推行,高管薪酬与绩效正相关,但涨幅惊人。高管会通过权力自定薪酬,提高盈利时的相关性,降低亏损时的相关性或者与之不相关。此外,民营上市公司高管会迎合股东的偏好发放股利获取高薪,支持股利迎合理论,实际控制人兼任CEO时,他会利用其股东的权力自定高薪,但也会综合权衡现金分红和薪酬的财富替代效应。
并购是高管重构权力和自定薪酬契约的一个有效手段。并购时高管薪酬主要由并购规模决定;此外即使并购后绩效不理想,并购也会提高薪酬。薪酬与并购绩效具有显著的非对称性,如果并购绩效差,高管会因此而受到惩罚,降低并购所提高的薪酬。但是,管理权力型公司高管薪酬与管理权力显著正相关,与是否并购以及并购后市场绩效不相关;而非管理权力型公司高管薪酬与管理权力不相关,与是否并购以及并购后负的市场绩效显著正相关,此时,高管在通过并购重构权力自定薪酬过程中,会因为并购后差的绩效受到降低更多薪酬的惩罚。
随着有关激励法规的推行,高管薪酬与无形资产投资之间的关系逐步由负相关转为正相关,与R&D投资之间显著正相关;但是考虑管理权力后发现,权力大的高管会通过权力转移R&D对薪酬的考核约束,使其薪酬与R&D投资不相关,即使有R&D投资,也会利用权力降低有R&D投资时的薪酬绩效敏感度。
根据上述分析可以发现,近年来的绩效考核、薪酬管理政策逐步有效,薪酬契约具有一定的有效性,然而绩效对薪酬的解释力度较小。此外,高管会运用权力、并购和R&D等隐蔽性的自由裁量性投资行为自定高薪,导致薪酬契约严重无效。未来应密切关注管理权力以及自由裁量性投资行为在激励机制中可能存在的代理问题,进一步完善激励机制,合理引导和考核投资行为,健全公司治理机制,加强高管薪酬的信息披露等。
Executive compensation is a controversial topic over the last few years.In recent years, CEO set a large part of his own compensation frequently found in the media,but Chinese scholars have rarely discussed this popular point of view.This paper based on the background of the China's Listed Companies,firstly followed the route of "Managerial Power-Discretionary Investment-Corporate Performance-Executive Compensation".By constructing several measure of managerial power to test the applicability of Optimal Contract Theory and Managerial Power Theory in China.I try to find out whether executive compensation becomes an agency problem? Whether and how top managers really set their own pay by power and discretionary investment? I hope this study will provide empirical evidences on improving the incentive mechanism of the listed companies in china.
By using the 2840 samples over 3 years from 2005 to 2007,the paper find a positive relation between executive pay and firm performance.But managers can set their own pay by power,whose compensation is more sensitive to profits than its losses,the correlation between compensation and performance in some companies is weak or even not significantly. Furthermore,the executive can achieve high compensation by dividend to cater for the shareholder,which support the catering view of dividends,the founder CEOs can set their own pay,but they also trade-off the wealth between pay and dividend.
M&A is a effective way for executive to restructure power and set their own compensation. Exectutive compensation can be increased after an acquisition even post-acquisition performance is poor.The pay is significantly asymmetric to post-acquisition performance, powerful CEO compensation is positive to power and is not relative to acquisition and post-acquisition performance,but the others' pay is positive to the acquisition and decrease for poor post-acquisition performance.So acquiring executives who is without power would be penalized for poor post-acquisition performance.
Following the code of compensation bring into effect,the relation between executive compensation and intangible investment is from negative to positive,R&D spending are strongly positively associated with CEOs compensation,but powerful CEOs compensation are not relative to R&D spending,they can mitigate the R&D restriction and decrease the sensitivity of executives' pay to performance when investing R&D.
In conclusion,the codes about performance assessment and compensation management have worked in recent years.The compensation contract in Chinese listed companies has certain validity,but the interpretabe power of performance to pay is low,the compensation increased strikingly.This paper also find that executives can affect compensation or even determine theirselves with great power and discretionary investment such as M&A and R&D spending,which make the compensation contract is inefficient and make the compensation incentive as a part of the agency problem.It is suggested that we should pay attention to the agency problem may be caused by managerial power and discretionary investment;improving incentive system;guiding and assessing investment;improving corporate governance; strengthen the disclosure of compensation information etc.
引文
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