中国农业保险需求与补贴问题研究
摘要
中国农业自然灾害十分严重,农户抵御自然风险的能力也非常有限,客观上需要利用有效的风险转移工具——农业保险来抵御风险、稳定农业生产、保障农民收入。农业保险也是WTO规则中较为重要的非价格类农业支持政策,因此近年来越来越受到学术界和决策部门的重视。2004、2005、2006、2007连续4年的中央1号文件、“十一五”规划及2006年6月颁布的《国务院关于保险业改革发展的若干意见》都对政策性农业保险的发展提出了明确要求。
我国农业保险自1934年开始试办至今已有70多年的历史,但一直步履蹒跚。在经历了20世纪80年代末至90年代初的试点高潮之后,农业保险逐步萎缩,直至2004年,新一轮农业保险试点重新在全国各地展开,才止住颓势。尽管受到决策部门的高度重视,但是由于财政支持不力,2004～2006年间农业保险仍然发展缓慢。鉴于此,2007年中央财政加大支持力度,安排10亿元资金,在全国6个省区推行政策性农业保险保费补贴试点,当年农业保险得到迅猛发展,保费收入达51.8亿元,比2006年增长504%。据悉,2008年中央财政给予政策性农业保险的保费补贴将达数十亿元,其范围将涵盖农业生产的全过程。
正是在这种现实背景下,本研究综合运用微观经济学、数理经济学、计量经济学等相关理论和方法,在已有研究的基础上将定性和定量研究相结合,根据问卷调查、实地访谈获得的一手资料,以及其它翔实的数据资料,重点对我国农业保险需求及政策性农业保险补贴的理论与实践进行了深入分析与探讨。
本文的主要内容及结论如下:
第一,探究影响我国农户农业保险需求的微观因素。作者根据湖北376户农户调查资料,对农户的风险态度、风险分散方式及农业保险在各种农村保险中的排序等进行描述性实证分析。研究表明,农户的风险态度、其传统的风险分散方式及农业保险在各种农村保险中排序靠后等因素对农户农业保险需求有消极影响。同时,通过建立Logit二元选择模型,对农户农业保险购买决策的影响因素进行实证分析。研究结果表明,农户家庭总收入、种植业收入占总收入的比例、耕地面积及受访者的风险认知程度对其农业保险购买决策有明显影响。
第二,分析不同补贴方案下我国农业保险保费的财政补贴额与农户支付额及可行性。根据目前我国农业保险实践及近期发展趋势,本文选择保成本的保障方式,在多种不同的模拟方案下,分别测算稻谷、小麦、玉米、大豆、棉花、花生、油菜籽、黄红麻、甘蔗、甜菜、烤烟等11种主要农作物和奶牛、生猪、肉鸡等3种畜禽的财政补贴额度和农户支付额,并对我国财政和各地区农户的支付能力进行分析。
在两种典型方案下,即当上述农作物与畜禽成本保障水平分别为70%与60%、财政补贴比例分别为60%与40%、农户支付比例分别为40%与60%时,若农作物保险和畜禽保险参与率均为30%或均为50%,则财政补贴总额分别为62.86亿元与104.76亿元,农户支付总额分别为75.73亿元与45.44亿元。同时,对政府与农户各自支付能力的分析表明,在上述保障水平和财政保费补贴率下,当农作物与畜禽保险的参与率均不超过50%时,如果保费补贴由中央和地方两级财政支付,补贴政策是可行的;此时农村居民人均保费约为50元,考虑到目前我国农民人均收入及收入来源结构差别较大,约有70%以上的农户具有支付能力。
第三,构建我国农业保险补贴体系。本研究从多维的角度构建了我国农业保险补贴体系,其中,补贴项目可考虑主要农作物多风险保险和主要家禽家畜死亡保险,如稻谷、小麦、玉米、大豆、棉花、花生和油菜籽,以及黄红麻、甘蔗、甜菜、烤烟等农作物多风险保险与能繁母猪、生猪、奶牛、肉鸡等畜禽死亡保险;补贴方式以保费补贴为主,并适当给予经营管理费补贴、税收优惠和再保险补贴;经营管理费补贴要兼顾政策需要和效率需要,建立责任制约机制,并依托基层保险和财政机构,收集保险对象的相关资料,减少补贴资金的浪费;补贴标准制定则应综合考虑农业保险区域保险费率和不同地区农户的支付能力及地方财政情况,合理规划各险种的补贴标准,循序渐进,逐步加大补贴资金的投入力度;补贴资金可以通过调整财政支出结构和财政支农支出结构及缩减政策性补贴支出等多渠道筹集。同时,还应完善农业保险补贴的配套措施,制定相关法律法规,健全国家的农业保险监管机构,保证财政补贴政策能够真正贯彻落实。
第四,选择适合我国国情的农业保险模式。本研究通过总结国外农业保险经营模式的经验教训,并对我国现有的6种试点经营模式进行分析,提出现阶段适合我国国情的农业保险经营模式应当是政府主导下的农业保险政策性定位、多元化经营主体共存的农业保险模式。在这种模式下,政府、保险公司和农民三方都能够实现自身的目标,即政府实现社会收益最大化,保险公司实现企业利润最大化,农民实现收入最大化。
鉴于国内针对农业保险需求的定量研究比较缺乏,针对补贴测算和补贴体系构建的系统研究较为少见,本研究在一定程度上丰富了农业保险需求和补贴的研究成果,尤其是对于我国农业保险补贴政策的制定有较为重要的参考价值。
China is one of the countries in the world suffering the severest agricultural natural disasters and it is very difficult for its farmers to cope with them.It is imperative that agricultural insurance which is the effective means of transferring risks should be made use of to cope with agricultural risks,stabilize agricultural production and guarantee farmers' income.Besides,agricultural insurance is one of the most important non-price policies supporting agriculture in WTO rules.Therefore,it has drawn more and more attention from academe and decision-making sectors.Four pieces of No.1 central document released consecutively from the year of 2004 to 2007,the "tenth-five year" planning and the document "State Council Guidance on Insurance Reform and Development" issued in June 2006 have all put forward requirement on the development of policy-oriented agricultural insurance.
Since the first trial in 1934,China agricultural insurance has gone through a history of more than 70 years;however,its development is rather difficult all the time.Between the late 1980s and the early 1990s,agricultural insurance made great progress and reached its climax.But since then,it stagnated and began to shrink.Not until 2004 has a new round trial of agricultural insurance been carried out all through the country.However, though the decision-making sectors have attached great importance to the development of agricultural insurance,it hardly made any progress from 2004 to 2006 as a result of inadequate fiscal support.Consequently,national government finance increased financial support in 2007,arranging 1 billion yuan to promote the trial of subsidizing agricultural insurance premium in six provinces and municipalities.Agricultural insurance expanded rapidly that year with a total sum of premium reaching 5.18 billion yuan,504%higher than that in 2006.It is reported that in 2008 premium subsidy of policy-oriented agricultural insurance offered by national government finance will be more than 1 billion yuan covering the whole agricultural production process.
Based on existing research and first-hand data from surveys and interviews,this dissertation focuses on exploring the demand for agricultural insurance and theories and practices of subsidization of policy-oriented agricultural insurance in China by making good use of theories and methods of microeconomics,mathematical economics and econometrics.
The main content and conclusion of the research is as follows.
Firstly,the dissertation analyzes factors affecting farmers' demand for agricultural insurance from the microeconomic perspective.With data obtained from surveys on 376 farm households in Hubei Province,first of all it makes a descriptive positive analysis on farmers' risk attitude and their means of spreading risks and ranking of agricultural insurance among all the varieties of rural insurance.It is found that factors like farmers' risk attitude,the traditional means of spreading risks and the minor ranking of agricultural insurance among varieties of rural insurance have negative impact on farmers' demand for agricultural insurance.
Secondly,the dissertation figures out the amount of fiscal subsidization for agricultural insurance premium and farmers' corresponding payment in different schemes, together with the feasibility analysis of premium subsidization policy.According to the practice and developing trend of agricultural insurance,the mode of guaranteeing production cost selected,the author estimates the amount of fiscal subsidy and farmers' payment for insurance premium of eleven main crops that include rice,wheat,corn, soybean,cotton,peanuts,rapeseeds,jute and ambary hemp,sugar-cane,beet-roots and flue-cured tobacco,and three kinds of livestock and poultry including milk cow,pigs and poulards in different simulation scenarios.And the author makes analysis of fiscal capability to offer premium subsidy and farmers' ability to pay for premium.
Among all the schemes,there are two typical ones.One is that the coverage level of the production cost of crops and livestock and poultry is 70%,fiscal subsidy is 60%and farmers' payment is 40%;the other is that the coverage level of the production cost of crops and livestock and poultry is 60%,fiscal subsidy is 40%and farmers' payment is 60%.If participating rate is 30%or 50%,then the total amount of fiscal premium subsidy is 6.286 billion yuan and 10.476 billion yuan respectively and correspondingly farmers' payment for premium is 7.573 billion yuan and4.544 billion yuan.On the above conditions and with a participating rate of agricultural insurance below 50%,the policy of subsidizing insurance premium is feasible if the subsidizing expenditure shared between central and local governments.When premium per farm household paid is about 50 yuan, more than 70%of the farmers are able to pay with a view to the average income gap and the different structure of income source.
Thirdly,the dissertation establishes the subsidization system of agricultural insurance from multiple perspectives.Multiple peril crop insurance of main grain and economic crops,including rice,wheat,corn,soybean,cotton,peanuts,rapeseeds,jute and ambary hemp,sugar-cane,beet-roots and flue-cured tobacco,and death insurance of livestock and poultry,including milk cow,pigs and poulards,should be recognized as the subsidized varieties of agricultural insurance.The subsidy should be mainly offered for premium and partly for operation and management expenditures,tax preference and reinsurance. Attention should be attached to policy goals and efficiency need as subsidy for operation and management expenditures offered,the responsibility system should be established and relevant information of insurable interest should also be collected by insurance agencies and fiscal institutions at grass-roots level,in order to avoid a waste of subsidy fund.When subsidization standards determined,regional premium rates and farmers' ability to pay and the condition of local government finance of different regions should be taken into consideration,so as to figure out a reasonable planning of subsidization standards for each insurance variety and increase fiscal subsidy for agricultural insurance step by step. Subsidy fund can be raised by adjusting the structure of budgetary expenditure and that of budgetary expenditure for agriculture and cutting down expenditures of policy-oriented subsidy.In addition,it is necessary to complete supporting measures for agricultural insurance subsidization,enact relevant laws and regulations and set up national institutions supervising agricultural insurance,so that fiscal subsidizing policy will be fully implemented.
Lastly,the dissertation establishes the management mode of China agricultural insurance which accords with its national basic conditions.On the basis of referring to foreign successful management experience of agricultural insurance and evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of current management modes of agricultural insurance trialed in China,the author proposes that at present the agricultural insurance mode should be the one predominated by the government with the participation of multiple main bodies. In such mode,the govemment,insurance companies and farmers can realize the goals they pursue,that is,the govemment achieves the maximization of social benefit,insurance companies realize the maximization of profit and farmers get the maximization of their income.
In view of the fact that quantitative research on demand for agricultural insurance and systematic estimation of fiscal subsidy and research on the establishment of subsidization system are scarce in domestic research,this dissertation enriches the research on demand and subsidy of agricultural insurance to a certain extent,especially it is of great reference significance for establishing the subsidization policy of agricultural insurance.
我国农业保险自1934年开始试办至今已有70多年的历史,但一直步履蹒跚。在经历了20世纪80年代末至90年代初的试点高潮之后,农业保险逐步萎缩,直至2004年,新一轮农业保险试点重新在全国各地展开,才止住颓势。尽管受到决策部门的高度重视,但是由于财政支持不力,2004～2006年间农业保险仍然发展缓慢。鉴于此,2007年中央财政加大支持力度,安排10亿元资金,在全国6个省区推行政策性农业保险保费补贴试点,当年农业保险得到迅猛发展,保费收入达51.8亿元,比2006年增长504%。据悉,2008年中央财政给予政策性农业保险的保费补贴将达数十亿元,其范围将涵盖农业生产的全过程。
正是在这种现实背景下,本研究综合运用微观经济学、数理经济学、计量经济学等相关理论和方法,在已有研究的基础上将定性和定量研究相结合,根据问卷调查、实地访谈获得的一手资料,以及其它翔实的数据资料,重点对我国农业保险需求及政策性农业保险补贴的理论与实践进行了深入分析与探讨。
本文的主要内容及结论如下:
第一,探究影响我国农户农业保险需求的微观因素。作者根据湖北376户农户调查资料,对农户的风险态度、风险分散方式及农业保险在各种农村保险中的排序等进行描述性实证分析。研究表明,农户的风险态度、其传统的风险分散方式及农业保险在各种农村保险中排序靠后等因素对农户农业保险需求有消极影响。同时,通过建立Logit二元选择模型,对农户农业保险购买决策的影响因素进行实证分析。研究结果表明,农户家庭总收入、种植业收入占总收入的比例、耕地面积及受访者的风险认知程度对其农业保险购买决策有明显影响。
第二,分析不同补贴方案下我国农业保险保费的财政补贴额与农户支付额及可行性。根据目前我国农业保险实践及近期发展趋势,本文选择保成本的保障方式,在多种不同的模拟方案下,分别测算稻谷、小麦、玉米、大豆、棉花、花生、油菜籽、黄红麻、甘蔗、甜菜、烤烟等11种主要农作物和奶牛、生猪、肉鸡等3种畜禽的财政补贴额度和农户支付额,并对我国财政和各地区农户的支付能力进行分析。
在两种典型方案下,即当上述农作物与畜禽成本保障水平分别为70%与60%、财政补贴比例分别为60%与40%、农户支付比例分别为40%与60%时,若农作物保险和畜禽保险参与率均为30%或均为50%,则财政补贴总额分别为62.86亿元与104.76亿元,农户支付总额分别为75.73亿元与45.44亿元。同时,对政府与农户各自支付能力的分析表明,在上述保障水平和财政保费补贴率下,当农作物与畜禽保险的参与率均不超过50%时,如果保费补贴由中央和地方两级财政支付,补贴政策是可行的;此时农村居民人均保费约为50元,考虑到目前我国农民人均收入及收入来源结构差别较大,约有70%以上的农户具有支付能力。
第三,构建我国农业保险补贴体系。本研究从多维的角度构建了我国农业保险补贴体系,其中,补贴项目可考虑主要农作物多风险保险和主要家禽家畜死亡保险,如稻谷、小麦、玉米、大豆、棉花、花生和油菜籽,以及黄红麻、甘蔗、甜菜、烤烟等农作物多风险保险与能繁母猪、生猪、奶牛、肉鸡等畜禽死亡保险;补贴方式以保费补贴为主,并适当给予经营管理费补贴、税收优惠和再保险补贴;经营管理费补贴要兼顾政策需要和效率需要,建立责任制约机制,并依托基层保险和财政机构,收集保险对象的相关资料,减少补贴资金的浪费;补贴标准制定则应综合考虑农业保险区域保险费率和不同地区农户的支付能力及地方财政情况,合理规划各险种的补贴标准,循序渐进,逐步加大补贴资金的投入力度;补贴资金可以通过调整财政支出结构和财政支农支出结构及缩减政策性补贴支出等多渠道筹集。同时,还应完善农业保险补贴的配套措施,制定相关法律法规,健全国家的农业保险监管机构,保证财政补贴政策能够真正贯彻落实。
第四,选择适合我国国情的农业保险模式。本研究通过总结国外农业保险经营模式的经验教训,并对我国现有的6种试点经营模式进行分析,提出现阶段适合我国国情的农业保险经营模式应当是政府主导下的农业保险政策性定位、多元化经营主体共存的农业保险模式。在这种模式下,政府、保险公司和农民三方都能够实现自身的目标,即政府实现社会收益最大化,保险公司实现企业利润最大化,农民实现收入最大化。
鉴于国内针对农业保险需求的定量研究比较缺乏,针对补贴测算和补贴体系构建的系统研究较为少见,本研究在一定程度上丰富了农业保险需求和补贴的研究成果,尤其是对于我国农业保险补贴政策的制定有较为重要的参考价值。
China is one of the countries in the world suffering the severest agricultural natural disasters and it is very difficult for its farmers to cope with them.It is imperative that agricultural insurance which is the effective means of transferring risks should be made use of to cope with agricultural risks,stabilize agricultural production and guarantee farmers' income.Besides,agricultural insurance is one of the most important non-price policies supporting agriculture in WTO rules.Therefore,it has drawn more and more attention from academe and decision-making sectors.Four pieces of No.1 central document released consecutively from the year of 2004 to 2007,the "tenth-five year" planning and the document "State Council Guidance on Insurance Reform and Development" issued in June 2006 have all put forward requirement on the development of policy-oriented agricultural insurance.
Since the first trial in 1934,China agricultural insurance has gone through a history of more than 70 years;however,its development is rather difficult all the time.Between the late 1980s and the early 1990s,agricultural insurance made great progress and reached its climax.But since then,it stagnated and began to shrink.Not until 2004 has a new round trial of agricultural insurance been carried out all through the country.However, though the decision-making sectors have attached great importance to the development of agricultural insurance,it hardly made any progress from 2004 to 2006 as a result of inadequate fiscal support.Consequently,national government finance increased financial support in 2007,arranging 1 billion yuan to promote the trial of subsidizing agricultural insurance premium in six provinces and municipalities.Agricultural insurance expanded rapidly that year with a total sum of premium reaching 5.18 billion yuan,504%higher than that in 2006.It is reported that in 2008 premium subsidy of policy-oriented agricultural insurance offered by national government finance will be more than 1 billion yuan covering the whole agricultural production process.
Based on existing research and first-hand data from surveys and interviews,this dissertation focuses on exploring the demand for agricultural insurance and theories and practices of subsidization of policy-oriented agricultural insurance in China by making good use of theories and methods of microeconomics,mathematical economics and econometrics.
The main content and conclusion of the research is as follows.
Firstly,the dissertation analyzes factors affecting farmers' demand for agricultural insurance from the microeconomic perspective.With data obtained from surveys on 376 farm households in Hubei Province,first of all it makes a descriptive positive analysis on farmers' risk attitude and their means of spreading risks and ranking of agricultural insurance among all the varieties of rural insurance.It is found that factors like farmers' risk attitude,the traditional means of spreading risks and the minor ranking of agricultural insurance among varieties of rural insurance have negative impact on farmers' demand for agricultural insurance.
Secondly,the dissertation figures out the amount of fiscal subsidization for agricultural insurance premium and farmers' corresponding payment in different schemes, together with the feasibility analysis of premium subsidization policy.According to the practice and developing trend of agricultural insurance,the mode of guaranteeing production cost selected,the author estimates the amount of fiscal subsidy and farmers' payment for insurance premium of eleven main crops that include rice,wheat,corn, soybean,cotton,peanuts,rapeseeds,jute and ambary hemp,sugar-cane,beet-roots and flue-cured tobacco,and three kinds of livestock and poultry including milk cow,pigs and poulards in different simulation scenarios.And the author makes analysis of fiscal capability to offer premium subsidy and farmers' ability to pay for premium.
Among all the schemes,there are two typical ones.One is that the coverage level of the production cost of crops and livestock and poultry is 70%,fiscal subsidy is 60%and farmers' payment is 40%;the other is that the coverage level of the production cost of crops and livestock and poultry is 60%,fiscal subsidy is 40%and farmers' payment is 60%.If participating rate is 30%or 50%,then the total amount of fiscal premium subsidy is 6.286 billion yuan and 10.476 billion yuan respectively and correspondingly farmers' payment for premium is 7.573 billion yuan and4.544 billion yuan.On the above conditions and with a participating rate of agricultural insurance below 50%,the policy of subsidizing insurance premium is feasible if the subsidizing expenditure shared between central and local governments.When premium per farm household paid is about 50 yuan, more than 70%of the farmers are able to pay with a view to the average income gap and the different structure of income source.
Thirdly,the dissertation establishes the subsidization system of agricultural insurance from multiple perspectives.Multiple peril crop insurance of main grain and economic crops,including rice,wheat,corn,soybean,cotton,peanuts,rapeseeds,jute and ambary hemp,sugar-cane,beet-roots and flue-cured tobacco,and death insurance of livestock and poultry,including milk cow,pigs and poulards,should be recognized as the subsidized varieties of agricultural insurance.The subsidy should be mainly offered for premium and partly for operation and management expenditures,tax preference and reinsurance. Attention should be attached to policy goals and efficiency need as subsidy for operation and management expenditures offered,the responsibility system should be established and relevant information of insurable interest should also be collected by insurance agencies and fiscal institutions at grass-roots level,in order to avoid a waste of subsidy fund.When subsidization standards determined,regional premium rates and farmers' ability to pay and the condition of local government finance of different regions should be taken into consideration,so as to figure out a reasonable planning of subsidization standards for each insurance variety and increase fiscal subsidy for agricultural insurance step by step. Subsidy fund can be raised by adjusting the structure of budgetary expenditure and that of budgetary expenditure for agriculture and cutting down expenditures of policy-oriented subsidy.In addition,it is necessary to complete supporting measures for agricultural insurance subsidization,enact relevant laws and regulations and set up national institutions supervising agricultural insurance,so that fiscal subsidizing policy will be fully implemented.
Lastly,the dissertation establishes the management mode of China agricultural insurance which accords with its national basic conditions.On the basis of referring to foreign successful management experience of agricultural insurance and evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of current management modes of agricultural insurance trialed in China,the author proposes that at present the agricultural insurance mode should be the one predominated by the government with the participation of multiple main bodies. In such mode,the govemment,insurance companies and farmers can realize the goals they pursue,that is,the govemment achieves the maximization of social benefit,insurance companies realize the maximization of profit and farmers get the maximization of their income.
In view of the fact that quantitative research on demand for agricultural insurance and systematic estimation of fiscal subsidy and research on the establishment of subsidization system are scarce in domestic research,this dissertation enriches the research on demand and subsidy of agricultural insurance to a certain extent,especially it is of great reference significance for establishing the subsidization policy of agricultural insurance.
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