利益表达与政治整合
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摘要
利益表达是利益集团的基本功能,政治整合则是指通过建立一种新的政治运行机制对原有的政治力量结构进行一系列的重组行为。宏观上看,在现代民主政治过程中,利益集团的活动就是在不断的利益表达和政治整合中进行的,而实现集团发展和利益格局的均衡则是民主政治的重要目标。哪里存在利益分歧,哪里就存在产生利益集团的可能性。在现代社会结构中,个人利益被整合为集团和组织的利益,现代的利益之争体现为社会集团利益之争。社会利益的失衡在很大程度上是源于未能实现从权利均衡到机会均衡的过渡。要实现社会利益均衡,就要改变利益集团间的非均衡竞争状态。只有从整体上推进体制改革,使各项改革配套进行,形成科学有效的利益协调机制并保证社会成员利益竞争的条件和机会平等,才能实现从权利均衡到机会均衡的发展。论文运用规范推理和实证分析的方法,就利益集团发展的均衡性问题进行研究,在充分论证多元竞争性均衡的理论价值和现实可能性的基础上,提出了当前中国利益集团发展的模式选择问题。
At present, the development of interest groups and influence on decision-making is more and more concerned by domestic academic. However, compared with the international sophisticated theoretical research on interest groups, the domestic academic research in this regard is still very insufficient. The development of domestic interest groups characterized by a very large non-equilibrium, witch caused a serious imbalance between the pattern of benefits, hindered the fair and just society achieve. Interest group politics is closely related to the institutional change, according to the new institutionalism, the direction of the evolution of the institutional change is related to the process and results of game among the interest groups in society. China is in a transition society, non-balanced development of interest groups will have far-reaching influences both on socio-political and economic. North said: "If we say that institution is the rules of the game, then the interest groups are gamers." Players should obey the rules of the game, after all. How to weaken structural inequality among the groups in terms of resources and social capital, so that interest groups and development activity achieves an orderly and rational status, witch will be a great theoretical and significancely practical subject.
Interest articulation is the basic function of interest groups, political integration is the means that the establishment of a new political operation mechanism restructures the original structure of the political forces. From macro perspective, in a modern democratic political process, interest group activity is conducting at the interests articulation and political integration. The implementation of group development and a balanced pattern of benefits is an important goal of democratic politics.
In this paper, from the logic of interest group action, the focus on the development of interest groups and the relationship between the balance of interests, and the main line of argument among the theoretical pluralism, the new right-wing groups and corporatism, re-emphasized the theory of pluralism Group values. On this basis, we propose the idea of making the right balance to a balanced view of opportunities, and further analysis of interest groups in China's current situation and development model choiceing. We believe that in an "open access to the social order," it is necessary to have numerous, complex and well-organized interest groups exist, so that a basic balance of benefits and sustainable competitive will it be possible to a democratic society.
Interest group is a widely used but the meaning is not unified concept. This requires us first of all, analysis the confusion rationale in the theoretical circle. We will define interest groups as some social groups having similar views or interests, composing requirements through its participation in the political process, and influencing public policy to achieve or maintain their interest. We will weaken the concept of interest groups in the organizational form, that is, it is not the necessary conditions whether the organization existing or not for interest groups. Because we believe that, if in accordance with the strict definition about the meaning of interest groups, Chinese interest groups do not currently exist. The legalization of Chinese interest groups have yet to solve the problem, organization of benefits is still in a legal and illegal cross-Strip up. But in fact the form of interest groups has affected the activity of public policy, and to some extent become the source of conflict of interest. Behind the discourse, interest groups, associations, interest groups, cross-used is also based on such a consideration, even though these terms have specific implication on great distinction. Thesis on the theory of theological interest groups carry out a lot of grooming, including a group of early American political theory, post-World War II the rise of pluralism Group theory, as well as elite theory, Corporatism, analysis of these theoretical perspectives of interest groups under the concept. On this basis, we analysis the adaptive problem of group theoretical on the benefits of Chinese organizations.
Where the benefits differences exist, where the possibility of interest groups exist. However, the influence and roles interest groups in socio-economic and political life are divergent. The voice of supporting interest groups revealed longing for a pluralistic democratic society: the power is widely distributed among various interest groups, the group influence to some extent can be offsetted each other, no one group can dominate the political system, which can be formed a balance. Opponents believe that there are always strong groups and disadvantaged groups of points in life,“the defects of pluralism paradise lies in the fact that the kingdom of heaven chorus voices mixed with a strong upper class accent." Interest groups’external environmental factors and internal organizational factors determine to a large extent the interest groups’nature and role in the political process. The former includes political culture, institutional structure, the nature of the party system, public policy and other factors, and the latter includes the forms of organization, scale and membership, money, concerned about the goals and Approach way to the Government.
These factors affect the balance of power of interest groups, of course, also affect the degree of group goals. For interest groups and the relationship between the balance of interests, first of all relates to the logic of collective action problem, a comparative analysis of the traditional theory and pluralism, and Logic of Collective Action, we can see that even though Olson's theory of group action has an impact on theoretical pluralism in terms of logic or practical experience, he did not fully explain the scale the complex relationship in the Group's products, so that adaptation is affected by the limitations of the theory.
In the modern social structure, personal interests are integrated for the interests of groups and organizations, the benefits of modern struggles reflected in benefits between social groups, then, why not further excavate the positive significance of group politics for modern democracy? The negative effects of Interest groups can be able to eliminate? Can people get out of the dilemma of collective action? Ideal form of pluralist democracy under what conditions can achieve? On these issues, we should first conduct a critical on Olsen superstition and the new institutionalism and social capital theory has proved that achievement in order to common interests and collective action is possible. Just as Dahl said, in a way, the ideals and the reality gap between the controlling factors are the result of man-made, it is also can be bridged by human action.
From the practical point of view, the non-balance harmony development at large extent stems from the failure to achieve the transition from the right balance to the opportunity balance. The right balance is social democracy and symbol of civilization, is the foundation and prerequisite of citizens other rights and interests. However, rights balance is more the concept of a value or guidelines. The balanced opportunity is the core of the right balance. Designed from the system and public policy at the level of different groups of society, especially the rights of expression and the right to pursue their own interests and regulation shall be arranged to protect the expression of different social groups to pursue their own interests and the starting point for a fair and equal process, witch will become a major mission of the new era economic and political systems construction.
With the deepening development of market-oriented economic and social interest changing and the pattern of adjustment, the current Chinese interest groups on the one hand, show a wide range of development, on the one hand, they do not form a Western-style checks and balances situation. From the vertical perspective, the public be divided into multiple strata, from the national and social managers, to managers, private entrepreneurs, professional and technical personnel, officers, individual industrial and commercial households, commercial services, industrial workers, agricultural workers until urban unemployed, the unemployed and underemployed persons, there is a big difference among these strata in the organization of resources, economic resources and cultural resources.
From the horizontal look, the public can be incorporated into the various forms of interest groups. Interest groups in a wide range of development trend, on the one hand the interests of society are the result of structural changes, on the other hand, the development of ideological change and political reform for the emergence of interest groups and activities provide a macroscopic view of the social background and limited system platform. However, Chinese interest groups in society development are very uneven. The organization of resources, financial resources, information resources, cultural resources or social relations as resources are concerned, are very different. Interest groups are groups of non-equilibrium competitive pluralism in practice difficult to solve the drawbacks of this interest group politics in the Western more developed countries is also true, but the more comprehensive system design and the protection of the rights in western countries will be able to reduce this non-balanced competition to a certain extent within the scope and extent. From the Chinese point of view, the relevant laws, regulations, and the absence of specific systems are the key reasons for the imbalance. To achieve a balanced society, it is necessary to change the non-balanced competition status of interest groups. Only from an overall push forward on structural reforms, the reform package, and the formation of scientific and effective coordination mechanism to ensure that benefits members of the community benefits of the conditions of competition and equal opportunity, the right balance from the opportunity can be achieved.
At present, the development of interest groups and influence on decision-making is more and more concerned by domestic academic. However, compared with the international sophisticated theoretical research on interest groups, the domestic academic research in this regard is still very insufficient. The development of domestic interest groups characterized by a very large non-equilibrium, witch caused a serious imbalance between the pattern of benefits, hindered the fair and just society achieve. Interest group politics is closely related to the institutional change, according to the new institutionalism, the direction of the evolution of the institutional change is related to the process and results of game among the interest groups in society. China is in a transition society, non-balanced development of interest groups will have far-reaching influences both on socio-political and economic. North said: "If we say that institution is the rules of the game, then the interest groups are gamers." Players should obey the rules of the game, after all. How to weaken structural inequality among the groups in terms of resources and social capital, so that interest groups and development activity achieves an orderly and rational status, witch will be a great theoretical and significancely practical subject.
Interest articulation is the basic function of interest groups, political integration is the means that the establishment of a new political operation mechanism restructures the original structure of the political forces. From macro perspective, in a modern democratic political process, interest group activity is conducting at the interests articulation and political integration. The implementation of group development and a balanced pattern of benefits is an important goal of democratic politics.
In this paper, from the logic of interest group action, the focus on the development of interest groups and the relationship between the balance of interests, and the main line of argument among the theoretical pluralism, the new right-wing groups and corporatism, re-emphasized the theory of pluralism Group values. On this basis, we propose the idea of making the right balance to a balanced view of opportunities, and further analysis of interest groups in China's current situation and development model choiceing. We believe that in an "open access to the social order," it is necessary to have numerous, complex and well-organized interest groups exist, so that a basic balance of benefits and sustainable competitive will it be possible to a democratic society.
Interest group is a widely used but the meaning is not unified concept. This requires us first of all, analysis the confusion rationale in the theoretical circle. We will define interest groups as some social groups having similar views or interests, composing requirements through its participation in the political process, and influencing public policy to achieve or maintain their interest. We will weaken the concept of interest groups in the organizational form, that is, it is not the necessary conditions whether the organization existing or not for interest groups. Because we believe that, if in accordance with the strict definition about the meaning of interest groups, Chinese interest groups do not currently exist. The legalization of Chinese interest groups have yet to solve the problem, organization of benefits is still in a legal and illegal cross-Strip up. But in fact the form of interest groups has affected the activity of public policy, and to some extent become the source of conflict of interest. Behind the discourse, interest groups, associations, interest groups, cross-used is also based on such a consideration, even though these terms have specific implication on great distinction. Thesis on the theory of theological interest groups carry out a lot of grooming, including a group of early American political theory, post-World War II the rise of pluralism Group theory, as well as elite theory, Corporatism, analysis of these theoretical perspectives of interest groups under the concept. On this basis, we analysis the adaptive problem of group theoretical on the benefits of Chinese organizations.
Where the benefits differences exist, where the possibility of interest groups exist. However, the influence and roles interest groups in socio-economic and political life are divergent. The voice of supporting interest groups revealed longing for a pluralistic democratic society: the power is widely distributed among various interest groups, the group influence to some extent can be offsetted each other, no one group can dominate the political system, which can be formed a balance. Opponents believe that there are always strong groups and disadvantaged groups of points in life,“the defects of pluralism paradise lies in the fact that the kingdom of heaven chorus voices mixed with a strong upper class accent." Interest groups’external environmental factors and internal organizational factors determine to a large extent the interest groups’nature and role in the political process. The former includes political culture, institutional structure, the nature of the party system, public policy and other factors, and the latter includes the forms of organization, scale and membership, money, concerned about the goals and Approach way to the Government.
These factors affect the balance of power of interest groups, of course, also affect the degree of group goals. For interest groups and the relationship between the balance of interests, first of all relates to the logic of collective action problem, a comparative analysis of the traditional theory and pluralism, and Logic of Collective Action, we can see that even though Olson's theory of group action has an impact on theoretical pluralism in terms of logic or practical experience, he did not fully explain the scale the complex relationship in the Group's products, so that adaptation is affected by the limitations of the theory.
In the modern social structure, personal interests are integrated for the interests of groups and organizations, the benefits of modern struggles reflected in benefits between social groups, then, why not further excavate the positive significance of group politics for modern democracy? The negative effects of Interest groups can be able to eliminate? Can people get out of the dilemma of collective action? Ideal form of pluralist democracy under what conditions can achieve? On these issues, we should first conduct a critical on Olsen superstition and the new institutionalism and social capital theory has proved that achievement in order to common interests and collective action is possible. Just as Dahl said, in a way, the ideals and the reality gap between the controlling factors are the result of man-made, it is also can be bridged by human action.
From the practical point of view, the non-balance harmony development at large extent stems from the failure to achieve the transition from the right balance to the opportunity balance. The right balance is social democracy and symbol of civilization, is the foundation and prerequisite of citizens other rights and interests. However, rights balance is more the concept of a value or guidelines. The balanced opportunity is the core of the right balance. Designed from the system and public policy at the level of different groups of society, especially the rights of expression and the right to pursue their own interests and regulation shall be arranged to protect the expression of different social groups to pursue their own interests and the starting point for a fair and equal process, witch will become a major mission of the new era economic and political systems construction.
With the deepening development of market-oriented economic and social interest changing and the pattern of adjustment, the current Chinese interest groups on the one hand, show a wide range of development, on the one hand, they do not form a Western-style checks and balances situation. From the vertical perspective, the public be divided into multiple strata, from the national and social managers, to managers, private entrepreneurs, professional and technical personnel, officers, individual industrial and commercial households, commercial services, industrial workers, agricultural workers until urban unemployed, the unemployed and underemployed persons, there is a big difference among these strata in the organization of resources, economic resources and cultural resources.
From the horizontal look, the public can be incorporated into the various forms of interest groups. Interest groups in a wide range of development trend, on the one hand the interests of society are the result of structural changes, on the other hand, the development of ideological change and political reform for the emergence of interest groups and activities provide a macroscopic view of the social background and limited system platform. However, Chinese interest groups in society development are very uneven. The organization of resources, financial resources, information resources, cultural resources or social relations as resources are concerned, are very different. Interest groups are groups of non-equilibrium competitive pluralism in practice difficult to solve the drawbacks of this interest group politics in the Western more developed countries is also true, but the more comprehensive system design and the protection of the rights in western countries will be able to reduce this non-balanced competition to a certain extent within the scope and extent. From the Chinese point of view, the relevant laws, regulations, and the absence of specific systems are the key reasons for the imbalance. To achieve a balanced society, it is necessary to change the non-balanced competition status of interest groups. Only from an overall push forward on structural reforms, the reform package, and the formation of scientific and effective coordination mechanism to ensure that benefits members of the community benefits of the conditions of competition and equal opportunity, the right balance from the opportunity can be achieved.
引文
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2利益集团政治是一把双刃剑,我们不能因为它对政治过程的消极影响而忽视其与民主政治发展的正向功能。试图从制度上看消除利益集团更不可能,利益集团的产生、成长和活动总是不可避免的,打压和控制只能是进一步削弱代表弱势群体的利益集团的形成,从而催化社会利益格局的失衡。利益集团政治的公开化、显性化、合法化在目前而言还是个较为“前瞻”性的问题,但我们可以看到在理论界已经不断发出这样的呼声。
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1这一点对于中国而言无疑具有更深层次的意义,尤其在权势分利集团控制的领域,多元主义还具有了反腐和反对集权主义的功效。
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1像美国这样的两党制体系自然认为社会利益是冲突的,党派的竞争反映了不同利益力量的较量;而在一党制或者集权国家,执政党一般作为国家总体利益的代表而存在,问题是,一个庞大而复杂的现代社会,能作为一个整体被代表吗?
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1同上,第112页。
2杜鲁门将利益集团和政治性利益集团作了区分,他认为所有的团体都是利益集团,因为它们是有着共同的态度。但当代利益集团具有普遍诉诸于政府行动的倾向,这也是一般集团发展为政治性利益集团的客观必然。
3陈尧.政治生活中的利益集团的成因分析[J].上海交通大学学报,2006(1):62.
4 Mark P Petracca. The Politics of Interests: Interest Groups Trans formed [M]. Boulder: Westview Press, 1992.
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2同上,第28页。
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4同上,第132页。
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2利益集团政治是一把双刃剑,我们不能因为它对政治过程的消极影响而忽视其与民主政治发展的正向功能。试图从制度上看消除利益集团更不可能,利益集团的产生、成长和活动总是不可避免的,打压和控制只能是进一步削弱代表弱势群体的利益集团的形成,从而催化社会利益格局的失衡。利益集团政治的公开化、显性化、合法化在目前而言还是个较为“前瞻”性的问题,但我们可以看到在理论界已经不断发出这样的呼声。
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1这一点对于中国而言无疑具有更深层次的意义,尤其在权势分利集团控制的领域,多元主义还具有了反腐和反对集权主义的功效。
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