高危系统组织安全行为主观博弈研究
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摘要
近年来,随着我国经济发展和社会进步,全国安全事故总数、较大事故数量和死亡人数虽呈稳步下降趋势,但数值仍然较大,且高危系统安全事故在其中占有很大比重。然而,高危系统多属于化工、能源、建筑、交通等国家支柱性行业,为维持国家经济的稳定运行和社会文化的持续发展起到了不可替代的作用。因此,研究高危系统安全风险的产生机制和影响因素,为降低其运行风险提供可操作的措施和建议,具有重要意义。
本研究将认知心理学理论引入演化博弈中,形成一类主观博弈方法,并用于分析三类高危系统组织安全行为产生机制及影响因素,主要内容如下：
首先,本研究基于理论与现实的矛盾提出了有意不安全行为产生和道路交通事故死亡人数占比过大这两个问题,并选择了主观博弈和分类对比两类针对性的方法。在分类方面,站在安全行为的直接执行者和安全风险的直接承担者的角度,将高危系统分成自组织、他组织和混合组织三类。
其次,运用主观博弈方法考察了具有典型自组织特征的道路交通系统、具有典型他组织特征的核电站系统和具有典型混合组织特征的工程施工系统三类系统,得到当个体(驾驶员、监管员、作业员、施工员)不重视安全所造成的损失(安全风险的增加、处罚风险等)不小于重视安全所需要耗费的成本时,所有个体均倾向于重视安全的结论。经过对比分析还得到了高危系统混合组织形式有利于施工员和监管员两类个体重视安全的结论。
第三,运用数值仿真实验考察了高危系统组织安全行为的影响因素,认为个体重视安全所需要耗费的成本的减少,基础安全风险、执行员(驾驶员、作业员和施工员的统称)的内部安全风险传导系数及来自于监管员的处罚风险的增加,有利于博弈双方重视安全；传导给监管员的安全风险系数的增加,仅有利于监管员重视安全；执行员内部的处罚风险的增加,仅有利于执行员重视安全；事故赔偿比例对演化结果不产生影响。同时,监管员和执行员重视安全的效果的提高,均有利于其自身重视安全,却不利于对方重视安全,意味着两类人员间存在“搭便车”的现象。
第四,运用数值仿真实验进一步考察了两类人员重视安全的比例之间的关系,发现在其他参数取特定初始值的情况下,执行员和监管员重视安全的比例在较大初始值范围内呈现反向变动关系,前者收敛于1而后者收敛于0。然而,当前者初始值较小且后者初始值较大时,在他组织高危系统中,二者交互轨迹收敛方向发生变化；在混合组织高危系统中,二者交互轨迹收敛过程受到干扰。可见,他组织高危系统中,两类人员重视安全的比例在阈值附近的变化会对系统最终演化方向产生重大影响,且此过程对随机干扰比较敏感,最终出现类似“蝴蝶效应”的现象；而混合组织高危系统中两类比例在阈值附近的变化会对系统演化过程产生干扰,却未见对结果产生影响。
此外,以JH高速铁路建设项目为例,详细阐述了在基于不安全行为矫正的工程安全方案双螺旋管理体系中,由模块化的方案编制、全程动态的宣传教育、自动可视的方案执行监控和立体化的评价改进四部分组成的组织行为链带动个体行为链螺旋上升、持续改进的过程和机理,为高危系统组织安全行为改进提供了可操作的措施和建议。
In recent years, with the economic development and the social progress in our country, the number of accidents, the number of major accidents and the deaths decreased while they were still huge, in which the accidents in High-Risk-System accounted for a large proportion. However, High-Risk-System belonged to the national pillar industry such as chemical industry, energy industry, building industry and transportation industry which played an irreplaceable role for the economic development and the social progress in our country. So, it was significant to study factors affecting High-Risk-System security for reducing the risk.
In the study, a kind of subjective game method was proposed by introducing psychology theory into evolutionary game theory. And the method was used to analysis the mechanism by which safety behavior occurred in three kinds of High-Risk-System. The main content was as follows:
Firstly, two problems, why intentional unsafe behavior occurred and why the deaths in road traffic accidents accounted for a large proportion in all accidents, were put forward, and two types of targeted methods, the subjective game and the classification and comparison were selected to solve them. Then the High-Risk-System was divided into self-organizing system, hetero-organizing system and hybrid organizing system.
Secondly, the subjective game was used to investigate the road traffic system, the nuclear power station system and the construction system, which in turn corresponded to self-organizing system, hetero-organizing system and hybrid organizing system. And the conclusion, all individuals tended to attach importance to safety while the losses of unsafe behavior were not less than the cost of safety behavior, was drawn. Then another conclusion, the individuals in the hybrid organizing system were most likely to emphasis on safety, was drawn.
Thirdly, a numerical simulation was used to investigate the factors and four conclusions were drawn. The first one was reducing the cost of safety behavior and increasing the losses such as the risk perception, the proportion of the risk spread to other workers and the punishment risk from supervisors were helpful. The second one was the proportion of the risk spread to supervisors only affected the supervisors and the punishment risk from other workers only affected the workers. The third one was the accident compensation did not affect the result. And the fourth one was there was "Free-rider" phenomenon between the supervisors and the workers.
Fourthly, a numerical simulation was used to investigate the relationship between the proportion of two types of personnel emphasis on safety, which showed the direction the proportion of two types of personnel emphasis on safety changed was inverse. However, in some special conditions, the direction the proportion of two types of personnel emphasis on safety changed was the same. Obviously, some parameters changing near the critical value affected the result, which was called "the butterfly effect".
Furthermore, by taking JH high-speed railway construction project as an example, a safety program management system of the double helix based on the correction of behavior was introduced. The system, introducing the idea of modularization into the non-material production process, was able to ensure the smooth implementation of the program and the continuous improvement with the entire dynamic education, the automatic visual monitoring as well as three-dimensional evaluation.
本研究将认知心理学理论引入演化博弈中,形成一类主观博弈方法,并用于分析三类高危系统组织安全行为产生机制及影响因素,主要内容如下：
首先,本研究基于理论与现实的矛盾提出了有意不安全行为产生和道路交通事故死亡人数占比过大这两个问题,并选择了主观博弈和分类对比两类针对性的方法。在分类方面,站在安全行为的直接执行者和安全风险的直接承担者的角度,将高危系统分成自组织、他组织和混合组织三类。
其次,运用主观博弈方法考察了具有典型自组织特征的道路交通系统、具有典型他组织特征的核电站系统和具有典型混合组织特征的工程施工系统三类系统,得到当个体(驾驶员、监管员、作业员、施工员)不重视安全所造成的损失(安全风险的增加、处罚风险等)不小于重视安全所需要耗费的成本时,所有个体均倾向于重视安全的结论。经过对比分析还得到了高危系统混合组织形式有利于施工员和监管员两类个体重视安全的结论。
第三,运用数值仿真实验考察了高危系统组织安全行为的影响因素,认为个体重视安全所需要耗费的成本的减少,基础安全风险、执行员(驾驶员、作业员和施工员的统称)的内部安全风险传导系数及来自于监管员的处罚风险的增加,有利于博弈双方重视安全；传导给监管员的安全风险系数的增加,仅有利于监管员重视安全；执行员内部的处罚风险的增加,仅有利于执行员重视安全；事故赔偿比例对演化结果不产生影响。同时,监管员和执行员重视安全的效果的提高,均有利于其自身重视安全,却不利于对方重视安全,意味着两类人员间存在“搭便车”的现象。
第四,运用数值仿真实验进一步考察了两类人员重视安全的比例之间的关系,发现在其他参数取特定初始值的情况下,执行员和监管员重视安全的比例在较大初始值范围内呈现反向变动关系,前者收敛于1而后者收敛于0。然而,当前者初始值较小且后者初始值较大时,在他组织高危系统中,二者交互轨迹收敛方向发生变化；在混合组织高危系统中,二者交互轨迹收敛过程受到干扰。可见,他组织高危系统中,两类人员重视安全的比例在阈值附近的变化会对系统最终演化方向产生重大影响,且此过程对随机干扰比较敏感,最终出现类似“蝴蝶效应”的现象；而混合组织高危系统中两类比例在阈值附近的变化会对系统演化过程产生干扰,却未见对结果产生影响。
此外,以JH高速铁路建设项目为例,详细阐述了在基于不安全行为矫正的工程安全方案双螺旋管理体系中,由模块化的方案编制、全程动态的宣传教育、自动可视的方案执行监控和立体化的评价改进四部分组成的组织行为链带动个体行为链螺旋上升、持续改进的过程和机理,为高危系统组织安全行为改进提供了可操作的措施和建议。
In recent years, with the economic development and the social progress in our country, the number of accidents, the number of major accidents and the deaths decreased while they were still huge, in which the accidents in High-Risk-System accounted for a large proportion. However, High-Risk-System belonged to the national pillar industry such as chemical industry, energy industry, building industry and transportation industry which played an irreplaceable role for the economic development and the social progress in our country. So, it was significant to study factors affecting High-Risk-System security for reducing the risk.
In the study, a kind of subjective game method was proposed by introducing psychology theory into evolutionary game theory. And the method was used to analysis the mechanism by which safety behavior occurred in three kinds of High-Risk-System. The main content was as follows:
Firstly, two problems, why intentional unsafe behavior occurred and why the deaths in road traffic accidents accounted for a large proportion in all accidents, were put forward, and two types of targeted methods, the subjective game and the classification and comparison were selected to solve them. Then the High-Risk-System was divided into self-organizing system, hetero-organizing system and hybrid organizing system.
Secondly, the subjective game was used to investigate the road traffic system, the nuclear power station system and the construction system, which in turn corresponded to self-organizing system, hetero-organizing system and hybrid organizing system. And the conclusion, all individuals tended to attach importance to safety while the losses of unsafe behavior were not less than the cost of safety behavior, was drawn. Then another conclusion, the individuals in the hybrid organizing system were most likely to emphasis on safety, was drawn.
Thirdly, a numerical simulation was used to investigate the factors and four conclusions were drawn. The first one was reducing the cost of safety behavior and increasing the losses such as the risk perception, the proportion of the risk spread to other workers and the punishment risk from supervisors were helpful. The second one was the proportion of the risk spread to supervisors only affected the supervisors and the punishment risk from other workers only affected the workers. The third one was the accident compensation did not affect the result. And the fourth one was there was "Free-rider" phenomenon between the supervisors and the workers.
Fourthly, a numerical simulation was used to investigate the relationship between the proportion of two types of personnel emphasis on safety, which showed the direction the proportion of two types of personnel emphasis on safety changed was inverse. However, in some special conditions, the direction the proportion of two types of personnel emphasis on safety changed was the same. Obviously, some parameters changing near the critical value affected the result, which was called "the butterfly effect".
Furthermore, by taking JH high-speed railway construction project as an example, a safety program management system of the double helix based on the correction of behavior was introduced. The system, introducing the idea of modularization into the non-material production process, was able to ensure the smooth implementation of the program and the continuous improvement with the entire dynamic education, the automatic visual monitoring as well as three-dimensional evaluation.
引文
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