我国食品安全规制效果评价及规制体制重构研究
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摘要
食品安全关乎民生,是保证人类生命健康和生活质量的基础。通过食品安全规制保证食品的质量安全不仅是一个技术问题,同时更是重要的经济、社会课题。随着农业生产能力、经济水平的不断提高,粮食安全以不再是大多数国家有关食品所关心的唯一问题,以食品质量安全程度为内涵的食品安全问题越来越得到政府决策者和社会公众的重视。近年来,我国食品安全事故频繁发生,食品安全问题甚至带来了严重的经济和社会后果,制约经济社会的可持续发展。加强食品安全规制,改善食品安全现状、控制食品安全事故发生成为消费者的迫切需求和政府关注的工作重点。十八届三中全会《决定》更明确指出,“完善统一权威的食品药品安全监管机构,建立最严格的覆盖全过程的监管制度,建立食品原产地可追溯制度和质量标识制度,保障食品药品安全。’
食品安全问题主要来自于信息不对称的市场失灵。食品本身的经验品和信任品属性导致消费者在购买前无法获知其质量属性,甚至在购买后仍对食品的营养成分和安全程度等信息难以确定,而且几乎很多的食源性疾病为慢性疾病,即使食用后对健康产生负面影响,也无法将影响完全归因于消费了该食品。食品的信任品属性是食品买卖中存在信息不对称的根源。由于生产加工企业和销售者相对于消费者而言对于食品安全属性拥有绝对的信息优势,因而能够以次充好,通过销售假冒伪劣和不安全食品降低成本,同时威胁消费者的健康和生命安全。由此也说明了政府对食品安全问题进行干预,对企业行为进行监督规范,强制其揭示食品相关信息、通过质量安全认证体系,并对企业违法行为予以惩处的必要性。
然而食品安全规制本身也存在各种问题,表现为政府失灵。学界的一个共识是,我国一直以来所形成的食品安全规制体制存在多部门共同规制、权责交叉重叠的“多头管理”问题。事实上,我国的食品安全规制体制一直处于不断发展和完善的过程当中,我国食品安全规制改革经历了以国家卫生部门为主导的食品安全规制体制向多部门分环节规制体制过渡,并在“大部制”改革的背景下逐渐形成卫生部门综合统筹的新规制体制的一系列过程,政府及相关部门对食品安全规制进行了多次重要、有益的改革。2013年3月份开始,在政府机构大部制改革的背景下,新组建食品药品监督管理总局整合了以往分散于卫生、农业、质检、工商、商务等各部门的食品安全规制职能和机构,使规制主体进一步集中,资源进一步整合。
大部制改革伊始,改革成效将在未来较长的一段时间内逐步显现。由于食品市场存在的严重信息不对称问题未能得到有效解决,故而尽管政府不断加强食品安全规制力度,食品安全事故仍层出不穷。就目前而言,通过对我国食品安全规制效果评价发现规制中存在的不足和问题,从规制体制角度提出改善规制效果的路径,并论证食品安全规制领域大部制改革的正确性和进一步改革的方向,进而提出包括企业、消费者、社会组织在内的多元主体共同参与食品安全治理,以此作为一种制度补充和保障,仍具有重要的现实意义。
因此本论文首先从我国食品安全规制体制改革过程入手,探究食品安全规制体制存在的问题,并对我国食品安全现状进行分析和评价。通过描述统计以及构建总体指标指出我国食品安全规制近年来呈现整体加强的趋势。
在此之后,分别从企业和消费者角度对我国食品安全规制的效果进行评价。基于DEA(数据包络分析)的方法,从企业角度评价我国食品安全规制投入产出效率,发现以投入产出效率衡量的我国食品安全规制效果并不理想。进而以山东省为例,考察接受食品安全规制(HACCP)企业的经营情况、产品质量安全程度以及消费者满意度等规制效果指标。同样得出食品安全规制效果有待提升的结论。消费者角度的规制效果评价方面,以消费者营养健康状况受食品安全规制的影响作为食品安全规制的间接效果,运用中国营养健康调查数据(CHNS),运用倍差法(DID)结合倾向得分匹配法(PSM)分析食品安全规制对于消费者食品消费量、营养健康水平的影响。研究结果显示,尽管食品安全规制有助于恢复食品安全事故后消费者的信心,改善消费者营养和健康状况,但这种促进作用并不显著。
实证分析的结果表明,我国目前的食品安全规制虽然在不断增强,但其效果并不明显。本文认为,导致这一现象的一个内在原因是,食品安全规制体制本身的复杂性,尤其是食品安全规制主体的权力配置问题。由于食品行业的规制本身面临多重委托—代理问题,存在着包括政府(规制机构)、企业、立法机构(代表消费者利益和社会福利)在内的多重委托代理关系,规制的环节中存在着道德风险,委托—代理链条冗长影响规制效率,同时作为这一委托—代理链条的中间环节的规制机构,是整个食品安全规制当中的关键,其权力配置的方式也直接影响着最终的规制效果。基于我国食品安全规制的体制特征,本文分别讨论了规制机构作为委托人和代理人的情况。规制机构作为代理人的情况下,通过构建多任务委托—代理模型,讨论食品安全规制体制进行大部制改革的必要性,发现走机构整合的“大部制”改革路线是我国食品安全规制体制改革的更优选择。而规制机构作为委托人的模型中,笔者则通过构建一个多委托人代理模型就可能存在规制俘获问题展开分析,提出进一步改革的方向。
食品安全规制同时涉及政府规制机构、企业以及消费者在内的多方利益相关者,规制者行为并非决定规制效果的唯一因素。本文通过构建食品生产加工企业之间、企业与消费者之间、政府规制机构与企业之间的多个博弈模型,分析各利益相关主体的行为、最优策略选择以及其影响因素,发现加强政府监督控制力度、强化企业社会责任、充分发挥消费者和社会组织的监督作用的重要性。
基于前文的分析,笔者提出将政府单一主体的食品安全规制扩展为多元主体共同主导的食品安全治理。指出在多元化的社会发展格局中,我国传统的以政府为单一治理主体的食品安全规制治理结构面临着诸多困境,已不能满足现代社会对食品安全治理的需求。最终提出通过构建规制者主导、企业自律、消费者参与、社会协同(包括行业协会、新闻媒体等)的食品安全合作治理框架,作为食品安全规制效果提升的最终制度保障。
Food safety which is related to people's livelihood is the foundation to guarantee the life, health and life quality of human being. It is not just a technical issue to ensure the quality and safety of food by food safety regulation, but even an important social and economic subject. With the improvement of agricultural production capacity and economic development level, food security is not the only concern of most countries any more, and the food safety problem which aims to elevate the level of food quality and safety is getting more attention from governmental decision makers and general public. In recent years, the food safety incidents have occurred frequently in China. The problem of food safety even causes severe economic and social consequence, and constraints the sustainable economic development. To strengthen the food safety regulation, change the current situation of food safety and control the accidents has been the urgent need of consumers and the key assignment of government. The Third Plenary Session of the eighteen cleared that "To improve food and drug safety regulatory agencies to be a unified authority, establishing the most stringent regulatory system to cover the whole process of food production and processing, establishing the traceability system of the origin food and quality labeling system to ensure food and drug safety.'
The food safety problems arise from information asymmetry. The consumers can not acquire all the qualities of food because of the experience qualities and credence qualities of food before purchase, and even can't make sure the nutritional ingredient and safety level of food after buying. Besides, considering most foodborne diseases are chronic, the incurrence of disease can not be attributed to taking that food certainly. Accordingly, the credence qualities of food are the origin of informational asymmetry in the food trading. The food production and processing enterprises can sell seconds at best quality prices and reduce the cost by selling fake and unsafe commodities, because they have information advantages over consumers. And that actually endangers the health and life safety of consumers. This explains the necessity of governmental intervation on food safety issues, supervision for corporate behaviors, forcing the film to reveal information about food and pass the quality and safety certification system, and punishing the act in violation of regulations.
However, there are also many defects even in food safety itself. We call that government failure. It has been an academic consensus that there are multi-sectional regulation and overlapping responsibilities problems so called "multiple management" in the food safety regulation system in our country. Actually, the food safety regulation system in China has been in continuous development and improvement process. The reform of food safety regulation system in China has been through the system led by state health department transitioned to multi-sectional regulation, and gradually formed the new system in the context of "large system" reform. The government and regulatory agencies has made a few important and beneficial reform of food safety regulation. From March2013, China Food and Drug Administration which is newly constructed integrated the functions and agencies that were decentralized among department of health, agriculture, quality supervision, industrial and commercial. That concentrates the regulation bodies, and integrates the resources.
The reform of large system is still in the beginning, so the effectiveness will appear gradually in a long period of time. Although government has been strengthening food safety regulation continuously, the food safety incidents still emerged in an endless stream because the serious information asymmetry problem can not be fixed efficiently in food market. As far as it goes, it still has a profound significance to find deficiencies and problems in food safety regulation by effect evaluation, propose the path of improving the effect of regulation and demonstrate the validity of large system reform, then put forward food safety governance involves enterprises, consumers and social associations as an institutional supplement and insurance.
Therefore, this thesis starts with the depiction and analysis of the course of food safety regulation reform in China to explore the problems existing in food safety regulation system, and then assesses the current situation of food safety in our country, shows the strengthening trend of food safety regulation during recent years by descriptive statistics and constructing an overall index.
After that, we evaluate the effect of food safety regulation in China from enterprise and consumer perspective separately. By DEA method, we assess the input-output efficiency of food safety regulation from enterprise perspective, and find out that the effect of food safety regulation is not idealistic. And then we take Shandong for an example to investigate some regulatory effect index of enterprises that adopt HACCP including the state of operation, the degree of product quality, and consumers'satisfaction. We also come to a conclusion that the effect of food safety regulation needs to be further improved.
From the consumers perspective, we empirically analyses the effect of food safety regulation on food consumption, the nutritional level and the health condition of consumers as the indirect effect of food safety regulation using difference in differences and propensity score matching method with CHNS database. The results show that:the consumer has restored the confidence on diary product. The food safety regulation has improved the growth of diary product consumption, and it also ameliorated the nutritional level and the health status of consumers. But in general, the promotion is not so significant and ideal.
The empirical analysis shows that the effect of food safety regulation is not significant. This thesis suggests that one of the internal causes of this phenomenon is the complexity of food safety system, especially the distribution of power. The food industry confronts with multiple principal-agent problems. There are multi-level principal-agent relationships among government (regulatory agencies), enterprises, legislature and moral risk in the sessions of regulation. The principal-agent chain is so long to reduce the efficiency of regulation. The regulatory agency as the intermediate links of this principal-agent chain is the key of the whole food safety regulation. The mode of power allocation affects the final effect of regulation.
Based on the characteristic of food safety regulation system in China, this paper analyses the situation of regulatory agencies as principal and agent respectively. When the regulatory agencies are considered as agent, this paper discusses the necessity of large system reform by constructing a multi-task principal-agent model, and points out that it it's a better choice to integrate the regulatory agencies. When the regulatory agencies are considered as principal, this paper analyses the probable regulatory capture, and proposes the direction of further reformation. Besides, we also consider the possibility of the cooperation of consumers and government.
Food safety regulation involves many stakeholder including the government, enterprise and consumers. So the behavior of regulator is not the only issue that decides the effect of regulation. This thesis analyses the behavior, optimal strategy choice and the influencing factors of every stakeholder by constructing several game models. So we find out the importance of strengthening government supervision and control and corporate social responsibility. The consumers and social associations can play a role in food safety governance too.
Based on the analysis above, this thesis recommends that it is a better choice to expand the conventional government-leading food safety regulation to food safety governance led by multiple subjects. In the pattern of pluralistic society, the conventional food safety governance structure is facing many difficulties, and can not meet the need of modern society. Eventually this paper makes a point to construct a food safety cooperative governance frame with regulator dominating, producer self-discipline, consumers involving and society cooperating, as the final institutional assurance to improve the effect of food safety regulation.
食品安全问题主要来自于信息不对称的市场失灵。食品本身的经验品和信任品属性导致消费者在购买前无法获知其质量属性,甚至在购买后仍对食品的营养成分和安全程度等信息难以确定,而且几乎很多的食源性疾病为慢性疾病,即使食用后对健康产生负面影响,也无法将影响完全归因于消费了该食品。食品的信任品属性是食品买卖中存在信息不对称的根源。由于生产加工企业和销售者相对于消费者而言对于食品安全属性拥有绝对的信息优势,因而能够以次充好,通过销售假冒伪劣和不安全食品降低成本,同时威胁消费者的健康和生命安全。由此也说明了政府对食品安全问题进行干预,对企业行为进行监督规范,强制其揭示食品相关信息、通过质量安全认证体系,并对企业违法行为予以惩处的必要性。
然而食品安全规制本身也存在各种问题,表现为政府失灵。学界的一个共识是,我国一直以来所形成的食品安全规制体制存在多部门共同规制、权责交叉重叠的“多头管理”问题。事实上,我国的食品安全规制体制一直处于不断发展和完善的过程当中,我国食品安全规制改革经历了以国家卫生部门为主导的食品安全规制体制向多部门分环节规制体制过渡,并在“大部制”改革的背景下逐渐形成卫生部门综合统筹的新规制体制的一系列过程,政府及相关部门对食品安全规制进行了多次重要、有益的改革。2013年3月份开始,在政府机构大部制改革的背景下,新组建食品药品监督管理总局整合了以往分散于卫生、农业、质检、工商、商务等各部门的食品安全规制职能和机构,使规制主体进一步集中,资源进一步整合。
大部制改革伊始,改革成效将在未来较长的一段时间内逐步显现。由于食品市场存在的严重信息不对称问题未能得到有效解决,故而尽管政府不断加强食品安全规制力度,食品安全事故仍层出不穷。就目前而言,通过对我国食品安全规制效果评价发现规制中存在的不足和问题,从规制体制角度提出改善规制效果的路径,并论证食品安全规制领域大部制改革的正确性和进一步改革的方向,进而提出包括企业、消费者、社会组织在内的多元主体共同参与食品安全治理,以此作为一种制度补充和保障,仍具有重要的现实意义。
因此本论文首先从我国食品安全规制体制改革过程入手,探究食品安全规制体制存在的问题,并对我国食品安全现状进行分析和评价。通过描述统计以及构建总体指标指出我国食品安全规制近年来呈现整体加强的趋势。
在此之后,分别从企业和消费者角度对我国食品安全规制的效果进行评价。基于DEA(数据包络分析)的方法,从企业角度评价我国食品安全规制投入产出效率,发现以投入产出效率衡量的我国食品安全规制效果并不理想。进而以山东省为例,考察接受食品安全规制(HACCP)企业的经营情况、产品质量安全程度以及消费者满意度等规制效果指标。同样得出食品安全规制效果有待提升的结论。消费者角度的规制效果评价方面,以消费者营养健康状况受食品安全规制的影响作为食品安全规制的间接效果,运用中国营养健康调查数据(CHNS),运用倍差法(DID)结合倾向得分匹配法(PSM)分析食品安全规制对于消费者食品消费量、营养健康水平的影响。研究结果显示,尽管食品安全规制有助于恢复食品安全事故后消费者的信心,改善消费者营养和健康状况,但这种促进作用并不显著。
实证分析的结果表明,我国目前的食品安全规制虽然在不断增强,但其效果并不明显。本文认为,导致这一现象的一个内在原因是,食品安全规制体制本身的复杂性,尤其是食品安全规制主体的权力配置问题。由于食品行业的规制本身面临多重委托—代理问题,存在着包括政府(规制机构)、企业、立法机构(代表消费者利益和社会福利)在内的多重委托代理关系,规制的环节中存在着道德风险,委托—代理链条冗长影响规制效率,同时作为这一委托—代理链条的中间环节的规制机构,是整个食品安全规制当中的关键,其权力配置的方式也直接影响着最终的规制效果。基于我国食品安全规制的体制特征,本文分别讨论了规制机构作为委托人和代理人的情况。规制机构作为代理人的情况下,通过构建多任务委托—代理模型,讨论食品安全规制体制进行大部制改革的必要性,发现走机构整合的“大部制”改革路线是我国食品安全规制体制改革的更优选择。而规制机构作为委托人的模型中,笔者则通过构建一个多委托人代理模型就可能存在规制俘获问题展开分析,提出进一步改革的方向。
食品安全规制同时涉及政府规制机构、企业以及消费者在内的多方利益相关者,规制者行为并非决定规制效果的唯一因素。本文通过构建食品生产加工企业之间、企业与消费者之间、政府规制机构与企业之间的多个博弈模型,分析各利益相关主体的行为、最优策略选择以及其影响因素,发现加强政府监督控制力度、强化企业社会责任、充分发挥消费者和社会组织的监督作用的重要性。
基于前文的分析,笔者提出将政府单一主体的食品安全规制扩展为多元主体共同主导的食品安全治理。指出在多元化的社会发展格局中,我国传统的以政府为单一治理主体的食品安全规制治理结构面临着诸多困境,已不能满足现代社会对食品安全治理的需求。最终提出通过构建规制者主导、企业自律、消费者参与、社会协同(包括行业协会、新闻媒体等)的食品安全合作治理框架,作为食品安全规制效果提升的最终制度保障。
Food safety which is related to people's livelihood is the foundation to guarantee the life, health and life quality of human being. It is not just a technical issue to ensure the quality and safety of food by food safety regulation, but even an important social and economic subject. With the improvement of agricultural production capacity and economic development level, food security is not the only concern of most countries any more, and the food safety problem which aims to elevate the level of food quality and safety is getting more attention from governmental decision makers and general public. In recent years, the food safety incidents have occurred frequently in China. The problem of food safety even causes severe economic and social consequence, and constraints the sustainable economic development. To strengthen the food safety regulation, change the current situation of food safety and control the accidents has been the urgent need of consumers and the key assignment of government. The Third Plenary Session of the eighteen cleared that "To improve food and drug safety regulatory agencies to be a unified authority, establishing the most stringent regulatory system to cover the whole process of food production and processing, establishing the traceability system of the origin food and quality labeling system to ensure food and drug safety.'
The food safety problems arise from information asymmetry. The consumers can not acquire all the qualities of food because of the experience qualities and credence qualities of food before purchase, and even can't make sure the nutritional ingredient and safety level of food after buying. Besides, considering most foodborne diseases are chronic, the incurrence of disease can not be attributed to taking that food certainly. Accordingly, the credence qualities of food are the origin of informational asymmetry in the food trading. The food production and processing enterprises can sell seconds at best quality prices and reduce the cost by selling fake and unsafe commodities, because they have information advantages over consumers. And that actually endangers the health and life safety of consumers. This explains the necessity of governmental intervation on food safety issues, supervision for corporate behaviors, forcing the film to reveal information about food and pass the quality and safety certification system, and punishing the act in violation of regulations.
However, there are also many defects even in food safety itself. We call that government failure. It has been an academic consensus that there are multi-sectional regulation and overlapping responsibilities problems so called "multiple management" in the food safety regulation system in our country. Actually, the food safety regulation system in China has been in continuous development and improvement process. The reform of food safety regulation system in China has been through the system led by state health department transitioned to multi-sectional regulation, and gradually formed the new system in the context of "large system" reform. The government and regulatory agencies has made a few important and beneficial reform of food safety regulation. From March2013, China Food and Drug Administration which is newly constructed integrated the functions and agencies that were decentralized among department of health, agriculture, quality supervision, industrial and commercial. That concentrates the regulation bodies, and integrates the resources.
The reform of large system is still in the beginning, so the effectiveness will appear gradually in a long period of time. Although government has been strengthening food safety regulation continuously, the food safety incidents still emerged in an endless stream because the serious information asymmetry problem can not be fixed efficiently in food market. As far as it goes, it still has a profound significance to find deficiencies and problems in food safety regulation by effect evaluation, propose the path of improving the effect of regulation and demonstrate the validity of large system reform, then put forward food safety governance involves enterprises, consumers and social associations as an institutional supplement and insurance.
Therefore, this thesis starts with the depiction and analysis of the course of food safety regulation reform in China to explore the problems existing in food safety regulation system, and then assesses the current situation of food safety in our country, shows the strengthening trend of food safety regulation during recent years by descriptive statistics and constructing an overall index.
After that, we evaluate the effect of food safety regulation in China from enterprise and consumer perspective separately. By DEA method, we assess the input-output efficiency of food safety regulation from enterprise perspective, and find out that the effect of food safety regulation is not idealistic. And then we take Shandong for an example to investigate some regulatory effect index of enterprises that adopt HACCP including the state of operation, the degree of product quality, and consumers'satisfaction. We also come to a conclusion that the effect of food safety regulation needs to be further improved.
From the consumers perspective, we empirically analyses the effect of food safety regulation on food consumption, the nutritional level and the health condition of consumers as the indirect effect of food safety regulation using difference in differences and propensity score matching method with CHNS database. The results show that:the consumer has restored the confidence on diary product. The food safety regulation has improved the growth of diary product consumption, and it also ameliorated the nutritional level and the health status of consumers. But in general, the promotion is not so significant and ideal.
The empirical analysis shows that the effect of food safety regulation is not significant. This thesis suggests that one of the internal causes of this phenomenon is the complexity of food safety system, especially the distribution of power. The food industry confronts with multiple principal-agent problems. There are multi-level principal-agent relationships among government (regulatory agencies), enterprises, legislature and moral risk in the sessions of regulation. The principal-agent chain is so long to reduce the efficiency of regulation. The regulatory agency as the intermediate links of this principal-agent chain is the key of the whole food safety regulation. The mode of power allocation affects the final effect of regulation.
Based on the characteristic of food safety regulation system in China, this paper analyses the situation of regulatory agencies as principal and agent respectively. When the regulatory agencies are considered as agent, this paper discusses the necessity of large system reform by constructing a multi-task principal-agent model, and points out that it it's a better choice to integrate the regulatory agencies. When the regulatory agencies are considered as principal, this paper analyses the probable regulatory capture, and proposes the direction of further reformation. Besides, we also consider the possibility of the cooperation of consumers and government.
Food safety regulation involves many stakeholder including the government, enterprise and consumers. So the behavior of regulator is not the only issue that decides the effect of regulation. This thesis analyses the behavior, optimal strategy choice and the influencing factors of every stakeholder by constructing several game models. So we find out the importance of strengthening government supervision and control and corporate social responsibility. The consumers and social associations can play a role in food safety governance too.
Based on the analysis above, this thesis recommends that it is a better choice to expand the conventional government-leading food safety regulation to food safety governance led by multiple subjects. In the pattern of pluralistic society, the conventional food safety governance structure is facing many difficulties, and can not meet the need of modern society. Eventually this paper makes a point to construct a food safety cooperative governance frame with regulator dominating, producer self-discipline, consumers involving and society cooperating, as the final institutional assurance to improve the effect of food safety regulation.
引文
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