先赔保险信用机制研究
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摘要
本文通过探讨中小企业、信用风险、信用制度和电子商务的一些国内外理论和实务,结合我国社会信用状况和中小企业的特点,提出了先赔保险信用机制。先赔保险信用机制是信用评级机构以信用评级为基础,对评级对象的经营行为进行监督和协调,并对信用评级对象的失信行为,以对第三者责任保险的方式进行部分先行赔付的信用制度。先赔保险信用机制是综合信用评估、信用管理、部分先行赔付和第三者责任险的信用制度。
先赔保险信用机制通过组建一个独立的信用权威机构(简称先赔企业,下同)作为中小企业信用风险的承保人,信用评级对象(简称投保企业,下同)作为投保人,向先赔企业购买第三者信用保险,受益人为投保企业的非特定交易对手。在此架构下,先赔企业则对投保企业的资信情况进行评估,做出信用评级,并且做出信用标识。如果投保企业在交易中失信,其交易对手会向先赔企业和投保企业同时索赔。先赔企业先向投保企业的交易对手赔付,再向投保企业索赔,并降低投保企业的信用等级。
先赔保险信用机制通过引入第三方,对中小企业进行信用评级,并通过信用转移为其潜在的交易对手分担信用风险,来降低中小企业交易过程中信息的不对称性和获取信息需要支付的成本,来促进市场中交易的达成。
信用先赔机制中各方的角色定位是:先赔信用企业对市场主体进行有偿信用评级,收取评估费,向所有市场主体承诺,对投保企业因违反合同而造成的损失进行部分补偿;投保企业则因投保和信用的提高获得更多交易机会;而投保企业的非特定交易对手则能免费的找到低风险的企业交易,得到一笔或有的交易补贴。三者之间各有所得。
本文通过讨论建立先赔机制是可能的、必要的,先赔机制的各类信用风险是可控的,从而论证了建立先赔保险信用机制的可行性。通过这种中小企业的新型信用评估模式,使先赔信用保险机制能通过集体协调、先行赔付、信用评估和信用附加等手段,为中小企业建立了受第三方制约的信任关系及信用共同体,为其提供信用评估、信用风险控制和提高交易效率三项重要经济服务功能,从而建立起了一种低成本和高保真的信息传递机制和信用激励机制,促进我国市场经济体制的建立健全、推动中小企业的健康规范化发展方面发挥重要作用,为市场主体最终实现单次匿名交易提供条件。
此外,本文提出了先赔保险信用专用信用评级制度、先赔机制的代位追偿制度和网络信用平台来充实来完善先赔信用机制。针对中小企业的先赔保险信用专用信用评级制度,为投保企业编制历史信用评级指数和在线信用评级指数。给出了先赔机制的代位追偿的概念,它指因投保企业主观上违约,发生了对其交易对手造成经济损失的失信事故,先赔企业自向投保企业的交易对手代赔后,先赔企业代位投保企业的交易对手对投保企业请求行使部分赔偿的制度。先赔机制的代位追偿增强了先赔企业对投保企业的约束,提高了先赔企业的抗风险的能力。作为先赔机制的补充,本文还倡导利用网络信用平台来保护守信者。先赔企业、投保企业和其他市场主体通过网络信用平台的信用风险预警体系和信用信息交流反馈机制,可以进行在线信用评估,及时预防各类风险,以将损失减到最小。
最后,为了使先赔机制能可持续的发展,本文强调了先赔机制的运作原则,即维护第三者利益原则、风险分担和部分损失补偿原则、最大诚实信用原则、代位追偿原则、责权发生制原则和保险利益原则和近因原则。明确了政府对先赔机制的外部支持和矫正的原因和内容、先赔企业的内部风险管理、外部非常风险防范,来确保先赔保险信用机制的作用的发挥和防范各种风险。
Based on SMEs, credit risk and credit system theories at home and abroad, this paper first creative sets up the Preengagement Indemnity Credit System ( for short the PICS)in light of China's social credit situation and the characteristics and the importance of small and medium enterprises. The PICS is a credit system integrate credit assessment,credit management,preengagement indemnity and the third-party liability insurance.
Firstly the PICS upbuilds an independence authoritative Preengagement Indemnity Organization (for short the PICO).The PICO has an agreement with small and medium enterprises which become its members. The PICO is as the accept insurance part of the third-party liability insurance, but the member is as the policy-holder. The PICO then rates and marks the policy-holder,and charges an amount of fee. Under the agreement, as soon as the policy-holder breaks faith in the business, the counterparty will claim for compensation from the PICO and the policy-holder. The PICO will pay the preengagement indemnity to the counterparty who had loss according to the member's credit rate. And then the PICO will claim for the preengagement idemnity from the policy-holder, and degrade its credit rate.The PICS can effectively supervise and coordinate the small and medium enterprices'behaviors.
The PICS, which shares the credit risk with the potenial bargainer through rate the small and medium enterprices by the independence third-party and tranfering credit. It reduces the cost payed due to communication is asymmetry in the bargaining process, and comes to an agreement.
In the PICS, the role-play is as follows.The PICO rates and marks the policy-holder,and promises to all market participants that it should partially compensate the counterparty for loss if the policy-holder disobays the contract.The policy-holder can acquire more and more business opportunities due to the credit promise.The counterparty will gain a low-risk business contract for free or contingent compensation.Three roles each gain benefits from the PICS.
The paper discusses the possibility and the inevitability to set up the PICS through testifiing that varies risks can be controled,and concludes that it is feasible to set up the PICS.The PICS, which should build a new small and medium enterprise credit assessment model, establishs a kind trust relationship constrained by the third-party and organises a credit community for the small and medium enterprises by unitive coordination, preengagement indemnity,credit assessment and credit affixation.It provides three important economic service functions such as credit assessment, credit risk control and transaction efficiency improvement,and creates a low-cost and high- fidelity information transmission mechanism and credit incentive mechanism.It will play an important role to promote to establish a China's sound market economy system and develop small and medium enterprises.These should provide conditions to realize the single anonymous transaction eventually.
This paper has also created a credit rate system, subrogation recovery credit mechanism and network platform to enrich and improve the PICS itself. The credit rate system includes credit rate design, historical credit rate index and online credit rate index. The concept of subrogation recovery refers to the concept of the third-party liability insurance. The subrogation recovery mechanism makes the PICO enhance the restriction to policy-holder and raise the anti-risk capability. In this paper, the author creates a network platform to protect credit trustworthiness as a supplement to the PICS. The PICO,the pocily-holder and other market participants can do credit assessment online through the credit risk early warning system and the credit information exchange and feedback mechanism of the network platform, preventing various types of risk and minimizing losses on time.
Finally, in order to make the PICS sustainable and continuable, the paper stressed the operation principle of the PICS, that is, the principle of safeguarding the interests of the third party, the risk-sharing and part compensation principle, the largest faith principle, the principle of subrogation recoveries, the principle of rights and responsibilities in insurance benefits and the principle of proximate cause. At same time the internal risk management and external risk prevention of the PICO guarantee normal operation. The paper indicates that the Government should support and channel off the development of the PICS from external environment.
先赔保险信用机制通过组建一个独立的信用权威机构(简称先赔企业,下同)作为中小企业信用风险的承保人,信用评级对象(简称投保企业,下同)作为投保人,向先赔企业购买第三者信用保险,受益人为投保企业的非特定交易对手。在此架构下,先赔企业则对投保企业的资信情况进行评估,做出信用评级,并且做出信用标识。如果投保企业在交易中失信,其交易对手会向先赔企业和投保企业同时索赔。先赔企业先向投保企业的交易对手赔付,再向投保企业索赔,并降低投保企业的信用等级。
先赔保险信用机制通过引入第三方,对中小企业进行信用评级,并通过信用转移为其潜在的交易对手分担信用风险,来降低中小企业交易过程中信息的不对称性和获取信息需要支付的成本,来促进市场中交易的达成。
信用先赔机制中各方的角色定位是:先赔信用企业对市场主体进行有偿信用评级,收取评估费,向所有市场主体承诺,对投保企业因违反合同而造成的损失进行部分补偿;投保企业则因投保和信用的提高获得更多交易机会;而投保企业的非特定交易对手则能免费的找到低风险的企业交易,得到一笔或有的交易补贴。三者之间各有所得。
本文通过讨论建立先赔机制是可能的、必要的,先赔机制的各类信用风险是可控的,从而论证了建立先赔保险信用机制的可行性。通过这种中小企业的新型信用评估模式,使先赔信用保险机制能通过集体协调、先行赔付、信用评估和信用附加等手段,为中小企业建立了受第三方制约的信任关系及信用共同体,为其提供信用评估、信用风险控制和提高交易效率三项重要经济服务功能,从而建立起了一种低成本和高保真的信息传递机制和信用激励机制,促进我国市场经济体制的建立健全、推动中小企业的健康规范化发展方面发挥重要作用,为市场主体最终实现单次匿名交易提供条件。
此外,本文提出了先赔保险信用专用信用评级制度、先赔机制的代位追偿制度和网络信用平台来充实来完善先赔信用机制。针对中小企业的先赔保险信用专用信用评级制度,为投保企业编制历史信用评级指数和在线信用评级指数。给出了先赔机制的代位追偿的概念,它指因投保企业主观上违约,发生了对其交易对手造成经济损失的失信事故,先赔企业自向投保企业的交易对手代赔后,先赔企业代位投保企业的交易对手对投保企业请求行使部分赔偿的制度。先赔机制的代位追偿增强了先赔企业对投保企业的约束,提高了先赔企业的抗风险的能力。作为先赔机制的补充,本文还倡导利用网络信用平台来保护守信者。先赔企业、投保企业和其他市场主体通过网络信用平台的信用风险预警体系和信用信息交流反馈机制,可以进行在线信用评估,及时预防各类风险,以将损失减到最小。
最后,为了使先赔机制能可持续的发展,本文强调了先赔机制的运作原则,即维护第三者利益原则、风险分担和部分损失补偿原则、最大诚实信用原则、代位追偿原则、责权发生制原则和保险利益原则和近因原则。明确了政府对先赔机制的外部支持和矫正的原因和内容、先赔企业的内部风险管理、外部非常风险防范,来确保先赔保险信用机制的作用的发挥和防范各种风险。
Based on SMEs, credit risk and credit system theories at home and abroad, this paper first creative sets up the Preengagement Indemnity Credit System ( for short the PICS)in light of China's social credit situation and the characteristics and the importance of small and medium enterprises. The PICS is a credit system integrate credit assessment,credit management,preengagement indemnity and the third-party liability insurance.
Firstly the PICS upbuilds an independence authoritative Preengagement Indemnity Organization (for short the PICO).The PICO has an agreement with small and medium enterprises which become its members. The PICO is as the accept insurance part of the third-party liability insurance, but the member is as the policy-holder. The PICO then rates and marks the policy-holder,and charges an amount of fee. Under the agreement, as soon as the policy-holder breaks faith in the business, the counterparty will claim for compensation from the PICO and the policy-holder. The PICO will pay the preengagement indemnity to the counterparty who had loss according to the member's credit rate. And then the PICO will claim for the preengagement idemnity from the policy-holder, and degrade its credit rate.The PICS can effectively supervise and coordinate the small and medium enterprices'behaviors.
The PICS, which shares the credit risk with the potenial bargainer through rate the small and medium enterprices by the independence third-party and tranfering credit. It reduces the cost payed due to communication is asymmetry in the bargaining process, and comes to an agreement.
In the PICS, the role-play is as follows.The PICO rates and marks the policy-holder,and promises to all market participants that it should partially compensate the counterparty for loss if the policy-holder disobays the contract.The policy-holder can acquire more and more business opportunities due to the credit promise.The counterparty will gain a low-risk business contract for free or contingent compensation.Three roles each gain benefits from the PICS.
The paper discusses the possibility and the inevitability to set up the PICS through testifiing that varies risks can be controled,and concludes that it is feasible to set up the PICS.The PICS, which should build a new small and medium enterprise credit assessment model, establishs a kind trust relationship constrained by the third-party and organises a credit community for the small and medium enterprises by unitive coordination, preengagement indemnity,credit assessment and credit affixation.It provides three important economic service functions such as credit assessment, credit risk control and transaction efficiency improvement,and creates a low-cost and high- fidelity information transmission mechanism and credit incentive mechanism.It will play an important role to promote to establish a China's sound market economy system and develop small and medium enterprises.These should provide conditions to realize the single anonymous transaction eventually.
This paper has also created a credit rate system, subrogation recovery credit mechanism and network platform to enrich and improve the PICS itself. The credit rate system includes credit rate design, historical credit rate index and online credit rate index. The concept of subrogation recovery refers to the concept of the third-party liability insurance. The subrogation recovery mechanism makes the PICO enhance the restriction to policy-holder and raise the anti-risk capability. In this paper, the author creates a network platform to protect credit trustworthiness as a supplement to the PICS. The PICO,the pocily-holder and other market participants can do credit assessment online through the credit risk early warning system and the credit information exchange and feedback mechanism of the network platform, preventing various types of risk and minimizing losses on time.
Finally, in order to make the PICS sustainable and continuable, the paper stressed the operation principle of the PICS, that is, the principle of safeguarding the interests of the third party, the risk-sharing and part compensation principle, the largest faith principle, the principle of subrogation recoveries, the principle of rights and responsibilities in insurance benefits and the principle of proximate cause. At same time the internal risk management and external risk prevention of the PICO guarantee normal operation. The paper indicates that the Government should support and channel off the development of the PICS from external environment.
引文
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