中国现阶段股权分置改革研究
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摘要
05年4月29日,中国证监会发布《关于上市公司股权分置改革试点有关问题的通知》,标志着股改的正式启动,被认为是资本市场的重大历史变革。各方期望股改的成功能推动资本市场的持续健康发展,而证监会也于06年12月26日认为“股改基本完成”、“资本市场正在发生着转折性的变化”。但市场自07年10月起,仅一年即从6124点暴跌到1664点,市场信心极度疲弱、正常功能无从发挥。本文致力于对股改进行全面的制度解析,寻求其制度深化的途径。
从股权分置制度溯源分析,股权分置是在渐进式转轨改革的大背景下,秉承“增量改革”路线,选择的临时性制度安排,在确保国有企业上市后国家绝对控股、国有资产不因股份上市流通而流失的同时,拓宽了国有企业的融资途径,更重要的是使中国股票市场获得了生存与发展的契机,有其历史合理性和必然性。
股权分置是特定时期的权宜之计,是市场机制向计划机制的让步,其负面作随资本市场发展进程日益凸显。主要表现在对资本市场基本功能发挥的制约与对参与主体行为的扭曲及利益的伤害,同时也内生了对股改的需求。股改必须服从整体经济、金融改革的时序,对股改的外生需求的分析长期以来被忽略了。而在商业银行改革需要、监管归位需要、国有资产管理体制改革需要等股改外生需求中,推进商业银行改革的需要,是05年股改得以实质启动的关键因素,这也说明了股改制度变迁的强制性特征。
在股改初次博弈中,非流通股东在对价“开价”时,并未充分考虑流通股东利益,而是存在明显的“锚定和调整”行为偏差。虽然不同公司的流通股东在所付出的历史成本,与受非流通股的可流通冲击,有显著的差别,但并未能在对价确定中被充分体现,“锚定效应”从一个侧面反映了对价博弈过程的不公平性。虽然非流通股东因此节约了对价博弈成本,获得了远高于流通股东的正收益,但未能建立股东利益一致性的基础,于上市公司长远发展不利。
股改第一阶段制度安排存在重大缺陷,集中体现在“大小非”问题对市场信心的极大压制;政府必须充当股改制度深化的初级行动团体,而对“大小非”问题的根本解决则是制度深化成功的必要条件;由于股改契约是具有时际性与不完全性的关系性契约,对其治理并不存在理论障碍。本文所提以“大非承诺”为核心的股改制度深化对策,是在肯定股改必要性的前提下,对股改第一阶段制度安排的重大缺陷的改进。
On April 29,2005,the issuance of "Circular on Issues relating to Pilot Reform of Listed Companies' Share Merger Reform",by China Securities Regulatory Commission,signed the official start of "reform of share merger",and which has been thought as "milestone" in the history of China's securities market.Every side expects the success of "share reform" can facilitate the healthy development of China's capital market.The China Securities Regulatory Commission held that "the share reform had roughly succeeded" on Dec 26 in 2006,and "the capital market was experiencing the turning point change".But since 2007 October,the stock index has sharply declined from 6124 point to 1664 point within only one year,the confidence to market is extremely weak and the capital market cannot normally function.This dissertation focuses on the profound institutional analyses into share reform and tries to quest the institutional deepening path of it.
In view of the origin of non-tradable shares institution,the share merger reform was carried out under the background of the "step by step" transition reform. It has inherited the "increment reform" path and chosen the interim institutional arrangement.The reform not only has insured the absolute share control of the state on the listed state-owned enterprises and isolated the state assets from reducing because of the circulation of originally non-tradable state shares,but also augmented the financing channel for state-owned enterprises and most importantly,afforded development opportunities to Chinese stock market.All of the above have historic rationality and inevitability.
For the share merger reform is the makeshift in special stage and the concession of market mechanism to planned mechanism,so the negative influence will increasingly apparent with the development of capital market.The negative influence mainly embodies in the restrict of fundamental function exertion of capital market and the torture and harm to the participating entity,while which give birth to the endogenous demand of share merger reform.The reform has to submitted the time sequence of macro economy and financial reform,but the exogenous demand of share reform has been neglected for a long time。Among the exogenous demands,the demand on advancing commercial bank reform is the key factor for the essential start-up of share merger reform in2005,and which also illuminate the compulsion character of the institutional evolution of share merger reform.
In the first stage game of share merger reform,the shareholders of non-tradable shares,in the process of bringing forward "consideration",did not fully take account into the benefits of shareholder's of tradable shares,so there apparently were the "anchoring and adjustment" behavior biases.Though the historic costs paid by the shareholders of tradable share in different enterprises significantly differ in contrast to the circulation shock from non-tradable shares,which was not fully embodied in the "consideration ratio".The "anchoring effect" in this dissertation reflects the injustice for the consideration game from one side.While the shareholders of non-tradable share in hence have retrenched the consideration game cost and gained the positive incomes outclassing the income of non-tradable shareholders,which will have disadvantages in the long-run development of listed companies without the construction of benefits consistency for all shareholders.
The share reform now is far from "roughly succeeded",there are momentous defects in the first stage of institution arrangement,and which mainly embodies in the huge suppress of "large and small non-tradable share" on confidence in market.The government should act as the "elementary action group" in the deepening of share merger reform,while the ultimate settlement to "large and small non-tradable share" problem is the necessary condition of the success of institutional deepening.There isn't theoretical obstacle to the governance of share reform contract in view that the share reform contract is the long-run and incomplete relationship contract.So in the precondition of confirming the necessity to the share merger reform,the nuclear countermeasure for deepening share reform,the "large tradable shareholders' promise",brought forwarded in this dissertation is the improvement of momentous defects in the first stage institutional arrangement of share merger reform.
从股权分置制度溯源分析,股权分置是在渐进式转轨改革的大背景下,秉承“增量改革”路线,选择的临时性制度安排,在确保国有企业上市后国家绝对控股、国有资产不因股份上市流通而流失的同时,拓宽了国有企业的融资途径,更重要的是使中国股票市场获得了生存与发展的契机,有其历史合理性和必然性。
股权分置是特定时期的权宜之计,是市场机制向计划机制的让步,其负面作随资本市场发展进程日益凸显。主要表现在对资本市场基本功能发挥的制约与对参与主体行为的扭曲及利益的伤害,同时也内生了对股改的需求。股改必须服从整体经济、金融改革的时序,对股改的外生需求的分析长期以来被忽略了。而在商业银行改革需要、监管归位需要、国有资产管理体制改革需要等股改外生需求中,推进商业银行改革的需要,是05年股改得以实质启动的关键因素,这也说明了股改制度变迁的强制性特征。
在股改初次博弈中,非流通股东在对价“开价”时,并未充分考虑流通股东利益,而是存在明显的“锚定和调整”行为偏差。虽然不同公司的流通股东在所付出的历史成本,与受非流通股的可流通冲击,有显著的差别,但并未能在对价确定中被充分体现,“锚定效应”从一个侧面反映了对价博弈过程的不公平性。虽然非流通股东因此节约了对价博弈成本,获得了远高于流通股东的正收益,但未能建立股东利益一致性的基础,于上市公司长远发展不利。
股改第一阶段制度安排存在重大缺陷,集中体现在“大小非”问题对市场信心的极大压制;政府必须充当股改制度深化的初级行动团体,而对“大小非”问题的根本解决则是制度深化成功的必要条件;由于股改契约是具有时际性与不完全性的关系性契约,对其治理并不存在理论障碍。本文所提以“大非承诺”为核心的股改制度深化对策,是在肯定股改必要性的前提下,对股改第一阶段制度安排的重大缺陷的改进。
On April 29,2005,the issuance of "Circular on Issues relating to Pilot Reform of Listed Companies' Share Merger Reform",by China Securities Regulatory Commission,signed the official start of "reform of share merger",and which has been thought as "milestone" in the history of China's securities market.Every side expects the success of "share reform" can facilitate the healthy development of China's capital market.The China Securities Regulatory Commission held that "the share reform had roughly succeeded" on Dec 26 in 2006,and "the capital market was experiencing the turning point change".But since 2007 October,the stock index has sharply declined from 6124 point to 1664 point within only one year,the confidence to market is extremely weak and the capital market cannot normally function.This dissertation focuses on the profound institutional analyses into share reform and tries to quest the institutional deepening path of it.
In view of the origin of non-tradable shares institution,the share merger reform was carried out under the background of the "step by step" transition reform. It has inherited the "increment reform" path and chosen the interim institutional arrangement.The reform not only has insured the absolute share control of the state on the listed state-owned enterprises and isolated the state assets from reducing because of the circulation of originally non-tradable state shares,but also augmented the financing channel for state-owned enterprises and most importantly,afforded development opportunities to Chinese stock market.All of the above have historic rationality and inevitability.
For the share merger reform is the makeshift in special stage and the concession of market mechanism to planned mechanism,so the negative influence will increasingly apparent with the development of capital market.The negative influence mainly embodies in the restrict of fundamental function exertion of capital market and the torture and harm to the participating entity,while which give birth to the endogenous demand of share merger reform.The reform has to submitted the time sequence of macro economy and financial reform,but the exogenous demand of share reform has been neglected for a long time。Among the exogenous demands,the demand on advancing commercial bank reform is the key factor for the essential start-up of share merger reform in2005,and which also illuminate the compulsion character of the institutional evolution of share merger reform.
In the first stage game of share merger reform,the shareholders of non-tradable shares,in the process of bringing forward "consideration",did not fully take account into the benefits of shareholder's of tradable shares,so there apparently were the "anchoring and adjustment" behavior biases.Though the historic costs paid by the shareholders of tradable share in different enterprises significantly differ in contrast to the circulation shock from non-tradable shares,which was not fully embodied in the "consideration ratio".The "anchoring effect" in this dissertation reflects the injustice for the consideration game from one side.While the shareholders of non-tradable share in hence have retrenched the consideration game cost and gained the positive incomes outclassing the income of non-tradable shareholders,which will have disadvantages in the long-run development of listed companies without the construction of benefits consistency for all shareholders.
The share reform now is far from "roughly succeeded",there are momentous defects in the first stage of institution arrangement,and which mainly embodies in the huge suppress of "large and small non-tradable share" on confidence in market.The government should act as the "elementary action group" in the deepening of share merger reform,while the ultimate settlement to "large and small non-tradable share" problem is the necessary condition of the success of institutional deepening.There isn't theoretical obstacle to the governance of share reform contract in view that the share reform contract is the long-run and incomplete relationship contract.So in the precondition of confirming the necessity to the share merger reform,the nuclear countermeasure for deepening share reform,the "large tradable shareholders' promise",brought forwarded in this dissertation is the improvement of momentous defects in the first stage institutional arrangement of share merger reform.
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