中国碳排放权初始分配与减排机制研究
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摘要
近年来，全球气候的日益变暖和极端灾害事件的频繁发生，使得以二氧化碳为主的温室气体减排形势日益严峻。碳减排已成为环境经济领域研究的热点问题之一。碳减排中存在的环境易变性、涉及主体广泛性、减排途径多样性、趋势不确定性等多重复杂特征，使得排放政策的分析与制订成为一个难题。基于总量控制目标，研究碳排放权的初始分配，界定被监管者的排放权利；设计符合国内现状的碳减排机制，为被监管者提供灵活的减排途径和政策激励，对推进节能减排、促进经济社会协调发展具有重要的理论和现实意义。
本文以科学发展观和可持续发展理念为指导思想，以外部性理论、公共产品理论、产权理论和比较优势理论为基础，运用规范分析和实证分析相结合的方法，考虑国内各地区碳排放绩效与减排成本提出梯度减排框架，设计公平与效率递阶优化的排放权免费分配模型和基于统一价格的排放权拍卖分配模型，研究复杂环境下排放企业的减排投资决策问题，提出中国碳排放权的初始分配与减排机制的初步构想，并给出促进有效减排的对策建议。具体研究内容与创新性工作如下：
（1）提出中国碳减排的基本框架
利用中国30个省级地区的碳排放与国内生产总值面板数据，从全国以及省域层面，分析碳排放与经济增长的协整关系和因果关联。运用非参数DEA方法，估算各省环境方向距离函数和影子价格，评价并比较各省碳排放效率与减排成本。发现碳排放效率与经济发展水平、资源禀赋和能源利用效率等因素间存在密切关系，并且经济发达、能源利用水平高的东部沿海地区和部分中部省份具有较高的排放效率；而经济落后、资源丰富的的少数中部及西部地区的碳排放效率明显较低。同时，以2002年为拐点，1996-2010年碳排放的影子价格呈先上涨后缓慢下降的变化趋势。以省域距离函数、碳排放影子价格、碳排放增长率和经济产值为聚类指标，把30个省域划分成陡坡区、平缓区和高原区三个不同的区域。剖析三大区域的排放特征，建议分别施以“保增长、缓减排”、“先强度减排、后总量控制”以及“较为严格的总量控制”政策。
（2）设计碳排放权初始分配模型
运用对数平均Divisia指数分解法，将中国碳排放总量分解为“3次产业”、“3类能源”（煤炭、石油、天然气）产生的碳排放总和。发现1996-2010年间对中国碳排放量增长贡献最大的正向驱动因素为人均GDP，其次是能源结构和人口总量；负向抑制因素的贡献大小依次为能源强度、产业结构。以碳排放均值、经济产值、人口、能源结构、产业结构和森林面积作为公平指标，以分配后的地区碳强度作为效率指标，构建公平与效率两级优化的免费分配模型。第一级优化以公平性最大为目标，利用信息熵法确定指标权重；第二级优化则追求效率最大化。利用该分配模型，以2006-2010年的相关数据为基础，测算中国省级地区2011年的碳排放权分配结果。2016年的碳权分配则取2011-2015年的数据予以估算，以此类推。
依据相关拍卖理论，建立基于统一价格的碳排放权拍卖分配机制。利用均衡分析，得出竞买人的弱占优报价策略和线性均衡报价策略。分析保留价对均衡结果的影响。运用这一拍卖模型对安徽省2015年的碳排放权拍卖进行了测算，并比较有、无保留价情形下分配方案的变化，发现较高的保留价使成交量下降但政府收益增加；与报价策略不变时相比，两种调整方案均提高了成交量和政府收益，其中，支付费用总和较高的方案其成交量也较高。
（3）研究不确定环境下的企业减排投资决策
系统阐述减排机制的基本原理与主要内容，深入分析碳减排中不确定性的来源、主要类型和潜在经济影响及其度量方法。以国内典型发电企业为例，构建包含电力价格、燃料价格、碳排放价格等外生不确定性和技术进步、碳减排率等内生不确定性因素的实物期权减排投资模型，求解得到投资阈值、投资期望首达时间和最佳投资补贴比例解析条件。利用参数敏感性分析，并借助蒙特卡罗模拟，发现碳价波动风险的增大将提高投资阈值并延迟投资，而技术进步、补贴比例和碳减排率与投资阈值、投资时点间存在负相关性，即技术进步越快、补贴比例越大、碳减排率越高，则投资阈值越低、投资时点越早，反之相反。
（4）提出中国碳减排的基本构想与政策建议
基于对不同分配方式的利弊分析和综合比较，给出国内的排放权初始分配方式选择的思路。比较研究三种灵活机制（排放贸易ET、清洁发展机制CDM和联合履约JI）在成本有效性、环境有效性和政治可行性等方面的差异，指出ET的成本有效性优于CDM和JI，而环境有效性和政治可行性则不如CDM和JI。利用一个包括政府与企业两个参与者的简单减排投资博弈模型，推导得到两主体的效用最大化条件。借鉴国际减排机制的成功经验，结合中国具体国情，从减排机制的选择，统计监测机制、激励约束机制和相关配套机制的设计等层面，提出国内碳减排的初步构想，并给出相应的政策建议。
The situation of greenhouse gases (dominated by carbon dioxide) abatement has been increasinglygrim along with the warming global climate and the frequent extreme disasters in recent years.Carbon mitigation has already become one of the environmental&economic research hot spots.Multiple complex characteristics of carbon emission reduction, including environmental variability,extensiveness of those regulated, diversity of reduction approaches and uncertainty of developmenttrends, make the analysis and formulation of emission policies a difficult problem. Under the totalcontrol targets, the initial allocation of carbon emission defines emission rights of regulated bodies;the abatement mechanism offers emitters flexible mitigation approaches and incentive policies, all ofwhich are of important theoretical and realistic significance for promoting energy saving, emissionreduction and coordinated economy-society development.
This paper, following the Scientific Outlook on Development and Sustainable Developmenttheory, based on the externality theory, public goods theory, property rights theory and comparativeadvantage theory, proposes gradient abatement framework according to domestic carbon emissionperformance and reduction cost, designs a free distribution model with two-stage optimization offairness and efficiency and a uniform-price auction allocation mechanism of emission rights, studiesemitter’s abatement investment decisions under complex conditions, lays out the initialconfigurations of emission rights allocation and abatement mechanisms, meanwhile puts forward theregulatory policies for effective emission reduction using by the methods of normative analysis andempirical analysis. The specific research contents and innovations are as follows:
1. Puts forward the basic framework of carbon emission reduction
Based on carbon emissions and GDP of Chinese30provinces, the co-integration and causality ofcarbon emissions and economic growth for both China and each province are explored. Using bynon-parameter DEA method, the environmental directional distance function and shadow price areestimated, meanwhile the carbon emission efficiency and the reduction cost among provinces areevaluated and compared. Results show that, there exists close relation between the carbon emissionefficiency and the level of economic development, resources and energy utilization efficiency andother factors; in addition, the developed eastern coastal and central provinces with high level ofenergy utilization have high emission efficiency, while the carbon emission efficiency of the minorundeveloped central and western regions with rich resources is much lower. Furthermore, the turningpoint appeared in2002, and the shadow price of carbon emissions during1996-2010firstly rosebefore2002and then gradually declined. Based on K-means clustering, in which the clusteringindices covering the provincial distance function, the shadow price of carbon emissions, growth rate of carbon emissions and economic output, Chinese30provinces are divided into three zones: steepslope zone, flat zone and plateau zone. According to the emission characteristics of three zones,recommended policies containing “guaranteeing economic growth, implementing small-degreereduction”,“first strength reduction, then total control” and “slightly strict total control” areprovided.
2. Designs the initial allocation scheme of carbon emission rights
According to the panel data of Chinese energy structure, energy intensity, economic growth,industrial structure and population size in1996-2010, the total carbon emissions can be resolved toemissions from “3industries” and “3energies”(coal, oil, natural gas) using by the logarithmic meanDivisia index decomposition method. Results show that for Chinese carbon emissions growth, thepositive driving factors contributed most is per capita GDP, which followed by energy structure andpopulation; the negative inhibiting factors are, in order, energy intensity and industrial structure.
Taking carbon emissions, economic output, population, energy structure, industrial structure andforest areas as the fairness indices, and carbon intensity as the efficiency index, a free allocationmodel with two-level optimization is proposed. The objective for the first level optimization isfairness maximization, in which the index weights were calculated by method of information entropy;while the second level optimization is to pursue maximum of efficiency. Based on the two-leveloptimization model and data from2006-2010, the carbon emission rights allocation scheme forChinese30provinces in2011is obtained. Allocation for2016is on the basis of data from2011-2015,and so on.
According to the auction theory, a uniform-price and asymmetric private value auction allocationmechanism is established. Moreover, the weakly dominant bidding strategies and linear equilibriumbidding strategies for bidders were given by equilibrium analysis. The impact of the reserve price onthe equilibrium results is also discussed. Based on this auction model, the carbon emissions auctionfor Anhui province in2015were calculated, and the auction schemes with and without reserve pricewere compared also. Results indicate that, under higher reserve price the government’s auctionrevenue would increase while the turnover fall; in addition, by contrast of constant bidding strategy,the volume and revenue in the two adjusted schemes are improved, meanwhile between the twoschemes, the turnover of the scheme with higher total pay is higher too.
3. Studies enterprise’s reduction investment decision under uncertainties
After discussing the basic principle and main contents of the emission reduction mechanism, thesources, main types, potential economic impacts and measurement method of uncertainty in carbonemissions reduction are analyzed. Making a domestic power generation company as an example, areal-options abatement investment model is built, in which exogenous uncertainties including theprice of electricity, fuel price, the price of carbon emissions and endogenous uncertainties containing technological progress and carbon reduction rate, then the threshold condition of investment,expected investment opportunity and the best proportion of investment subsidies are given. Using bythe sensitivity analysis of parameters, and by the help of Monte Carlo simulation, some importantconclusions can be found: the increase of volatility risk of the carbon price will make investmentthreshold bigger and delay investment; while technological progress, proportion of subsidies andcarbon emission reduction rate have negative impacts on investment threshold and investment time,that is, the faster the technological progress meanwhile the greater of the proportion of reductionsubsides and reduction rates are, the lower the investment threshold and the earlier the investmenttime are, or vice versa.
4. Proposes the basic idea and policy implications of Chinese carbon emission reductionmechanism
Based on systematic comparison of different allocation methods, an allocation scheme of carbonemission rights for China is constructed. Then three flexible mechanisms (ET, CDM and JI) arecompared systematically from differences in cost effectiveness, environmental effectiveness andpolitical feasibility. Although the cost effectiveness of ET is better than that of CDM and JI, itsenvironmental effectiveness and political feasibility are worse. Using a simple reduction investmentgame model including a government and an enterprise, the conditions of utility maximization for thetwo participants are derived. Learn from the successful experience of international emissionreduction mechanism, combined with China specific conditions, the basic scheme for carbonemission reduction is put forward in light of the planning of abatement mechanism, statisticalmonitoring mechanism, incentive-constrain mechanism, and other mechanisms involved, and somereasonable policy suggestions are provided at the same time.
本文以科学发展观和可持续发展理念为指导思想，以外部性理论、公共产品理论、产权理论和比较优势理论为基础，运用规范分析和实证分析相结合的方法，考虑国内各地区碳排放绩效与减排成本提出梯度减排框架，设计公平与效率递阶优化的排放权免费分配模型和基于统一价格的排放权拍卖分配模型，研究复杂环境下排放企业的减排投资决策问题，提出中国碳排放权的初始分配与减排机制的初步构想，并给出促进有效减排的对策建议。具体研究内容与创新性工作如下：
（1）提出中国碳减排的基本框架
利用中国30个省级地区的碳排放与国内生产总值面板数据，从全国以及省域层面，分析碳排放与经济增长的协整关系和因果关联。运用非参数DEA方法，估算各省环境方向距离函数和影子价格，评价并比较各省碳排放效率与减排成本。发现碳排放效率与经济发展水平、资源禀赋和能源利用效率等因素间存在密切关系，并且经济发达、能源利用水平高的东部沿海地区和部分中部省份具有较高的排放效率；而经济落后、资源丰富的的少数中部及西部地区的碳排放效率明显较低。同时，以2002年为拐点，1996-2010年碳排放的影子价格呈先上涨后缓慢下降的变化趋势。以省域距离函数、碳排放影子价格、碳排放增长率和经济产值为聚类指标，把30个省域划分成陡坡区、平缓区和高原区三个不同的区域。剖析三大区域的排放特征，建议分别施以“保增长、缓减排”、“先强度减排、后总量控制”以及“较为严格的总量控制”政策。
（2）设计碳排放权初始分配模型
运用对数平均Divisia指数分解法，将中国碳排放总量分解为“3次产业”、“3类能源”（煤炭、石油、天然气）产生的碳排放总和。发现1996-2010年间对中国碳排放量增长贡献最大的正向驱动因素为人均GDP，其次是能源结构和人口总量；负向抑制因素的贡献大小依次为能源强度、产业结构。以碳排放均值、经济产值、人口、能源结构、产业结构和森林面积作为公平指标，以分配后的地区碳强度作为效率指标，构建公平与效率两级优化的免费分配模型。第一级优化以公平性最大为目标，利用信息熵法确定指标权重；第二级优化则追求效率最大化。利用该分配模型，以2006-2010年的相关数据为基础，测算中国省级地区2011年的碳排放权分配结果。2016年的碳权分配则取2011-2015年的数据予以估算，以此类推。
依据相关拍卖理论，建立基于统一价格的碳排放权拍卖分配机制。利用均衡分析，得出竞买人的弱占优报价策略和线性均衡报价策略。分析保留价对均衡结果的影响。运用这一拍卖模型对安徽省2015年的碳排放权拍卖进行了测算，并比较有、无保留价情形下分配方案的变化，发现较高的保留价使成交量下降但政府收益增加；与报价策略不变时相比，两种调整方案均提高了成交量和政府收益，其中，支付费用总和较高的方案其成交量也较高。
（3）研究不确定环境下的企业减排投资决策
系统阐述减排机制的基本原理与主要内容，深入分析碳减排中不确定性的来源、主要类型和潜在经济影响及其度量方法。以国内典型发电企业为例，构建包含电力价格、燃料价格、碳排放价格等外生不确定性和技术进步、碳减排率等内生不确定性因素的实物期权减排投资模型，求解得到投资阈值、投资期望首达时间和最佳投资补贴比例解析条件。利用参数敏感性分析，并借助蒙特卡罗模拟，发现碳价波动风险的增大将提高投资阈值并延迟投资，而技术进步、补贴比例和碳减排率与投资阈值、投资时点间存在负相关性，即技术进步越快、补贴比例越大、碳减排率越高，则投资阈值越低、投资时点越早，反之相反。
（4）提出中国碳减排的基本构想与政策建议
基于对不同分配方式的利弊分析和综合比较，给出国内的排放权初始分配方式选择的思路。比较研究三种灵活机制（排放贸易ET、清洁发展机制CDM和联合履约JI）在成本有效性、环境有效性和政治可行性等方面的差异，指出ET的成本有效性优于CDM和JI，而环境有效性和政治可行性则不如CDM和JI。利用一个包括政府与企业两个参与者的简单减排投资博弈模型，推导得到两主体的效用最大化条件。借鉴国际减排机制的成功经验，结合中国具体国情，从减排机制的选择，统计监测机制、激励约束机制和相关配套机制的设计等层面，提出国内碳减排的初步构想，并给出相应的政策建议。
The situation of greenhouse gases (dominated by carbon dioxide) abatement has been increasinglygrim along with the warming global climate and the frequent extreme disasters in recent years.Carbon mitigation has already become one of the environmental&economic research hot spots.Multiple complex characteristics of carbon emission reduction, including environmental variability,extensiveness of those regulated, diversity of reduction approaches and uncertainty of developmenttrends, make the analysis and formulation of emission policies a difficult problem. Under the totalcontrol targets, the initial allocation of carbon emission defines emission rights of regulated bodies;the abatement mechanism offers emitters flexible mitigation approaches and incentive policies, all ofwhich are of important theoretical and realistic significance for promoting energy saving, emissionreduction and coordinated economy-society development.
This paper, following the Scientific Outlook on Development and Sustainable Developmenttheory, based on the externality theory, public goods theory, property rights theory and comparativeadvantage theory, proposes gradient abatement framework according to domestic carbon emissionperformance and reduction cost, designs a free distribution model with two-stage optimization offairness and efficiency and a uniform-price auction allocation mechanism of emission rights, studiesemitter’s abatement investment decisions under complex conditions, lays out the initialconfigurations of emission rights allocation and abatement mechanisms, meanwhile puts forward theregulatory policies for effective emission reduction using by the methods of normative analysis andempirical analysis. The specific research contents and innovations are as follows:
1. Puts forward the basic framework of carbon emission reduction
Based on carbon emissions and GDP of Chinese30provinces, the co-integration and causality ofcarbon emissions and economic growth for both China and each province are explored. Using bynon-parameter DEA method, the environmental directional distance function and shadow price areestimated, meanwhile the carbon emission efficiency and the reduction cost among provinces areevaluated and compared. Results show that, there exists close relation between the carbon emissionefficiency and the level of economic development, resources and energy utilization efficiency andother factors; in addition, the developed eastern coastal and central provinces with high level ofenergy utilization have high emission efficiency, while the carbon emission efficiency of the minorundeveloped central and western regions with rich resources is much lower. Furthermore, the turningpoint appeared in2002, and the shadow price of carbon emissions during1996-2010firstly rosebefore2002and then gradually declined. Based on K-means clustering, in which the clusteringindices covering the provincial distance function, the shadow price of carbon emissions, growth rate of carbon emissions and economic output, Chinese30provinces are divided into three zones: steepslope zone, flat zone and plateau zone. According to the emission characteristics of three zones,recommended policies containing “guaranteeing economic growth, implementing small-degreereduction”,“first strength reduction, then total control” and “slightly strict total control” areprovided.
2. Designs the initial allocation scheme of carbon emission rights
According to the panel data of Chinese energy structure, energy intensity, economic growth,industrial structure and population size in1996-2010, the total carbon emissions can be resolved toemissions from “3industries” and “3energies”(coal, oil, natural gas) using by the logarithmic meanDivisia index decomposition method. Results show that for Chinese carbon emissions growth, thepositive driving factors contributed most is per capita GDP, which followed by energy structure andpopulation; the negative inhibiting factors are, in order, energy intensity and industrial structure.
Taking carbon emissions, economic output, population, energy structure, industrial structure andforest areas as the fairness indices, and carbon intensity as the efficiency index, a free allocationmodel with two-level optimization is proposed. The objective for the first level optimization isfairness maximization, in which the index weights were calculated by method of information entropy;while the second level optimization is to pursue maximum of efficiency. Based on the two-leveloptimization model and data from2006-2010, the carbon emission rights allocation scheme forChinese30provinces in2011is obtained. Allocation for2016is on the basis of data from2011-2015,and so on.
According to the auction theory, a uniform-price and asymmetric private value auction allocationmechanism is established. Moreover, the weakly dominant bidding strategies and linear equilibriumbidding strategies for bidders were given by equilibrium analysis. The impact of the reserve price onthe equilibrium results is also discussed. Based on this auction model, the carbon emissions auctionfor Anhui province in2015were calculated, and the auction schemes with and without reserve pricewere compared also. Results indicate that, under higher reserve price the government’s auctionrevenue would increase while the turnover fall; in addition, by contrast of constant bidding strategy,the volume and revenue in the two adjusted schemes are improved, meanwhile between the twoschemes, the turnover of the scheme with higher total pay is higher too.
3. Studies enterprise’s reduction investment decision under uncertainties
After discussing the basic principle and main contents of the emission reduction mechanism, thesources, main types, potential economic impacts and measurement method of uncertainty in carbonemissions reduction are analyzed. Making a domestic power generation company as an example, areal-options abatement investment model is built, in which exogenous uncertainties including theprice of electricity, fuel price, the price of carbon emissions and endogenous uncertainties containing technological progress and carbon reduction rate, then the threshold condition of investment,expected investment opportunity and the best proportion of investment subsidies are given. Using bythe sensitivity analysis of parameters, and by the help of Monte Carlo simulation, some importantconclusions can be found: the increase of volatility risk of the carbon price will make investmentthreshold bigger and delay investment; while technological progress, proportion of subsidies andcarbon emission reduction rate have negative impacts on investment threshold and investment time,that is, the faster the technological progress meanwhile the greater of the proportion of reductionsubsides and reduction rates are, the lower the investment threshold and the earlier the investmenttime are, or vice versa.
4. Proposes the basic idea and policy implications of Chinese carbon emission reductionmechanism
Based on systematic comparison of different allocation methods, an allocation scheme of carbonemission rights for China is constructed. Then three flexible mechanisms (ET, CDM and JI) arecompared systematically from differences in cost effectiveness, environmental effectiveness andpolitical feasibility. Although the cost effectiveness of ET is better than that of CDM and JI, itsenvironmental effectiveness and political feasibility are worse. Using a simple reduction investmentgame model including a government and an enterprise, the conditions of utility maximization for thetwo participants are derived. Learn from the successful experience of international emissionreduction mechanism, combined with China specific conditions, the basic scheme for carbonemission reduction is put forward in light of the planning of abatement mechanism, statisticalmonitoring mechanism, incentive-constrain mechanism, and other mechanisms involved, and somereasonable policy suggestions are provided at the same time.
引文
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