代理、信息和中国上市公司非效率投资
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摘要
投资理论从来都是经济理论以及公司金融研究的热门领域,近年来随着信息经济学、契约经济学以及行为经济学等的发展,关于信息不对称、代理问题和行为人非理性导致的偏离标准净现值规则的非效率投资现象成为了学者们的研究焦点并取得了丰硕成果。不过西方学者的研究通常是基于产权明晰、治理结构完善、监管严密、信用与法律可靠的成熟市场经济环境进行的。比较而言,中国的市场制度还很不成熟,在公司治理机制和投融资体制的众多方面都有着自己极其特殊之处。本文以2000-2004年为时间窗口,采用规范分析和在实证分析相结合的方法,试图揭示中国上市公司非效率投资的基本特征及其内在机理,为抑制中国上市公司非效率投资决策提供建设性意见。
本文研究发现:首先,中国上市公司受融资约束问题和代理问题的共同困扰。不过,对于低成长性上市公司来说,代理问题是造成投资现金流敏感性的主导因素;对于高成长性上市公司来说,融资约束问题和代理问题可能同样严重。其次,随着市场化转轨的不断深入,对于中国上市公司来说负债已经不是一种“软约束”,甚至表现出了比现金流更为突出的对投资支出的约束力。并且,负债融资对投资支出的约束力在不同类型企业中影响机制不尽相同:高负债抑制了低成长性企业的自由现金流问题;但对于高成长企业来说,因为债务悬横问题未必占据主导地位,代理问题也许同样严重,可能二者的共同作用导致了负债融资与企业投资支出的负相关。第三,在股权分置、国有股“一股独大”的情况下,投资现金流敏感性在不同股权性质企业间有明显差异:高成长性企业中,国有控股上市公司的融资约束问题比非国有控股上市公司要相对轻微;低成长性企业中,股权性质的不同并没有造成自由现金流问题的程度差异。此外,负债融资对投资支出的影响程度不因股权不同存在明显差异。最后,相对于健康企业,财务困境企业的投资者与管理者之间的信息不对称问题更为严重,逆向选择和道德风险问题也更为突出,投资现金流敏感性也更为显著。而在转轨时期的中国,高负债企业为了摆脱财务困境,往往采取各种策略逃废债务。财务困境上市公司具有扭曲投资的倾向,尤其是过度投资行为。
本文认为,由于股权结构不合理、治理机制不完善、债权人和中小投资者保护不充分以及监管滞后等原因,中国上市公司的信息不对称和代理问题十分突出,由此引发的非效率投资现象也非常严重,最为关键的治理措施就是要建立和完善有效的公司治理机制,尽管股权分置改革的基本完成有助于股权结构的优化,但全流通后中国上市公司投资现金流敏感性及非效率投资影响因素的变化还有待进一步深入研究。
Investment theory is always one of the hot researching fields on the economic theory and corporate finance. In recent years, along with the development of information economics, contractual economics as well as the behavior economics, inefficient investment phenomenon deviating from standard rule of net present values caused by information asymmetry, agency problems and irrational behaviors has been becoming the focus of the researchers’attention and obtained the substantial results. However, the studies of western researchers generally based on the mature market-oriented economy characterised by clear property rights, sound governance structure, tight supervise, as well as reliable credibility and law. By contrast with it, Chinese market system having many own special merit on corporate governance, investment and finance mechanism is immature, nonstandard and defective. Focus on 2000-2004, using normal and data analysis, This paper tries to reveal the essence and mechanism of the Chinese listed companies and provide the constructive suggestion on bringing down it.
This paper has the results as follows: First, Chinese listed companies were obsessed by financial constrains and agency problem. Nevertheless, for firms with low growth opportunities, agency problem was the dominant factor; for firms with high growth opportunities, no obvious evidence to indicate that the dominant factor was agency problem or financial constrains. Secondly, the negative relation of debt financing and Chinese listed companies investment was stronger than investment-cash flow sensitivities. Moreover, this discipline role had different influential mechanism: high leverage control the free cash flow problem in the firms with low growth opportunities; but for firms with high growth opportunities, maybe debt overhang and agency problem having equal influence result in the negative relation. Thirdly, as the split share structure and“Domination of a Single State Shareholder”, the sensitivities of investment-cash flow have notable divergence: for firms with high growth opportunities, financial constrain is light for state-controlled firms than non-state-controlled firms; for firms with low growth opportunities, the diversity of equity character does not lead to the difference of free cash flow problem. Moreover, the impact of debt financing on investment does not have significant difference between stated-owned listed companies and non- stated-owned companies. Lastly, in contrast to financial healthy enterprise, financial distress enterprise has more serious information asymmetry more prominent adverse choice and moral hazard. So its sensitivity of investment-cash flow is more stronger. In china during transiting periods, to eliminate financial distress situation, firms with high leverage often take all kinds of strategies to abandon debt. Financial distress listed companies probably distort investment, especially over-investment.
The author thinks that, as unreasonable equity structure, imperfect governance mechanism, insufficient protection for creditor and small investors, as well as lagging supervise an management, the information asymmetry and agency problem are quite serious. And it leads to significant inefficient investment. The key and effective measures are to build effective governance mechanism. Although the reform of split share structure have been finished, the sensitivities of investment-cash flow and the influential factors of inefficient investment of Chinese listed companies need further research.
本文研究发现:首先,中国上市公司受融资约束问题和代理问题的共同困扰。不过,对于低成长性上市公司来说,代理问题是造成投资现金流敏感性的主导因素;对于高成长性上市公司来说,融资约束问题和代理问题可能同样严重。其次,随着市场化转轨的不断深入,对于中国上市公司来说负债已经不是一种“软约束”,甚至表现出了比现金流更为突出的对投资支出的约束力。并且,负债融资对投资支出的约束力在不同类型企业中影响机制不尽相同:高负债抑制了低成长性企业的自由现金流问题;但对于高成长企业来说,因为债务悬横问题未必占据主导地位,代理问题也许同样严重,可能二者的共同作用导致了负债融资与企业投资支出的负相关。第三,在股权分置、国有股“一股独大”的情况下,投资现金流敏感性在不同股权性质企业间有明显差异:高成长性企业中,国有控股上市公司的融资约束问题比非国有控股上市公司要相对轻微;低成长性企业中,股权性质的不同并没有造成自由现金流问题的程度差异。此外,负债融资对投资支出的影响程度不因股权不同存在明显差异。最后,相对于健康企业,财务困境企业的投资者与管理者之间的信息不对称问题更为严重,逆向选择和道德风险问题也更为突出,投资现金流敏感性也更为显著。而在转轨时期的中国,高负债企业为了摆脱财务困境,往往采取各种策略逃废债务。财务困境上市公司具有扭曲投资的倾向,尤其是过度投资行为。
本文认为,由于股权结构不合理、治理机制不完善、债权人和中小投资者保护不充分以及监管滞后等原因,中国上市公司的信息不对称和代理问题十分突出,由此引发的非效率投资现象也非常严重,最为关键的治理措施就是要建立和完善有效的公司治理机制,尽管股权分置改革的基本完成有助于股权结构的优化,但全流通后中国上市公司投资现金流敏感性及非效率投资影响因素的变化还有待进一步深入研究。
Investment theory is always one of the hot researching fields on the economic theory and corporate finance. In recent years, along with the development of information economics, contractual economics as well as the behavior economics, inefficient investment phenomenon deviating from standard rule of net present values caused by information asymmetry, agency problems and irrational behaviors has been becoming the focus of the researchers’attention and obtained the substantial results. However, the studies of western researchers generally based on the mature market-oriented economy characterised by clear property rights, sound governance structure, tight supervise, as well as reliable credibility and law. By contrast with it, Chinese market system having many own special merit on corporate governance, investment and finance mechanism is immature, nonstandard and defective. Focus on 2000-2004, using normal and data analysis, This paper tries to reveal the essence and mechanism of the Chinese listed companies and provide the constructive suggestion on bringing down it.
This paper has the results as follows: First, Chinese listed companies were obsessed by financial constrains and agency problem. Nevertheless, for firms with low growth opportunities, agency problem was the dominant factor; for firms with high growth opportunities, no obvious evidence to indicate that the dominant factor was agency problem or financial constrains. Secondly, the negative relation of debt financing and Chinese listed companies investment was stronger than investment-cash flow sensitivities. Moreover, this discipline role had different influential mechanism: high leverage control the free cash flow problem in the firms with low growth opportunities; but for firms with high growth opportunities, maybe debt overhang and agency problem having equal influence result in the negative relation. Thirdly, as the split share structure and“Domination of a Single State Shareholder”, the sensitivities of investment-cash flow have notable divergence: for firms with high growth opportunities, financial constrain is light for state-controlled firms than non-state-controlled firms; for firms with low growth opportunities, the diversity of equity character does not lead to the difference of free cash flow problem. Moreover, the impact of debt financing on investment does not have significant difference between stated-owned listed companies and non- stated-owned companies. Lastly, in contrast to financial healthy enterprise, financial distress enterprise has more serious information asymmetry more prominent adverse choice and moral hazard. So its sensitivity of investment-cash flow is more stronger. In china during transiting periods, to eliminate financial distress situation, firms with high leverage often take all kinds of strategies to abandon debt. Financial distress listed companies probably distort investment, especially over-investment.
The author thinks that, as unreasonable equity structure, imperfect governance mechanism, insufficient protection for creditor and small investors, as well as lagging supervise an management, the information asymmetry and agency problem are quite serious. And it leads to significant inefficient investment. The key and effective measures are to build effective governance mechanism. Although the reform of split share structure have been finished, the sensitivities of investment-cash flow and the influential factors of inefficient investment of Chinese listed companies need further research.
引文
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