农村宅基地退出中农民权益保护问题研究
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摘要
我国在工业化、城镇化快速发展的进程中,耕地面积日益锐减,严重威胁到国家粮食安全,为此,国务院提出了“十八亿亩”耕地保护红线,依靠占用耕地来满足建设用地需求受到国家层面的制约。面对严格的耕地保护和城镇建设用地供给不足的矛盾,中央政府制定了城乡建设用地增减挂钩政策。城乡建设用地增减挂钩是通过拆旧(农村建设用地)建新(城镇建设用地)、土地复垦,实现耕地总量不变、耕地面积不减少和土地质量不降低,使用地布局趋于合理化。促进粗放利用的农村宅基地退出成为各地方政府实施挂钩政策的主要内容。由于宅基地承载着农民的庭院农业经营、农民的生存居住保障、低成本的生活方式。在我国社会保障还不健全的背景下,农村宅基地被大部分农民视为最后一道生存保障屏障。各级政府在推进宅基地退出中理应遵循“自愿”、“有偿”原则,实现退地农民安居乐业。然而,在当前城乡建设用地增减挂钩实施过程中,农民作为宅基地退出的主体,其权益并没有得到有效的保护,农民在各地方政府推进的农村宅基地退出中权益受损问题普遍存在。目前,城乡建设用地增减挂钩背景下宅基地退出中农民权益问题引起了政府高度重视,它已经成为影响我国新农村建设与城镇化发展的关键。因此,研究宅基地退出中农民权益保护问题,无疑对维护农民权益和农村社会稳定,推动工业化、城镇化发展都要重要的意义。
论文按照“提出问题——构建理论基础——实证分析——根源探究——政策设计”这一逻辑思路展开,运用理论分析、规范分析、案例分析、实证分析和博弈分析等研究方法,对农村宅基地退出权益保护问题进行了较为详细地研究。根据这-分析思路,论文分别从理论研究、实证分析、对策建议三个层面进行论述,构成论文的基本内容如下：
第一部分为理论研究。首先运用规范分析的方法,对本文研究对象的内涵进行了全面界定。从宅基地退出主体、客体、形式对宅基地退出的内涵进行清晰界定,同时对农民土地权益的内涵进行了全面界定,确定了本文研究的范围。其次选择了与该研究相关的土地产权理论、效率公平理论以及博弈理论,并对这些理论在宅基地退出中农民权益保护的应用进行简要分析,这对后续研究是重要的理论借鉴。
第二部分系统分析了当前农村宅基地退出的现状及对农民权益的影响。首先阐述宅基地退出的制度基础、社会基础以及政策基础,介绍了我国实践中出现的宅基地退出代表模式的具体做法和各自的特点,在此基础上抽象概括出当前农村宅基地退出的总体特征和存在的共同问题。其次,在对我国农村宅基地制度所蕴含的土地权益、城乡建设用地增加挂钩政策所承载的土地权益以及我国宅基地的功能所包涵的土地权益的解读和分析的基础上,界定了农村宅基地退出中农民土地权益的具体内涵。并结合我国宅基地退出主要模式,分析宅基地退出如何影响农民经济权益、政治权益、社会权益。
第三部分实证分析了宅基地退出中农民权益的变化。本文借鉴Amartya Sen的可行性能力理论,分别从经济状况、居住状况、保障状况、社区状况和心理状况五个方面构建反映农民权益测度的一级指标体系,选取农业收入、非农收入、日常消费支出、人均居住面积、住房结构、住房质量、人均耕地面积、就业机会、社会保险的提供情况、治安状况、卫生状况、交通出行情况、教育设施、医疗设施、经济满意度、生活满意度16个二级指标,利用对重庆市九龙坡区323户“退地上楼”的农民的调查数据,运用统计描述和模糊数学的评价法对宅基地退出中农户权益问题进行测度。实证研究结果表明,现阶段农民宅基地退出实现集中居住,极大地改善了农民的住房条件和居住环境,但是伴随着农民居住方式的改变,农民生产生活方式发生了必然变化,在此过程中农民的经济权益、社会权益、保障权益都不同程度地受损。尤其是经济权益和社会权益受损更严重。
第四部分根据实证研究结果,结合农民宅基地权益受损的事实,从不同主体的利益博弈、我国宅基地产权制度等视角阐述了农民土地权益受损的经济和制度原因。通过构建博弈模型分析了宅基地退出中农民与地方政府的利益博弈。在博弈分析的过程中,采用了从简单到复杂的原则,层层放宽博弈假设,揭示了博弈分析下农民权益受损的主要原因在于：(1)地方政府的行为缺乏有效的约束和监督。在没有任何约束和监督的情况下,地方政府由于自身拥有特权以及身份的多重性,往往会做出优先保护自身利益的行为而致使农民权益受损。(2)农民缺乏维权意识和维权能力。在农民与地方政府的讨价还价过程中,地方政府凭借其政策制定的“优先权”,往往首先抛出实现自身退出收益最大化的方案,然后视农民的反应做出政策调整。在中国现行的政治体制和权力架构下,农民在政治上处于弱势群体的地位,同时由于文化程度低下致使他们维权意识和维权能力不足。在整个博弈过程,农民由于无权无势,始终处于博弈的弱势地位,无法与地方政府的强势进行讨价还价而导致农民各方面权益得不到有效保护。从农村宅基地产权制度来看,宅基地所有权主体不明确、农村居民享有的宅基地产权权能不完善等方面造成农民土地权益的受损。
第五部分为研究结论和政策建议。梳理和总结前文的理论和实证分析结论,根据研究结论从完善宅基地产权制度、转变政府角色与规范政府行为、提升农民主体地位等方面提出了相应的政策建议。
本文可能的创新点：(1)尝试对所研究的内容“农村宅基地退出和农民土地权益”内涵进行清晰界定。本文研究内容涉及到两个核心概念,在研究前,需对概念有清晰的界定。本文从退出主体、客体、形式、目的对宅基地退出概念进行了明确界定。解读和分析我国宅基地制度所蕴含的权益,城乡建设用地增减挂钩政策所承载的农民权益以及基于农村宅基地功能所包涵的权益的基础上,将农村宅基地退出中农民土地权益内涵界定为经济权益、政治权益和社会权益的综合。(2)构建博弈模型分析了农民与地方政府的利益博弈行为,揭示农民权益受损的经济社会原因。(3)以森(Sen)的可行性理论为理论依据,尝试构建一套测度农民土地权益的指标体系,构建了农民权益测度的的模糊数学法评价模型,以定量化的方法对农村宅基地退出中农民土地权益受损问题进行了评价分析,突破了以往的“农民权益问题”研究主要采用归纳演绎等文字叙述的方法。因此在研究方法上具有一定的创新。
In the rapid process of industrialization and urbanization, arable land area decreased day by day, which threats nation's food security seriously. So, the State Council puts forward the "eighteen million acres of farmland protection red line", which means that relying on occupying farmland to meet construction demand has been restricted by nation. How to cope with the contradiction of construction and protection properly? Then the policy that Urban Construction Land Increase and Rural Residential Land Decrease produced. This policy through the demolition of the old (rural construction land), creation of the new (urban construction land) and land reclamation, to make sure the same amount of the total arable land and not reduced arable land area, also, without lowing the land quality, which all make the most use of land and realize rationalization. As a major component of rural construction land, homestead is an important part of this policy. In practice, the local government through replace or clear up rural homestead and other forms to promote Homestead Exit. Then the government sort out the homestead reclamation, and on the base of "balanced divination total arable land", get some saving indicators of the land for construction to ease the development of urban construction land supply "bottleneck." Therefore, Homestead Exit of the Urban Construction Land Increase and Rural Residential Land Decrease policy played a positive role in promoting farmland protection, relieving stress of construction land. As homestead carries out a role of farming operation, farmers' survival of living guarantee, low-cost way of life, Homestead Exit will affect the lifestyle of farmers. Under the background of China has a not sound social security system, homestead is regarded as the last barrier of survival of farmers in rural area. So, in the process of promoting Homestead Exit, the local government should follow in the principle of "voluntarily" and "paid" to make exiting land farmer live and work steadily. However, in the current implementation process of Urban Construction Land Increase and Rural Residential Land Decrease policy, farmers as the main of exiting homestead, their rights and interests have not been effectively protected, and their rights and interests damaged generally when the local government promoted homestead exit. Currently, under the background of urban and rural construction sites linked, the problem of farmers' rights and interests in the homestead exit has attracted government's high attention, and has been a key impact on China's new rural construction and urbanization development. Therefore, researching protection issues of farmers' rights and interests will no doubt be significant to protect farmers' rights and rural social stability, promote the development of industrialization and urbanization smoothly.
This paper through the analytical framework of "related concepts defined-build the theoretical foundation-an empirical analysis-identify the source of the problem-the proposed rights protection policies," uses theoretical analysis, normative analysis, case studies, empirical analysis and Game analysis and other research methods, makes a detailed study of farmers' rights and interests protection in the homestead exit. Based on this analytical framework, the paper discussed from the theoretical research, empirical analysis, policy suggestions three levels, which make up the basic contents of this paper:
The whole paper contains six chapters, part one is theoretical research. Firstly, the paper applied normative analysis method, defined the concept of rural homestead exit from exiting subject, object, form, and defined the concept of farmers'rights and interests.and determine the research scope of this article. Then, the paper chose three associated theories with the study that are land property rights theory, fair and efficiency theory and game theory, and made a brief analysis of their application of protecting farmers'rights and interests in the homestead exit, which is an important theoretical reference for further research.
Part two mainly analyzed theoretically the influence that rural homestead exit makes on farmers'rights and interests. At first, the paper makes a system summary of our country current rural homestead exit from the exiting background, the practice patterns and characteristics. On this basis, through analyzing the rural homestead system, Urban Construction Land Increase and Rural Residential Land Decrease policy, the farmer rights and interests which are carried on the homestead, the paper defined the connotation of farmers' rights and interests in the homestead exit, and combining with the homestead exitpractice,analysis the homestead exit influence on farmers'economic.politicalandsocial rights and interests.
Part three is an empirical research of farmers' rights and interests damaging problem in the process of rural homestead exit. Following the theory of the feasibility of Amartya Sen ability, forming evaluation index systems inculding five level indicators and16secondary indicators to measure farmers' rights and interests that damaged, five level indicators included economic situation, housing conditions, dwelling environment, subsistence allowances and psychological factors,16secondary indicators included agricultural income, non-agricultural income, ordinary spending, housing area, housingstructure, housingquality, agriculturalacreage, employment, opportunities, socialsecurit, law-and-ordersituation, sanitarycondition, medicalstandards, educationalplant, lifesatisfaction, economic satisfaction, on this basis, build a analyzed model of measuring farmers' rights and interests damaged, and with the323household survey data of Chongqing Jiulongpoqu, measured the rights and interests problem of exiting land farmer. Results show that it has greatly improved the housing conditions and dwelling environment of the farmers,but with changes of farmers'living, inevitablely, changes have taken place in farmers' production and living ways, farmer's rights and interests received different levels damaged in the exit process of the homestead exit, especially economic rights and interests of farmers and the social security has been damaged more serious.
Part four is based on case studies and research on the level of farmers, combining with the fact that farmers' land rights and interests is damaged, from perspectives of the land property rights system, different behavior subjects'benefit gambling, analyzes the reasons of why farmer's rights and interests is damaged in the homestead exit. We construct game model to analyze between farmers and the local government, in the process of game analysis,we use the principle of from simple to complex,gradually relax game hypothesis,conclud the reasons of farmers' land rights and interests damaging,(1)the behavior of local government is lack of effective constraints and supervision.in the absence of any restrictions, each benefit main body tends to make better decisions for themselves. Local government due to the multiplicity of privileges and its own identity, the cause of the government departments have the priority to protect their own interests.(2)the farmers are lack of consciousness and ability of safeguarding rights.In the bargaining process of farmers and the local government,the local government have priority of making poliy,often throw first realize own solution to maximize pro fit, then see the reaction of farmers to make policy adjustment.Under China's current political system and power strcture,farmenrs are in a disadvataged position in politics.,an the sanme time,their consciousness and ability of safeguarding rights are lack because of low cultural degree.Throughout the game, due to the powerless, the farmers are in a weak position, in the game, can't bargain with the strength of the local government and farmers' rights and interests of all aspects can not get effective protection. From the point of property right system of rural homestead, land ownership is not clear, the land property rights power of rural residents is not perfect, lack of land development rights of farmers' land rights and interests is damaged.
Part five are conclusions and policy suggestions,As for the present situation and reasons of farmers' rights and interests being damaged in the current rural homestead exit, chapter six put forward countermeasures to protect farmers' rights and interests. Policy Suggestions including:one is to perfect the land property rights system, mainly including clear the ownership and use right of the land, build up the land development rights system and establish legal security system of rural homestead exit. Second is to turn on the government' role. The third one is to improve farmers' subject status, mainly including building endorsement organization of farmers themselves and improve the quality of farmers, etc.
In this paper, the possible innovation lies in:(1) try to define the concept of rural homestead exit and farmers' land rights and interests. The concept "rural homestead exit" is mainly defined from exiting subject, object, form, purpose to determine the research extent of rural homestead exit in this paper, from the research content, this paper changes past single study object (such as only consider one aspect of farmers' rights and interests), tries to define contents of farmer's rights and interests entirely from the hidden rights and interests of our country's land system, farmers' rights and interests laying on Urban Construction Land Increase and Rural Residential Land Decrease policy, and rights and interests based on rural homestead function three sides.(2) Build a game model to analyzes the game behavior between the farmers and the local government and explained the economic and insitutional reasons of the farmers rights and interests.(3)from the research methods, this paper changes past single study method (only with theoretical analysis or case analysis) analysis farmers' rights and interests being damaged. Tries to set up a theoretical framework of farmer's rights and interests change in the rural homestead exit, using sen (sen) feasibility ability theory, on the basis of5kinds of free tools put forward by sen, build up a set of index system to analysis and estimate rights and interests, take fuzzy mathematics method to do an empirical research about farmers' rights and interests being damaged in the rural homestead exit.
论文按照“提出问题——构建理论基础——实证分析——根源探究——政策设计”这一逻辑思路展开,运用理论分析、规范分析、案例分析、实证分析和博弈分析等研究方法,对农村宅基地退出权益保护问题进行了较为详细地研究。根据这-分析思路,论文分别从理论研究、实证分析、对策建议三个层面进行论述,构成论文的基本内容如下：
第一部分为理论研究。首先运用规范分析的方法,对本文研究对象的内涵进行了全面界定。从宅基地退出主体、客体、形式对宅基地退出的内涵进行清晰界定,同时对农民土地权益的内涵进行了全面界定,确定了本文研究的范围。其次选择了与该研究相关的土地产权理论、效率公平理论以及博弈理论,并对这些理论在宅基地退出中农民权益保护的应用进行简要分析,这对后续研究是重要的理论借鉴。
第二部分系统分析了当前农村宅基地退出的现状及对农民权益的影响。首先阐述宅基地退出的制度基础、社会基础以及政策基础,介绍了我国实践中出现的宅基地退出代表模式的具体做法和各自的特点,在此基础上抽象概括出当前农村宅基地退出的总体特征和存在的共同问题。其次,在对我国农村宅基地制度所蕴含的土地权益、城乡建设用地增加挂钩政策所承载的土地权益以及我国宅基地的功能所包涵的土地权益的解读和分析的基础上,界定了农村宅基地退出中农民土地权益的具体内涵。并结合我国宅基地退出主要模式,分析宅基地退出如何影响农民经济权益、政治权益、社会权益。
第三部分实证分析了宅基地退出中农民权益的变化。本文借鉴Amartya Sen的可行性能力理论,分别从经济状况、居住状况、保障状况、社区状况和心理状况五个方面构建反映农民权益测度的一级指标体系,选取农业收入、非农收入、日常消费支出、人均居住面积、住房结构、住房质量、人均耕地面积、就业机会、社会保险的提供情况、治安状况、卫生状况、交通出行情况、教育设施、医疗设施、经济满意度、生活满意度16个二级指标,利用对重庆市九龙坡区323户“退地上楼”的农民的调查数据,运用统计描述和模糊数学的评价法对宅基地退出中农户权益问题进行测度。实证研究结果表明,现阶段农民宅基地退出实现集中居住,极大地改善了农民的住房条件和居住环境,但是伴随着农民居住方式的改变,农民生产生活方式发生了必然变化,在此过程中农民的经济权益、社会权益、保障权益都不同程度地受损。尤其是经济权益和社会权益受损更严重。
第四部分根据实证研究结果,结合农民宅基地权益受损的事实,从不同主体的利益博弈、我国宅基地产权制度等视角阐述了农民土地权益受损的经济和制度原因。通过构建博弈模型分析了宅基地退出中农民与地方政府的利益博弈。在博弈分析的过程中,采用了从简单到复杂的原则,层层放宽博弈假设,揭示了博弈分析下农民权益受损的主要原因在于：(1)地方政府的行为缺乏有效的约束和监督。在没有任何约束和监督的情况下,地方政府由于自身拥有特权以及身份的多重性,往往会做出优先保护自身利益的行为而致使农民权益受损。(2)农民缺乏维权意识和维权能力。在农民与地方政府的讨价还价过程中,地方政府凭借其政策制定的“优先权”,往往首先抛出实现自身退出收益最大化的方案,然后视农民的反应做出政策调整。在中国现行的政治体制和权力架构下,农民在政治上处于弱势群体的地位,同时由于文化程度低下致使他们维权意识和维权能力不足。在整个博弈过程,农民由于无权无势,始终处于博弈的弱势地位,无法与地方政府的强势进行讨价还价而导致农民各方面权益得不到有效保护。从农村宅基地产权制度来看,宅基地所有权主体不明确、农村居民享有的宅基地产权权能不完善等方面造成农民土地权益的受损。
第五部分为研究结论和政策建议。梳理和总结前文的理论和实证分析结论,根据研究结论从完善宅基地产权制度、转变政府角色与规范政府行为、提升农民主体地位等方面提出了相应的政策建议。
本文可能的创新点：(1)尝试对所研究的内容“农村宅基地退出和农民土地权益”内涵进行清晰界定。本文研究内容涉及到两个核心概念,在研究前,需对概念有清晰的界定。本文从退出主体、客体、形式、目的对宅基地退出概念进行了明确界定。解读和分析我国宅基地制度所蕴含的权益,城乡建设用地增减挂钩政策所承载的农民权益以及基于农村宅基地功能所包涵的权益的基础上,将农村宅基地退出中农民土地权益内涵界定为经济权益、政治权益和社会权益的综合。(2)构建博弈模型分析了农民与地方政府的利益博弈行为,揭示农民权益受损的经济社会原因。(3)以森(Sen)的可行性理论为理论依据,尝试构建一套测度农民土地权益的指标体系,构建了农民权益测度的的模糊数学法评价模型,以定量化的方法对农村宅基地退出中农民土地权益受损问题进行了评价分析,突破了以往的“农民权益问题”研究主要采用归纳演绎等文字叙述的方法。因此在研究方法上具有一定的创新。
In the rapid process of industrialization and urbanization, arable land area decreased day by day, which threats nation's food security seriously. So, the State Council puts forward the "eighteen million acres of farmland protection red line", which means that relying on occupying farmland to meet construction demand has been restricted by nation. How to cope with the contradiction of construction and protection properly? Then the policy that Urban Construction Land Increase and Rural Residential Land Decrease produced. This policy through the demolition of the old (rural construction land), creation of the new (urban construction land) and land reclamation, to make sure the same amount of the total arable land and not reduced arable land area, also, without lowing the land quality, which all make the most use of land and realize rationalization. As a major component of rural construction land, homestead is an important part of this policy. In practice, the local government through replace or clear up rural homestead and other forms to promote Homestead Exit. Then the government sort out the homestead reclamation, and on the base of "balanced divination total arable land", get some saving indicators of the land for construction to ease the development of urban construction land supply "bottleneck." Therefore, Homestead Exit of the Urban Construction Land Increase and Rural Residential Land Decrease policy played a positive role in promoting farmland protection, relieving stress of construction land. As homestead carries out a role of farming operation, farmers' survival of living guarantee, low-cost way of life, Homestead Exit will affect the lifestyle of farmers. Under the background of China has a not sound social security system, homestead is regarded as the last barrier of survival of farmers in rural area. So, in the process of promoting Homestead Exit, the local government should follow in the principle of "voluntarily" and "paid" to make exiting land farmer live and work steadily. However, in the current implementation process of Urban Construction Land Increase and Rural Residential Land Decrease policy, farmers as the main of exiting homestead, their rights and interests have not been effectively protected, and their rights and interests damaged generally when the local government promoted homestead exit. Currently, under the background of urban and rural construction sites linked, the problem of farmers' rights and interests in the homestead exit has attracted government's high attention, and has been a key impact on China's new rural construction and urbanization development. Therefore, researching protection issues of farmers' rights and interests will no doubt be significant to protect farmers' rights and rural social stability, promote the development of industrialization and urbanization smoothly.
This paper through the analytical framework of "related concepts defined-build the theoretical foundation-an empirical analysis-identify the source of the problem-the proposed rights protection policies," uses theoretical analysis, normative analysis, case studies, empirical analysis and Game analysis and other research methods, makes a detailed study of farmers' rights and interests protection in the homestead exit. Based on this analytical framework, the paper discussed from the theoretical research, empirical analysis, policy suggestions three levels, which make up the basic contents of this paper:
The whole paper contains six chapters, part one is theoretical research. Firstly, the paper applied normative analysis method, defined the concept of rural homestead exit from exiting subject, object, form, and defined the concept of farmers'rights and interests.and determine the research scope of this article. Then, the paper chose three associated theories with the study that are land property rights theory, fair and efficiency theory and game theory, and made a brief analysis of their application of protecting farmers'rights and interests in the homestead exit, which is an important theoretical reference for further research.
Part two mainly analyzed theoretically the influence that rural homestead exit makes on farmers'rights and interests. At first, the paper makes a system summary of our country current rural homestead exit from the exiting background, the practice patterns and characteristics. On this basis, through analyzing the rural homestead system, Urban Construction Land Increase and Rural Residential Land Decrease policy, the farmer rights and interests which are carried on the homestead, the paper defined the connotation of farmers' rights and interests in the homestead exit, and combining with the homestead exitpractice,analysis the homestead exit influence on farmers'economic.politicalandsocial rights and interests.
Part three is an empirical research of farmers' rights and interests damaging problem in the process of rural homestead exit. Following the theory of the feasibility of Amartya Sen ability, forming evaluation index systems inculding five level indicators and16secondary indicators to measure farmers' rights and interests that damaged, five level indicators included economic situation, housing conditions, dwelling environment, subsistence allowances and psychological factors,16secondary indicators included agricultural income, non-agricultural income, ordinary spending, housing area, housingstructure, housingquality, agriculturalacreage, employment, opportunities, socialsecurit, law-and-ordersituation, sanitarycondition, medicalstandards, educationalplant, lifesatisfaction, economic satisfaction, on this basis, build a analyzed model of measuring farmers' rights and interests damaged, and with the323household survey data of Chongqing Jiulongpoqu, measured the rights and interests problem of exiting land farmer. Results show that it has greatly improved the housing conditions and dwelling environment of the farmers,but with changes of farmers'living, inevitablely, changes have taken place in farmers' production and living ways, farmer's rights and interests received different levels damaged in the exit process of the homestead exit, especially economic rights and interests of farmers and the social security has been damaged more serious.
Part four is based on case studies and research on the level of farmers, combining with the fact that farmers' land rights and interests is damaged, from perspectives of the land property rights system, different behavior subjects'benefit gambling, analyzes the reasons of why farmer's rights and interests is damaged in the homestead exit. We construct game model to analyze between farmers and the local government, in the process of game analysis,we use the principle of from simple to complex,gradually relax game hypothesis,conclud the reasons of farmers' land rights and interests damaging,(1)the behavior of local government is lack of effective constraints and supervision.in the absence of any restrictions, each benefit main body tends to make better decisions for themselves. Local government due to the multiplicity of privileges and its own identity, the cause of the government departments have the priority to protect their own interests.(2)the farmers are lack of consciousness and ability of safeguarding rights.In the bargaining process of farmers and the local government,the local government have priority of making poliy,often throw first realize own solution to maximize pro fit, then see the reaction of farmers to make policy adjustment.Under China's current political system and power strcture,farmenrs are in a disadvataged position in politics.,an the sanme time,their consciousness and ability of safeguarding rights are lack because of low cultural degree.Throughout the game, due to the powerless, the farmers are in a weak position, in the game, can't bargain with the strength of the local government and farmers' rights and interests of all aspects can not get effective protection. From the point of property right system of rural homestead, land ownership is not clear, the land property rights power of rural residents is not perfect, lack of land development rights of farmers' land rights and interests is damaged.
Part five are conclusions and policy suggestions,As for the present situation and reasons of farmers' rights and interests being damaged in the current rural homestead exit, chapter six put forward countermeasures to protect farmers' rights and interests. Policy Suggestions including:one is to perfect the land property rights system, mainly including clear the ownership and use right of the land, build up the land development rights system and establish legal security system of rural homestead exit. Second is to turn on the government' role. The third one is to improve farmers' subject status, mainly including building endorsement organization of farmers themselves and improve the quality of farmers, etc.
In this paper, the possible innovation lies in:(1) try to define the concept of rural homestead exit and farmers' land rights and interests. The concept "rural homestead exit" is mainly defined from exiting subject, object, form, purpose to determine the research extent of rural homestead exit in this paper, from the research content, this paper changes past single study object (such as only consider one aspect of farmers' rights and interests), tries to define contents of farmer's rights and interests entirely from the hidden rights and interests of our country's land system, farmers' rights and interests laying on Urban Construction Land Increase and Rural Residential Land Decrease policy, and rights and interests based on rural homestead function three sides.(2) Build a game model to analyzes the game behavior between the farmers and the local government and explained the economic and insitutional reasons of the farmers rights and interests.(3)from the research methods, this paper changes past single study method (only with theoretical analysis or case analysis) analysis farmers' rights and interests being damaged. Tries to set up a theoretical framework of farmer's rights and interests change in the rural homestead exit, using sen (sen) feasibility ability theory, on the basis of5kinds of free tools put forward by sen, build up a set of index system to analysis and estimate rights and interests, take fuzzy mathematics method to do an empirical research about farmers' rights and interests being damaged in the rural homestead exit.
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