基于产权分析的城市交通拥挤问题研究
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摘要
随着我国改革开放的深入和城市化进程的不断加快,城市居民的生活水平有了很大提高,人们日常出行的频次和结构都发生了显著变化,小汽车出行比重的快速提高成为了城市居民出行方式变化的主要特征。出行总量的增加和出行结构的变化不仅给现有的城市交通体系带来了巨大压力,并且在特定空间布局的作用下,还会导致出行时间增加、舒适度下降以及由此带来的出行成本的提高和环境的进一步恶化,这其中城市交通拥挤就是现代城市交通问题的核心内容。
针对日益严重的城市交通拥挤问题,学者、研究机构及各地政府分别试图从不同方面对交通拥挤进行解释、分析和探寻解决途径。总体来看,目前对城市交通拥挤问题的研究主要沿着两条路径进行:一条是基于各种数理分析和仿真的技术分析,一条则是基于公共物品、外部性研究的经济分析。这些研究在城市交通拥挤的成因、产生的社会成本以及采用何种方式加以解决方面等方面已经取得了不少成果,而且像路网优化、公交优先、限制小汽车使用等政策已经在一些城市稳步推进和实施,但是从实际来看城市交通拥挤问题不太可能在短期内得以根本上解决。
产生这种理论——现实困境的一个重要原因就是以往的理论只是针对城市交通系统的个别子系统展开研究,因而难以获得造成城市交通拥挤的深层次原因以及系统的解决办法。为了弥补理论研究中的上述缺陷,本文从城市交通的产权属性出发,对城市交通按照不同的产权属性进行分类,从公共物品产权、混合产权和俱乐部产权的角度分别探讨提高城市交通公共领域供给效率的产权结构,研究不同产权配置影响行为主体决策的微观机理,并结合城市基础设施投融资模式和交通需求管理,探讨城市交通供给和需求的最佳产权配置状态。最后结合我国以及北京市的实际情况,分析我国城市交通拥挤产生的深层次原因,提出基于产权结构选择、产权束管理、行政权力改革以及纵向一体化等缓解城市交通拥挤问题的政策建议。
With the increasing of Chinese cities' urbanization and the deepening of the reform, people's living standard improved, which resulted in the corresponding changes of their trip in the city. As the characteristic of these changes, motorized travel not only confines the development space of the city, but also makes people face more time delay, comfort losing and environmental deterioration in their daily commuting with the interaction of certain space layout of the city.
Although local government takes measures as public transport priority, demand management and improving the urban traffic infrastructure etc., to ease urban traffic congestion, the situation is still getting worse. There are defects with these measures and the study researches made by scholars anyway. As the matter of fact, former study of the urban traffic congestion developed in two different directions, one is technological way, by using the tool of modeling, mathematical analysis and emulation. The other way is economical analysis based on theories of common goods and externalities. Although there are achievements in the study and the implementing of government policies, urban traffic congestion is more likely equilibrated, and there is no obvious trend which indicates that the urban traffic congestion will be eased in a short time.
The dilemma as shown above is a result of the unilateralization of the researches and the policies in a certain extent. This respective rather than systemic way of dealing with the traffic jam limited both scholars and officials ability of touching the deep-seated nature of urban traffic congestion. To supply this gap, the author studied the mechanism of the corresponding individual's decision-making from the property rights point of view, and build up a utility-property rights model to explain how individuals make there decision in their daily commuting. Furthermore, urban traffic system was cataloged according to the property rights characteristics. As the consequence, corresponding subsystems were studied respectively considering the common rights, mixed property rights and club property rights. As the output of the theoretical research shown above, the author reveal the deep cause of the urban traffic congestion and put forward some suggestions to ease the congestion condition of China's city taking the example of Beijing.
针对日益严重的城市交通拥挤问题,学者、研究机构及各地政府分别试图从不同方面对交通拥挤进行解释、分析和探寻解决途径。总体来看,目前对城市交通拥挤问题的研究主要沿着两条路径进行:一条是基于各种数理分析和仿真的技术分析,一条则是基于公共物品、外部性研究的经济分析。这些研究在城市交通拥挤的成因、产生的社会成本以及采用何种方式加以解决方面等方面已经取得了不少成果,而且像路网优化、公交优先、限制小汽车使用等政策已经在一些城市稳步推进和实施,但是从实际来看城市交通拥挤问题不太可能在短期内得以根本上解决。
产生这种理论——现实困境的一个重要原因就是以往的理论只是针对城市交通系统的个别子系统展开研究,因而难以获得造成城市交通拥挤的深层次原因以及系统的解决办法。为了弥补理论研究中的上述缺陷,本文从城市交通的产权属性出发,对城市交通按照不同的产权属性进行分类,从公共物品产权、混合产权和俱乐部产权的角度分别探讨提高城市交通公共领域供给效率的产权结构,研究不同产权配置影响行为主体决策的微观机理,并结合城市基础设施投融资模式和交通需求管理,探讨城市交通供给和需求的最佳产权配置状态。最后结合我国以及北京市的实际情况,分析我国城市交通拥挤产生的深层次原因,提出基于产权结构选择、产权束管理、行政权力改革以及纵向一体化等缓解城市交通拥挤问题的政策建议。
With the increasing of Chinese cities' urbanization and the deepening of the reform, people's living standard improved, which resulted in the corresponding changes of their trip in the city. As the characteristic of these changes, motorized travel not only confines the development space of the city, but also makes people face more time delay, comfort losing and environmental deterioration in their daily commuting with the interaction of certain space layout of the city.
Although local government takes measures as public transport priority, demand management and improving the urban traffic infrastructure etc., to ease urban traffic congestion, the situation is still getting worse. There are defects with these measures and the study researches made by scholars anyway. As the matter of fact, former study of the urban traffic congestion developed in two different directions, one is technological way, by using the tool of modeling, mathematical analysis and emulation. The other way is economical analysis based on theories of common goods and externalities. Although there are achievements in the study and the implementing of government policies, urban traffic congestion is more likely equilibrated, and there is no obvious trend which indicates that the urban traffic congestion will be eased in a short time.
The dilemma as shown above is a result of the unilateralization of the researches and the policies in a certain extent. This respective rather than systemic way of dealing with the traffic jam limited both scholars and officials ability of touching the deep-seated nature of urban traffic congestion. To supply this gap, the author studied the mechanism of the corresponding individual's decision-making from the property rights point of view, and build up a utility-property rights model to explain how individuals make there decision in their daily commuting. Furthermore, urban traffic system was cataloged according to the property rights characteristics. As the consequence, corresponding subsystems were studied respectively considering the common rights, mixed property rights and club property rights. As the output of the theoretical research shown above, the author reveal the deep cause of the urban traffic congestion and put forward some suggestions to ease the congestion condition of China's city taking the example of Beijing.
引文
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