农业技术创新的产权问题研究
|
摘要
农业技术进步是农业效益和经济增长的引擎,农业技术创新活动是提升农业整体竞争力的有效途径。由于传统较单一的以政府公有产权形式无偿提供农业技术体系的僵化,制约了私有及混合等多种形式农业技术创新活动积极性的提高,最终导致农业技术创新总量的有限性和难以产业化。而产权清晰和合理产权制度的设计将为农业技术创新主体提供内生的激励机制和外部环境。特别是近6年中央“一号文件“、政府工作报和十七届三中全会强调必须着眼增强农业技术自主创新能力,加快农业科技成果转化应用,提高科技对农业增长的贡献率,切实加强知识产权保护,引导涉农企业开展技术创新活动,促进现代农业持续发展,带动农民增收和农村繁荣。
论文在深刻剖析当前农业技术创新产权研究的基本范畴、基本理论和历史演变的基础上,通过实际调研,从政府、企业、科研机构和农业技术需求者信息不对称角度分析农业技术产权交易价格的决定;同时结合农业技术创新的特点,设计最优的产权制度组合,构建农业技术创新的制度体系和产权保护体系,并提出针对性强、可操作的对策与建议。本文共分八章。第一章为导论。阐明本文研究的背景、目的和理论与现实意义:进行国内外关于科技创新的产权制度问题研究,特别是关于农业科技创新的产权制度问题研究进行综述,把握农业技术创新与产权的研究前沿,找准论文的突破口,梳理出农业技术创新产权问题研究的基本框架。第二章主要阐述农业技术创新及产权(制度)的基本概念,理清技术创新、农业技术创新的特点和产权的基本功能,把握农业技术的产权结构和属性,明确知识产权(专利、植物品种权等)是农业技术创新产权的核心。并梳理技术产权、农业技术产权的基础经典理论,把握农业技术产权的生成机理,创新知识产权促进农业技术创新的作用机制。第三章从制度变迁动态视角,研讨农业技术创新产权的起源和演化,将沿袭财产—产权—技术产权—农业技术创新产权的思路展开,进而说明农业技术创新产权制度的形成。第四章根据农业技术产权主体交易双方的信息不对称(逆向选择和道德风险问题),结合激励相容理论,通过数理模型推导出有区别的农业技术创新成果的交易价格契约,进而决定其价格的生成机理与模式选择。第五章考虑到专利是农业技术产权研究的核心环节,已专利为例,在剖析Nordhaus-Scherer经典模型的基础上,结合信息经济理论,从专利的两个纬度(专利长度、专利宽度)构建产权制度绩效模型(竞争博弈I-E模型,信息披露模型等),分析有效激励农业技术创新的产权组合。第六章是产权制度对农业技术创新主体作用的实证分析。论文选择有代表性的涉农企业、科研机构、农业高等院校和农村地区进行座谈和问卷调查,了解各主体对农业技术创新研究的制度偏好、面临的困难和预期,以及他们对农业科技创新产权改革的预期与建议。然后以农业品种权为例,根据实践调研数据和相关统计资料数据就产权制度对农业技术创新主体的作用进行计量实证。第七章在阐释我国现阶段农业技术知识产权保护现状和分析存在问题的基础上,引入Romer(1990)和Barro(1997)的内生技术进步模型,充分考虑产权保护在激励中国农业技术自主创新和模仿国外农业技术的影响,结合农业技术比一般技术更强公共产品的特性,从中引申出促进中国农业技术创新的知识产权保护制度选择。第八章归纳了本文研究的基本结论,形成了农业技术创新产权交易、最优制度设计和产权保护的具体实施策略和对策建议,提出了农业技术创新产权问题研究的进一步展望。
本文在汲取前人研究成果的基础上,结合中国实际,对农业技术创新的产权问题进行经济学研究,自己认为可能在以下四个方面取得了一定的研究创新:一是通过知识产权与农业技术创新的关联分析,创新产权制度促进农业技术创新的作用机制:二是基于农业技术产权主体交易双方的逆向选择和道德风险问题,结合激励相容理论有区别的制定农业技术创新成果的交易价格,进而决定其价格的生成机理与模式选择;三是将Nordhaus-Scherer经典模型拓展到非对称信息领域,基于专利长度和专利宽度,通过数理模型,探讨农业技术创新最优产权制度的确定。四是利用Romer—Barro内生技术进步模型引申出促进中国农业技术创新的知识产权保护制度选择。
Agricultural technology progress is the engine of agricultural efficiency and economic growth, agricultural technology innovation is an effective way on enhance the overall competitiveness of agriculture. As the agricultural technology system of government owned property is a single and rigid, and constraints the positive such as private and mixed forms of agricultural technology innovation activities , lead to limited and difficult to industrialization of total amount in agricultural technology innovation. Clear property rights and reasonable design of the property rights system provide the incentive mechanism of endogenous and external environment for agricultural technology innovation. Especially, 6 central "One document" reported the work of the Government and the Third Plenary Session of 17 emphasis on enhancing the capability of independent innovation in agricultural technology, speed up the achievements of agricultural science and technology applications, raise the contribution rate of science and technology agricultural growth, strengthen protection of intellectual property rights, guide to carry out technological innovation activities of agriculture-related enterprises, promote the sustainable development of modem agriculture, driven income of farmers and rural prosperity.
In this paper, we profound analysis basic category, basic theory and the history of the evolution in property rights of agricultural technology innovation. Through practical research, analysis property prices decisions of agricultural technology from perspective of information asymmetry on the government, enterprises, research institutions and agricultural technology needs. At the same time, combine the characteristics of technological innovation in agriculture, design the optimal combination of the property rights system, construction of agricultural technology innovation system and property rights protection system, and put forward operational Countermeasures and suggestions.This article is divided into eight chapters: The first chapter is introduction, it discusses the background to the study, the purpose and the theory and practical significance, and property rights issues of technological innovation system in china and abroad, Especially, research summary on property rights of agricultural technology innovation system. grasp the forefront of research in agricultural technology innovation and property rights, find a breakthrough, sort out the basic framework of the study on property rights of agricultural technological innovation. The second article discusses the basic concepts of agricultural technology innovation and property rights , sort out the basic functions on the characteristics of technological innovation, technological innovation in agriculture and property rights, grasp the structure of property rights and property on agricultural technology, clear intellectual property rights (patents, plant varieties, etc.) is the core of property rights in agricultural technology innovation. The papers sorted based on classical theory of technical property rights and property rights in agricultural technology, grasp the formation mechanism of agricultural technology property rights, Innovative mechanism of action on property rights to promote agricultural technology innovation. The third chapter from the dynamic view of institutional Change, study the origin and evolution of property rights in agricultural technology innovation, follow the property - property rights - property rights - property rights, agricultural technology innovation to start, and explain the formation of property rights in agricultural technology innovation system. The fourth chapter according to information asymmetry on two sides of property rights transactions of agricultural technology (adverse selection and moral hazard problems), combination of incentive compatibility theory, through the mathematical model derived from different agricultural technology innovation price contract, and then determining their own pricing model for options. Chapter V taking into account the property rights of agricultural technology patent is the core part of the study, in the analysis of Nordhaus-Scherer classical model, combination of the information economy theory, construction of the property rights system performance model(competitive game I-E model, information model, etc.) from the two patents (the patent length, the width of the patent), analysis of the optimal property portfolio effectively on agricultural technology innovation. Chapter VI choose a representative farm enterprises, research institutes, agricultural universities and rural areas to execute discussion and questionnaire survey,understanding of the system of preferences, difficulties and expectations about technological innovation in agriculture, as well as their expectations for reform and recommendations. Then agricultural Varieties as an example , according to the practice of research data and relevant statistical data, property rights system to promote technological innovation in agriculture execute empirical measurement. Chapter VII based protect the status quo and problems of intellectual property rights in agricultural technology , lead into Romer-Barro endogenous technological progress model, consider the impact on Protection of property rights in stimulating innovation of agricultural technology in China and to imitate foreign agricultural technology, combination the characteristics of public goods in agricultural technology more than the general technical, come out intellectual property protection system to choose on China's agricultural technological innovation. Chapter VIII summed up the basic conclusions of the study, draw relevant conclusions on research of intellectual property rights for agricultural technology Innovation , put forward specific measures on property transactions of agricultural technology innovation, optimal system design and protection of property rights, Making specific Countermeasures.
In this paper, on the basis of proceeding research results, in close connection with China's national conditions, I think may be in the following four areas of study has made some innovations:Firstly, through correlation analysis of intellectual property and technological innovation in agriculture, innovative mechanism of action on property rights to promote agricultural technology innovation. Secondly, based on adverse selection and moral hazard problems in the main agricultural property transactions, combination of incentive compatibility theory, draw up transaction prices of agricultural technology innovation, and decided the price formation mechanism and mode selection.Thirdly, extended the classic model of Nordhaus-Scherer to the field of asymmetric information, based on patent length and patent width, pass through mathematical model, discussion on the determination of the optimal system of property rights in agricultural technological innovation.Finally, based Romer-Barro endogenous technological progress model, come out intellectual property protection system to choose on China's agricultural technological innovation.
论文在深刻剖析当前农业技术创新产权研究的基本范畴、基本理论和历史演变的基础上,通过实际调研,从政府、企业、科研机构和农业技术需求者信息不对称角度分析农业技术产权交易价格的决定;同时结合农业技术创新的特点,设计最优的产权制度组合,构建农业技术创新的制度体系和产权保护体系,并提出针对性强、可操作的对策与建议。本文共分八章。第一章为导论。阐明本文研究的背景、目的和理论与现实意义:进行国内外关于科技创新的产权制度问题研究,特别是关于农业科技创新的产权制度问题研究进行综述,把握农业技术创新与产权的研究前沿,找准论文的突破口,梳理出农业技术创新产权问题研究的基本框架。第二章主要阐述农业技术创新及产权(制度)的基本概念,理清技术创新、农业技术创新的特点和产权的基本功能,把握农业技术的产权结构和属性,明确知识产权(专利、植物品种权等)是农业技术创新产权的核心。并梳理技术产权、农业技术产权的基础经典理论,把握农业技术产权的生成机理,创新知识产权促进农业技术创新的作用机制。第三章从制度变迁动态视角,研讨农业技术创新产权的起源和演化,将沿袭财产—产权—技术产权—农业技术创新产权的思路展开,进而说明农业技术创新产权制度的形成。第四章根据农业技术产权主体交易双方的信息不对称(逆向选择和道德风险问题),结合激励相容理论,通过数理模型推导出有区别的农业技术创新成果的交易价格契约,进而决定其价格的生成机理与模式选择。第五章考虑到专利是农业技术产权研究的核心环节,已专利为例,在剖析Nordhaus-Scherer经典模型的基础上,结合信息经济理论,从专利的两个纬度(专利长度、专利宽度)构建产权制度绩效模型(竞争博弈I-E模型,信息披露模型等),分析有效激励农业技术创新的产权组合。第六章是产权制度对农业技术创新主体作用的实证分析。论文选择有代表性的涉农企业、科研机构、农业高等院校和农村地区进行座谈和问卷调查,了解各主体对农业技术创新研究的制度偏好、面临的困难和预期,以及他们对农业科技创新产权改革的预期与建议。然后以农业品种权为例,根据实践调研数据和相关统计资料数据就产权制度对农业技术创新主体的作用进行计量实证。第七章在阐释我国现阶段农业技术知识产权保护现状和分析存在问题的基础上,引入Romer(1990)和Barro(1997)的内生技术进步模型,充分考虑产权保护在激励中国农业技术自主创新和模仿国外农业技术的影响,结合农业技术比一般技术更强公共产品的特性,从中引申出促进中国农业技术创新的知识产权保护制度选择。第八章归纳了本文研究的基本结论,形成了农业技术创新产权交易、最优制度设计和产权保护的具体实施策略和对策建议,提出了农业技术创新产权问题研究的进一步展望。
本文在汲取前人研究成果的基础上,结合中国实际,对农业技术创新的产权问题进行经济学研究,自己认为可能在以下四个方面取得了一定的研究创新:一是通过知识产权与农业技术创新的关联分析,创新产权制度促进农业技术创新的作用机制:二是基于农业技术产权主体交易双方的逆向选择和道德风险问题,结合激励相容理论有区别的制定农业技术创新成果的交易价格,进而决定其价格的生成机理与模式选择;三是将Nordhaus-Scherer经典模型拓展到非对称信息领域,基于专利长度和专利宽度,通过数理模型,探讨农业技术创新最优产权制度的确定。四是利用Romer—Barro内生技术进步模型引申出促进中国农业技术创新的知识产权保护制度选择。
Agricultural technology progress is the engine of agricultural efficiency and economic growth, agricultural technology innovation is an effective way on enhance the overall competitiveness of agriculture. As the agricultural technology system of government owned property is a single and rigid, and constraints the positive such as private and mixed forms of agricultural technology innovation activities , lead to limited and difficult to industrialization of total amount in agricultural technology innovation. Clear property rights and reasonable design of the property rights system provide the incentive mechanism of endogenous and external environment for agricultural technology innovation. Especially, 6 central "One document" reported the work of the Government and the Third Plenary Session of 17 emphasis on enhancing the capability of independent innovation in agricultural technology, speed up the achievements of agricultural science and technology applications, raise the contribution rate of science and technology agricultural growth, strengthen protection of intellectual property rights, guide to carry out technological innovation activities of agriculture-related enterprises, promote the sustainable development of modem agriculture, driven income of farmers and rural prosperity.
In this paper, we profound analysis basic category, basic theory and the history of the evolution in property rights of agricultural technology innovation. Through practical research, analysis property prices decisions of agricultural technology from perspective of information asymmetry on the government, enterprises, research institutions and agricultural technology needs. At the same time, combine the characteristics of technological innovation in agriculture, design the optimal combination of the property rights system, construction of agricultural technology innovation system and property rights protection system, and put forward operational Countermeasures and suggestions.This article is divided into eight chapters: The first chapter is introduction, it discusses the background to the study, the purpose and the theory and practical significance, and property rights issues of technological innovation system in china and abroad, Especially, research summary on property rights of agricultural technology innovation system. grasp the forefront of research in agricultural technology innovation and property rights, find a breakthrough, sort out the basic framework of the study on property rights of agricultural technological innovation. The second article discusses the basic concepts of agricultural technology innovation and property rights , sort out the basic functions on the characteristics of technological innovation, technological innovation in agriculture and property rights, grasp the structure of property rights and property on agricultural technology, clear intellectual property rights (patents, plant varieties, etc.) is the core of property rights in agricultural technology innovation. The papers sorted based on classical theory of technical property rights and property rights in agricultural technology, grasp the formation mechanism of agricultural technology property rights, Innovative mechanism of action on property rights to promote agricultural technology innovation. The third chapter from the dynamic view of institutional Change, study the origin and evolution of property rights in agricultural technology innovation, follow the property - property rights - property rights - property rights, agricultural technology innovation to start, and explain the formation of property rights in agricultural technology innovation system. The fourth chapter according to information asymmetry on two sides of property rights transactions of agricultural technology (adverse selection and moral hazard problems), combination of incentive compatibility theory, through the mathematical model derived from different agricultural technology innovation price contract, and then determining their own pricing model for options. Chapter V taking into account the property rights of agricultural technology patent is the core part of the study, in the analysis of Nordhaus-Scherer classical model, combination of the information economy theory, construction of the property rights system performance model(competitive game I-E model, information model, etc.) from the two patents (the patent length, the width of the patent), analysis of the optimal property portfolio effectively on agricultural technology innovation. Chapter VI choose a representative farm enterprises, research institutes, agricultural universities and rural areas to execute discussion and questionnaire survey,understanding of the system of preferences, difficulties and expectations about technological innovation in agriculture, as well as their expectations for reform and recommendations. Then agricultural Varieties as an example , according to the practice of research data and relevant statistical data, property rights system to promote technological innovation in agriculture execute empirical measurement. Chapter VII based protect the status quo and problems of intellectual property rights in agricultural technology , lead into Romer-Barro endogenous technological progress model, consider the impact on Protection of property rights in stimulating innovation of agricultural technology in China and to imitate foreign agricultural technology, combination the characteristics of public goods in agricultural technology more than the general technical, come out intellectual property protection system to choose on China's agricultural technological innovation. Chapter VIII summed up the basic conclusions of the study, draw relevant conclusions on research of intellectual property rights for agricultural technology Innovation , put forward specific measures on property transactions of agricultural technology innovation, optimal system design and protection of property rights, Making specific Countermeasures.
In this paper, on the basis of proceeding research results, in close connection with China's national conditions, I think may be in the following four areas of study has made some innovations:Firstly, through correlation analysis of intellectual property and technological innovation in agriculture, innovative mechanism of action on property rights to promote agricultural technology innovation. Secondly, based on adverse selection and moral hazard problems in the main agricultural property transactions, combination of incentive compatibility theory, draw up transaction prices of agricultural technology innovation, and decided the price formation mechanism and mode selection.Thirdly, extended the classic model of Nordhaus-Scherer to the field of asymmetric information, based on patent length and patent width, pass through mathematical model, discussion on the determination of the optimal system of property rights in agricultural technological innovation.Finally, based Romer-Barro endogenous technological progress model, come out intellectual property protection system to choose on China's agricultural technological innovation.
引文
[1] Alchian.A.A,"Uncertainty, Education and EconomicTheory", Journal of Political Economy, 1950,58-69
[2] Alchain, A.A. and Demsets, H., Production, Information Cost and Economics Organization. The American Economic Review, 1972,5:pp.777-795
[3] Arrow, K. Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention [A]. In:R.R.Nelson. The Rate and Discretion of Inventive Activity [C]. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962:609-625
[4] Arrow,K.(1962):"Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Inventions." InR.Nelson,ed.,The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity.Prince on University Press. 1962:123-152
[5] Barzel,Y.(1968):"Optimal Timingof Innovations." Review of Economicsand Statistics August,pp.348-355
[6] Baton, J. Patents and Antitrust: A Rethinking in Light of Patent Breadth and Sequential Innovation [J]. Antitrust Law of Journal, 1997,65(2):449-466.
[7] Beck,R.(1981):"Competition for Patent Monopolies." Reviewin Law and Economics3,1981:91-110
[8] Bessen, J. Patents and the Diffusion of Technical Information [J]. Economics Letters, 2005, 86(1):121-128
[9] Candal, N. and Scotchmer,S. Coordinating Research Joint Ventures [J]. Journal of Public Economics, 1993,51 (2):173-193
[10] Chang, H. Patent Scope, Antitrust Policy, and Cumulative Innovation [J]. The RAND Journal of Economics, 1995,26 (1):24-57
[11] Chin,J.andGGrossman(1988):"Intellectual Property Rights and North-South Trade." NBER Working, 1988:27-69
[12] Coase.R.H, "The Nature of the Firm", 1937,4-49
[13] Coase.R.H,"The Problem of Social Cost", Journal of Law and Economics, 1960,3-9
[14] Cohen,W.AndD.Levinthal(1989):"Innovation and Learning: The Two Faces of R&D." Economic Journal. 1989:569-596
[15] Dasgupta, P. and Stiglitz, J. Industrial Structure and the Nature of Innovative Activity [J]. The Economic Journal, 1980:266-293
[16] Dasgupta, P. and Stiglitz,J. Uncertainty, Industrial Structure, and the Speed of R&D [J]. The Bell Journal of Economics, 1980,11 (1):1-28
[17] Dasgupta,P.(1988):"Patents, Priority and Imitationor the Economics of Racesand Waiting Games." Economic Journal,1988:66-80
[18] Dasgupta,P.andJ.Stiglitz(1980):"Industrial Structure and the Nature of Innovative Activity." Economic Journal90,1980:226-293
[19] Denicolo, V. Two Stage Patent Races and Patent Policy [J].The RAND Journal of Economics, 2000b, 31 (3):488-501
[20] Drahos, P. and Maher,I. Innovation, Competition, Standards and Intellectual Property: Policy Perspectives from Economics and Law [J]. Information Economics and Policy, 2004,16(1): 1-11
[21] Eisenberg, R. Do EST Patents Matter? [J]. Trends in Genetics, 1998, 14(10): 379-381
[22] Eswaran, M. Cross-Licensing of Competing Patents as a Facilitating Device [J]. Canadian Journal of Economics, 1994, 27(3):689-708
[23] Farrell, J and Katz, M. Innovation, Rent Extraction and Integration in Systems Markets, Working Paper, 2000,Unversity of California, Berkelry.2000
[24] Gallini, N. Deterrence by Market Sharing [J].1984,74(5):931-941
[25] Gallini, N. and Winter, R. Licensing in the Theory of Innovation [J]. The RAND Journal of Economics, 1985,16(2):237-252
[26] Gallini, N. and Wright, B. Technology Transfer under Asymmetric Information [J].The RAND Journal of Economics, 1990,21(1): 147-160
[27] Gallini, N. Patent Policy and Costly Imitation [J] . The RAND Journal of Economics, 1992,23(1):52-63
[28] Gilbert, R. and Sharpiro, C. Optimal Patent Length and Breadth [J]. The RAND Journal of Economics, 1990,21(1):106-112
[29] Gilbert, R. andD. Newbery (1982):" Pre-emptive Patentingand the Persistence of Monopoly." American Economic Review,72,3 :pp.514-526
[30] Gillbert, R. and Willard, K. Is Innovation King at the Antitrust Agencies? The Intellectual Property Guidelines Five Years Later [J]. Antitrust Law Journal, 2001, 69(1):43-86
[31] Green, J. and Scotchmen S. On the Division of Profit in Sequential Innovation [J].The RAND Journal of Economics, 1995,26(1 ):20-33
[32] Griliches,Z."Patents: Recent Trends and Puzzles."Brookings Paperson Economic Activity: Macroeconomics, 1989:291 -319
[33] Grossman, G. and Shapiro, C. Optimal Dynamic R&D Programs [J]. The Rand Journal of Economics, 1986,17(4):581-593
[34] Grossman, G. and Helpman, E. Quality Ladders in the Theory of Growth [J].Review of Economic Studies, 1991,58(1):43-61
[35] Hall, B. and Rosemary, H. The Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semi-conductor Industry, 1979-1995 [J]. The RAND Journal of Economics, 2001, 32(1):101-128
[36] Helpman, E. Innovation, Imitation, and Intellectual Property Rights [J]. Econometrica, 1993,61 (6):1247-1280
[37] Horstman, I., McDonald, G. and Sliwinski, A. Patents as Information Transfer Mechnisams: To Patent or Not to Patent [J]. Journal of Political Economics, 1983, 93(5):837-856
[38] Hunt, R. . Patentability, Industry Structure, and Innovation [J].The Journal of Industrial Economics, 2004, LII(3):401-419
[39] I·Fisher,Elementary Principles of Economics, New York:Macmillan,1923,27
[40] Jorde, T. and Teece, D. Innovation and Cooperation: Implication for Antitrust [J].Journal of Economic Perspective, 1990,4(3):75-96
[41] Kamien, M. and Schwartz, N. Expenditure Patterns for Risky R and D Projects [J].Journal of Applied Probability, 1971, 8(1):60-73
[42] Kamien, M. and Schwartz, N. Patent Life and R and D Rivalry [J]. The American Economic Review, 1974,64(1):183-187
[43] Katz, M. An analysis of Cooperative Research and Development [J]. The RAND Journal of Economics, 1986,17(4):527-543.
[44] Katz, M. and Shapiro, C. R&D Rivalry with Licensing or Imitation [J]. The Amercian Economics, 1987,77(3):402-420.
[45] Klemperer, P. How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be? [J]. The rand Journal of Economics, 1990,21(1): 113-130.
[46] Lanjouw, J. Patent Protection in the Shadow of Infringement: Simulation Estimations of Patent Value [J]. Review of Economic Studies, 1998,65(4): 71-99
[47] Lee, J. and Mansfiled, E. Intellectual Property Protection and U.S. Foreign Direct Investment [J]. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 1996, (2):181-186
[48] Lerner, J. and Merges, R. The Control of Technology Alliance: An Empirical Analysis of the Biotechnology Industry [J]. Journal of Industrial Economics, 1998,46(2): 1-32
[49] Lewis WA.Economic Development with Unlimited Supply of Labour.The Manchester School,1954(5):139-191
[50] Lin-J-Y." Development strategy.Viability, and Economic convergence", the lnaugurd D.Gate Johnson lecture, presented at the University of Chicago on Mayl4,2001
[51] Liobet, G. Patent Litigation When Innovation Is Cumulative [J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2003,21(8):1135-1157
[52] Loury, G. Market Structure and Innovation [J]. Quarterly Journal of Econonmics, 1979,9-3):395-410
[53] Loury,G. "Market Strctureand Innovation." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1979:395- 410
[54] Lucas, R. Optimal Management of a Research and Development Project [J]. Management Science, 1971,17(11):679-697
[55] Merges, R. Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: the Case of Blocking Patents [J]. Tennessee Law Review, 1990,62:75-106
[56] Nordhaus, W. Invention, Growth and Welfare [M] . London: The MIT Press, 1969.
[57] Nordhaus,W. "The Optimal Lifeofa Patent: Reply."American Economic Review, 1972:428-431
[58] Donoghue, T., Scotchmer, S. and Thisse, J. Patent Breadth, Patent Life, and the Pace of Technological Process [J]. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 1998a,7(1):1-30
[59] Donoghue, T. A Patentability Rerequirement for Sequential Innovation [J]. The RAND Journal of Economics, 1998b, 29(4):654-679
[60] Porter, M. The Competitive Advantage of Nations [M]. New York: Free Press, 1990
[61] Reinganum, J. Technology Adoption under Imperfect Information [J]. Bell Journal of Economics, 1983,14(1):57-69
[62] Romer, P. Are Nonconvexities Important for Understanding Growth? [J]. American Economic Review, 1990, 80(2):97-103
[63] Romer, p. When Should We Use Intellectual Property Rights? [J]. AEA Papers and Proceedings, 2002, 92(2):213-216
[64] Rostow WW."The stages of Economic Growth".Cambridge .Cambrige University press, 1960,1974
[65] Sappington, D. Optimal Regulation of Research and Development under Imperfect Information [J]. Bell Journal of Economics, 1982,13(2):354-368
[66] Scherer, F. M. Nordhaus's Theory of Optimal Patent Life: A Geometric Reinterpretation [J]. The American Economic Review, 1972,62(3):422-427
[67] Scherer,F."Nordhaus's Theory of Optical PatentLife."American Economic Review, 1972:62-79
[68] Schultz TW." Tansforming Traditional Agriculture ".Yale:Yale University Press, 1964
[69] Scotchmer, S. Protecting Early Innovations: Should Second-Generation Products be Patentable? [J]. The RAND Journal of Economics, 1996,27(2):322-331
[70] Shapiro, C. Patent Licensing and R&D Rivalry [J]. The Amercian Economics Review, 1985, 75(2):25-30
[71] Sherpard, A. Licensing to Enhance Demand for New Technoligies [J]. The RAND Journal of Economics, 1987,18(3):360-368
[72] Stiglitz, J. Discussion [J]. The American Economic Review, 1969,59(2):44-49
[73] Whinston, M. Exclusivity and Tying in U.S. v. Microsoft: What We Know, and Don't Know [J]. Journal of Economic Perspective, 2001,15(2):63-80
[74] Wright, B. The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Research Contracts [J]. The American Economic Review, 1983, 73(4):691-707
[75]阿尔钦.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典[M].北京:经济科学出版社,1996,1101-1103
[76]埃里克·菲吕博顿(德),鲁道夫·瑞切特著(美).新制度经济学-一个交易费用分析范式[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2006,102-106
[77]艾伦·瑞安.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典[M].北京:经济科学出版社,1996,1099-1100
[78]安东内利(意).创新经济学--新技术与结构变迁[M].北京:高等教育出版社,2006,2-5
[79]奥尔森(美).集体行动的逻辑[M].上海:上海人民出版社,1995,4-6
[80]安维复.技术创新的社会建构--建立健全国家创新体系的理论分析与政策建议[M].上海:文汇出版社,2003,5-16
[81]巴泽尔(美).产权经济学[M].上海:上海人民出版社,1997,6-8
[82]保罗·J·扎克.产权与增长[J].经济研究,1995(3):3-13
[83]贝克尔(美).人类行为的经济分析[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2004;11-13
[84]宾默尔(英).博弈论与社会契约[M].上海:上海财经大学出版社,2003,6-9
[85]布罗姆利(美).经济利益与经济制度-公共政策的理论基础[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2006,3-10
[86]陈清泰.促进企业自主创新的政策思考[J].管理世界,2006(7):1-3
[87]陈卫平著.中国农业国际竞争力-理论、方法与实证研究[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2005,4-10
[88]陈钊著.信息与激励经济学[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2005,12-36
[89]成帅华,倪世雄.必要的选择TRIPS与发展中国家[J].世界经济与政治,2001(9):61-64.
[90]程启智.内部性与外部性及其政府管制的产权分析[J].管理世界,2002(12):62-68.
[91]楚尔鸣,李勇辉.高新技术产业经济学[M].北京:中国经济出版社,2005,6-15
[92]丛林.技术进步与区域经济发展[M].成都:四川土投机气象印刷厂,2002,1-12
[93]戴强.技术创新与知识产权保护的互动性研究[J].技术经济,2006(8):28-31
[94]大不列颠百科全书[M].北京:中国大百科全书出版社,1999,509-510
[95]德勒巴克(美).新制度经济学前沿[M].北京:北京经济科学出版社,2003,1-3
[96]范里安(美).微观经济学-现代观点[M].上海:上海人民出版社,1994,12-14
[97]费景汉,拉尼斯(美).增长和发展-演进观点[M].北京:商务印书管,2004,12-15
[98]弗鲁博顿著(美).新制度经济学--一个交易费用分析范式[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2006,1-4
[99]傅素英,张俊飚.我国农业技术国际转移的竞争策略分析[J].中国科技论谈,2008(2):97-101
[100]高铁梅.计量经济分析方法与建模:EVIEWSO应用及实例[M].北京清华大学出版社,2006
[101]辜胜阻,李正有著.创新与高科技产业化[M].武汉:武汉大学出版社,2001,5-14
[102]古祖雪.后TRIPS时代的国际知识产权制度变革与国际关系的演变-以WTO 多哈回合谈判为中心[J].中国社会科学,200(2):143-146
[103]韩朝华.明晰产权与规范政府[J].经济研究,2003(2):18-26
[104]霍奇逊编(英).制度与演化经济学现代文选--关键性概念[M].北京:高等教育出版社,2005,8-11
[105]黄教珍.对我国农业技术创新知识产权保护的思考[J].农业考古,2006(6):245-248
[106]黄少安.公有制经济中的产权研究:对象和方法[J].学习与探索,1995(2):29-32
[107]黄少安.”交易费用”范畴研究[J].学术期刊,1995(11):38-44
[108]黄少安.现代产权经济学的基本方法论[J].中国社会科学,1996(2):16-26
[109]黄少安,王怀震.从潜产权到产权:一种产权起源假说[J].经济理论与经济管理,2003(8):13-16
[110]黄少安著.产权经济学导论[M].北京:经济科学出版社出版,2004,10-56
[111]黄少安,杜卫亮.关于”潜产权”的功能[J].财经理论与实践,2005(2):26-28
[112]黄少安.政府行为与国有产权交易[J].产权导刊,2005(3):12-16
[113]黄少安.国有产权交易中的政府职责[J].上海国资,2005(4):16-18
[114]黄少安,郭艳茹.对英国谷物法变革(1815-1846)的重新解释及对现实的启示[J].中国社会科学,2006(3):50-61.
[115]加里·D·利贝卡普.产权的缔约分析[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社,2001,3-5
[116]姜爱萍,吕敏,陈会英.中国农业技术产权实施应用案例探析[J].美中经济评论,2007(62).10-36
[117]姜鑫.诱致性农业技术创新模型及中国农业技术变革的实证研究[J].财经论坛,2007(3):1-7
[118]考夫著(奥).专利制度经济学[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2005,8-12
[119]科斯,阿尔钦,诺斯等.财产权利与制度变迁[M].上海:上海人民出版社,1994,11-204
[120]科斯.企业、市场与法律[M].上海:上海人民出版社,1990,233-235
[121]柯武刚,史漫飞.制度经济学:社会秩序与公共政策[M].北京:商务印书馆,2000,9-41
[122]寇宗来著.专利制度的功能与绩效[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2005,9-35
[123]理查德.R.纳尔逊,G.多西等.技术进步与经济理论[M].北京:经济科学出版社,1992,112-116
[124]理查德·派普斯.财产伦[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2003,2-6
[125]李春顶.我国知识产权保护的经济学解析与对策[J].华南农业大学学报(社会科学版),2005(4):66-70
[126]李稻葵.转型经济中的模糊产权理论[J].经济研究,1995(4):42-50
[127]李平,崔喜君,刘建.中国自主创新中研发资本投入产出绩效分析-兼论人力资本和知识产权保护的影响[J].中国社会科学,2007(2):32-42
[128]李仕明.产权理论和国有产权制度改革[J].经济研究,1995(2):41-45
[129]李永波,高新伟.企业技术创新的产权制度分析[J].经济理论问题[J].生产力研究,2005(12):40-43
[130]李永波,高新伟.企业技术创新的产权制度分析[J].生产力研究,2005(12):40-43
[131]李岳云,罗必良.产权:一个分析框架及其应用[J].南方经济,2002(5):9-12
[132]李兆友著.技术创新主体论[M].沈阳:东北大学出版社,2004
[133]李振宇,黄少安.制度失灵与技术创新-农民焚烧秸秆的经济学分析[J].中国农村观察,2002(5):11-16
[134]林岗,张宇.产权分析的两种范式[J].中国社会科学,2000(1):134-145
[135]林毅夫著.制度技术与中国农业发展[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2005,10-19
[136]刘春田.知识产权法[M].中国人民大学出版社,2000
[137]刘辉,曾福生.技术进步促进农业结构优化[J].农业技术经济,2004(1):48-52
[138]刘伟,李风圣.产权通论[M].北京:北京出版社,1998,10-12
[139]刘小玄.中国转轨过程中的产权和市场-关于市场、产权行为和绩效的分析[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2003,12-55
[140]刘小玄,李利英.企业产权变革的效率分析[J].中国社会科学,2005(2):4-16.
[141]刘学.技术合约与交易费用研究[M].华夏出版社,2001
[142]罗伯特·考特,托马斯·尤伦.法和经济学[M].上海:上海人民出版社,1994,125-127
[143]吕福新.产权的经济学和管理学分析[J].《管理世界》双月刊,2005(11):166-169
[144]吕明瑜.技术创新的益处效应与产权激励功能探讨[J].经济经伟,2006(3):149-152
[145]吕明瑜.技术创新产权激励的制度安排[J].经济问题探索,2006(8):94-98
[146]罗必良,李善民.公有产权、代理成本与剩余索取权[J].南方经济,1996(4):14-16
[147]罗必良.”奥尔森困境”及其困境[J].学术研究,1999(9):8-11
[148]青木昌彦(日).比较制度分析[M].上海:上海远东出版社,2001,35-39
[149]史普博(美).管制与市场[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2003,7-13
[150]思拉恩·埃格特森.新制度经济学[M].北京:商务印书馆,1996,35-36
[151]斯密德著(美).财产、权力和公共选择--对法和经济学的进一步思考[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2006,200-223
[152]斯密德著(美).制度与行为经济学[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2004,12-23
[153]马克思,恩格斯.马克思恩格斯全集[M].北京:商务印书馆,1990,47-523
[154]马克思.资本论(第三卷)[M].北京:商务印书馆,1990,10-424
[155]农业部课题组.我国农业技术推广体系调查与改革思考[J].中国农村经济,2005(2):46-54
[156]诺斯.经济史的结构于变迁[M].上海:上海人民出版社,1991,12-15
[157]欧阳饶,生延超.技术差距、技术能力与后发地区技术赶超[J].中国软科学,2008(2):153-160
[158]庞柏林.中国农业技术创新驱动模式研究[J].学习与探索,2008(1):171-173
[159]彭德琳.新制度经济学[M].武汉:湖北人民出版社,2002,10-21
[160]钱时惕.科技进步与世界经济发展[M].保定:河北大学出版社,2000,4-32
[161]盛洪.中国的过度经济学[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2006,3-22
[162]宋德军,刘阳.中国农业技术扩散的市政研究[J].经济纵横,2007(6):99-100
[163]速水佑次郎著(日).发展经济学-从贫困到富裕[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2003,2-12
[164]索罗著(美).增长理论--一种解析[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2003,8-16
[165]谭崇台.发展经济学的新发展[M].武汉:武汉大学出版社,1999,11-115
[166]汪三贵,刘晓展等著.技术扩散与缓解贫困[M].北京:中国农业出版社,1998,12-25
[167]王春法.技术创新政策:理论基础与工具选择[M].北京:经济科学出版社,1998,139-160
[168]王大洲.技术创新与制度结构[M].沈阳:东北大学出版社,2001,3-16
[169]王法典.农业技术知识产权保护面临的问题及对策[J].学术交流,2005(5):63-65
[170]王金柱.双产权制度论[M].北京:商务印书馆,2005,6-28
[171]王九云.有效保护技术创新过程中形成的知识产权[J].管理世界,2001(2):213-214
[172]王九云,叶元煦.论保护知识产权对技术创新的驱动功能[J].管理世界,2001(6):204-205
[173]王黎萤,陈劲.技术标准战略、知识产权战略与技术创新协同发展关系研究[J].中国软科学,2004(12):24-27
[174]王清平.论科技成果知识产权化[J].中国科技论坛,2006(7):81-85
[175]王雪苓.当代技术创新的经济分析--基于信息及其技术视角的宏观分析[M].成都:西南财经大学出版社,2005,8-29
[176]王振中.产权理论与经济发展[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2005
[177]王争.专利制度的经济学研究综述[J].北京大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2006(3):141-151
[178]魏杰.现代产权制度辨析[M].北京:首都经济贸易大学出版社,2000
[179]韦尔德(英)、福布斯(印).从追随者到领先者--管理新兴工业化经济的技术与创新[M].北京:高等教育出版2005,11-23
[180]沃克.牛津法律大辞典[M].北京:光明日报出版社,1988,729
[181]吴敬琏著.发展中国高新技术产业--制度重于技术[M].北京:中国发展出版社,2002
[182]吴宣恭.产权理论比较[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2000
[183]吴易风.产权理论:马克思和科斯的比较[J].中国社会科学,2007(2):4-18
[184]西奥多·W·舒尔茨.改造传统农业[M].北京:商务印书馆,2003,78-89
[185]夏保华著.企业持续技术创新的结构[M].沈阳:东北大学出版社,2001,5-19
[186]徐清,刘义圣冲国农业技术进步问题新探-基于发展经济学视角[J].农业经济导刊,2006(9):115-120
[187]徐瑄.关于知识产权的几个深层次理论问题[J].北京大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2003(3):101-108
[188]杨武.技术创新产权[M],北京:清华大学出版社,1999,121-165
[189]扬武,王玲.论技术创新产权制度[J].科技管理研究,2005(10):11-13
[190]扬武,王玲.知识产权保护下的技术创新者与模仿者竞争模型研究[J].科研管理,2006(7):48-52
[191]杨灿明.产权特性与产业定位[J].经济研究,2001(9):53-59
[192]杨国涛.我国地区间农业技术差距的一种超函数测算方法[J].安徽农业科学,2007(2):21-25
[193]杨晓维.技术、市场与企业所有权安排[J].经济研究,2000(2):40-48
[194]叶祥松.西方经济学的产权理论[J].理论探讨,2001(7):50-56
[195]易先忠,张亚斌.技术差距、知识产权保护与后发国技术进步[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2006(10):111-121
[196]银纯泉.中国产权交易市场发展与预测[J].管理世界,2003(4):129-131
[197]尹翔硕.技术进步与新经济[M].北京:人民出版社,2002,5-9
[198]俞培果,蒋葵.农业科技投入的价格效应和分配效应探析[J].中国农村经济,2006(7):32-37
[199]袁克.中国知识产权保护的经济学分析[J].南开经济研究,2003(2):52-55
[200]约瑟夫·熊彼特,经济发展理论[M].北京:商务印书馆,1990,73-98
[201]詹姆斯·A·道,阿兰·鲁福斯·华特斯等.发展经济学的革命[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2000,128-201
[202]曾福生,匡远配.论制度创新与农业技术进步[J].农业技术经济,2001(6):13-18
[203]曾福生,李明贤著.技术进步与农业增长方式的转变[M].长沙:国防科技大学出版社,2001,46-68
[204]曾福生.湖南省农业技术推广模式分析[J].农业技术经济,2006(2):50-54
[205]曾福生.社会主义新农村建设情况的调查与思考[J].农业经济问题,2006(10):56-59
[206]张弘著.技术创新与中国流通产业发展[M].北京:首都经济贸易大学出版社,2006
[207]张维迎.博弈论与信自、经济学[M].上海二连书店,1996
[208]张维迎.产权、政府与信誉[M].北京:三联出版社,2001
[209]赵芝俊.近20年中国农业技术进步贡献率的变动趋势[J].中国农村经济,2006(3):64-69
[210]郑成思.知识产权法教程[M].法律出版社,1993,12-25
[211]周凤华,朱雪忠.2000-2004年中国知识产权研究的文献计量分析[J].科研管理,2006(4):53-60
[212]周衍平.农业技术产权实施的模式选择与保障措施[J].中国农村经济,2006(11):29-35
[213]朱利民,潘娜.基于技术创新的知识产权不确定性定价研究[J].当代经理人,2006(5):137-138
[214]朱玉春,郭江.中国农业乡镇的技术进步及其与农业增长的相关分析[J].中国农村经济,2006(11):45-51
[215]邹薇.知识产权保护的经济学分析[J].世界经济,2002(2):3-11
[2] Alchain, A.A. and Demsets, H., Production, Information Cost and Economics Organization. The American Economic Review, 1972,5:pp.777-795
[3] Arrow, K. Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention [A]. In:R.R.Nelson. The Rate and Discretion of Inventive Activity [C]. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962:609-625
[4] Arrow,K.(1962):"Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Inventions." InR.Nelson,ed.,The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity.Prince on University Press. 1962:123-152
[5] Barzel,Y.(1968):"Optimal Timingof Innovations." Review of Economicsand Statistics August,pp.348-355
[6] Baton, J. Patents and Antitrust: A Rethinking in Light of Patent Breadth and Sequential Innovation [J]. Antitrust Law of Journal, 1997,65(2):449-466.
[7] Beck,R.(1981):"Competition for Patent Monopolies." Reviewin Law and Economics3,1981:91-110
[8] Bessen, J. Patents and the Diffusion of Technical Information [J]. Economics Letters, 2005, 86(1):121-128
[9] Candal, N. and Scotchmer,S. Coordinating Research Joint Ventures [J]. Journal of Public Economics, 1993,51 (2):173-193
[10] Chang, H. Patent Scope, Antitrust Policy, and Cumulative Innovation [J]. The RAND Journal of Economics, 1995,26 (1):24-57
[11] Chin,J.andGGrossman(1988):"Intellectual Property Rights and North-South Trade." NBER Working, 1988:27-69
[12] Coase.R.H, "The Nature of the Firm", 1937,4-49
[13] Coase.R.H,"The Problem of Social Cost", Journal of Law and Economics, 1960,3-9
[14] Cohen,W.AndD.Levinthal(1989):"Innovation and Learning: The Two Faces of R&D." Economic Journal. 1989:569-596
[15] Dasgupta, P. and Stiglitz, J. Industrial Structure and the Nature of Innovative Activity [J]. The Economic Journal, 1980:266-293
[16] Dasgupta, P. and Stiglitz,J. Uncertainty, Industrial Structure, and the Speed of R&D [J]. The Bell Journal of Economics, 1980,11 (1):1-28
[17] Dasgupta,P.(1988):"Patents, Priority and Imitationor the Economics of Racesand Waiting Games." Economic Journal,1988:66-80
[18] Dasgupta,P.andJ.Stiglitz(1980):"Industrial Structure and the Nature of Innovative Activity." Economic Journal90,1980:226-293
[19] Denicolo, V. Two Stage Patent Races and Patent Policy [J].The RAND Journal of Economics, 2000b, 31 (3):488-501
[20] Drahos, P. and Maher,I. Innovation, Competition, Standards and Intellectual Property: Policy Perspectives from Economics and Law [J]. Information Economics and Policy, 2004,16(1): 1-11
[21] Eisenberg, R. Do EST Patents Matter? [J]. Trends in Genetics, 1998, 14(10): 379-381
[22] Eswaran, M. Cross-Licensing of Competing Patents as a Facilitating Device [J]. Canadian Journal of Economics, 1994, 27(3):689-708
[23] Farrell, J and Katz, M. Innovation, Rent Extraction and Integration in Systems Markets, Working Paper, 2000,Unversity of California, Berkelry.2000
[24] Gallini, N. Deterrence by Market Sharing [J].1984,74(5):931-941
[25] Gallini, N. and Winter, R. Licensing in the Theory of Innovation [J]. The RAND Journal of Economics, 1985,16(2):237-252
[26] Gallini, N. and Wright, B. Technology Transfer under Asymmetric Information [J].The RAND Journal of Economics, 1990,21(1): 147-160
[27] Gallini, N. Patent Policy and Costly Imitation [J] . The RAND Journal of Economics, 1992,23(1):52-63
[28] Gilbert, R. and Sharpiro, C. Optimal Patent Length and Breadth [J]. The RAND Journal of Economics, 1990,21(1):106-112
[29] Gilbert, R. andD. Newbery (1982):" Pre-emptive Patentingand the Persistence of Monopoly." American Economic Review,72,3 :pp.514-526
[30] Gillbert, R. and Willard, K. Is Innovation King at the Antitrust Agencies? The Intellectual Property Guidelines Five Years Later [J]. Antitrust Law Journal, 2001, 69(1):43-86
[31] Green, J. and Scotchmen S. On the Division of Profit in Sequential Innovation [J].The RAND Journal of Economics, 1995,26(1 ):20-33
[32] Griliches,Z."Patents: Recent Trends and Puzzles."Brookings Paperson Economic Activity: Macroeconomics, 1989:291 -319
[33] Grossman, G. and Shapiro, C. Optimal Dynamic R&D Programs [J]. The Rand Journal of Economics, 1986,17(4):581-593
[34] Grossman, G. and Helpman, E. Quality Ladders in the Theory of Growth [J].Review of Economic Studies, 1991,58(1):43-61
[35] Hall, B. and Rosemary, H. The Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semi-conductor Industry, 1979-1995 [J]. The RAND Journal of Economics, 2001, 32(1):101-128
[36] Helpman, E. Innovation, Imitation, and Intellectual Property Rights [J]. Econometrica, 1993,61 (6):1247-1280
[37] Horstman, I., McDonald, G. and Sliwinski, A. Patents as Information Transfer Mechnisams: To Patent or Not to Patent [J]. Journal of Political Economics, 1983, 93(5):837-856
[38] Hunt, R. . Patentability, Industry Structure, and Innovation [J].The Journal of Industrial Economics, 2004, LII(3):401-419
[39] I·Fisher,Elementary Principles of Economics, New York:Macmillan,1923,27
[40] Jorde, T. and Teece, D. Innovation and Cooperation: Implication for Antitrust [J].Journal of Economic Perspective, 1990,4(3):75-96
[41] Kamien, M. and Schwartz, N. Expenditure Patterns for Risky R and D Projects [J].Journal of Applied Probability, 1971, 8(1):60-73
[42] Kamien, M. and Schwartz, N. Patent Life and R and D Rivalry [J]. The American Economic Review, 1974,64(1):183-187
[43] Katz, M. An analysis of Cooperative Research and Development [J]. The RAND Journal of Economics, 1986,17(4):527-543.
[44] Katz, M. and Shapiro, C. R&D Rivalry with Licensing or Imitation [J]. The Amercian Economics, 1987,77(3):402-420.
[45] Klemperer, P. How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be? [J]. The rand Journal of Economics, 1990,21(1): 113-130.
[46] Lanjouw, J. Patent Protection in the Shadow of Infringement: Simulation Estimations of Patent Value [J]. Review of Economic Studies, 1998,65(4): 71-99
[47] Lee, J. and Mansfiled, E. Intellectual Property Protection and U.S. Foreign Direct Investment [J]. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 1996, (2):181-186
[48] Lerner, J. and Merges, R. The Control of Technology Alliance: An Empirical Analysis of the Biotechnology Industry [J]. Journal of Industrial Economics, 1998,46(2): 1-32
[49] Lewis WA.Economic Development with Unlimited Supply of Labour.The Manchester School,1954(5):139-191
[50] Lin-J-Y." Development strategy.Viability, and Economic convergence", the lnaugurd D.Gate Johnson lecture, presented at the University of Chicago on Mayl4,2001
[51] Liobet, G. Patent Litigation When Innovation Is Cumulative [J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2003,21(8):1135-1157
[52] Loury, G. Market Structure and Innovation [J]. Quarterly Journal of Econonmics, 1979,9-3):395-410
[53] Loury,G. "Market Strctureand Innovation." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1979:395- 410
[54] Lucas, R. Optimal Management of a Research and Development Project [J]. Management Science, 1971,17(11):679-697
[55] Merges, R. Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: the Case of Blocking Patents [J]. Tennessee Law Review, 1990,62:75-106
[56] Nordhaus, W. Invention, Growth and Welfare [M] . London: The MIT Press, 1969.
[57] Nordhaus,W. "The Optimal Lifeofa Patent: Reply."American Economic Review, 1972:428-431
[58] Donoghue, T., Scotchmer, S. and Thisse, J. Patent Breadth, Patent Life, and the Pace of Technological Process [J]. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 1998a,7(1):1-30
[59] Donoghue, T. A Patentability Rerequirement for Sequential Innovation [J]. The RAND Journal of Economics, 1998b, 29(4):654-679
[60] Porter, M. The Competitive Advantage of Nations [M]. New York: Free Press, 1990
[61] Reinganum, J. Technology Adoption under Imperfect Information [J]. Bell Journal of Economics, 1983,14(1):57-69
[62] Romer, P. Are Nonconvexities Important for Understanding Growth? [J]. American Economic Review, 1990, 80(2):97-103
[63] Romer, p. When Should We Use Intellectual Property Rights? [J]. AEA Papers and Proceedings, 2002, 92(2):213-216
[64] Rostow WW."The stages of Economic Growth".Cambridge .Cambrige University press, 1960,1974
[65] Sappington, D. Optimal Regulation of Research and Development under Imperfect Information [J]. Bell Journal of Economics, 1982,13(2):354-368
[66] Scherer, F. M. Nordhaus's Theory of Optimal Patent Life: A Geometric Reinterpretation [J]. The American Economic Review, 1972,62(3):422-427
[67] Scherer,F."Nordhaus's Theory of Optical PatentLife."American Economic Review, 1972:62-79
[68] Schultz TW." Tansforming Traditional Agriculture ".Yale:Yale University Press, 1964
[69] Scotchmer, S. Protecting Early Innovations: Should Second-Generation Products be Patentable? [J]. The RAND Journal of Economics, 1996,27(2):322-331
[70] Shapiro, C. Patent Licensing and R&D Rivalry [J]. The Amercian Economics Review, 1985, 75(2):25-30
[71] Sherpard, A. Licensing to Enhance Demand for New Technoligies [J]. The RAND Journal of Economics, 1987,18(3):360-368
[72] Stiglitz, J. Discussion [J]. The American Economic Review, 1969,59(2):44-49
[73] Whinston, M. Exclusivity and Tying in U.S. v. Microsoft: What We Know, and Don't Know [J]. Journal of Economic Perspective, 2001,15(2):63-80
[74] Wright, B. The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Research Contracts [J]. The American Economic Review, 1983, 73(4):691-707
[75]阿尔钦.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典[M].北京:经济科学出版社,1996,1101-1103
[76]埃里克·菲吕博顿(德),鲁道夫·瑞切特著(美).新制度经济学-一个交易费用分析范式[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2006,102-106
[77]艾伦·瑞安.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典[M].北京:经济科学出版社,1996,1099-1100
[78]安东内利(意).创新经济学--新技术与结构变迁[M].北京:高等教育出版社,2006,2-5
[79]奥尔森(美).集体行动的逻辑[M].上海:上海人民出版社,1995,4-6
[80]安维复.技术创新的社会建构--建立健全国家创新体系的理论分析与政策建议[M].上海:文汇出版社,2003,5-16
[81]巴泽尔(美).产权经济学[M].上海:上海人民出版社,1997,6-8
[82]保罗·J·扎克.产权与增长[J].经济研究,1995(3):3-13
[83]贝克尔(美).人类行为的经济分析[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2004;11-13
[84]宾默尔(英).博弈论与社会契约[M].上海:上海财经大学出版社,2003,6-9
[85]布罗姆利(美).经济利益与经济制度-公共政策的理论基础[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2006,3-10
[86]陈清泰.促进企业自主创新的政策思考[J].管理世界,2006(7):1-3
[87]陈卫平著.中国农业国际竞争力-理论、方法与实证研究[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2005,4-10
[88]陈钊著.信息与激励经济学[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2005,12-36
[89]成帅华,倪世雄.必要的选择TRIPS与发展中国家[J].世界经济与政治,2001(9):61-64.
[90]程启智.内部性与外部性及其政府管制的产权分析[J].管理世界,2002(12):62-68.
[91]楚尔鸣,李勇辉.高新技术产业经济学[M].北京:中国经济出版社,2005,6-15
[92]丛林.技术进步与区域经济发展[M].成都:四川土投机气象印刷厂,2002,1-12
[93]戴强.技术创新与知识产权保护的互动性研究[J].技术经济,2006(8):28-31
[94]大不列颠百科全书[M].北京:中国大百科全书出版社,1999,509-510
[95]德勒巴克(美).新制度经济学前沿[M].北京:北京经济科学出版社,2003,1-3
[96]范里安(美).微观经济学-现代观点[M].上海:上海人民出版社,1994,12-14
[97]费景汉,拉尼斯(美).增长和发展-演进观点[M].北京:商务印书管,2004,12-15
[98]弗鲁博顿著(美).新制度经济学--一个交易费用分析范式[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2006,1-4
[99]傅素英,张俊飚.我国农业技术国际转移的竞争策略分析[J].中国科技论谈,2008(2):97-101
[100]高铁梅.计量经济分析方法与建模:EVIEWSO应用及实例[M].北京清华大学出版社,2006
[101]辜胜阻,李正有著.创新与高科技产业化[M].武汉:武汉大学出版社,2001,5-14
[102]古祖雪.后TRIPS时代的国际知识产权制度变革与国际关系的演变-以WTO 多哈回合谈判为中心[J].中国社会科学,200(2):143-146
[103]韩朝华.明晰产权与规范政府[J].经济研究,2003(2):18-26
[104]霍奇逊编(英).制度与演化经济学现代文选--关键性概念[M].北京:高等教育出版社,2005,8-11
[105]黄教珍.对我国农业技术创新知识产权保护的思考[J].农业考古,2006(6):245-248
[106]黄少安.公有制经济中的产权研究:对象和方法[J].学习与探索,1995(2):29-32
[107]黄少安.”交易费用”范畴研究[J].学术期刊,1995(11):38-44
[108]黄少安.现代产权经济学的基本方法论[J].中国社会科学,1996(2):16-26
[109]黄少安,王怀震.从潜产权到产权:一种产权起源假说[J].经济理论与经济管理,2003(8):13-16
[110]黄少安著.产权经济学导论[M].北京:经济科学出版社出版,2004,10-56
[111]黄少安,杜卫亮.关于”潜产权”的功能[J].财经理论与实践,2005(2):26-28
[112]黄少安.政府行为与国有产权交易[J].产权导刊,2005(3):12-16
[113]黄少安.国有产权交易中的政府职责[J].上海国资,2005(4):16-18
[114]黄少安,郭艳茹.对英国谷物法变革(1815-1846)的重新解释及对现实的启示[J].中国社会科学,2006(3):50-61.
[115]加里·D·利贝卡普.产权的缔约分析[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社,2001,3-5
[116]姜爱萍,吕敏,陈会英.中国农业技术产权实施应用案例探析[J].美中经济评论,2007(62).10-36
[117]姜鑫.诱致性农业技术创新模型及中国农业技术变革的实证研究[J].财经论坛,2007(3):1-7
[118]考夫著(奥).专利制度经济学[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2005,8-12
[119]科斯,阿尔钦,诺斯等.财产权利与制度变迁[M].上海:上海人民出版社,1994,11-204
[120]科斯.企业、市场与法律[M].上海:上海人民出版社,1990,233-235
[121]柯武刚,史漫飞.制度经济学:社会秩序与公共政策[M].北京:商务印书馆,2000,9-41
[122]寇宗来著.专利制度的功能与绩效[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2005,9-35
[123]理查德.R.纳尔逊,G.多西等.技术进步与经济理论[M].北京:经济科学出版社,1992,112-116
[124]理查德·派普斯.财产伦[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2003,2-6
[125]李春顶.我国知识产权保护的经济学解析与对策[J].华南农业大学学报(社会科学版),2005(4):66-70
[126]李稻葵.转型经济中的模糊产权理论[J].经济研究,1995(4):42-50
[127]李平,崔喜君,刘建.中国自主创新中研发资本投入产出绩效分析-兼论人力资本和知识产权保护的影响[J].中国社会科学,2007(2):32-42
[128]李仕明.产权理论和国有产权制度改革[J].经济研究,1995(2):41-45
[129]李永波,高新伟.企业技术创新的产权制度分析[J].经济理论问题[J].生产力研究,2005(12):40-43
[130]李永波,高新伟.企业技术创新的产权制度分析[J].生产力研究,2005(12):40-43
[131]李岳云,罗必良.产权:一个分析框架及其应用[J].南方经济,2002(5):9-12
[132]李兆友著.技术创新主体论[M].沈阳:东北大学出版社,2004
[133]李振宇,黄少安.制度失灵与技术创新-农民焚烧秸秆的经济学分析[J].中国农村观察,2002(5):11-16
[134]林岗,张宇.产权分析的两种范式[J].中国社会科学,2000(1):134-145
[135]林毅夫著.制度技术与中国农业发展[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2005,10-19
[136]刘春田.知识产权法[M].中国人民大学出版社,2000
[137]刘辉,曾福生.技术进步促进农业结构优化[J].农业技术经济,2004(1):48-52
[138]刘伟,李风圣.产权通论[M].北京:北京出版社,1998,10-12
[139]刘小玄.中国转轨过程中的产权和市场-关于市场、产权行为和绩效的分析[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2003,12-55
[140]刘小玄,李利英.企业产权变革的效率分析[J].中国社会科学,2005(2):4-16.
[141]刘学.技术合约与交易费用研究[M].华夏出版社,2001
[142]罗伯特·考特,托马斯·尤伦.法和经济学[M].上海:上海人民出版社,1994,125-127
[143]吕福新.产权的经济学和管理学分析[J].《管理世界》双月刊,2005(11):166-169
[144]吕明瑜.技术创新的益处效应与产权激励功能探讨[J].经济经伟,2006(3):149-152
[145]吕明瑜.技术创新产权激励的制度安排[J].经济问题探索,2006(8):94-98
[146]罗必良,李善民.公有产权、代理成本与剩余索取权[J].南方经济,1996(4):14-16
[147]罗必良.”奥尔森困境”及其困境[J].学术研究,1999(9):8-11
[148]青木昌彦(日).比较制度分析[M].上海:上海远东出版社,2001,35-39
[149]史普博(美).管制与市场[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2003,7-13
[150]思拉恩·埃格特森.新制度经济学[M].北京:商务印书馆,1996,35-36
[151]斯密德著(美).财产、权力和公共选择--对法和经济学的进一步思考[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2006,200-223
[152]斯密德著(美).制度与行为经济学[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2004,12-23
[153]马克思,恩格斯.马克思恩格斯全集[M].北京:商务印书馆,1990,47-523
[154]马克思.资本论(第三卷)[M].北京:商务印书馆,1990,10-424
[155]农业部课题组.我国农业技术推广体系调查与改革思考[J].中国农村经济,2005(2):46-54
[156]诺斯.经济史的结构于变迁[M].上海:上海人民出版社,1991,12-15
[157]欧阳饶,生延超.技术差距、技术能力与后发地区技术赶超[J].中国软科学,2008(2):153-160
[158]庞柏林.中国农业技术创新驱动模式研究[J].学习与探索,2008(1):171-173
[159]彭德琳.新制度经济学[M].武汉:湖北人民出版社,2002,10-21
[160]钱时惕.科技进步与世界经济发展[M].保定:河北大学出版社,2000,4-32
[161]盛洪.中国的过度经济学[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2006,3-22
[162]宋德军,刘阳.中国农业技术扩散的市政研究[J].经济纵横,2007(6):99-100
[163]速水佑次郎著(日).发展经济学-从贫困到富裕[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2003,2-12
[164]索罗著(美).增长理论--一种解析[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2003,8-16
[165]谭崇台.发展经济学的新发展[M].武汉:武汉大学出版社,1999,11-115
[166]汪三贵,刘晓展等著.技术扩散与缓解贫困[M].北京:中国农业出版社,1998,12-25
[167]王春法.技术创新政策:理论基础与工具选择[M].北京:经济科学出版社,1998,139-160
[168]王大洲.技术创新与制度结构[M].沈阳:东北大学出版社,2001,3-16
[169]王法典.农业技术知识产权保护面临的问题及对策[J].学术交流,2005(5):63-65
[170]王金柱.双产权制度论[M].北京:商务印书馆,2005,6-28
[171]王九云.有效保护技术创新过程中形成的知识产权[J].管理世界,2001(2):213-214
[172]王九云,叶元煦.论保护知识产权对技术创新的驱动功能[J].管理世界,2001(6):204-205
[173]王黎萤,陈劲.技术标准战略、知识产权战略与技术创新协同发展关系研究[J].中国软科学,2004(12):24-27
[174]王清平.论科技成果知识产权化[J].中国科技论坛,2006(7):81-85
[175]王雪苓.当代技术创新的经济分析--基于信息及其技术视角的宏观分析[M].成都:西南财经大学出版社,2005,8-29
[176]王振中.产权理论与经济发展[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2005
[177]王争.专利制度的经济学研究综述[J].北京大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2006(3):141-151
[178]魏杰.现代产权制度辨析[M].北京:首都经济贸易大学出版社,2000
[179]韦尔德(英)、福布斯(印).从追随者到领先者--管理新兴工业化经济的技术与创新[M].北京:高等教育出版2005,11-23
[180]沃克.牛津法律大辞典[M].北京:光明日报出版社,1988,729
[181]吴敬琏著.发展中国高新技术产业--制度重于技术[M].北京:中国发展出版社,2002
[182]吴宣恭.产权理论比较[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2000
[183]吴易风.产权理论:马克思和科斯的比较[J].中国社会科学,2007(2):4-18
[184]西奥多·W·舒尔茨.改造传统农业[M].北京:商务印书馆,2003,78-89
[185]夏保华著.企业持续技术创新的结构[M].沈阳:东北大学出版社,2001,5-19
[186]徐清,刘义圣冲国农业技术进步问题新探-基于发展经济学视角[J].农业经济导刊,2006(9):115-120
[187]徐瑄.关于知识产权的几个深层次理论问题[J].北京大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2003(3):101-108
[188]杨武.技术创新产权[M],北京:清华大学出版社,1999,121-165
[189]扬武,王玲.论技术创新产权制度[J].科技管理研究,2005(10):11-13
[190]扬武,王玲.知识产权保护下的技术创新者与模仿者竞争模型研究[J].科研管理,2006(7):48-52
[191]杨灿明.产权特性与产业定位[J].经济研究,2001(9):53-59
[192]杨国涛.我国地区间农业技术差距的一种超函数测算方法[J].安徽农业科学,2007(2):21-25
[193]杨晓维.技术、市场与企业所有权安排[J].经济研究,2000(2):40-48
[194]叶祥松.西方经济学的产权理论[J].理论探讨,2001(7):50-56
[195]易先忠,张亚斌.技术差距、知识产权保护与后发国技术进步[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2006(10):111-121
[196]银纯泉.中国产权交易市场发展与预测[J].管理世界,2003(4):129-131
[197]尹翔硕.技术进步与新经济[M].北京:人民出版社,2002,5-9
[198]俞培果,蒋葵.农业科技投入的价格效应和分配效应探析[J].中国农村经济,2006(7):32-37
[199]袁克.中国知识产权保护的经济学分析[J].南开经济研究,2003(2):52-55
[200]约瑟夫·熊彼特,经济发展理论[M].北京:商务印书馆,1990,73-98
[201]詹姆斯·A·道,阿兰·鲁福斯·华特斯等.发展经济学的革命[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2000,128-201
[202]曾福生,匡远配.论制度创新与农业技术进步[J].农业技术经济,2001(6):13-18
[203]曾福生,李明贤著.技术进步与农业增长方式的转变[M].长沙:国防科技大学出版社,2001,46-68
[204]曾福生.湖南省农业技术推广模式分析[J].农业技术经济,2006(2):50-54
[205]曾福生.社会主义新农村建设情况的调查与思考[J].农业经济问题,2006(10):56-59
[206]张弘著.技术创新与中国流通产业发展[M].北京:首都经济贸易大学出版社,2006
[207]张维迎.博弈论与信自、经济学[M].上海二连书店,1996
[208]张维迎.产权、政府与信誉[M].北京:三联出版社,2001
[209]赵芝俊.近20年中国农业技术进步贡献率的变动趋势[J].中国农村经济,2006(3):64-69
[210]郑成思.知识产权法教程[M].法律出版社,1993,12-25
[211]周凤华,朱雪忠.2000-2004年中国知识产权研究的文献计量分析[J].科研管理,2006(4):53-60
[212]周衍平.农业技术产权实施的模式选择与保障措施[J].中国农村经济,2006(11):29-35
[213]朱利民,潘娜.基于技术创新的知识产权不确定性定价研究[J].当代经理人,2006(5):137-138
[214]朱玉春,郭江.中国农业乡镇的技术进步及其与农业增长的相关分析[J].中国农村经济,2006(11):45-51
[215]邹薇.知识产权保护的经济学分析[J].世界经济,2002(2):3-11
© 2004-2018 中国地质图书馆版权所有 京ICP备05064691号 京公网安备11010802017129号 地址：北京市海淀区学院路29号 邮编：100083 电话：办公室：(+86 10)66554848；文献借阅、咨询服务、科技查新：66554700 |