高技术企业技术标准许可定价研究
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摘要
在高技术企业技术标准竞争中,成功地开发出高技术企业技术标准,并非能够天然地获得市场上的成功。技术标准市场化价值不仅取决于终端用户基础规模大小,而且还取决于使用该技术标准开发中间件、兼容品、配套品的丰裕度。丰裕度越小,各个成员企业面临的结构性风险越大。技术标准系统内部存在基于技术标准开发基础件、中间件等核心产品的企业,还包括中间设备制造商、终端制造商、运营商、内容与应用程序开发商等配套技术开发商。技术标准开发商为了引导不同类型的配套技术开发商融入技术标准主导的技术范式,必须科学运用价格杠杆,针对不同类型的技术标准被许可方,采取不同的技术标准许可定价策略,推进技术标准开发商、各类配套技术开发商之间收益合理分成、协同共赢。技术标准许可定价目标并非局限于单一类型配套技术开发商、单一许可价格水平的盈亏平衡,而在于对各类配套技术开发商许可的价格结构实现全局最优化。
交叉网络外部性是技术标准开发商实施价格歧视的重要依据。本文通过归纳总结当前国内外研究领域关于外部性理论的最新研究进展,从外部性概念与本质特征、外部性内生化签约行为与策略、外部性内生化机理、外部性内生化实现条件等方面,提出了内生外部性分析法。平台作为一种“市场合约”,是实现双边或多边市场用户交叉网络外部性“内生化”的重要组织形式与制度安排。高技术企业技术标准具备一般意义上平台所具备的多边市场用户、用户需求的交叉网络外部性、不对称价格结构等典型特征,引入平台多边市场分析法、外部性内部化分析法、非对称定价分析法,开展技术标准许可定价研究极为重要。
通过分析高技术企业技术标准多边成员类型、多边成员之间的外部性产生机理、技术标准的平台本质特征、技术标准多边许可非对称定价机理,提出了高技术企业技术标准许可定价基本模式,包括技术标准许可收费模式、技术标准许可免费模式、技术标准许可补贴模式。从高技术企业技术标准许可定价策略视角,深入研究了歧视定价策略、捆绑定价策略、交叉补贴定价策略、非对称定价策略、渗透定价策略。
通过研究高技术企业技术标准许可定价博弈要素与博弈关系,展开了技术标准许可定价纳什均衡分析,推导了技术标准许可双方的效用函数与纳什均衡状态。在此基础上,构建了技术标准许可非对称定价的两阶段博弈模型,分析了网络外部性对许可双方效用的影响机理,并进行了模型应用及实证研究。
Developing technology standard successfully is not necessarily successful in the technology standard competition of hi-tech enterprises. The market value of technology standard not only depends on the size of end users, but also on the diversification of middleware, compatible and supporting products. Technology standard system not only consists of some core enterprises which develop basic components, middleware based on technology standard, but also consists of supporting technology developers such as middleware manufacturer, terminal manufacturer, operator, content and application developer. In order to attract various supporting technology developers adopt the technology paradigm of technology standard, technology standard developers have to make different technology standard pricing strategies for different standard licensee by price lever. This will help to make a reasonable income distribution and realize collaborative effect among the technology standard developers and supporting technology developers. The aim of pricing for technology standard is not break-even of one supporting technology developer or one license price level, but the global optimization for the price structure of various supporting technology developers.
Cross-group network externality is an important basis of price discrimination for technology standard developers. This paper summarized the recent research progress of externality theory and put forward the method of endogenous externality from the perspective of externality concept and character, contracting behavior and tactics of externality endogenization, mechanism of externality endogenization, realizing conditions of externality endogenization. Platform, as a "Market Contract", is an important organization and institution arrangement of realizing cross-group network externality "endogenization" for two-sided or multi-sided market users. The technology standard of hi-tech enterprise has some characters like platform, such as multi-sided market user, cross-group network externality of user demand, asymmetric price structure. Therefore, it is important for this paper to explore the pricing method of technology standard by method of multi-sided market of platform, method of externality endogenization, method of asymmetric pricing.
This paper put forward basic pricing modes of technology standard of hi-tech enterprises through analyzing the member type of technology standard of hi-tech enterprises, the externality mechanism among multiple members, the character of technology standard, the asymmetric pricing of multiple license of technology standard. Those pricing modes consist of charge mode, free mode and subsidy mode. In addition, this paper studied some pricing strategies from the perspective of technology standard pricing strategy of hi-tech enterprises, including discriminatory pricing, bundled pricing, cross-subsidy pricing, asymmetric pricing, penetration pricing.
Through studying the game elements and game relations of technology standard pricing, this paper made a Nash equilibrium analysis of technology standard, and then deduced the utilization function and Nash equilibrium of licensor and licensee. This paper also constructed two-stage game model of asymmetric pricing of technology standard license, and analyzed the effect mechanism of network externality on licensor and licensee, finally made a model application and empirical research.
交叉网络外部性是技术标准开发商实施价格歧视的重要依据。本文通过归纳总结当前国内外研究领域关于外部性理论的最新研究进展,从外部性概念与本质特征、外部性内生化签约行为与策略、外部性内生化机理、外部性内生化实现条件等方面,提出了内生外部性分析法。平台作为一种“市场合约”,是实现双边或多边市场用户交叉网络外部性“内生化”的重要组织形式与制度安排。高技术企业技术标准具备一般意义上平台所具备的多边市场用户、用户需求的交叉网络外部性、不对称价格结构等典型特征,引入平台多边市场分析法、外部性内部化分析法、非对称定价分析法,开展技术标准许可定价研究极为重要。
通过分析高技术企业技术标准多边成员类型、多边成员之间的外部性产生机理、技术标准的平台本质特征、技术标准多边许可非对称定价机理,提出了高技术企业技术标准许可定价基本模式,包括技术标准许可收费模式、技术标准许可免费模式、技术标准许可补贴模式。从高技术企业技术标准许可定价策略视角,深入研究了歧视定价策略、捆绑定价策略、交叉补贴定价策略、非对称定价策略、渗透定价策略。
通过研究高技术企业技术标准许可定价博弈要素与博弈关系,展开了技术标准许可定价纳什均衡分析,推导了技术标准许可双方的效用函数与纳什均衡状态。在此基础上,构建了技术标准许可非对称定价的两阶段博弈模型,分析了网络外部性对许可双方效用的影响机理,并进行了模型应用及实证研究。
Developing technology standard successfully is not necessarily successful in the technology standard competition of hi-tech enterprises. The market value of technology standard not only depends on the size of end users, but also on the diversification of middleware, compatible and supporting products. Technology standard system not only consists of some core enterprises which develop basic components, middleware based on technology standard, but also consists of supporting technology developers such as middleware manufacturer, terminal manufacturer, operator, content and application developer. In order to attract various supporting technology developers adopt the technology paradigm of technology standard, technology standard developers have to make different technology standard pricing strategies for different standard licensee by price lever. This will help to make a reasonable income distribution and realize collaborative effect among the technology standard developers and supporting technology developers. The aim of pricing for technology standard is not break-even of one supporting technology developer or one license price level, but the global optimization for the price structure of various supporting technology developers.
Cross-group network externality is an important basis of price discrimination for technology standard developers. This paper summarized the recent research progress of externality theory and put forward the method of endogenous externality from the perspective of externality concept and character, contracting behavior and tactics of externality endogenization, mechanism of externality endogenization, realizing conditions of externality endogenization. Platform, as a "Market Contract", is an important organization and institution arrangement of realizing cross-group network externality "endogenization" for two-sided or multi-sided market users. The technology standard of hi-tech enterprise has some characters like platform, such as multi-sided market user, cross-group network externality of user demand, asymmetric price structure. Therefore, it is important for this paper to explore the pricing method of technology standard by method of multi-sided market of platform, method of externality endogenization, method of asymmetric pricing.
This paper put forward basic pricing modes of technology standard of hi-tech enterprises through analyzing the member type of technology standard of hi-tech enterprises, the externality mechanism among multiple members, the character of technology standard, the asymmetric pricing of multiple license of technology standard. Those pricing modes consist of charge mode, free mode and subsidy mode. In addition, this paper studied some pricing strategies from the perspective of technology standard pricing strategy of hi-tech enterprises, including discriminatory pricing, bundled pricing, cross-subsidy pricing, asymmetric pricing, penetration pricing.
Through studying the game elements and game relations of technology standard pricing, this paper made a Nash equilibrium analysis of technology standard, and then deduced the utilization function and Nash equilibrium of licensor and licensee. This paper also constructed two-stage game model of asymmetric pricing of technology standard license, and analyzed the effect mechanism of network externality on licensor and licensee, finally made a model application and empirical research.
引文
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