劳动成本变动的经济效应分析
|
摘要
拥有丰富且廉价的劳动力资源一直被认为是中国经济的比较优势之所在,也被认为是中国企业借以维持产品价格优势、参与市场竞争的重要基础。近期,中国劳动力价格的持续上升引起了人们的担忧。有观点认为,这是对中国劳动成本优势的侵蚀,并将使中国经济以及企业总体上陷入发展的困境。然而,劳动力价格具有双重性质:对于企业而言它意味着成本,对于工人而言则形成报酬。劳动成本的变动在本质上反映了不同主体之间的利益分配。竞争压力驱使企业压缩劳动成本,这直接导致了劳动者报酬的增长压抑,使得基础的微观分配结构朝着偏离普通劳动者的一方倾斜。偏斜的分配结构不仅频繁地引发了劳资冲突,还将通过抑制社会的有效需求和人力资本投资对经济增长构成根本性约束。
本文从劳动力价格的双重性质出发,尝试通过分析劳动成本变动的经济效应回答三个基本问题,即:当前中国劳动成本水平的增长是否足以令人感到担忧?劳动成本变动影响经济和企业发展的内在机理是什么?劳动者参与经济分享与经济增长和企业发展目标之间是否具有利益一致性?
在宏观层面,提高劳动者报酬是经济和社会发展的内在要求。对劳动者报酬水平增长条件下我国单位劳动成本以及相对单位劳动成本水平变动的分析结果表明,劳动成本并非决定经济竞争力的唯一因素,而生产率在劳动成本增长效应的发挥过程中发挥着根本性作用。近年我国FDI流入和出口数据支持了这一结论,而对劳动成本与贸易之间关系的模型分析则对此给出了进一步的印证。同时数据显示,当前中国的劳动成本优势依然较为显著,而未来劳动成本水平仍然具有较大的增长空间。因此,简单地因为劳动者报酬水平上升而感到担忧是没有必要的。经济竞争力指标的实际变动状况表明,劳动者参与经济分享与经济竞争力提升是可以共同实现的目标。
在微观层面,本文集中分析劳动成本变动对于企业竞争力和企业发展的影响。劳动密集型鞋产品的出口表明,当前中国企业的产品价格优势十分显著。即使劳动者报酬成本的较快增长完全转入产品价格当中,也不会对当前产品的价格竞争力产生根本性影响。另一方面,即使劳动者报酬成本增长的压力无法通过价格转嫁,劳动力价格的双重性质同样决定了劳动者报酬成本增长与企业竞争力之间并不仅仅简单地表现为此消彼长式的互斥关系。在雇佣契约框架下,劳动者报酬成本变动与企业竞争力演进之间的关系大体遵循两个方向上的逻辑。特别地,劳动者报酬成本增长将对企业的雇用效率形成激励,从而增长的劳动者报酬成本将可从生产效率的提高和对交易费用的节约中得到抵偿。
最后,本文基于博弈视角给出了一个关于劳动成本增长效应释放机制的新解释,提出在自由交易的市场环境当中,劳动成本增长的压力将通过所谓“博弈-接受/不接受”机制转化为劳动力市场当中的流动、搜寻和匹配行为以及企业的创新、迁移或者破产行为并最终得到释放。这一分析表明,当前的劳动成本增长可以成为促进企业转换发展模式的契机,而企业与工人之间也可形成和谐的利益分配关系。政府则可以在引导企业科学发展、统一企业与工人之间的利益分配矛盾方面发挥积极的作用。运用大样本数据和案例,本文实证检验了劳动成本增长效应的内在机理,并且证明了企业与工人和谐发展的双赢模式不仅在理论上可行,同时也是现实存在的。
本文的创新之处在于,选择从全新的利益分配视角考察当前的劳动成本增长问题。通过计算和比较不同类型劳动成本指标的水平及其变动状况,完整地展示了我国当前的劳动成本优势、未来劳动成本水平的增长空间以及劳动成本变动条件下经济竞争力的实际演进状况。在此基础上,系统地分析了劳动成本增长对于经济和企业竞争力的影响及其作用机理,并最终论证了保护劳动者权益与促进经济和企业发展目标之间具有统一性。
Owning abundant and cheap labor resources has been considered as China's economic comparative advantage. It has also been treated as the important foundation supporting Chinese enterprises to maintain the price advantage of their products and to compete in the market. The recent continuous increase in China's labor price has aroused some worries. Some people think it will erode China's labor cost advantage and push the enterprises, and the whole economy, into development predicament. However, labor price has a dual nature: it means the cost to enterprises and the compensation to workers. This decides the change of labor cost reflecting in essence the distribution among different interest bodies. Driven by competitive pressure, enterprises cut down the labor cost. This led directly to the suppression of the growth in workers compensation and the biased micro distribution structure deviating from common workers, which frequently triggers the conflicts between labor and management. Furthermore, the biased distribution structure will inhibit the effective demands as well as the investments in human capital of the whole society, thus constituting a fundamental constraint to economic growth.
Based on the dual nature of labor price, this paper tries to answer three basic questions through analyzing the economic effects of the change in labor cost: The first is whether the current increase in China's labor cost is enough to cause the worry? The second is what is the intrinsic mechanism to the changes in labor cost affecting the developments of the whole economy and enterprises and the? The third is whether there is consistent interest among the goals of labors' participation in the economic sharing and economic growth and enterprise development?
On the macro aspect, it's the intrinsic requirements of the developments of economy and society to increase labor compensation. The results from the analysis of changes of unit labor cost and relative unit labor cost levels show that productivity plays a fundamental role in the process of labor cost effects. The conclusion is proved in the analysis of China's FDI inflows and export situation in recent years. It is further confirmed in the analysis based on trade model. Meanwhile, data analysis shows that China's labor cost advantage is still significant at present and there is still a large room for labor cost increase. Therefore, it is not necessary to worry about the increase simply in labor compensation. The actual changes of competitiveness indicators show that labor's participation in the economic sharing and enhancement of economic competitiveness can be integrated to achieve the goal.
On the micro aspect, the analysis concentrates on the effects of changes in labor costs on the competitiveness of enterprises and their development. The export situation of labor-intensive products such as shoes shows that the Chinese enterprises have significant advantage on the aspect of product price at the present. Even if the quicker increase in labor compensation cost is all transmitted into price, it will not smooth away the advantage of its price competitiveness. On the other hand, even if the pressure of labor compensation cost increasing cannot be transmitted through product price, it's not a simple rise-exclusive relationship between labor compensation cost and the competitiveness of enterprises due to the dual nature of labor price. Under the contractual framework, the relationship between the changes in labor compensation cost and the evolution of enterprise competitiveness generally follows two-direction logics. In particular, the increase in labor compensation cost will stimulate the efficiency of enterprises' employment, thus the increase in labor compensation cost can be offset through the enhancement of productivity and the reduction of transaction costs.
Finally a new interpretation is offered on release mechanism of the effects of labor cost increasing based on bargaining perspective. In the market environment of free transaction, the pressure of labor cost increasing will be released eventually by so-called "bargain-accept/not-accept" mechanism, which will lead to the turnover, searching and matching in labor market as well as enterprise's acts of innovation, migration or bankruptcy. This analysis indicates that the current increase in labor cost may motivate the pattern transitions of enterprises' development and a harmonious relationship between the enterprise and the labor can be achieved. And the government may play an active role in guiding enterprises' scientific development and harmonizing the conflict of benefit distribution between the enterprise and the labor. Empirical researches, based on the large sample data and the cases of some enterprises, examine the intrinsic mechanism to the effects of labor cost increase and prove that the win-win model of harmonious development between enterprise and workers is not only theoretically possible but exists in reality as well.
The paper analyses the problem of current labor cost increase from a new perspective of distribution of interests. The explicit calculation and comparative analysis of several kinds of labor cost index illustrate more completely China's current labor cost advantage, the growth space of labor cost in the future and the evolution of economic competitiveness under the condition of the labor cost changing .Then a systematic analysis is given of the effects of labor cost increase on competitiveness of economy and enterprises. Finally the unitarity is expounded and proved between improving labor's benefits and promoting the development goals of economy and enterprises.
本文从劳动力价格的双重性质出发,尝试通过分析劳动成本变动的经济效应回答三个基本问题,即:当前中国劳动成本水平的增长是否足以令人感到担忧?劳动成本变动影响经济和企业发展的内在机理是什么?劳动者参与经济分享与经济增长和企业发展目标之间是否具有利益一致性?
在宏观层面,提高劳动者报酬是经济和社会发展的内在要求。对劳动者报酬水平增长条件下我国单位劳动成本以及相对单位劳动成本水平变动的分析结果表明,劳动成本并非决定经济竞争力的唯一因素,而生产率在劳动成本增长效应的发挥过程中发挥着根本性作用。近年我国FDI流入和出口数据支持了这一结论,而对劳动成本与贸易之间关系的模型分析则对此给出了进一步的印证。同时数据显示,当前中国的劳动成本优势依然较为显著,而未来劳动成本水平仍然具有较大的增长空间。因此,简单地因为劳动者报酬水平上升而感到担忧是没有必要的。经济竞争力指标的实际变动状况表明,劳动者参与经济分享与经济竞争力提升是可以共同实现的目标。
在微观层面,本文集中分析劳动成本变动对于企业竞争力和企业发展的影响。劳动密集型鞋产品的出口表明,当前中国企业的产品价格优势十分显著。即使劳动者报酬成本的较快增长完全转入产品价格当中,也不会对当前产品的价格竞争力产生根本性影响。另一方面,即使劳动者报酬成本增长的压力无法通过价格转嫁,劳动力价格的双重性质同样决定了劳动者报酬成本增长与企业竞争力之间并不仅仅简单地表现为此消彼长式的互斥关系。在雇佣契约框架下,劳动者报酬成本变动与企业竞争力演进之间的关系大体遵循两个方向上的逻辑。特别地,劳动者报酬成本增长将对企业的雇用效率形成激励,从而增长的劳动者报酬成本将可从生产效率的提高和对交易费用的节约中得到抵偿。
最后,本文基于博弈视角给出了一个关于劳动成本增长效应释放机制的新解释,提出在自由交易的市场环境当中,劳动成本增长的压力将通过所谓“博弈-接受/不接受”机制转化为劳动力市场当中的流动、搜寻和匹配行为以及企业的创新、迁移或者破产行为并最终得到释放。这一分析表明,当前的劳动成本增长可以成为促进企业转换发展模式的契机,而企业与工人之间也可形成和谐的利益分配关系。政府则可以在引导企业科学发展、统一企业与工人之间的利益分配矛盾方面发挥积极的作用。运用大样本数据和案例,本文实证检验了劳动成本增长效应的内在机理,并且证明了企业与工人和谐发展的双赢模式不仅在理论上可行,同时也是现实存在的。
本文的创新之处在于,选择从全新的利益分配视角考察当前的劳动成本增长问题。通过计算和比较不同类型劳动成本指标的水平及其变动状况,完整地展示了我国当前的劳动成本优势、未来劳动成本水平的增长空间以及劳动成本变动条件下经济竞争力的实际演进状况。在此基础上,系统地分析了劳动成本增长对于经济和企业竞争力的影响及其作用机理,并最终论证了保护劳动者权益与促进经济和企业发展目标之间具有统一性。
Owning abundant and cheap labor resources has been considered as China's economic comparative advantage. It has also been treated as the important foundation supporting Chinese enterprises to maintain the price advantage of their products and to compete in the market. The recent continuous increase in China's labor price has aroused some worries. Some people think it will erode China's labor cost advantage and push the enterprises, and the whole economy, into development predicament. However, labor price has a dual nature: it means the cost to enterprises and the compensation to workers. This decides the change of labor cost reflecting in essence the distribution among different interest bodies. Driven by competitive pressure, enterprises cut down the labor cost. This led directly to the suppression of the growth in workers compensation and the biased micro distribution structure deviating from common workers, which frequently triggers the conflicts between labor and management. Furthermore, the biased distribution structure will inhibit the effective demands as well as the investments in human capital of the whole society, thus constituting a fundamental constraint to economic growth.
Based on the dual nature of labor price, this paper tries to answer three basic questions through analyzing the economic effects of the change in labor cost: The first is whether the current increase in China's labor cost is enough to cause the worry? The second is what is the intrinsic mechanism to the changes in labor cost affecting the developments of the whole economy and enterprises and the? The third is whether there is consistent interest among the goals of labors' participation in the economic sharing and economic growth and enterprise development?
On the macro aspect, it's the intrinsic requirements of the developments of economy and society to increase labor compensation. The results from the analysis of changes of unit labor cost and relative unit labor cost levels show that productivity plays a fundamental role in the process of labor cost effects. The conclusion is proved in the analysis of China's FDI inflows and export situation in recent years. It is further confirmed in the analysis based on trade model. Meanwhile, data analysis shows that China's labor cost advantage is still significant at present and there is still a large room for labor cost increase. Therefore, it is not necessary to worry about the increase simply in labor compensation. The actual changes of competitiveness indicators show that labor's participation in the economic sharing and enhancement of economic competitiveness can be integrated to achieve the goal.
On the micro aspect, the analysis concentrates on the effects of changes in labor costs on the competitiveness of enterprises and their development. The export situation of labor-intensive products such as shoes shows that the Chinese enterprises have significant advantage on the aspect of product price at the present. Even if the quicker increase in labor compensation cost is all transmitted into price, it will not smooth away the advantage of its price competitiveness. On the other hand, even if the pressure of labor compensation cost increasing cannot be transmitted through product price, it's not a simple rise-exclusive relationship between labor compensation cost and the competitiveness of enterprises due to the dual nature of labor price. Under the contractual framework, the relationship between the changes in labor compensation cost and the evolution of enterprise competitiveness generally follows two-direction logics. In particular, the increase in labor compensation cost will stimulate the efficiency of enterprises' employment, thus the increase in labor compensation cost can be offset through the enhancement of productivity and the reduction of transaction costs.
Finally a new interpretation is offered on release mechanism of the effects of labor cost increasing based on bargaining perspective. In the market environment of free transaction, the pressure of labor cost increasing will be released eventually by so-called "bargain-accept/not-accept" mechanism, which will lead to the turnover, searching and matching in labor market as well as enterprise's acts of innovation, migration or bankruptcy. This analysis indicates that the current increase in labor cost may motivate the pattern transitions of enterprises' development and a harmonious relationship between the enterprise and the labor can be achieved. And the government may play an active role in guiding enterprises' scientific development and harmonizing the conflict of benefit distribution between the enterprise and the labor. Empirical researches, based on the large sample data and the cases of some enterprises, examine the intrinsic mechanism to the effects of labor cost increase and prove that the win-win model of harmonious development between enterprise and workers is not only theoretically possible but exists in reality as well.
The paper analyses the problem of current labor cost increase from a new perspective of distribution of interests. The explicit calculation and comparative analysis of several kinds of labor cost index illustrate more completely China's current labor cost advantage, the growth space of labor cost in the future and the evolution of economic competitiveness under the condition of the labor cost changing .Then a systematic analysis is given of the effects of labor cost increase on competitiveness of economy and enterprises. Finally the unitarity is expounded and proved between improving labor's benefits and promoting the development goals of economy and enterprises.
引文
4 汪伟.劳动力供给高峰即将结束,转变经济增长方式的关键时刻已经到来[J].新民周刊,2007,(1).
23(英) 博斯沃思等著.劳动市场经济学.何璋等译[M].北京:中国经济出版社,2003。
29 樊纲.现代三火经济理论体系的比较与综合[M].上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,2006,p289.
53(美) 阿瑟.刘易斯编著.二元经济论.施炜,谢兵,苏玉宏译[M].北京:北京经济学院出版社.1989.
[1]Abowd,J.and Lemieux,T.The effects of International Trade on Collective Bargaining Outcomes:A Comparison of the United States and Canada.in Immigration,Trade,and the Labor Market,ed.J.Abowd and Richard Freeman[M].Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1991
[2]Aghion,P.& Howitt,P.Endogenous Growth Theory[M].Cambridge:MIT Press,1998
[3]Akerlof,G.A.& Yellen,L.Faimess and Unemployment[J].The American Economic Review,Papers and Proceedings of the One-Hundredth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association,1988,78(2),44-49
[4]Akerlof,G.A.& Yellen,L.The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1990,105(2),255-283
[5]Akerlof,G.A.Gift Exchange and Efficiency-Wage Theory:Four Views[J].The American Economic Review,Papers and Proceedings of the Ninety-Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association,1984,74(2) 79-83
[6]Akerlof,G.A.& Miyazaki,H.The Implicit Contract Theory of Unemployment Meets the Wage Bill Argument[J].Review of Economic Studies,1980(47):321-38
[7]Akerlof,G.A.& Stiglitz,J.E.Capital,Wages and Structural Unemployment[J].The Economic Journal,1969,Vol.79(314):269-281
[8]Akerlof,G.A.A Theory of Social Custom,of Which Unemployment May be One Consequence[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1980,Vol.94(4):749-775
[9]Akerlof,G.A.Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1982,Vol.97(4):543-569
[10]Alchian,A.A.& Demsetz,H.Production,Information Cost,and Economic Organization[J].American Economic Review,1972,62:777-795
[11]Alchian,A.A.Some Economics of Property Rights[J].Politico,1965,30(4): 816-829
[12] Allen,B.T Market Concentration and Wage Increases-U.S. Manufacturing, 1947-1964[J]. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 1968,Vol. 21(3): 353-366
[13] Ark B.van. Economic Growth and Labor Productivity in Europe: Haif a Century of East-West Comparisons[J]. www.ggdc.net, 2000
[14] Ark B.van. International Comparisons of Output and Productivity[J]. Groningen Growth and Development Center, Monograph Series, No. 1 , Groningen, 1993.
[15] Arnott, R. J. & Stiglitz, J. Labor Turnover, Wage Structures, and Moral Hazard_The Inefficiency of Competitive Markets [J]. Journal of Labor Economics, 1985, Vol. 3(4): 434-462
[16] Arnott, R. J., Arthur J. & Stiglitz, J.E. Implicit Contracts, Labor Mobility, and Unemployment [J].The American Economic Review, 1988,Vol. 78(5): 1046-1066
[17] Azariadis,C. Implicit Contracts and Underemployment Equilibria[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1975(83):1183-1202
[18] Baily, M.N. Wages and Unemployment under Uncertain Demand [J]. Review Of Economic Studies, 1974(41): 37-50
[19] Baker,G. Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement [J]. The Journal of Political Economy, 1992, 100(3): 598-614
[20] Baker,G. & Holmstrom,B. Internal Labor Markets: Too Many Theories, Too Few Facts [J].The American Economic Review,1995, Vol. 85(2): 255-259
[21] Baker,G.,Jensen,M. & Murphy,K. Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory[J]. Journal of Finance, 1988,43(3)
[22] Barzel Y. Economic Analysis of Property Rights[M]. Cambridge University Press, 1989
[23] Becker,G. Human Capital:A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis,with Special Reference to Edu-cation[M]. National Bureau of Economic Research,New York, 1964
[24] Blinder,A.S & Choi.D.A. Shred of Evidence on Theories of Wage Stickiness [J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1990,Vol.105(4): 1003-1015
[25] Bowles, S. Competitive Wage Determination and Involuntary Unemployment: A Conflict Model [J]. mimeo., University of Massachusetts, May 1981
[26] Bowles, S. The Production Process in a Competitive Economy: Walrasian, Neo-Hobbesian and Marxian Models, mimeo. University of Massachusetts, May 1983
[27] Brown, C. & Medoff,J.L. The Employer Size WageEffect[J] Journal of Political Economy, 1989(18): 1027-1059
[28] Bryson,A. & Forth, J. The Theory and Practice of Pay Setting[J]. Manpower Human Resources Lab Discussion Paper,2006,No. 0001
[29] Bull,C. The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts[J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1987,Vol. 102(1):147-160
[30] Calor,O. & Moav,O. From Physical to human capital accumulation: Inequality in the process of development [A]. Discussion paper no.2307[C], London: CEPR, 1999,120-135
[31] Calvo,G.A. & Wellisz,S. Hierarchy, Ability, and Income Distribution[J].The Journal of Political Economy, 1979, Vol. 87(5): 991-1010
[32] Campbell III,C.M. Do Firms Pay Efficiency Wages? Evidence with Data at the Firm Level [J]. Journal of Labor Economics, 1993,Vol 11(3): 442-470
[33] Cappelli, P. & Chauvin, K. An Interplant Test of the Efficiency Wage Hypothesis [J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1991,Vol.106(3):769-787
[34] Carmichael, H. Self-Enforcing Contracts, Shirking, and Life Cycle Incentives [J] .The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1989, 3(4), 65-83
[35] Champernowne,D.G. A Model of Income Distribution[J]. The Economic Journal, 1953,Vol. 63(250): 318-351
[36] Chang Ching-Huei. On the Optimal Rate Structure of an Individual Income Tax[J].Southern Economic Journal ,1994,Vol. 60(4): 927-935
[37] Craig, B., Pencavel, J. & Farber, H., etal. Participation and Productivity: A Comparison of Worker Cooperatives and Conventional Firms in the Plywood Industry [J]. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Microeconomics, 1995 Vol:121-174
[38]Dickens,W.T.& Katz,L.F.Inter Industry Wage Differences and Theories of Wage Determination,NBER Working Paper,1987
[39]Eaton,B.C.& White,W.Agent Compensation and the Limits of Bonding[J].Economic Inquiry,1982,20:330-43
[40]Ehrenberg,R.& Smith,S.Modem Labor Economics:Theory and Public Policy [M].Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc.1997
[41]Fitzroy,F.& Kraft,K.Cooperation,Productivity and Profit Sharing[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,102:1,23-35
[42]Galor,O.& Zeira,J.Income distribution and macroeconomics[J].Review of Economic Studies,1993,60:35-52
[43]Gera,S.& Grenier,G.Inter-industry Wage Differentials and Efficiency Wages:Some Canadian Evidence[J].The Canadian Journal of Economics,1994,Vol.27(1):81-100
[44]Gera,S.,Gu,W.& Lin,Z.Technology and the Demand for Skills in Canada:An Industry-Level Analysis[J].The Canadian Journal of Economics,2001,Vol.34(1):132-148
[45]Gordon,D.F.A Neo-Classical Theory of Keynesian Unemployment[J].Economic Inquiry,1974(12):431-459
[46]Greenwald,B.& Stiglitz,J.E.Pareto Inefficiency of Market Economies:Search And Efficiency Wage Models[J].The American Economic Review,1988,78(2):351-355
[47]Gregorio,J.D.& Kim Se-Jik.International Economic Review,Vol.41(3):579-607
[48]Grier.K.B.& Tullock,G.An Emperical Analysis of Cross-National Economic Growth,1950-1980[J].Journal of Monetary Economics,1989,Vol.24(1):259-276
[49]Groshen,E.L.A.Krueger.The Structure of Supervision and Pay in Hospitals[J].Industrial and Labour Relations Review,1990(43):135S-146S
[50]Guasch,J.L.& Weiss,A.An Equilibrium Analysis of Wage-Productivity Gaps[J].The Review of Economic Studies,1982,Vol.49(4):485-497
[51]Haber,S.E.& Goldfarb,R.Dose Salaried Status Affect Human Capital Accumulation?[J].Industrial and Labor Relations Review,1995,Vol.48(2): 322-337
[52] Harris, M. & Holmstrom, B. A Theory of Wage Dynamics [J] .The Review of Economic Studies, 1982, Vol. 49(3):315-333
[53] Heckman, J.& Guilherme, L. Self-Selection and the Distribution of Hourly Wages. Journal of Labor Economics, 1990,Vol. 8(1):S329-S363
[54] Hicks, J. R. Wages and Interest: The Dynamic Problem The Economic Journal, 1935,Vol. 45(179)456-468
[55] Hicks, J. R.The theory of wages[M]. London: MacMillan, 1963,2
[56] Hill P. Multilateral Measurements of Purchasing Power and Real GDP[M]. Eurostat, 1982.
[57] Holmstrom,B. & Migrom,M. The Firm as an Incentive System[J]. The American Economic Review, 1994,Vol. 84(4):972-991
[58] Holmstrom,B. & Milgrom,M. Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses:Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design[J]. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1991,Vol. 7:24-52
[59] Holmstrom,B. Contractual Models of the Labor Market[J]. The American Economic Review, 1981,Vol. 71(2):308-313
[60] Holmstrom,B. Moral Hazard and Observability[J]. The Bell Journal of Economics, 1979,Vol. 10(1): 74-91
[61] Hutchens, R. A Test of Lazear's Theory of Delayed Payment Contracts [J]. Journal of Labor Economics, 1987,Vol. 5(4): S153-S170
[62] Hutchens, R. Seniority, Wages & Productivity: A Turbulent Decade [J]. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1989, Vol. 3, (4):49-64
[63] Jovanovic, B. Job-Matching and the Theory of Turnover. The Journal of Political Economy, 1979,Vol. 87(5): 972-990
[64] Kahneman,D. Knetsch,J.L. & Thaler,R. Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market[J]. The American Economic Review, 1986, Vol. 76(4):728-741
[65] Katz, L. & Krueger, A. The Effect of the Minimum Wage on the Fast-Food Industry[J].Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 1992,Vol. 46(1):6-21
[66] Konings, J. & Patrick, W. Evidence of Efficiency Wage Payments in UK Firm Level Panel Data[J].The Economic Journal, 1994/Vol. 104(424): 542-555
[67] Kornelia,K. & Zettelmeyer,J. Competitiveness in Transition Economies: What Scope for Real Appreciation [J]. IMF Staff Paper, 1998,Vol.45(2)
[68] Krueger,A.B & Summers, L.H. Efficiency Wages and the Inter-Industry Wage Structure[J]. Econometrica, Vol.56,(2): 259-293
[69] Krueger,A.B. Measuring Labor's Share[J]. The American Economic Review, 1999,Vol.89(2):45-51
[70] Krueger,A.B. Ownership, Agency, and Wages: An Examination of Franchising in the Fast Food Industry[J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.106(1): 75-101
[71] Laing,D. .Involuntary Layoffs in a Model with Asymmetric Information Concerning Worker Ability[J]. The Review of Economic Studies, 1994,Vol. 61(2): 375-392
[72] Lazear.E.P. Agency, Earnings Profiles, Productivity, and Hours Restrictions[J]. The American Economic Review, 1981,Vol. 71,(4): 606-620
[73] Lazear,E.P. Labor Economics and the Psychology of Organizations[J]. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1991, Vol. 5(2): 89-110
[74] Lazear,E.P. Performance Pay and Productivity [J]. The American Economic Review,2000, Vol. 90(5):1346-1361
[75] Lazear,E.P. Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1979(87): 1261-84
[76] Leibenstein,H. The Theory of Underemployment in Backward Economies[J]. The Journal of Political Economy ,1957, 65(2): 91-103
[77] Leonard, J.S. Carrots and Sticks: Pay, Supervision, and Turnover [J]. Journal of Labour Economics, 1987, (5):4-2: S136-S152
[78] Lester,R.A . Results and implications of some recent wage studies [J]. In RA Lester & J. Shister (Eds.), Insights into labor issues: 197-225
[79] Levine,D.I. Can Wage Increases Pay For Themselves? Tests with a Producitve Function[J].The Economic Journal,1992,Vol.102(414):1102-1115
[80] Levine,D.I. Fairness, Markets, and Ability to Pay: Evidence from Compensation Executives[J]. The American Economic Review, 1993,Vol. 83(5): 1241-1259
[81] Lindbeck,A .& Snower,D.J.WageSetting, Unemployment, and Insider-Outsider Relations[J]. The American Economic Review, 1986:235-239
[82] Lucas,R.E. On the Mechanics of Economic Development[J]. Journal of Monetary Economics, 1988,22(4): 3-42
[83] MacLeod,W.B. & Malcomson, J. M. Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment. Econometrica,1989, Vol. 57(2): 1989
[84] MacLeod,W.B. & Malcomson, J. M. Reputation and Hierarchy in Dynamic Models of Employment[J]. The Journal of Political Economy, 1988,Vol. 96(4): 832-854
[85] Maddison A. & Ark B. van. An International Comparison of Real Output and Purchasing Power and Labour Productivity in Manufacturing Industries: Brazil Mexico and the USA in 1975[J]. Research Memorandum 569 (GD-8), Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Groningen, 1994b.
[86] Malcolmson, J.M. Unemployment and the Efficiency Wage Hypothesis, Economic Journal, 1981, 91, 848-66
[87] Malcolmson,J. M. Work Incentives, Hierarchy, and Internal Labor Markets[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1984,92: 486-507
[88] Milgrom, P.& Roberts, J. Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence [J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 1982,27(2):280-312
[89] Mincer, J. Studies in Human Capital: Collected essays of Jacob Mincer, Volume II. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1993
[90] Mowday,R.T. Leader Characteristics, Self-Confidence, and Methods of Upward Influence in Organizational Decision Situations[J]. The Academy of Management Journal, 1979,22(4), 709-725
[91] Murphy,K. M. & Reilly, K. Human Capital and Information: The Employer Size-Wage Effect [J].The Journal of Human Resources, 1995,Vol.30(1): 1-18
[92] Murphy, K. M. & Welch, F. The Structure of Wages [J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1992, Vol. 107(1): 285-326
[93]Murphy,K.M.& Welch,F.Inequality and Relative Wages[J].The American Economic Review,1993,Vol.83(2):104-109
[94]Nalbantian,H.R.& Schotter,A.Productivity Under Group Incentives:An Experimental Study[J].The American Economic Review,1997,87(3):314-341
[95]Nalbantian,H.R.& Schotter,A.Matching and Efficiency in the Baseball Free-Agent System_An Experimental Examination[J].Journal of Labor Economics,1995,13(1):1-31
[96]Nalebuff,B.J & Stiglitz,J.E.Prizes and Incentives:Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition[J].The Bell Journal of Economics,1983,Vol.14,(1):21-43
[97]Oi,W.Y.Employment Relations in Dual Labor Markets("It's Nice Work If You Can Get It")[J].Journal of Labor Economics,1990,Vol.8(1):S124-S149
[98]Okun,A.Prices and Quantities:A Macroeconomic Analysis.Oxford:Basil Blackwell,1981
[99]Pencavel,J.& Holmlund,B.The Determination of Wages,Employment,and Work Hours in an Economy with Centralised Wage-Setting:Sweden,1950-83[J].The Economic Journal,1988,Vol.98(393):1105-1126
[100]Piore,M J.Birds of Passage:Migrant Workers and Industrial Society[M].New York:Cambridge University Press,1979
[101]Prendergast,C.A Theory of "Yes Men"[J].The American Economic Review,1993,Vol.83(4):757-770
[102]Raff,D.M & Summers,L.H.Did Henry Ford Pay Efficiency Wages?[J].Journal of Labor Economics,1987,Vol.5(4):S57-S86
[103]Rajah Ramkishen S.Competitiveness in the Global Economy with Reference to Singapore"[J].Institute of Policy Studies,2004
[104]Rebitzer,J.B.Radical Political Economy and the Economics of Labor Markets [J].Journal of Economic Literature,1993,Vol.31(3):1394-1434
[105]Rebitzer,J.B & Taylor,J.Efficiency Wages and Employment Rents:The Employer-Size Wage Effect in the Job Market for Lawyers[J].Journal of Labor Economics,1995,13(4):678-708
[106]Roger,K. & Meguire,P. Macrieconomic Determinants of Growth: A Cross-Country Evidence[J]. Journal of Monetary Economics, 1985 ,Vol.16: 141-164
[107]Romer,P.M. Endogenous Technological Change[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1990,Vol.98: 89-111
[108]Romer,P.M. Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1986,94: 1002-1037
[109]Roy, A.D. The distribution of Earnings and of Individual Output [J]. Economic Journal, 1950
[110]Rubinstein, A. Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model[J]. Econometrica, 1982, Vol. 50(1): 97-110
[111]Salop, S. C. A Model of the Natural Rate of Unemployment.The American Economic Review,1979, Vol. 69(1):117-125
[112] Salop, S.C. A model of the natural rate of unemployment, American Economic Review 1979(69): 117-125
[113]Sappington,D. Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships [J]. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1991,Vol. 5(2): 45-66
[114]Schlicht, E. Labour turnover, wage structure, and natural unemployment, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 1978, 134: 337-46
[115]Shapiro,C & Stiglitz,J.E. Equilibrium Unempolyment as a Worker Discipline Device[J]. The American Economic Review,1984, Vol. 74(3): 433-444
[116] Simon, H.A. Organizations and Markets [J]. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 1995, 5(3): 273-294
[117]Simon,H. Administrative Behaviour: Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organizations[M]. The Free Press, A Division of Simon & Schuster Inc., New York, 1947
[118]Simon,H. Prediction and Prescription in Systems Modeling [J]. Operations Research, 1990, 38(1): 7-14
[119]Smith,A. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Weath of Nations[M].Reprint, edited by E. Carman.Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1776
[120]Solow, R. & Stiglitz, J. Output, Employment, and Wages in the Short Run [J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1968,Vol. 82(4): 537-560
[121]Solow, R. Alternative Approaches to Macroeconomic Theory: A Partial View [J]. The Canadian Journal of Economics, 1979,Vol. 12(3): 339-354
[122]Solow,R. Another Possible Source of Wage Stickiness[J]. Journal of Macroeconomics, 1979,1:79-82
[123]Spence, A. M. Job Market Signaling. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1973, 87: 355-379
[124] Stiglitz, J. E. Alternative Theories of Wage Determination and Unemployment in LDC's: The Labor Turnover Model [J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1974, 88(2): 194-227
[125] Stiglitz, J. E. The Causes and Consequences of The Dependence of Quality on Price [J] Journal of Economic Literature, 1987,Vol. 25,(1): 1-48
[126]Stiglitz,J.E. The Efficiency Wage Hypothesis, Surplus Labour, and the Distribution of Income in L.D.C.s[J]. Oxford Economic Papers, New Series, 1976,Vol. 28(2): 185-207
[127] Stiglitz,J.E. The Theory of "Screening," Education, and the Distribution of Income[J].The American Economic Review, 1975,Vol. 65(3): 283-300
[128]Stoft, S. Cheat-Threat Theory: An Explanation of Involuntary Unemployment [J], mimeo. Boston University, May 1982
[129]Teulings,C.N. Comparative Advantage, Relative Wages, and the Accumulation of Human Capital[J]. Journal of Political Economy,2005,Vol113:425—461
[130]Thomas,J. & Worrall,T. Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts [J].The Review of Economic Studies,1988, Vol. 55(4): 541-553
[131]Thurow,L.C. The Optimum Lifetime Distribution of Consumption Expenditures: Reply[J]. The American Economic Review, 1975,Vol. 65(4): 753-755
[132]Triplett,E. The Measurement of Labor Cost [M]. The University of Chicago Press, 1983
[133] Anthony,T.G. & Golub,S.S.Towards a System of Multilateral Unit Labor Cost- Based Competitiveness Indicators for Advanced,Developing,and Transition Countries[J].IMF Working Paper,1997
[134]Weiss A.Job queues and layoffs in labor market with flexible wage[J].Journal of Political Economy,1980,88:526-538
[135]Weiss,A.Efficiency Wages:Models of Unemployment,Layoffs and Wage Dispersion[M].New Jersey,Princeton,Princeton University Press,1990
[136]Weiss,A.Human Capital vs.Signalling Explanations of Wages[J].The Journal of Economic Perspectives,1995,Vol.9(4):133-154
[137]Weisskopf,T.,Bowles,S.& Gordon,D.Hearts and Minds:A Social Model of Aggregate Productivity Growth in the U.S.,1948-1979[J].Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,1984
[138]Yellen,J.L.Efficiency Wage Models of Unemployment[J].The American Economic Review,1984,74(2):200-205
[139]Banister,J.中国制造业工资和劳动者报酬[J].中国劳动经济学,2006,(2)
[140]E.菲吕博腾,S.平乔维奇.产权与经济理论:近期文献的一个综述.财产权利与制度变迁[M].上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1994
[141]阿瑟.刘易斯编著.施炜,谢兵,苏玉红译.二元经济论[M].北京:北京经济学院出版社,1989
[142]保罗.克鲁格曼.亚洲奇迹的神话[J].外交,1994,11-12
[143]蔡昉,王德文.外商直接投资与就业--一个人力资本分析框架[J].财经论丛,2004,(1)
[144]蔡昉,都阳,王美艳.中国劳动力市场转型与发育[M].北京:商务印书馆,2005
[145]陈惠雄.要素使用权交易的效率模式与积极工资政策效应分析.中国工业经济,2003,(12)
[146]陈凌.德国劳动市场与就业政策研究[M].北京:中国劳动社会保障出版社,2000
[147]大卫.桑普斯福特,泽弗里斯.桑纳托斯主编.卢昌崇,王询译.劳动经济学前沿问题[M].北京:中国税务出版社,2000
[148]德里克·博斯沃思、彼德·道金斯、索尔斯坦·斯特龙巴克著.劳动市场经济学. 何璋等译[M].北京:中国经济出版社,2003
[149]德姆塞茨.关于产权的理论.财产权利与制度变迁[M].上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1994
[150]董克用.中国转轨时期薪酬制度研究[M].北京:中国劳动社会保障出版社,2003
[151]都阳.劳动力市场供求关系转变与劳动力成本[J].中国劳动经济学,2006,(2)
[152]樊纲.现代三大经济理论体系的比较与综合[M].上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,2006
[153]郭克莎.制造业生产效率的国际比较[J].中国工业经济,2000,(9)
[154]国际劳工局.劳动力市场主要指标体系(1999).国际劳工与信息研究所译[M].北京:中国劳动社会保障出版社,2001
[155]哈罗德.德姆塞茨.所有权、控制权与企业[M].北京:经济科学出版社,1999.
[156]何为.从劳动力成本角度看中国产品的国际竞争力[J].亚太经济,2001,(3)
[157]洪远朋.经济理论比较研究[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,2002
[158]金碚,胥和平,谢晓霞.中国工业国际竞争力报告[J].管理世界,1997,(4)
[159]金碚.论企业竞争力的性质[J].中国工业经济,2001,(10)
[160]坎贝尔.R.麦克南,斯坦利.L.布鲁,大卫.A 麦克菲逊著.刘文,赵成美,连海霞译.当代劳动经济学[M].北京:人民邮电出版社,2004
[161]孔泾源主编.中国居民收入分配年度报告(2004)[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2005
[162]李实,佐藤宏主编.经济转型的代价--中国城市失业、贫困、收入差距的经验分析[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2004
[163]李实等著.中国居民收入分配实证分析[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2000
[164]林毅夫,李永军.比较优势、竞争优势与发展中国家的经济发展[J].管理世界,2003(7)
[165]林毅夫.发展战略、自生能力和经济收敛[J].经济学季刊,2002,(2)
[166]卢锋.我国工资与劳动成本变动及国际比较(1978-2004)--人民币实际汇率长期走势研究之二.北京大学中国经济研究中心讨论稿,2006
[167]陆铭,蒋仕卿.重构“铁三角”:中国的劳动力市场改革、收入分配和经济增 长[J].管理世界,2007,(6)
[168]陆铭.工资和就业的议价理论--对中国二元就业体制的效率考察[M].上海:三联出版社,2004
[169]吕政.论我国传统工业化道路的经验与教训[J].中国工业经济,2003,(1)
[170]罗默.高级宏观经济学(中译本)[M].上海:上海财经大学出版社,2003
[171]马克思.工资、价格和利润.马克思恩格斯选集(第二卷)[M].北京:人民出版社,1995
[172]马丹,许少强.中国国际竞争力的历史变迁与冲击来源[J].国际金融研究,2006,(1)
[173]迈克尔.波特.竞争优势[M].北京:华夏出版社,1997
[174]迈克尔.波特.竞争战略[M].北京:华夏出版社,1997
[175]青木昌彦著.比较制度分析.周黎安译[M].上海:上海远东出版社,2001
[176]任若恩.关于中国制造业国际竞争力的进一步研究[J].经济研究,1998,(2)
[177]托马斯·弗里德曼著.世界是平的.何帆译[M].长沙:湖南科学技术出版社,2006
[178]王曦.中国转型经济总需求分析:微观基础与总量运行[M].广东:中山大学出版社,2004
[179]王小鲁.改革20年和今后20年:投资对经济增长的贡献[J].国家行政学院学报,2001,(4)
[180]王一江.政府干预与劳动者利益[J].比较,2004,(9)
[181]谢德仁.企业的性质:要素使用权交易合约之履行过程[J].经济研究,2002,(4).
[182]谢建国,陈漓高.政府支出与居民消费--一个基于跨期迭代模型的中国经验分析[J].经济科学,2002,(6).
[183]邢春冰.中国不同所有制企业的工资决定考察[J].经济研究,2005,(6)
[184]徐佳宾.产业升级中的中国劳动成本优势[J].经济理论与经济管理,2005,(2)
[185]姚先国,高怿.雇佣剩余、剩余分割与企业的雇用效率[J].财经研究,2007,(3)(人大复印资料〈民营经济与中小企业管理〉全文转载,2007,6)
[186]姚先国,高怿.当前我国收入分配结构变动及其对经济增长的约束.[J].重庆大学学报(社科版),2007,(2)
[187]姚先国,高怿.劳动成本增长与基于雇用效率的企业成本最优[J].中国石油大学学报(社科版),2007,(2)
[188]姚先国,李晓华.市场化与工资不平等增长:变动程度及影响因素[J].浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版),2007,(1)
[189]姚先国,盛乐.乡镇企业和国有企业经济效率差异的人力资本产权因素分析.经济研究,2002,(3)
[190]姚先国,陈凌.试论劳动力市场的供给管理[J].管理世界,1997,(6)
[191]姚先国,郭继强.论劳动力产权[J].学术月刊,1996,(6)
[192]姚先国,韩军.从工会现状看劳资关系:来自浙江的实证.浙江大学劳动保障和公共政策研究中心工作论文,2007
[193]姚先国.比较经济体制分析[M].浙江大学出版社,1999
[194]姚先国.经济增长方式转换的制度条件.浙江大学劳动保障和公共政策研究中心工作论文,2005
[195]姚先国.企业本位论反思[J].中国工业经济,2004,(4)
[196]姚先国.社会主义企业收入分配论[M].杭州:浙江大学出版,1992
[197]曾湘泉.劳动经济学[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,2003
[198]郑海涛,任若恩.多边比较下的中国制造业国际竞争力研究:1980-2004[J].经济研究,2005,(12)
[199]邹至庄.中国经济转型[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2005
23(英) 博斯沃思等著.劳动市场经济学.何璋等译[M].北京:中国经济出版社,2003。
29 樊纲.现代三火经济理论体系的比较与综合[M].上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,2006,p289.
53(美) 阿瑟.刘易斯编著.二元经济论.施炜,谢兵,苏玉宏译[M].北京:北京经济学院出版社.1989.
[1]Abowd,J.and Lemieux,T.The effects of International Trade on Collective Bargaining Outcomes:A Comparison of the United States and Canada.in Immigration,Trade,and the Labor Market,ed.J.Abowd and Richard Freeman[M].Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1991
[2]Aghion,P.& Howitt,P.Endogenous Growth Theory[M].Cambridge:MIT Press,1998
[3]Akerlof,G.A.& Yellen,L.Faimess and Unemployment[J].The American Economic Review,Papers and Proceedings of the One-Hundredth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association,1988,78(2),44-49
[4]Akerlof,G.A.& Yellen,L.The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1990,105(2),255-283
[5]Akerlof,G.A.Gift Exchange and Efficiency-Wage Theory:Four Views[J].The American Economic Review,Papers and Proceedings of the Ninety-Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association,1984,74(2) 79-83
[6]Akerlof,G.A.& Miyazaki,H.The Implicit Contract Theory of Unemployment Meets the Wage Bill Argument[J].Review of Economic Studies,1980(47):321-38
[7]Akerlof,G.A.& Stiglitz,J.E.Capital,Wages and Structural Unemployment[J].The Economic Journal,1969,Vol.79(314):269-281
[8]Akerlof,G.A.A Theory of Social Custom,of Which Unemployment May be One Consequence[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1980,Vol.94(4):749-775
[9]Akerlof,G.A.Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1982,Vol.97(4):543-569
[10]Alchian,A.A.& Demsetz,H.Production,Information Cost,and Economic Organization[J].American Economic Review,1972,62:777-795
[11]Alchian,A.A.Some Economics of Property Rights[J].Politico,1965,30(4): 816-829
[12] Allen,B.T Market Concentration and Wage Increases-U.S. Manufacturing, 1947-1964[J]. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 1968,Vol. 21(3): 353-366
[13] Ark B.van. Economic Growth and Labor Productivity in Europe: Haif a Century of East-West Comparisons[J]. www.ggdc.net, 2000
[14] Ark B.van. International Comparisons of Output and Productivity[J]. Groningen Growth and Development Center, Monograph Series, No. 1 , Groningen, 1993.
[15] Arnott, R. J. & Stiglitz, J. Labor Turnover, Wage Structures, and Moral Hazard_The Inefficiency of Competitive Markets [J]. Journal of Labor Economics, 1985, Vol. 3(4): 434-462
[16] Arnott, R. J., Arthur J. & Stiglitz, J.E. Implicit Contracts, Labor Mobility, and Unemployment [J].The American Economic Review, 1988,Vol. 78(5): 1046-1066
[17] Azariadis,C. Implicit Contracts and Underemployment Equilibria[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1975(83):1183-1202
[18] Baily, M.N. Wages and Unemployment under Uncertain Demand [J]. Review Of Economic Studies, 1974(41): 37-50
[19] Baker,G. Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement [J]. The Journal of Political Economy, 1992, 100(3): 598-614
[20] Baker,G. & Holmstrom,B. Internal Labor Markets: Too Many Theories, Too Few Facts [J].The American Economic Review,1995, Vol. 85(2): 255-259
[21] Baker,G.,Jensen,M. & Murphy,K. Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory[J]. Journal of Finance, 1988,43(3)
[22] Barzel Y. Economic Analysis of Property Rights[M]. Cambridge University Press, 1989
[23] Becker,G. Human Capital:A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis,with Special Reference to Edu-cation[M]. National Bureau of Economic Research,New York, 1964
[24] Blinder,A.S & Choi.D.A. Shred of Evidence on Theories of Wage Stickiness [J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1990,Vol.105(4): 1003-1015
[25] Bowles, S. Competitive Wage Determination and Involuntary Unemployment: A Conflict Model [J]. mimeo., University of Massachusetts, May 1981
[26] Bowles, S. The Production Process in a Competitive Economy: Walrasian, Neo-Hobbesian and Marxian Models, mimeo. University of Massachusetts, May 1983
[27] Brown, C. & Medoff,J.L. The Employer Size WageEffect[J] Journal of Political Economy, 1989(18): 1027-1059
[28] Bryson,A. & Forth, J. The Theory and Practice of Pay Setting[J]. Manpower Human Resources Lab Discussion Paper,2006,No. 0001
[29] Bull,C. The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts[J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1987,Vol. 102(1):147-160
[30] Calor,O. & Moav,O. From Physical to human capital accumulation: Inequality in the process of development [A]. Discussion paper no.2307[C], London: CEPR, 1999,120-135
[31] Calvo,G.A. & Wellisz,S. Hierarchy, Ability, and Income Distribution[J].The Journal of Political Economy, 1979, Vol. 87(5): 991-1010
[32] Campbell III,C.M. Do Firms Pay Efficiency Wages? Evidence with Data at the Firm Level [J]. Journal of Labor Economics, 1993,Vol 11(3): 442-470
[33] Cappelli, P. & Chauvin, K. An Interplant Test of the Efficiency Wage Hypothesis [J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1991,Vol.106(3):769-787
[34] Carmichael, H. Self-Enforcing Contracts, Shirking, and Life Cycle Incentives [J] .The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1989, 3(4), 65-83
[35] Champernowne,D.G. A Model of Income Distribution[J]. The Economic Journal, 1953,Vol. 63(250): 318-351
[36] Chang Ching-Huei. On the Optimal Rate Structure of an Individual Income Tax[J].Southern Economic Journal ,1994,Vol. 60(4): 927-935
[37] Craig, B., Pencavel, J. & Farber, H., etal. Participation and Productivity: A Comparison of Worker Cooperatives and Conventional Firms in the Plywood Industry [J]. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Microeconomics, 1995 Vol:121-174
[38]Dickens,W.T.& Katz,L.F.Inter Industry Wage Differences and Theories of Wage Determination,NBER Working Paper,1987
[39]Eaton,B.C.& White,W.Agent Compensation and the Limits of Bonding[J].Economic Inquiry,1982,20:330-43
[40]Ehrenberg,R.& Smith,S.Modem Labor Economics:Theory and Public Policy [M].Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc.1997
[41]Fitzroy,F.& Kraft,K.Cooperation,Productivity and Profit Sharing[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,102:1,23-35
[42]Galor,O.& Zeira,J.Income distribution and macroeconomics[J].Review of Economic Studies,1993,60:35-52
[43]Gera,S.& Grenier,G.Inter-industry Wage Differentials and Efficiency Wages:Some Canadian Evidence[J].The Canadian Journal of Economics,1994,Vol.27(1):81-100
[44]Gera,S.,Gu,W.& Lin,Z.Technology and the Demand for Skills in Canada:An Industry-Level Analysis[J].The Canadian Journal of Economics,2001,Vol.34(1):132-148
[45]Gordon,D.F.A Neo-Classical Theory of Keynesian Unemployment[J].Economic Inquiry,1974(12):431-459
[46]Greenwald,B.& Stiglitz,J.E.Pareto Inefficiency of Market Economies:Search And Efficiency Wage Models[J].The American Economic Review,1988,78(2):351-355
[47]Gregorio,J.D.& Kim Se-Jik.International Economic Review,Vol.41(3):579-607
[48]Grier.K.B.& Tullock,G.An Emperical Analysis of Cross-National Economic Growth,1950-1980[J].Journal of Monetary Economics,1989,Vol.24(1):259-276
[49]Groshen,E.L.A.Krueger.The Structure of Supervision and Pay in Hospitals[J].Industrial and Labour Relations Review,1990(43):135S-146S
[50]Guasch,J.L.& Weiss,A.An Equilibrium Analysis of Wage-Productivity Gaps[J].The Review of Economic Studies,1982,Vol.49(4):485-497
[51]Haber,S.E.& Goldfarb,R.Dose Salaried Status Affect Human Capital Accumulation?[J].Industrial and Labor Relations Review,1995,Vol.48(2): 322-337
[52] Harris, M. & Holmstrom, B. A Theory of Wage Dynamics [J] .The Review of Economic Studies, 1982, Vol. 49(3):315-333
[53] Heckman, J.& Guilherme, L. Self-Selection and the Distribution of Hourly Wages. Journal of Labor Economics, 1990,Vol. 8(1):S329-S363
[54] Hicks, J. R. Wages and Interest: The Dynamic Problem The Economic Journal, 1935,Vol. 45(179)456-468
[55] Hicks, J. R.The theory of wages[M]. London: MacMillan, 1963,2
[56] Hill P. Multilateral Measurements of Purchasing Power and Real GDP[M]. Eurostat, 1982.
[57] Holmstrom,B. & Migrom,M. The Firm as an Incentive System[J]. The American Economic Review, 1994,Vol. 84(4):972-991
[58] Holmstrom,B. & Milgrom,M. Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses:Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design[J]. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1991,Vol. 7:24-52
[59] Holmstrom,B. Contractual Models of the Labor Market[J]. The American Economic Review, 1981,Vol. 71(2):308-313
[60] Holmstrom,B. Moral Hazard and Observability[J]. The Bell Journal of Economics, 1979,Vol. 10(1): 74-91
[61] Hutchens, R. A Test of Lazear's Theory of Delayed Payment Contracts [J]. Journal of Labor Economics, 1987,Vol. 5(4): S153-S170
[62] Hutchens, R. Seniority, Wages & Productivity: A Turbulent Decade [J]. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1989, Vol. 3, (4):49-64
[63] Jovanovic, B. Job-Matching and the Theory of Turnover. The Journal of Political Economy, 1979,Vol. 87(5): 972-990
[64] Kahneman,D. Knetsch,J.L. & Thaler,R. Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market[J]. The American Economic Review, 1986, Vol. 76(4):728-741
[65] Katz, L. & Krueger, A. The Effect of the Minimum Wage on the Fast-Food Industry[J].Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 1992,Vol. 46(1):6-21
[66] Konings, J. & Patrick, W. Evidence of Efficiency Wage Payments in UK Firm Level Panel Data[J].The Economic Journal, 1994/Vol. 104(424): 542-555
[67] Kornelia,K. & Zettelmeyer,J. Competitiveness in Transition Economies: What Scope for Real Appreciation [J]. IMF Staff Paper, 1998,Vol.45(2)
[68] Krueger,A.B & Summers, L.H. Efficiency Wages and the Inter-Industry Wage Structure[J]. Econometrica, Vol.56,(2): 259-293
[69] Krueger,A.B. Measuring Labor's Share[J]. The American Economic Review, 1999,Vol.89(2):45-51
[70] Krueger,A.B. Ownership, Agency, and Wages: An Examination of Franchising in the Fast Food Industry[J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.106(1): 75-101
[71] Laing,D. .Involuntary Layoffs in a Model with Asymmetric Information Concerning Worker Ability[J]. The Review of Economic Studies, 1994,Vol. 61(2): 375-392
[72] Lazear.E.P. Agency, Earnings Profiles, Productivity, and Hours Restrictions[J]. The American Economic Review, 1981,Vol. 71,(4): 606-620
[73] Lazear,E.P. Labor Economics and the Psychology of Organizations[J]. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1991, Vol. 5(2): 89-110
[74] Lazear,E.P. Performance Pay and Productivity [J]. The American Economic Review,2000, Vol. 90(5):1346-1361
[75] Lazear,E.P. Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1979(87): 1261-84
[76] Leibenstein,H. The Theory of Underemployment in Backward Economies[J]. The Journal of Political Economy ,1957, 65(2): 91-103
[77] Leonard, J.S. Carrots and Sticks: Pay, Supervision, and Turnover [J]. Journal of Labour Economics, 1987, (5):4-2: S136-S152
[78] Lester,R.A . Results and implications of some recent wage studies [J]. In RA Lester & J. Shister (Eds.), Insights into labor issues: 197-225
[79] Levine,D.I. Can Wage Increases Pay For Themselves? Tests with a Producitve Function[J].The Economic Journal,1992,Vol.102(414):1102-1115
[80] Levine,D.I. Fairness, Markets, and Ability to Pay: Evidence from Compensation Executives[J]. The American Economic Review, 1993,Vol. 83(5): 1241-1259
[81] Lindbeck,A .& Snower,D.J.WageSetting, Unemployment, and Insider-Outsider Relations[J]. The American Economic Review, 1986:235-239
[82] Lucas,R.E. On the Mechanics of Economic Development[J]. Journal of Monetary Economics, 1988,22(4): 3-42
[83] MacLeod,W.B. & Malcomson, J. M. Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment. Econometrica,1989, Vol. 57(2): 1989
[84] MacLeod,W.B. & Malcomson, J. M. Reputation and Hierarchy in Dynamic Models of Employment[J]. The Journal of Political Economy, 1988,Vol. 96(4): 832-854
[85] Maddison A. & Ark B. van. An International Comparison of Real Output and Purchasing Power and Labour Productivity in Manufacturing Industries: Brazil Mexico and the USA in 1975[J]. Research Memorandum 569 (GD-8), Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Groningen, 1994b.
[86] Malcolmson, J.M. Unemployment and the Efficiency Wage Hypothesis, Economic Journal, 1981, 91, 848-66
[87] Malcolmson,J. M. Work Incentives, Hierarchy, and Internal Labor Markets[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1984,92: 486-507
[88] Milgrom, P.& Roberts, J. Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence [J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 1982,27(2):280-312
[89] Mincer, J. Studies in Human Capital: Collected essays of Jacob Mincer, Volume II. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1993
[90] Mowday,R.T. Leader Characteristics, Self-Confidence, and Methods of Upward Influence in Organizational Decision Situations[J]. The Academy of Management Journal, 1979,22(4), 709-725
[91] Murphy,K. M. & Reilly, K. Human Capital and Information: The Employer Size-Wage Effect [J].The Journal of Human Resources, 1995,Vol.30(1): 1-18
[92] Murphy, K. M. & Welch, F. The Structure of Wages [J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1992, Vol. 107(1): 285-326
[93]Murphy,K.M.& Welch,F.Inequality and Relative Wages[J].The American Economic Review,1993,Vol.83(2):104-109
[94]Nalbantian,H.R.& Schotter,A.Productivity Under Group Incentives:An Experimental Study[J].The American Economic Review,1997,87(3):314-341
[95]Nalbantian,H.R.& Schotter,A.Matching and Efficiency in the Baseball Free-Agent System_An Experimental Examination[J].Journal of Labor Economics,1995,13(1):1-31
[96]Nalebuff,B.J & Stiglitz,J.E.Prizes and Incentives:Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition[J].The Bell Journal of Economics,1983,Vol.14,(1):21-43
[97]Oi,W.Y.Employment Relations in Dual Labor Markets("It's Nice Work If You Can Get It")[J].Journal of Labor Economics,1990,Vol.8(1):S124-S149
[98]Okun,A.Prices and Quantities:A Macroeconomic Analysis.Oxford:Basil Blackwell,1981
[99]Pencavel,J.& Holmlund,B.The Determination of Wages,Employment,and Work Hours in an Economy with Centralised Wage-Setting:Sweden,1950-83[J].The Economic Journal,1988,Vol.98(393):1105-1126
[100]Piore,M J.Birds of Passage:Migrant Workers and Industrial Society[M].New York:Cambridge University Press,1979
[101]Prendergast,C.A Theory of "Yes Men"[J].The American Economic Review,1993,Vol.83(4):757-770
[102]Raff,D.M & Summers,L.H.Did Henry Ford Pay Efficiency Wages?[J].Journal of Labor Economics,1987,Vol.5(4):S57-S86
[103]Rajah Ramkishen S.Competitiveness in the Global Economy with Reference to Singapore"[J].Institute of Policy Studies,2004
[104]Rebitzer,J.B.Radical Political Economy and the Economics of Labor Markets [J].Journal of Economic Literature,1993,Vol.31(3):1394-1434
[105]Rebitzer,J.B & Taylor,J.Efficiency Wages and Employment Rents:The Employer-Size Wage Effect in the Job Market for Lawyers[J].Journal of Labor Economics,1995,13(4):678-708
[106]Roger,K. & Meguire,P. Macrieconomic Determinants of Growth: A Cross-Country Evidence[J]. Journal of Monetary Economics, 1985 ,Vol.16: 141-164
[107]Romer,P.M. Endogenous Technological Change[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1990,Vol.98: 89-111
[108]Romer,P.M. Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1986,94: 1002-1037
[109]Roy, A.D. The distribution of Earnings and of Individual Output [J]. Economic Journal, 1950
[110]Rubinstein, A. Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model[J]. Econometrica, 1982, Vol. 50(1): 97-110
[111]Salop, S. C. A Model of the Natural Rate of Unemployment.The American Economic Review,1979, Vol. 69(1):117-125
[112] Salop, S.C. A model of the natural rate of unemployment, American Economic Review 1979(69): 117-125
[113]Sappington,D. Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships [J]. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1991,Vol. 5(2): 45-66
[114]Schlicht, E. Labour turnover, wage structure, and natural unemployment, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 1978, 134: 337-46
[115]Shapiro,C & Stiglitz,J.E. Equilibrium Unempolyment as a Worker Discipline Device[J]. The American Economic Review,1984, Vol. 74(3): 433-444
[116] Simon, H.A. Organizations and Markets [J]. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 1995, 5(3): 273-294
[117]Simon,H. Administrative Behaviour: Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organizations[M]. The Free Press, A Division of Simon & Schuster Inc., New York, 1947
[118]Simon,H. Prediction and Prescription in Systems Modeling [J]. Operations Research, 1990, 38(1): 7-14
[119]Smith,A. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Weath of Nations[M].Reprint, edited by E. Carman.Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1776
[120]Solow, R. & Stiglitz, J. Output, Employment, and Wages in the Short Run [J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1968,Vol. 82(4): 537-560
[121]Solow, R. Alternative Approaches to Macroeconomic Theory: A Partial View [J]. The Canadian Journal of Economics, 1979,Vol. 12(3): 339-354
[122]Solow,R. Another Possible Source of Wage Stickiness[J]. Journal of Macroeconomics, 1979,1:79-82
[123]Spence, A. M. Job Market Signaling. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1973, 87: 355-379
[124] Stiglitz, J. E. Alternative Theories of Wage Determination and Unemployment in LDC's: The Labor Turnover Model [J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1974, 88(2): 194-227
[125] Stiglitz, J. E. The Causes and Consequences of The Dependence of Quality on Price [J] Journal of Economic Literature, 1987,Vol. 25,(1): 1-48
[126]Stiglitz,J.E. The Efficiency Wage Hypothesis, Surplus Labour, and the Distribution of Income in L.D.C.s[J]. Oxford Economic Papers, New Series, 1976,Vol. 28(2): 185-207
[127] Stiglitz,J.E. The Theory of "Screening," Education, and the Distribution of Income[J].The American Economic Review, 1975,Vol. 65(3): 283-300
[128]Stoft, S. Cheat-Threat Theory: An Explanation of Involuntary Unemployment [J], mimeo. Boston University, May 1982
[129]Teulings,C.N. Comparative Advantage, Relative Wages, and the Accumulation of Human Capital[J]. Journal of Political Economy,2005,Vol113:425—461
[130]Thomas,J. & Worrall,T. Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts [J].The Review of Economic Studies,1988, Vol. 55(4): 541-553
[131]Thurow,L.C. The Optimum Lifetime Distribution of Consumption Expenditures: Reply[J]. The American Economic Review, 1975,Vol. 65(4): 753-755
[132]Triplett,E. The Measurement of Labor Cost [M]. The University of Chicago Press, 1983
[133] Anthony,T.G. & Golub,S.S.Towards a System of Multilateral Unit Labor Cost- Based Competitiveness Indicators for Advanced,Developing,and Transition Countries[J].IMF Working Paper,1997
[134]Weiss A.Job queues and layoffs in labor market with flexible wage[J].Journal of Political Economy,1980,88:526-538
[135]Weiss,A.Efficiency Wages:Models of Unemployment,Layoffs and Wage Dispersion[M].New Jersey,Princeton,Princeton University Press,1990
[136]Weiss,A.Human Capital vs.Signalling Explanations of Wages[J].The Journal of Economic Perspectives,1995,Vol.9(4):133-154
[137]Weisskopf,T.,Bowles,S.& Gordon,D.Hearts and Minds:A Social Model of Aggregate Productivity Growth in the U.S.,1948-1979[J].Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,1984
[138]Yellen,J.L.Efficiency Wage Models of Unemployment[J].The American Economic Review,1984,74(2):200-205
[139]Banister,J.中国制造业工资和劳动者报酬[J].中国劳动经济学,2006,(2)
[140]E.菲吕博腾,S.平乔维奇.产权与经济理论:近期文献的一个综述.财产权利与制度变迁[M].上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1994
[141]阿瑟.刘易斯编著.施炜,谢兵,苏玉红译.二元经济论[M].北京:北京经济学院出版社,1989
[142]保罗.克鲁格曼.亚洲奇迹的神话[J].外交,1994,11-12
[143]蔡昉,王德文.外商直接投资与就业--一个人力资本分析框架[J].财经论丛,2004,(1)
[144]蔡昉,都阳,王美艳.中国劳动力市场转型与发育[M].北京:商务印书馆,2005
[145]陈惠雄.要素使用权交易的效率模式与积极工资政策效应分析.中国工业经济,2003,(12)
[146]陈凌.德国劳动市场与就业政策研究[M].北京:中国劳动社会保障出版社,2000
[147]大卫.桑普斯福特,泽弗里斯.桑纳托斯主编.卢昌崇,王询译.劳动经济学前沿问题[M].北京:中国税务出版社,2000
[148]德里克·博斯沃思、彼德·道金斯、索尔斯坦·斯特龙巴克著.劳动市场经济学. 何璋等译[M].北京:中国经济出版社,2003
[149]德姆塞茨.关于产权的理论.财产权利与制度变迁[M].上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1994
[150]董克用.中国转轨时期薪酬制度研究[M].北京:中国劳动社会保障出版社,2003
[151]都阳.劳动力市场供求关系转变与劳动力成本[J].中国劳动经济学,2006,(2)
[152]樊纲.现代三大经济理论体系的比较与综合[M].上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,2006
[153]郭克莎.制造业生产效率的国际比较[J].中国工业经济,2000,(9)
[154]国际劳工局.劳动力市场主要指标体系(1999).国际劳工与信息研究所译[M].北京:中国劳动社会保障出版社,2001
[155]哈罗德.德姆塞茨.所有权、控制权与企业[M].北京:经济科学出版社,1999.
[156]何为.从劳动力成本角度看中国产品的国际竞争力[J].亚太经济,2001,(3)
[157]洪远朋.经济理论比较研究[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,2002
[158]金碚,胥和平,谢晓霞.中国工业国际竞争力报告[J].管理世界,1997,(4)
[159]金碚.论企业竞争力的性质[J].中国工业经济,2001,(10)
[160]坎贝尔.R.麦克南,斯坦利.L.布鲁,大卫.A 麦克菲逊著.刘文,赵成美,连海霞译.当代劳动经济学[M].北京:人民邮电出版社,2004
[161]孔泾源主编.中国居民收入分配年度报告(2004)[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2005
[162]李实,佐藤宏主编.经济转型的代价--中国城市失业、贫困、收入差距的经验分析[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2004
[163]李实等著.中国居民收入分配实证分析[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2000
[164]林毅夫,李永军.比较优势、竞争优势与发展中国家的经济发展[J].管理世界,2003(7)
[165]林毅夫.发展战略、自生能力和经济收敛[J].经济学季刊,2002,(2)
[166]卢锋.我国工资与劳动成本变动及国际比较(1978-2004)--人民币实际汇率长期走势研究之二.北京大学中国经济研究中心讨论稿,2006
[167]陆铭,蒋仕卿.重构“铁三角”:中国的劳动力市场改革、收入分配和经济增 长[J].管理世界,2007,(6)
[168]陆铭.工资和就业的议价理论--对中国二元就业体制的效率考察[M].上海:三联出版社,2004
[169]吕政.论我国传统工业化道路的经验与教训[J].中国工业经济,2003,(1)
[170]罗默.高级宏观经济学(中译本)[M].上海:上海财经大学出版社,2003
[171]马克思.工资、价格和利润.马克思恩格斯选集(第二卷)[M].北京:人民出版社,1995
[172]马丹,许少强.中国国际竞争力的历史变迁与冲击来源[J].国际金融研究,2006,(1)
[173]迈克尔.波特.竞争优势[M].北京:华夏出版社,1997
[174]迈克尔.波特.竞争战略[M].北京:华夏出版社,1997
[175]青木昌彦著.比较制度分析.周黎安译[M].上海:上海远东出版社,2001
[176]任若恩.关于中国制造业国际竞争力的进一步研究[J].经济研究,1998,(2)
[177]托马斯·弗里德曼著.世界是平的.何帆译[M].长沙:湖南科学技术出版社,2006
[178]王曦.中国转型经济总需求分析:微观基础与总量运行[M].广东:中山大学出版社,2004
[179]王小鲁.改革20年和今后20年:投资对经济增长的贡献[J].国家行政学院学报,2001,(4)
[180]王一江.政府干预与劳动者利益[J].比较,2004,(9)
[181]谢德仁.企业的性质:要素使用权交易合约之履行过程[J].经济研究,2002,(4).
[182]谢建国,陈漓高.政府支出与居民消费--一个基于跨期迭代模型的中国经验分析[J].经济科学,2002,(6).
[183]邢春冰.中国不同所有制企业的工资决定考察[J].经济研究,2005,(6)
[184]徐佳宾.产业升级中的中国劳动成本优势[J].经济理论与经济管理,2005,(2)
[185]姚先国,高怿.雇佣剩余、剩余分割与企业的雇用效率[J].财经研究,2007,(3)(人大复印资料〈民营经济与中小企业管理〉全文转载,2007,6)
[186]姚先国,高怿.当前我国收入分配结构变动及其对经济增长的约束.[J].重庆大学学报(社科版),2007,(2)
[187]姚先国,高怿.劳动成本增长与基于雇用效率的企业成本最优[J].中国石油大学学报(社科版),2007,(2)
[188]姚先国,李晓华.市场化与工资不平等增长:变动程度及影响因素[J].浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版),2007,(1)
[189]姚先国,盛乐.乡镇企业和国有企业经济效率差异的人力资本产权因素分析.经济研究,2002,(3)
[190]姚先国,陈凌.试论劳动力市场的供给管理[J].管理世界,1997,(6)
[191]姚先国,郭继强.论劳动力产权[J].学术月刊,1996,(6)
[192]姚先国,韩军.从工会现状看劳资关系:来自浙江的实证.浙江大学劳动保障和公共政策研究中心工作论文,2007
[193]姚先国.比较经济体制分析[M].浙江大学出版社,1999
[194]姚先国.经济增长方式转换的制度条件.浙江大学劳动保障和公共政策研究中心工作论文,2005
[195]姚先国.企业本位论反思[J].中国工业经济,2004,(4)
[196]姚先国.社会主义企业收入分配论[M].杭州:浙江大学出版,1992
[197]曾湘泉.劳动经济学[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,2003
[198]郑海涛,任若恩.多边比较下的中国制造业国际竞争力研究:1980-2004[J].经济研究,2005,(12)
[199]邹至庄.中国经济转型[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2005
© 2004-2018 中国地质图书馆版权所有 京ICP备05064691号 京公网安备11010802017129号 地址：北京市海淀区学院路29号 邮编：100083 电话：办公室：(+86 10)66554848；文献借阅、咨询服务、科技查新：66554700 |