农户贷款行为研究
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摘要
自2004年以来,连续11年中央一号文件把焦点放在“三农”问题上,“三农”问题的核心之一便是农村金融的发展,而农村金融发展中迫切需要解决的是农户贷款问题,从而规范农户贷款行为,提高农户贷款可得性,进而全面盘活农村经济,提高农民收入。为此,政府不断出台各种政策,其中最具影响力的举措是竞争机制的引入,除农村信用社以外,中国邮政储蓄银行、中国农业银行、村镇银行和小额贷款公司近年来均可为农户提供贷款,至此农村金融市场的竞争格局已初步形成,并有日趋激烈之势。因此,谁能准确把握农户贷款行为特征及规律,谁就能赢得农村金融市场。但目前有关农户贷款行为的系统研究严重缺失。本研究在总结、借鉴已有相关研究成果的基础上,以山东省农户6年的追踪调研数据为依据,研究农户贷款行为特征及规律,为全面提升金融服务水平提供实证依据和科学参考,从而促进农户贷款可持续健康发展,使农村金融真正成为解决“三农”问题的核心动力,有效促进城镇化和农业现代化的发展。
本研究在农村金融市场“二元”结构理论、农村金融理论、行为金融学理论和信息不对称理论的基础上,综合运用实证与规范分析、数理和计量分析、实地调查等研究方法,从供需结合的视角,对农户的贷款需求、贷款行为和贷款可得性进行深入分析。首先,引入有效贷款需求概念,把农户贷款需求分为生产经营性贷款需求、生活消费性贷款需求和混合性贷款需求并对其影响因素进行深入分析；其次,以山东省东、中、西部573户连续6年的追踪调研数据为基础,对农户贷款行为按区域、富裕程度和农户种类的不同进行分别探讨,运用面板数据和多层线性模型(HLM模型)揭示出农户贷款行为的特征及发展规律；再次,运用逻辑回归,F检验和T检验等方法对农户贷款可得性中存在的信贷约束现象及其影响因素进行深入分析,运用多元层级回归模型对农信社嫌贫爱富现象进行理论解释；最后,得出本研究的结论并提出相应政策建议。
本研究的主要结论及建议：
1.从理论上来讲,我国农村金融市场是典型的二元经济结构市场,农村信用社对农户贷款的垄断现象严重,农户贷款所遇到的问题较多,其贷款行为表现出的“羊群现象”较为明显,由于存在严重的信息不对称现象,农户贷款成本较高。
2.从农户贷款需求的角度来看,农户贷款需求较为旺盛,需求数量和金额逐年增加,但生产经营性贷款需求、生活消费性贷款需求和混合性贷款需求差别较为明显；农户贷款需求影响因素较多,农户家庭纯收入、农户家庭资产、户主年龄等是影响农户贷款的重要因素；与以往学者研究的结论不同,农户贷款需求满足度较高。
3.从农户贷款行为的角度来看,不同区域、不同资产和不同类型的农户贷款存在较大差异,其影响因素较多；6年来农户贷款的四个核心要素(授信金额、贷款金额、贷款次数、平均贷款金额)变化明显,表现出按一定速率逐年上升的趋势,但初始值和发展速率的影响因素因不同区域、不同富裕程度和不同类型农户而不同。
4.从农户贷款可得性的角度来看,农户贷款可得性较高,受到的信贷约束程度较低,完全信贷约束主要约束的是相对贫穷农户,部分信贷约束主要约束的是相对富裕农户。农户贷款可得性具有“极化”现象,有明显的“嫌贫爱富”效应,富裕农户与贫穷农户在获得贷款金额上呈现出典型的“马太效应”。为提高农户贷款可得性,本文提出,是从政策方面向贫穷农户倾斜,二是消除农村信用社的信贷垄断,三是增加农户的投资机会,四是区别对待贫困和富裕农户贷款。
Central first document focused on "three rural problems" for11years from2004, one of the core of "three rural problems" is the development of rural finance, and the urgent need to solve in the development of rural finance is farmer loan problems, so we can regulate credit behavior, improve farmers'loans, and then fully invigorated the rural economy and increase farmers'income. In order to achieve this goal, the government has introduced a variety of policy, one of the most influential action is to introduce competition mechanism, in addition to the Rural Credit Cooperatives, Postal Savings Bank, Chinese Agricultural Bank, China village banks and small loan companies can provide farmers with loans in recent years, so far, the rural financial market competition pattern has been formed, and become more and more competitive. Therefore, who can accurately grasp the characteristics of farmer loan behavior and law, who can win the rural financial market. But system research of the farmers loan behavior is serious lack. This study based on summarizing and borrowing of existing research achievements, according to the farmers tracking survey data in Shandong province for6years, study the farmers loan behavior characteristics and laws for enhance the level of financial services and provide an empirical basis and scientific reference, so as to promote the sustainable and healthy development of rural credit, let the rural finance become the core power of solving the "three rural" problems, and effectively promote the development of urbanization and agricultural modernization.
This study based on rural financial market "two yuan" structure theory, rural financial theory, behavioral finance theory and information asymmetry theory, comprehensive use of empirical and normative analysis, mathematical and econometric analysis, field surveys and other research methods, from combination of supply and demand perspective, depth analyse farmers loans demand, farmers loans behavior and availability of loans. First, we introduct effective loan demand, put the farmers loan demand into production business loan demand, consumer loan demand and mixed loan demand, then depth analyse the influence factors of farmers loan demand; second, according to573the farmers tracking survey data in East,West and Middle part of Shandong province for6years, depth analyse the farmers behavior with different regional, different prosperity and different types, then we using panel data and hierarchical linear model (HLM model) to reveal the characteristics and rules of farmers loan behavior; third, we depth analyse the credit constraints of availability of farmers loan and its influence factors using logistic regression, F test and T test method, we explain the phenomenon of "xian pin ai fu" from theoretical using multiple hierarchical regression model; at last, we propose the conclusions of this study and put forward the corresponding policy recommendations.
The main conclusion and suggestion:
1. From perspective of theory, China's rural financial market is a typical dual economic structure phenomenon of market. Rural credit cooperatives monopolize the farmers loan seriously, farmers loans encountered many problems, its loan behavior exhibit "herding phenomenon" obviously. Due to the existence of serious information asymmetry, the cost of farmer loan is high.
2. From perspective of farmers'loan demand, the farmers loan demand is exuberant, the number and amount of demand has increased year by year. But the difference of production business loan demand, consumer loan demand and mixed loan demand is obvious. There are many factors affecting farmer demand, farmer household net income, household assets, householder age influence the farmers loan. Unlike previous study conclusions, satisfaction of farmers loans demand is higher in this study.
3. From perspective of farmers loan behavior, there is a big difference between different regions, different property and different types of farmers, and it is affected by many factors.The four core elements of farmers loans (credit amount, loan amount, number of loans, the average loan amount) changed obviously for6years, and expressed a rising trend year by year with a certain rate, but the initial value factors and development rate are different between different regions, different wealth and different types of farmers.
4. From perspective of farmers loan availability, farmers loan availability is high, credit constraints is low, complete credit constraint main constraint the relatively poor farmers, part credit constraint main constraint the relatively rich farmers. Farmers loan availability has a "polarization" phenomenon, express the obvious " despise the poor and curry favour with the rich" effect, rich farmers and poor farmers showed a typical "Matthew effect" in amount of obtaining the loan. In order to improve the farmers loan availability, fist, we suggest the policy of credit slope to the poor farmers; second, we should eliminate the rural credit cooperatives credit monopoly to farmer loan; third, we should increase the peasants' investment opportunities; last, we should adopt different loan policy to rich and poor farmers.
本研究在农村金融市场“二元”结构理论、农村金融理论、行为金融学理论和信息不对称理论的基础上,综合运用实证与规范分析、数理和计量分析、实地调查等研究方法,从供需结合的视角,对农户的贷款需求、贷款行为和贷款可得性进行深入分析。首先,引入有效贷款需求概念,把农户贷款需求分为生产经营性贷款需求、生活消费性贷款需求和混合性贷款需求并对其影响因素进行深入分析；其次,以山东省东、中、西部573户连续6年的追踪调研数据为基础,对农户贷款行为按区域、富裕程度和农户种类的不同进行分别探讨,运用面板数据和多层线性模型(HLM模型)揭示出农户贷款行为的特征及发展规律；再次,运用逻辑回归,F检验和T检验等方法对农户贷款可得性中存在的信贷约束现象及其影响因素进行深入分析,运用多元层级回归模型对农信社嫌贫爱富现象进行理论解释；最后,得出本研究的结论并提出相应政策建议。
本研究的主要结论及建议：
1.从理论上来讲,我国农村金融市场是典型的二元经济结构市场,农村信用社对农户贷款的垄断现象严重,农户贷款所遇到的问题较多,其贷款行为表现出的“羊群现象”较为明显,由于存在严重的信息不对称现象,农户贷款成本较高。
2.从农户贷款需求的角度来看,农户贷款需求较为旺盛,需求数量和金额逐年增加,但生产经营性贷款需求、生活消费性贷款需求和混合性贷款需求差别较为明显；农户贷款需求影响因素较多,农户家庭纯收入、农户家庭资产、户主年龄等是影响农户贷款的重要因素；与以往学者研究的结论不同,农户贷款需求满足度较高。
3.从农户贷款行为的角度来看,不同区域、不同资产和不同类型的农户贷款存在较大差异,其影响因素较多；6年来农户贷款的四个核心要素(授信金额、贷款金额、贷款次数、平均贷款金额)变化明显,表现出按一定速率逐年上升的趋势,但初始值和发展速率的影响因素因不同区域、不同富裕程度和不同类型农户而不同。
4.从农户贷款可得性的角度来看,农户贷款可得性较高,受到的信贷约束程度较低,完全信贷约束主要约束的是相对贫穷农户,部分信贷约束主要约束的是相对富裕农户。农户贷款可得性具有“极化”现象,有明显的“嫌贫爱富”效应,富裕农户与贫穷农户在获得贷款金额上呈现出典型的“马太效应”。为提高农户贷款可得性,本文提出,是从政策方面向贫穷农户倾斜,二是消除农村信用社的信贷垄断,三是增加农户的投资机会,四是区别对待贫困和富裕农户贷款。
Central first document focused on "three rural problems" for11years from2004, one of the core of "three rural problems" is the development of rural finance, and the urgent need to solve in the development of rural finance is farmer loan problems, so we can regulate credit behavior, improve farmers'loans, and then fully invigorated the rural economy and increase farmers'income. In order to achieve this goal, the government has introduced a variety of policy, one of the most influential action is to introduce competition mechanism, in addition to the Rural Credit Cooperatives, Postal Savings Bank, Chinese Agricultural Bank, China village banks and small loan companies can provide farmers with loans in recent years, so far, the rural financial market competition pattern has been formed, and become more and more competitive. Therefore, who can accurately grasp the characteristics of farmer loan behavior and law, who can win the rural financial market. But system research of the farmers loan behavior is serious lack. This study based on summarizing and borrowing of existing research achievements, according to the farmers tracking survey data in Shandong province for6years, study the farmers loan behavior characteristics and laws for enhance the level of financial services and provide an empirical basis and scientific reference, so as to promote the sustainable and healthy development of rural credit, let the rural finance become the core power of solving the "three rural" problems, and effectively promote the development of urbanization and agricultural modernization.
This study based on rural financial market "two yuan" structure theory, rural financial theory, behavioral finance theory and information asymmetry theory, comprehensive use of empirical and normative analysis, mathematical and econometric analysis, field surveys and other research methods, from combination of supply and demand perspective, depth analyse farmers loans demand, farmers loans behavior and availability of loans. First, we introduct effective loan demand, put the farmers loan demand into production business loan demand, consumer loan demand and mixed loan demand, then depth analyse the influence factors of farmers loan demand; second, according to573the farmers tracking survey data in East,West and Middle part of Shandong province for6years, depth analyse the farmers behavior with different regional, different prosperity and different types, then we using panel data and hierarchical linear model (HLM model) to reveal the characteristics and rules of farmers loan behavior; third, we depth analyse the credit constraints of availability of farmers loan and its influence factors using logistic regression, F test and T test method, we explain the phenomenon of "xian pin ai fu" from theoretical using multiple hierarchical regression model; at last, we propose the conclusions of this study and put forward the corresponding policy recommendations.
The main conclusion and suggestion:
1. From perspective of theory, China's rural financial market is a typical dual economic structure phenomenon of market. Rural credit cooperatives monopolize the farmers loan seriously, farmers loans encountered many problems, its loan behavior exhibit "herding phenomenon" obviously. Due to the existence of serious information asymmetry, the cost of farmer loan is high.
2. From perspective of farmers'loan demand, the farmers loan demand is exuberant, the number and amount of demand has increased year by year. But the difference of production business loan demand, consumer loan demand and mixed loan demand is obvious. There are many factors affecting farmer demand, farmer household net income, household assets, householder age influence the farmers loan. Unlike previous study conclusions, satisfaction of farmers loans demand is higher in this study.
3. From perspective of farmers loan behavior, there is a big difference between different regions, different property and different types of farmers, and it is affected by many factors.The four core elements of farmers loans (credit amount, loan amount, number of loans, the average loan amount) changed obviously for6years, and expressed a rising trend year by year with a certain rate, but the initial value factors and development rate are different between different regions, different wealth and different types of farmers.
4. From perspective of farmers loan availability, farmers loan availability is high, credit constraints is low, complete credit constraint main constraint the relatively poor farmers, part credit constraint main constraint the relatively rich farmers. Farmers loan availability has a "polarization" phenomenon, express the obvious " despise the poor and curry favour with the rich" effect, rich farmers and poor farmers showed a typical "Matthew effect" in amount of obtaining the loan. In order to improve the farmers loan availability, fist, we suggest the policy of credit slope to the poor farmers; second, we should eliminate the rural credit cooperatives credit monopoly to farmer loan; third, we should increase the peasants' investment opportunities; last, we should adopt different loan policy to rich and poor farmers.
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