中国弱自然垄断行业绩效评价研究
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摘要
传统经济理论认为,电信、电力、民航、铁路行业属于自然垄断行业,他们都具有极强的资产专用性和强烈的排他性,由此产生了强自然垄断性,即产业的需求条件决定了在该产业在一个区域内只能存在一家企业,否则会出现规模不经济的效果。据此,传统经济理论认为具有强自然垄断特性的自然垄断行业不适宜在行业内部展开竞争,只能在政府的监管下实施垄断经营。所以在我国,属于自然垄断行业成为了这些行业中的垄断企业抗拒市场化改革进程、维护自身垄断利益的最好借口。可是,国外同类行业的成功改革经验及我国20多年的改革实践都清楚的证明,随着技术进步和管理方法的创新,这些自然垄断行业的所谓强自然垄断性特征并不能成为展开市场竞争的阻碍。我国的这些行业实际上属于弱自然垄断行业,即它们的进入壁垒主要由行政管制构成,一旦政府的行政管制取消,这些行业必将成为竞争性行业。事实上,破除垄断、实现市场化竞争正成为自然垄断行业发展的大趋势。
自改革以来,以电信、电力、铁路、民航为代表的我国弱自然垄断行业进行了长期的、大规模的改革。改革的初衷是为了提高全行业绩效,因此行业绩效的变动情况是检验这些行业改革成败的最主要标准,也是人们普遍关注的问题。通过对弱自然垄断行业改革以来的绩效进行纵向对比及行业间的横向对比,就可以对改革政策做出客观的评价,为下一步的改革提供科学合理的决策依据。本文的选题正是在这样的背景下确定的。
根据反垄断与管制经济学的定义,行业综合经济绩效分为资源配置效率和技术进步率两部分。本文分别应用寻租理论中的塔洛克模型(Tullock)和因子分析法测算了我国主要弱自然垄断行业改革以来的资源配置效率和技术进步率,应用基于非参数的Malmquist指数法测算了这些行业技术进步率的主要代表指标——TFP的变动情况。通过SE-DEA模型测算了这些行业的综合经济绩效。实证分析结果表明,我国主要弱自然垄断行业的改革总体上是成功的,改革使这些行业的绩效不断得到提高;引入竞争机制是促进垄断企业提高绩效的最有效手段。以增强行业内部的竞争性为目地的改革措施产生了巨大竞争压力,促使垄断企业积极寻求改进效率、增加产出的方法,全行业的绩效因此得以提高。在提高绩效的具体手段方面,是技术的不断进步(包括管理方法的更新)而不是加大的资源投入推动这些行业绩效的提高。弱自然垄断行业的每一次快速发展都伴随着重大改革政策的出台,因此,体制创新是弱自然垄断行业发展的根本动力。通过这些行业绩效的横向对比可以发现,市场竞争越充分的行业,如电信业,其行业绩效也提升的较快;而行政保护过多、改革步伐迟缓的行业,如铁路,其行业绩效提升则十分缓慢。实证分析结果还表明,我国的弱自然垄断行业仍处于粗放型增长阶段。因此,如何尽快实现增长方式的转变,是弱自然垄断行业未来发展需要解决的最主要问题。
由于我国弱自然垄断行业企业竞争力较弱以及“入世”后垄断行业对外资开放日期日益临近,使这些行业不可能再走西方国家开放管制——企业数量激增——兼并重组——寡头垄断的老路,因为这样的竞争成本太高、耗时过长,客观条件不允许。根据产业经济学理论的重大发展——可竞争市场理论,一个行业的总体绩效并不一定与企业数量成反比关系,只要该行业的进入门槛足够低,行业外资本随时可以进入,哪怕行业内只有一家企业,潜在的竞争压力也会迫使该企业像处于完全竞争市场中那样行事,不敢行使垄断行业的特权。因此,只要我国政府放松对弱自然垄断行业进入管制,扶持行业内新进入企业和弱势企业,垄断企业在竞争的压力下就会提高绩效,社会福利将增加而又避免了大量企业进入后恶性竞争所导致的资源浪费。
According to traditional theories, due to great asset specificity, there is strong natural monopoly in industries like telecom, electric power, aviation and railway transportation. These industries are not suitable for competition, and should operate under government monopoly management and regulation. So in China, natural monopoly becomes the main excuse of these industries for refusing marketing reform and maintaining monopoly benefits. But overseas successful reform in similar industries and practice of 20 years reform in China proved that through technology advancement and management innovation, the so-called natural monopoly characteristic of these industries cannot be barrier to open market competition. Therefore these industries are not strong natural monopoly industries that cannot be put into market competition. But belong to weak natural monopoly industries, that is, their entry barriers mainly are caused by government administrative control. Once administrative control is cancelled, these industries will be competitive industries. In fact, monopoly breaking and market competition is the main development trend of natural monopoly industries.
Since the reform, there have been long term and large-scale reform in Chinese weak monopoly industries such as telecom, electric power, aviation and railway transportation. Original intention of reform was to improve performance of the whole industry. So industry performance is a main index of evaluating the result of reform in these industries. According to definition in economics of regulation and antitrust, comprehensive industry economic achievements can be evaluated by resources deployment efficiency and technology advancement rate. This thesis calculated resources deployment efficiency and technology advancement rate of Chinese main weak natural monopoly industries with Tullock model and factor analytic method, and calculated the change of TFP index based on non-parameter Malmquist index method, which is a main representative index of technology advancement rate. Then calculated comprehensive economic achievements of these industries with SE-DEA model. Empirical analysis result shows that the reform of Chinese weak monopoly industries is successful as a whole. Reform improved performance of these industries continuously. It is technology advancement that improved performances of these industries, but not increased resources input. Crosswise contrast showed that performance of more perfect competitive industries such as telecom improves faster, while performance of industries with too much administrative protection and reform slowly such as railway transportation also improves very slowly.
Since the competitive power of Chinese weak natural monopoly industries is very weak and oncoming opening date of monopoly industries to foreign investments, these industries cannot develop as the way of western country, which is opening regulation, with explosion quantity of enterprises, merger and reorganization, and then become oligopoly. The competition cost is too high, and it will take a long time. According to competitive market theory, which is the newest achievement in industrial economics, there is no certainly inverse relation between the overall performance of an industry and quantity of firms. If the entry barriers are low enough, capital outside the industry can enter freely at any time. Even if there is only one firm in an industry, potential competition will also force this firm acts as in perfect competitive market and cannot exercises its monopoly power. So monopoly firm will improve performance, social welfare will increase and resources waste caused by blind competition when too many firm enter an industry can be avoided only if our government relaxes regulation on weak natural monopoly industry, and supports recently entered firm.
自改革以来,以电信、电力、铁路、民航为代表的我国弱自然垄断行业进行了长期的、大规模的改革。改革的初衷是为了提高全行业绩效,因此行业绩效的变动情况是检验这些行业改革成败的最主要标准,也是人们普遍关注的问题。通过对弱自然垄断行业改革以来的绩效进行纵向对比及行业间的横向对比,就可以对改革政策做出客观的评价,为下一步的改革提供科学合理的决策依据。本文的选题正是在这样的背景下确定的。
根据反垄断与管制经济学的定义,行业综合经济绩效分为资源配置效率和技术进步率两部分。本文分别应用寻租理论中的塔洛克模型(Tullock)和因子分析法测算了我国主要弱自然垄断行业改革以来的资源配置效率和技术进步率,应用基于非参数的Malmquist指数法测算了这些行业技术进步率的主要代表指标——TFP的变动情况。通过SE-DEA模型测算了这些行业的综合经济绩效。实证分析结果表明,我国主要弱自然垄断行业的改革总体上是成功的,改革使这些行业的绩效不断得到提高;引入竞争机制是促进垄断企业提高绩效的最有效手段。以增强行业内部的竞争性为目地的改革措施产生了巨大竞争压力,促使垄断企业积极寻求改进效率、增加产出的方法,全行业的绩效因此得以提高。在提高绩效的具体手段方面,是技术的不断进步(包括管理方法的更新)而不是加大的资源投入推动这些行业绩效的提高。弱自然垄断行业的每一次快速发展都伴随着重大改革政策的出台,因此,体制创新是弱自然垄断行业发展的根本动力。通过这些行业绩效的横向对比可以发现,市场竞争越充分的行业,如电信业,其行业绩效也提升的较快;而行政保护过多、改革步伐迟缓的行业,如铁路,其行业绩效提升则十分缓慢。实证分析结果还表明,我国的弱自然垄断行业仍处于粗放型增长阶段。因此,如何尽快实现增长方式的转变,是弱自然垄断行业未来发展需要解决的最主要问题。
由于我国弱自然垄断行业企业竞争力较弱以及“入世”后垄断行业对外资开放日期日益临近,使这些行业不可能再走西方国家开放管制——企业数量激增——兼并重组——寡头垄断的老路,因为这样的竞争成本太高、耗时过长,客观条件不允许。根据产业经济学理论的重大发展——可竞争市场理论,一个行业的总体绩效并不一定与企业数量成反比关系,只要该行业的进入门槛足够低,行业外资本随时可以进入,哪怕行业内只有一家企业,潜在的竞争压力也会迫使该企业像处于完全竞争市场中那样行事,不敢行使垄断行业的特权。因此,只要我国政府放松对弱自然垄断行业进入管制,扶持行业内新进入企业和弱势企业,垄断企业在竞争的压力下就会提高绩效,社会福利将增加而又避免了大量企业进入后恶性竞争所导致的资源浪费。
According to traditional theories, due to great asset specificity, there is strong natural monopoly in industries like telecom, electric power, aviation and railway transportation. These industries are not suitable for competition, and should operate under government monopoly management and regulation. So in China, natural monopoly becomes the main excuse of these industries for refusing marketing reform and maintaining monopoly benefits. But overseas successful reform in similar industries and practice of 20 years reform in China proved that through technology advancement and management innovation, the so-called natural monopoly characteristic of these industries cannot be barrier to open market competition. Therefore these industries are not strong natural monopoly industries that cannot be put into market competition. But belong to weak natural monopoly industries, that is, their entry barriers mainly are caused by government administrative control. Once administrative control is cancelled, these industries will be competitive industries. In fact, monopoly breaking and market competition is the main development trend of natural monopoly industries.
Since the reform, there have been long term and large-scale reform in Chinese weak monopoly industries such as telecom, electric power, aviation and railway transportation. Original intention of reform was to improve performance of the whole industry. So industry performance is a main index of evaluating the result of reform in these industries. According to definition in economics of regulation and antitrust, comprehensive industry economic achievements can be evaluated by resources deployment efficiency and technology advancement rate. This thesis calculated resources deployment efficiency and technology advancement rate of Chinese main weak natural monopoly industries with Tullock model and factor analytic method, and calculated the change of TFP index based on non-parameter Malmquist index method, which is a main representative index of technology advancement rate. Then calculated comprehensive economic achievements of these industries with SE-DEA model. Empirical analysis result shows that the reform of Chinese weak monopoly industries is successful as a whole. Reform improved performance of these industries continuously. It is technology advancement that improved performances of these industries, but not increased resources input. Crosswise contrast showed that performance of more perfect competitive industries such as telecom improves faster, while performance of industries with too much administrative protection and reform slowly such as railway transportation also improves very slowly.
Since the competitive power of Chinese weak natural monopoly industries is very weak and oncoming opening date of monopoly industries to foreign investments, these industries cannot develop as the way of western country, which is opening regulation, with explosion quantity of enterprises, merger and reorganization, and then become oligopoly. The competition cost is too high, and it will take a long time. According to competitive market theory, which is the newest achievement in industrial economics, there is no certainly inverse relation between the overall performance of an industry and quantity of firms. If the entry barriers are low enough, capital outside the industry can enter freely at any time. Even if there is only one firm in an industry, potential competition will also force this firm acts as in perfect competitive market and cannot exercises its monopoly power. So monopoly firm will improve performance, social welfare will increase and resources waste caused by blind competition when too many firm enter an industry can be avoided only if our government relaxes regulation on weak natural monopoly industry, and supports recently entered firm.
引文
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