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商标法上的混淆可能性研究
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摘要
依据我国现行商标法,“相同∕近似”标准为商标侵权判定标准,即只要在相同或类似商品上使用相同或近似商标便可以认定存在商标侵权,而不管消费者是否存在混淆可能性。“相同∕近似”标准一方面过分保护商标专用权,容易形成“符号暴力”;另一方面存在“商品类似”、“商标近似”、“混淆可能性”和“商标侵权”之间的逻辑关系错误。比较外国立法例,多数国家都以混淆可能性为商标侵权判定标准,而商品类似和商标近似只是评估混淆可能性的考量因素之一,除这两个因素外还包括被告意图、实际混淆、商标强度等多种因素。因此,确立混淆可能性在我国商标法中的基础性地位具有重要意义。本文试图以混淆可能性的正当性为逻辑起点,以混淆可能性的发展为主线,以“多因素检测方法”为视角,指出我国立法之不足,并提出构建意见。
     在研究方法上,主要采用了比较分析法、案例分析法、跨学科分析法。比较分析法几乎贯穿整个论文。本文收集和消化了大量的美国、欧盟、加拿大相关资料,并对我国立法进行横向比较。与外国商标立法相比,我国商标立法最大的不足便是未确立混淆可能性在我国商标侵权判定过程中的基础性地位。在论证过程中,文章援引了大量国内外经典案例:如美国ATMOS时钟案、STEINWAY案、BIGFOOT案;欧盟CANON案、SABEL案;加拿大BARBIE案;我国蓝色风暴案、红河红案、鳄鱼案等。在论述消费者时,引入“消费者认知行为模式”对“合理谨慎消费者”及“消费者注意力”进行跨学科分析。除以上三种主要分析方法外,为论证需要还应用了历史分析法、辩证分析法等。
     本文的主要创新之处在于,通过对商标价值形成过程的研究,认为商标的价值形成经过了两个阶段:第一阶段,商标注册人选择一个既存的符号或创造一个新的符号与商品相结合,作为商标投入流通领域;第二阶段,当商标开始流通后,消费者开始认可该商标。这个阶段尤为重要,因为消费者对商标的认可程度决定了应该授予商标的保护程度。既然商标注册人与消费者都对商标价值形成付出了努力,商标注册人与消费者就应该成为商标的共同权利人。作为商标价值的共同创造人消费者理应受到商标制度保护,而混淆可能性恰当保护了商标注册人和消费者的利益,实现了利益平衡。
     在结构上,文章分为六部分,约十八万字。
     第一章论证了以消费者混淆可能性评估商标侵权的正当性,并详述了混淆可能性的概念、起源、发展及功能。首先,研究支撑商标混淆可能性制度的法哲学基础。传统的功利主义和经济理论追逐财富最大化与经济效率,过分扩大对商标注册人的保护范围,轻视了对消费者权利的保护,导致了商标注册人与消费者之间的利益失衡,因此无法证明混淆可能性制度的正当性。社会规划理论肯定了消费者在商标价值创造过程中的作用,认为是商标注册人与消费公众共同创造了商标价值。从这个意义上讲,消费者有权免于使用任何可能引起自身混淆的商标。然而,该理论本身也存在一定缺陷,如该理论中的“分配正义”在认定上具有主观性,难以在司法实践中形成统一的司法认知,不利于保护商标注册人利益,而且有碍自由竞争。因此,将二者相结合,以“经济—社会规划论”为混淆可能性法哲学基础较为合理。其次,文章从商标功能角度界定了混淆可能性概念,认为广义混淆可能性概念更为合理。再次,对混淆可能性的起源及发展历程进行梳理。在商标保护初期,法院通常依据欺诈理论追究行为人的侵权责任。然而,欺诈理论本身并不能充分保护商标注册人和消费者利益,因此法院开始寻求新的混淆可能性标准评估商标侵权案件。最初的混淆可能性理论仅指消费者对商品来源的混淆,随后出现了初始利益混淆、售后混淆和反向混淆等。最后,混淆可能性既厘清了商标专用权范围,又恰当地平衡了商标注册人、消费者与其他竞争者之间的利益关系。
     第二章探讨了混淆可能性在司法实践中的两种存在形式,混淆可能性推定与混淆可能性判定。混淆可能性推定规则适用于相同商标应用在相同商品上的案件,而混淆可能性判定规则适用于相同商标应用在类似商品上以及相似商标应用在类似商品上的案件。在混淆可能性的具体适用上,各国通常采用“多因素检测方法”,一般包括消费者因素、商标因素、商品因素、被告意图因素、实际混淆五类因素。在“多因素检测方法”框架下,各因素之间具有一定的灵活性与相关性。每个因素都是可变的、相对的,并且在个案中的作用具有变量特性。因此,法院在审理具体案件时,不应过分重视单个因素,应将其他诸因素综合起来作为“混合体”加以考虑。
     第三章从司法模式与消费者认知行为模式出发,诠释了“理性消费者”的含义并考量了评估消费者注意力水平的相关因素。该部分试图通过将发展完善的消费者行为理论与盲动的司法实践相结合,以弥合这种理论与实践的裂缝。在消费者注意力水平的评估上,法院通常依据商品价格、购买行为持续的时间及复杂程度、购买行为的频繁性、购买者自身的条件、购买者类型等因素判断。
     第四章研究了商标因素在混淆可能性认定过程中的具体适用。商标因素具体包括商标强度和商标相似度。从商标强度来说,商标越强保护范围越广泛,商标越弱保护范围越狭小。值得注意的是,商标强度不等于商标的显著性,而是商标显著性与商标知名度的融合。同时,强和弱的划分是相对的,只是为了分析的便利,事实上更多的商标处于广泛的中间地带。此外,商标强度具有动态性,在具体认定过程中必须结合商标诞生之初的概念强度和涉诉时的商业强度综合判断。从商标法意义上的商标相似性来说,是一种“混淆性近似”,单纯的商标在物理意义或者自然状态下的近似事实是不够的。认定商标相似性需要以普通消费者的一般注意力为标准,在商标使用背景下对商标进行通体观察并着重比较商标的主要部分,同时依据现实市场条件对商标隔离比较与并行比较,此外还需考虑商标强度、商标使用的特定历史和实际使用情形。在具体比较时,以音、形、义为分析结构。
     第五章分析了商品因素在混淆可能性认定过程中的具体适用。法律对商品保护范围经历了从竞争规则到相同描述属性规则再到商标类似规则的演变。商品或服务的保护范围以避免消费者混淆为必要限度。在商标相同或相似的具体认定上,法院往往依据商品分类表与区分表、商品功能和商品属性、商标强度与相似度、商品之间的竞争关系、商品质量、销售渠道、商品多元化与自然扩张七个方面加以考量。
     第六章反思我国商标侵权检测标准的立法现状及不足,并提出构建意见。在立法宗旨上,我国现行商标法侧重保护商标注册人,对消费者利益关注较少,引起了商标当事人利益的失衡。我国《商标法》正文避开了混淆可能性概念,对此只字未提,虽然在后来的司法解释中引入了混淆可能性概念,但并未确立混淆可能性的基准性地位。我国现行法律以“相同∕近似”标准认定商标侵权,即无论是否造成相关公众的混淆,只要在相同或类似商品上使用相同或近似商标的行为都可以认定为商标侵权。“相同∕近似”标准,违背了商标基本功能,容易形成“符号暴力”,而且存在着“商标相似或商品类似、混淆可能性、商标侵权”三者关系定位的逻辑错误。建议:首先,重新定位商标法立法宗旨。恰当的立法旨趣应当以保护商标注册人和防止消费者混淆为核心,同时以维护公平竞争为目的;其次,厘清“商标相似或商品类似、混淆可能性、商标侵权”三者关系,以混淆可能性为商标侵权判定标准。再次,以“多因素检测方法”评估混淆可能性,包括实际混淆程度、商标相似性、商标强度、商品类似性、消费者注意力水平、被告意图等一切与案件事实相关的因素。
According to China's current law,"Identical/Similarity" standard is trademarkinfringement test, namely, as long as using identical or similar trademark on identical orsimilar products can be hold trademark infringement, regardless of whether consumers areconfused. On one hand,"Identical/Similarity" standard excessively widens the scope ofprotection to trademark owners, which are easy to form "symbolic violence". On the otherhand, there are logical relationship errors among "similarity of trademarks","Proximity ofproducts or services","Likelihood of confusion" and "trademark infringement". Comparingwith foreign legislation,"likelihood of confusion" is the criterion of trademark infringementin most jurisdictions of the world, while "similarity of trademarks" and "Proximity ofproducts" are only two assessing factors in the judge. In addition to "similarity of trademarks"and "Proximity of products", there are still other consideration factors such as defendant'sintent, actual confusion, strength of trademark and the degree of care employed by consumers.It is important to correct our unreasonable "Identical/Similarity" test and establish "likelihoodof confusion" criterion. This article is intended to start with legitimacy of likelihood ofconfusion, put the development of likelihood of confusion as the main line and in the view ofmulti-factor test in order to have a deep study on likelihood of confusion theory, aiming topoint out China's legislation deficiency and propose the construction opinions.
     The paper mainly uses comparative analysis, case analysis, interdisciplinary analysis.Method of comparative analysis and case analysis are almost throughout the entire thesis. Onthe basis of collecting and digesting large amounts of related materials about United States,European Union and Canada, the paper reaches a conclusion that the biggest deficiency ofChina's trademark law is lack of fundamental criterion of likelihood of confusion. In theprocess of argumentation, the article quoted a large number of domestic and foreign classicalcases, such as ATMOS clock case of USA, CANON case of EU, BARBIE case of Canada andBlue Storm case of China. When comes to consumer, the article introduces "consumerbehavior model" and give a interdisciplinary analysis to "reasonable prudent consumer" and"the degree of care". In addition to the above three major analysis methods, the article stilluses historical analysis and dialectical analysis.
     The main innovation of this paper is the idea about "common authors" model. By studying on the formation of brand value, there are two stages in fact: in the first stage,trademark registrant selects an existing symbol or creates a new symbol as his trademark andputs into market; in the second stage, consuming public begin to recognize the trademark.This stage is particularly important, because the degree of recognition decides the scope thetrademark protection at last. Since trademark registrant and consumers both contribute tobrand value, they are entitled to be common authors. In a result, consuming public as thecommon creator of trademark value should be protected, and likelihood of confusion testproperly achieves the balance of interests between trademark registrant and consumers.
     In the structure, the paper is divided into six parts, and the total amount is about180,000words.
     PartⅠ demonstrates the jurisprudence of "Likelihood of confusion" and recounts theconception, genesis, development and functions of "Likelihood of confusion". First of all, thechapter has a research on jurisprudence of "Likelihood of confusion". Utilitarian andeconomic theory cannot justify "Likelihood of confusion", because the theory goes afterwealth maximization and economic efficiency, excessively widens the scope of protection totrademark owners, paying less attention to consumer rights, leading to interest unbalancesbetween trademark owner and consuming public at last. Social-planning theory confirms therole of consumers played in the process of brand value creation, holding that trademark ownerand consuming public create brand value together. In this sense, consuming public are entitledto be protected from trademark confusion. While there are still some disadvantages.Forexample, the conception of "distributive justice" belongs to subjective recognition,thereforeit is difficult to reach a uniform judicial notice in practice. In addition, the theory itselfovertones planned economy color, so it goes against trademark owner's rights to be confusedby trademark uses and impedes the free competition. In conclusion, adopting the combinationof the two theories as the foundation of likelihood of confusion is much better. Secondly, thechapter defines the concept of likelihood of confusion in the view of trademark functions, andagrees with the definition of likelihood of confusion in broad sense. Thirdly, the chaptercombs the genesis and development of likelihood of confusion. In early period,the courtsusually based on fraud theory to hold liability of trademark infringement. However, fraudtheory could not protect trademark owner and consuming public adequately. Therefore, thecourt began to look for new trademark infringement test: likelihood of confusion. Initially,likelihood of confusion only referred to source confusion of goods at sale, subsequently expanded to initial interest confusion, post-sale confusion, reverse confusion and so on. Lastly,likelihood of confusion not only clarifies the scope of exclusive right, but also properlybalances the interests of trademark owner, consumer and other competitors.
     PartⅡ explores two forms of likelihood of confusion existing in judicial practice,presumption and determination. Presumption rules apply to identity case, namely, identicalmark using on identical product, and determination rules are adequate for the other casesexcept there is no trademark infringement, including similar marks using on identical goodsand similar marks using on similar goods. In the specific application of likelihood ofconfusion, most of the countries apply "multi-factor tests" to evaluate likelihood of confusion.By comparison,the test basically consists of five factors, particularly "mark factor","productfactor","consumer factor","defendant's intent" and "actual confusion". According to"multi-factor tests", there are flexibility and interrelatedness among the factors. Each factor ismutable and relative. As a result, when judging a certain case, the court should not put toomuch emphasis on individual factors, while related factors may be consolidated forconsideration.
     PartⅢ from judicial model and consumer cognitive behavior model, interprets themeaning of "rational consumer" and takes related factors which will evaluate the level ofconsumer attention into accounts. This part tries to combine developed consumer cognitivebehavior with judicial practice so that it can heal the gaps between theory and practice.Meanwhile, this part discusses the factors evaluating the level of consumer attention, such asthe price of product, length and complexity of the purchase process, frequency of purchase,the purchaser's own conditions, the types of the purchaser and so on.
     PartⅣ mainly discusses trademark factor in the course of evaluating likelihood ofconfusion. Trademark factor includes two specific factors, strength of trademark andsimilarity of trademarks. Generally, the higher strength of the trademark, the more protectionto trademark; in contrast, the lower strength the trademark is, the less protection to trademark.Notably, strength of trademark is not equal to the distinctiveness of trademark, but theintegrations of the distinctiveness and the fame. Meanwhile, strong and weak are relative,only for convenience of analysis. In fact, most trademarks lie in extensive intermediate zone.Furthermore, the strength of trademark is variable so that the courts should comprehensivelyconsider both the inherent conceptual strength and commercial strength. In the sense oftrademark law, trademark similarity is confusing similarity, the similarity in physical meaning or nature state is not sufficient. When assesses the similarity of trademarks, there are someprinciples should be obeyed. For examples, focus on the general level of reasonable prudentconsumers, compare the marks in their entireties and put much attention to the main part,consider marks singly or together referring to real market conditions, strength of marks,specific historical and actual uses of mark and so on. In addition, the courts usually applysound, meaning and appearance to analyze the trademarks between the parties.
     PartⅤ analyzes product factor in the course of evaluating likelihood of confusion. Thelaw on commodity protection changed from "competition" rules,"same descriptive property"rules to "related goods" rules. The boundary of product protection is likelihood of confusion.When assesses the Proximity of products s, the courts tend to refer to classification of product,functions and attributes of the products, strength of mark, similarity of marks, competitionrelationships between products, quality of products, sale channels, product diversity andnatural expansion.
     PartⅣ rethinks present legislations and disadvantages of China's trademark infringementtest, and proposes constructed opinions. In the legislative purposes, China's current trademarklaw excessively widens the scope of protection to trademark owners, but pays less attention toconsumer rights. These facts lead to interest unbalances between trademark owner andconsuming public at last. In China's current trademark law text, there is not a "likelihood ofconfusion" concept, said nothing to it. Although referred to "likelihood of confusion" injudicial interpretation later, China's trademark law did not put "likelihood of confusion" in abasic position. According to China's current trademark law, infringement test is"Same Similarity" standard, namely, as long as the actor apply a identical or similar trademarkand use on a identical or similar product, there is a trademark infringement, It doesn't matterwhether consuming public have been confused."Same Similarity" standard violates the basicfunctions of trademark and tends to form "symbolic violence", meanwhile it lies wrongpositions to "similarity of trademarks","Proximity of products","Likelihood of confusion"and "trademark infringement". Suggestions: first of all, relocate the legislative purpose oftrademark law, protect both trademark owners' interest and against consumer confusion, at thesame time maintain free competition. Secondly, make clear the logical relationships among"similarity of trademarks or Proximity of products","likelihood of confusion" and "trademarkinfringement". It is crucial to make "likelihood of confusion" as trademark infringement basictest. Thirdly, applying "multi-factor "to assess "likelihood of confusion", including actual confusion, similarity of marks, strength of mark, Proximity of products, attention level ofreasonable prudent consumers, defendant's intent and all factors related to certain case.
引文
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    2627Lior Zemer,“On the Value of Copyright Theory”, Intellectual Property Quarterly, Vol1,2006, p.60.N. Stephan Kinsella,“Against Intellectual Property”, J. Libertarian Stud., Vol15,2001, p.12.
    29[美]威廉·M.兰德斯、查理德·A.波斯纳,前注[16],第216页。(商标提供给消费者的信息是非常明显的,其帮助消费者对产品或服务的来源或源产地进行识别,但是并不是大多数功利主义理论家所宣称的质量功能。商标的这些功能应该作为进一步探讨的对象。兰德斯和波斯纳主张,商标向人们提供了两种类型的信息。第一种是使消费者得以确认商品来源的信息。这种有关产品来源的信息,使得消费者可以依据自身过去的消费实践和其他消费者的推荐,降低选择商标的成本,从而节约了消费者的搜索成本。第二种是有关产品本身的信息,例如描述性商标除了可以指明商品来源外,也可以描述产品品牌的特性,因此同样可以降低消费者的搜索成本。)
    30Stephen L. Carter,“Owning Whp. Doesn't Exist”,13Harvard J.L.&Pub. Pol'y99,1990, p.105.
    32Viva Moffat,“Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor patents: The Problem of Overlapping Intellectual Property Protection”,Berkeley Technology Law Journal, Vol19,2004, pp.1488-89.(然而,休斯认为,将商标权建立在消费者权利上的理论基础是薄弱的。他主张,商标是制造商的一种表达权,而不是消费者接收信息的权利。事实上,商标通过提供一种维护尊重和识别来源的重要手段满足了财产人格论的识别特性。休斯的观点侧重于商标原则的一方当事人,他的观点提供了对“制造商”的识别,但否认了消费大众的任何作用。)
    33事实上,学者们对该理论的名称并未达成一致性意见。例如,费舍尔认为“社会规划论”是该理论的最佳称号.而Zeme主张“社会与机构规划理论”更为适宜。笔者同意费舍尔的观点,将称该理论为“社会规划论”,因为该名称反映了该理论坚持消费者福利及分配正义等内容。参见William W. Fisher III,“Property and Contract on the Internet”,Chicago-kent Law Review, Vol73,1998, pp.1214–15.
    34J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on trademark and Unfair Competition, West Group press,20054th,§2:4.
    35[英]丹尼斯·劳埃德:《法理学》,许章润译,北京:法律出版社,2007年版,第524页。
    36Jason J. Bosland,“The Culture of Trade Marks: An Alternat.ive Cultural Theory Perspective”, Media&Arts Law Review,Vol10,2005, p.7.
    37张体锐:“商标普通被许可人独立诉权的合理性”,《电子知识产权》,2011年第5期,第66页。
    38Steven Wilf,“Who Authors Trademarks?”, Cardozo Arts&Entertainment Law Journal, Vol17,1999, p.8.
    39Id, p.8.
    40J.Thomas McCarthy, supra note34,§2:2.
    41Lior Zemer, supra note26, p.70.
    42Rockland Mortgage Corp. v. S'holders Funding, Inc.,835F. Supp.182,196,30U.S.P.Q.2d1270,1281(D. Del.1993).
    43Smith v. Chanel, Inc.,402F.2d562,159U.S.P.Q.388(9th Cir.1968).
    4445Top Tobacco, L.P. v. North Atlantic Operating Co., Inc.,509F.3d380,85U.S.P.Q.2d1251(7th Cir.2007).Mishawaka Rubber&Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co.,316U.S.203,86L. Ed.1381,62S. Ct.1022,53U.S.P.Q.323(1942).
    46Mathias Strasser,“The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection Revisited: Putting the Dilution Doctrine into Context”,
    Fordham Intellectual Property, Media&Entertainment Law Journal, Vol10,2006, p.400.
    47Id, supra note11, para26.
    48Id, supra note12, para.18.
    51Id, supra note11, para26.
    52[日]田村善之:《日本知识产权法》,周超、李雨峰、李希同译,北京:知识产权出版社,2011年版,第68页。
    53Kenner Parker Toys, Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc.,963F.2d350cert. denied,506U.S.862(1992).
    54Keith M. Stolte,“How Early Did Anglo-American Trademark Law Begin? An Answer to Schechter’s Conundrum”,Fordham Intellectual Property, Media&Entertainment Law Journal, Vol8,1998, pp.505,506.转引自J. Thomas McCarthy,supra note34,§5:2.
    55Singleton v. Bolton,99Eng. Rep.661(K.B.1783).转引自J. Thomas McCarthy, supra note34,§5:2.
    56M.P. McKenna,“The Normp.ive Foundations of Trademark Law”, Notre Dame Law Review, Vol82,2007, pp.1839,1857.
    57Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf,240U.S.403,412,36S. Ct.357(1916).转引自J. Thomas McCarthy, supra note34,§5:2.
    58J. Thomas McCarthy, supra note34,§2:14.
    59Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. D. Trainer&Sons,101U.S.51,55,62(1879).转引自Leah Chan Grinvald,“Making Much AdoAbout Theory:The Chinese Trademark Law”, Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review, Vol15,2008, p53.
    60Dodge Stationery Co. v. Dodge,145Cal.380,78P.879(1904).
    61J. Thomas McCarthy, supra note34,§23:5.
    62J. Thomas McCarthy, supra note34,§5:6.
    63J. Thomas McCarthy, supra note34,§23:10.
    64Anne M. McCarthy,“The post-sale confusion: Why the General Public should be Included in the Likelihood of ConfusionInquiry?”, Fordham Law Review, Vol67,1999, p.3337.
    65Ferrari S.p.A. Esercizio Fabriche Automobili e Corse v. McBurnie,11U.S.P.Q.2d1843,1989WL298658(S.D. Cal.1989).
    66Richard L.Kirkpp.rick, Likelihood of Confusion in Trademark Law, Practising Law Institute press,1995,§1:4.
    67Syntex Lab.Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co.,437F.2d566,568(2d Cir.1971).
    68United Stp.es v. Hon,904F.2d803,807,14U.S.P.Q.2d1959,1962n.2(2d Cir.1990)(在相关的立法沿革与制定法修订中都没有排除在仿冒案件中的购买者和非购买者的混淆); Commc'ns Sp.ellite Corp. v. Comcet, Inc.,429F.2d1245,166U.S.P.Q.353,356(4th Cir.1970)(包括消费者、供应商、投资者、雇工和普通公众).
    69In re Decombe,9U.S.P.Q.2d1812,1814-15(T.T.A.B.1988).(混淆可能性并不局限于争议产品的购买者,而是可能产生于任何分配过程阶段).
    70Richard L. Kirkpp.rick, supra note66,§1.7.
    71J. Thomas McCarthy, supra note34,§23:6.
    72Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc.,94F.3d376,39U.S.P.Q.2d1990,1995(7th Cir.1996).
    73Promp.ek v. Equitrac,300F.3d808,812-13,63U.S.P.Q.2d2018,2021(7th Cir.2002).
    74李雨峰:“迷失的路——论搜索引擎服务商在商标法上的注意义务”,《学术论坛》,2009年第5期,第63页。
    75J. Thomas McCarthy, supra note34,§23:14.
    76Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper Corp.,192F.3d633,52U.S.P.Q.2d1035(7th Cir.1999).
    77Id, supra note9.
    78Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp.,818F.2d254(2d Cir.1987).
    80Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp.,174F.3d1036,50U.S.P.Q.2d1545(9th Cir.1999).
    82Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communicp.ions Corp.,354F.3d1020,1034–1035,69U.S.P.Q.2d1417,1427(9thCir.2004).
    83E. Goldman,“Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law”, Emory law Journal, Vol54,2005, p.566.
    84Interstellar Starship Services, Ltd. v. Epix, Inc.,304F.3d936,64U.S.P.Q.2d1514(9th Cir.2002)(但是法院指出,如果商标本身并不著名或不具有立即识别性,那么初始兴趣混淆也不会必然发生)
    85Lamparello v. Falwell,420F.3d309,76U.S.P.Q.2d1024(4th Cir.2005).
    86Australian Gold, Inc. v. Hp.field,436F.3d1228(10th Cir.2006).
    89Niki. R. Woods,“Initial Interest Confusion in Metagas Cases: The Move from Confusion to Diversion”, Berkeley
    Technology Law Journal, Vol22,2007, p393.
    9091Tdata Inc. v. Aircraft Technical Publishers,411F. Supp.2d901,908(S.D. Ohio.2006).Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, LP,423F.3d539(6th Cir.2005).
    93Niki. R. Woods, supar note89, p.410.
    9495Id, supra note8.Checkpoint Systems, Inc. v. Check Point Software Technologies, Inc.,269F.3d270,60U.S.P.Q.2d1609(3d Cir.2001).
    96Nike, Inc. v.“Just Did It” Enterprises,6F.3d1225,28U.S.P.Q.2d1385,1388(7th Cir.1993).
    97Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int'l, Ltd.,998F.2d985,27U.S.P.Q.2d1516(Fed.Cir.1993).
    9899Hermes Intern. v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc.,219F.3d104,55U.S.P.Q.2d1360(2d Cir.2000).Shashank Upadhye,“Trademark Surveys: Identifying the Relevant Universe of Confused Consumers”, Fordham
    Intellectual Property, Media&Entertainment, Vol8,1998, pp.549.571.
    100J. Thomas McCarthy, supar note34,§23:5.
    101Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc.,94F.3d376,39U.S.P.Q.2d1990(7th Cir.1996).
    102例如,在Redken案中,法院表达了对1962年修正案的看法:国会只是试图阐明兰哈姆法典的合理要旨,即当产品流通于市场中时,对消费者混淆可能性的考虑不仅取决于那些实际做出购买决定的人,也包括那些具有购买意愿并考虑购买该产品的人。参见Redken Lab., Inc. v. Clairol Inc.,350F. Supp.1301,1305-06n.10(C.D. Cal.1972).
    103Esercizio v. Roberts,944F.2d1235(6th Cir.1991).
    105Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss&Co.,631F. Supp.735(S.D.N.Y.1985).
    106Rolex Wp.ch U.S.A., Inc. v. Canner,645F. Supp.492-95(S.D. Fla.1986).
    107Commerce Np.. Ins. Services, Inc. v. Commerce Ins. Agency, Inc.,214F.3d432,55U.S.P.Q.2d1098(3d Cir.2000).
    108Sands, Taylor&Wood Co. v. Quaker Op.s Co.,978F.2d947,24U.S.P.Q.2d1001,1010(7th Cir.1992).
    109Banff, Ltd. v. Federp.ed Dep't Stores, Inc.,841F.2d486,6U.S.P.Q.2d1187(2d Cir.1988).
    110J. Thomas McCarthy, supar note34,§23:10.
    111Id, supar note34,§23:10.
    112Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire&Rubber Co.,408F. Supp.1219,189U.S.P.Q.17(D. Colo.1976).
    114Restp.ement Third, Unfair Competition,§20, comment f,1995.
    115兰哈姆法典§32(1)(a),内容如下:任何人在未经注册人同意,在商业中将任何一项已注册标志的复制品、仿冒品、抄袭品或具有欺骗性的伪造品使用在与任何物品或服务有关的销售、提供销售、批发或广告上,并且这种使用有可能引起混淆、误解或欺骗;……应在注册人提出的民事诉讼中承担下文规定的对注册人的补救。根据该条文的规定,足以认定反向混淆行为具有可诉性。事实上,根据欧盟商标法理论,其并不认为“反向混淆”有别于一般的混淆类型,因为“对商标侵权责任认定起决定性作用的是混淆的事实,而不是混淆的‘方向’”。参见Jeremy Phillips, Trade MarkLaw: A Practical Anatomy, Oxford:Oxford University Press,2003,p.351.
    116Banff, Ltd. v. Federp.ed Dep't Stores, Inc.,841F.2d486,6U.S.P.Q.2d1187(2d Cir.1988).
    117J. Thomas McCarthy, supar note34,§24:30-24:43.
    118119Sands, Taylor&Wood Co. v. Quaker Op.s Co.,978F.2d947,24U.S.P.Q.2d1001,1012(7th Cir.1992).Checkpoint Systems, Inc. v. Check Point Software Technologies, Inc.,269F.3d270,60U.S.P.Q.2d1609(3d Cir.2001)
    120A&H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc.,237F.3d198,57U.S.P.Q.2d1097(3d Cir.2000).
    121Altira Group LLC v. Philip Morris Companies Inc.,207F. Supp.2d1193,1200,63U.S.P.Q.2d1438,1443(D. Colo.2002).
    122Freedom Card, Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase&Co.,432F.3d463,478,77U.S.P.Q.2d1515(3d Cir.2005).
    123P.trezzi, LLC v. Maytag Corp.,436F.3d32,40,77U.S.P.Q.2d1641(1st Cir.2006).
    124J. Thomas McCarthy, supar note34,§32:159.
    125Lang v. Retirement Living Publishing Co.,949F.2d576,21U.S.P.Q.2d1041,1046(2d Cir.1991).
    126P.trezzi, LLC v. Maytag Corp.,436F.3d32,77U.S.P.Q.2d1641(1st Cir.2006).
    127J. Thomas McCarthy, supar note34,§23:10.
    12812915U.S.A.1117(a).J. Thomas McCarthy, supar note34,§30:77.
    130J. Thomas McCarthy, supar note34,§30:79.
    131Robert P. Merges,“Comment, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, in Symposium: Toward a Third
    Intellectual Property Paradigm”, Columbia Law. Revivw,Vol94,1994, p.2655.
    132J. Thomas McCarthy, supar note34,§23:1.
    133Lanham Act§32,15U.S.C.§1114(1994).法条内容为:“未经商标注册人同意,在商业中将复制、伪造、仿冒或者欺骗性模仿注册商标的标志用于商品或服务的销售、承诺销售、分销或广告宣传,可能引起混淆、误认或欺骗的行为,应当承担侵权责任。侵权行为还包括‘复制、伪造、仿冒或者欺骗性模仿注册商标,并将其应用到企图在商业中与注册商标商品或服务的销售、承诺销售、分销或广告宣传等方面有关的标签、招牌、印刷品容器或广告上,并可能引起混淆、误认或欺骗’的行为。”此法条为联邦注册商标提供了法律保护依据。Lanham Act§43(a),15U.S.C.§1125(a)(1994).法条内容为:“任何人在商业中,在任何商品或服务或与之有关的方面或商品容器上,使用任何文字、名词、名称、符号或图形,或其组合,或任何虚假的产地标记,对事实进行虚假性或误导性描述或表示,可能引起混淆、错误或欺骗,使人误以为其与他人具有附属关系、联系或联合关系,或误以为其商品或服务或商业活动来源于他人或受到他人赞助或许可的,可以提起民事诉讼行为,追究行为人责任。”本法条对未注册商标同样提供了保护。Lanham Act2(d),15U.S.C.§1052(d)(1994).法条内容为:“凡可用以识别申请人物品与他人物品的商标都不应因其性质拒绝予以注册,但有下列情形之一者除外:(四)包含有与他人已在专利与商标局注册的某一标志十分相似的标志,或者是他人在美国已经在先使用并且尚未放弃的某一标志或商号,而一旦在申请人的物品上使用有可能引起混淆、误解或欺骗。”
    134Utah Lighthouse Ministry v. Foundp.ion for Apologetic Informp.ion and Research,527F.3d1045,86U.S.P.Q.2d1865(10th Cir.2008)(法院认为,商标侵权是不正当竞争的一种)。
    135Inwood Laborp.ories, Inc. v. Ives Laborp.ories, Inc.,456U.S.844, n.14,72L. Ed.2d606,102S. Ct.2182,214U.S.P.Q.1136(1982).Falcon Rice Mill, Inc. v. Community Rice Mill, Inc.,725F.2d336,222U.S.P.Q.197(5th Cir.1984).
    137Dart Drug Corp. v. Schering Corp.,320F.2d745,137U.S.P.Q.848(D.C. Cir.1963).
    138J. Thomas McCarthy, supar note34,§2:7.
    139Ames Publishing Co. v. Walker--Davis Publicp.ions, Inc.,372F. Supp.1,182U.S.P.Q.46(E.D. Pa.1974).
    140李雨峰,前注[5],第46-47页。
    141Pepsico, Inc. v. Grapette Co.,416F.2d285,163U.S.P.Q.193(8th Cir.1969).(消费者可能购买了某个其原以为具有特定质量保证或特殊性能的产品但最终发现实际上所购买的是另外一种产品,而这种损失将被公众在后来的行为中所救济,即公众将很快对该产品失去信心,导致消费者不能获取最初应得的保护)
    142Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Baccarp. Clothing Co.,692F.2d1272,216U.S.P.Q.1083(9th Cir.1982).
    143144Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co.,314F.2d149,136U.S.P.Q.508(9th Cir.1963).Davidoff v. PLD Int'l,263F.3d1297,1301,60U.S.P.Q.2d1046,1048-49(11th Cir.2001).
    145USA Network v. Gannett Co.,584F. Supp.195,198,223U.S.P.Q.678,680(D. Colo.1984).(与商标法保护公众利益与私人利益的双重目的相一致,为证实商标侵权行为,原告必须证明其欲寻求救济商标的有效性并且必须同时证明被告使用了一个有可能引起相关公众混淆的相似性商标…);15U.S.C.§1127(兰哈姆法典的立法目的在于保护那些反对不正当竞争的从事商业交易的人并防止在此商业交易中欺诈与欺骗的发生)。
    146Boston Duck Tours, LP v. Super Duck Tours, LLC,531F.3d1,12,87U.S.P.Q.2d1385(1st Cir.2008).
    147148Dwinell-Wright Co. v. White House Milk Co.,132F.2d822,825,56U.S.P.Q.120(2d Cir.1943).Gucci Am., Inc. v. Action Activewear, Inc.,759F. Supp.1060,1064,19U.S.P.Q.2d1448(S.D.N.Y.1991).
    149Rolex Wp.ch U.S.A., Inc. v. Canner,645F. Supp.484,494-95,1U.S.P.Q.2d1117(S.D. Fla.1986).
    150Elizabeth F. Judge, Daniel Gervial, Intellectual Property: The Law in Canada, Thomson Carswell press,2005, p.257.转引自孔祥俊:《商标与不正当竞争法原理和判例》,北京:法律出版社,2009年版,第258页。
    151Deutsche Renault AG v. Audi AG,Case C-317/91,1995,1CMLR461.15215U.S.C.§1052(d);.15U.S.C.§1063;15U.S.C.§1064.
    153例如,兰哈姆法典§2、15U.S.C.A.§1052规定:“凡可用以识别申请人物品与他人物品的商标都不应因其性质拒绝按主要注册予以注册,但有下列情形之一者除外:……(四)包含有与他人已在专利与商标局注册的某一标志十分相似的标志,或者是他人在美国已经在先使用并且尚未放弃的某一标志或商号,而一旦在申请人的物品上使用有可能引起混淆、误解或欺骗;但如果专利与商标局局长认为,假如对标志或这些标志所适用的物品的使用方式或地点加以一定的条件或限制,从而一个以上的人对相同或相似标志的继续使用不可能引起混淆、误解或欺骗,当这些人在下列特定的时间之前已在商业上共同合法使用因而成为其标志的合法使用人时,则可颁发给他们共同注册。”
    154Restonettes, Inc., v. Coty,264U.S.359,368,44S. Ct.350,(1924).
    155156AMF Incorporp.ed v. Sleekcraft Boars,599F.2d341,(9th Cir.1979).WIPO, Intellectual Property Reading Material, World Intellectual Property Organization press,1998, p.130.
    157Dwinell-Wright Co. v. White House Milk Co.,132F.2d822,825,56U.S.P.Q.120,122(2d Cir.1943).
    158J. Thomas McCarthy, supra note34,§24:12.
    160Stacey. L. Dogan&Mark. A. Lemley,“The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?”, Emory LawJournal, Vol54,2005, p.486.
    162Trademark Directive No.89/104, art.5(1)(a), O.J. L40/1, p.4(1989); Trademark Regulation No.40/94, art.9(1)(a), O.J.L11/1, p.5(1994); GTA,§14(1)(1), p.612.
    163Mathias Strasser, supra note46, p.393.
    16415U.S.C.§1125(a)(1)(A); Trademark Directive No.89/104, art.4(1)(b), O.J. L40/1, p.3(1989); Trademark Regulp.ionNo.40/94art.8(1)(b), O.J. L11/1, p.4(1994); GTA,12,§14(2)(2), p.612.
    165Wendy’s Int’l, Inc. v. Big Bite, Inc.,576F. Supp.816,821(S.D. Ohio1983).
    166167Restatement Third Unfair Competition§21,1995.Richard L. Kirkpp.rick, supra note66,2§4; J. Thomas McCarthy, supra note34,24§30-43.
    168Lord Jeff Knitting Co. v. Warnaco, Inc.,594F. Supp.579,581,225U.S.P.Q.671,672(S.D.N.Y.1984).
    169Pignons S.A. de Mecanique v. Polaroid Corp.,657F.2d482,487,212U.S.P.Q.246,250(1st Cir.1981).
    170Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp.,287F.2d492,495,128U.S.P.Q.411,413(2d Cir.1961).
    171Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc.,721F.2d460(3d Cir.1983).
    172A&H Sportswear v. Victoria's Secret Stores,237F.3d198,215,57U.S.P.Q.2d1097,1105-06(3d Cir.2000).
    173174Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple,747F.2d1522,224U.S.P.Q.185(4th Cir.1984).Oreck Corp. v. U.S. Floor Systems, Inc.,803F.2d166,231U.S.P.Q.634(5th Cir.1986).
    175Frisch's Restaurants v. Elby's Big Boy,670F.2d642,214U.S.P.Q.15(6th Cir.1982).
    176Helene Curtis Industries, Inc. v. Church&Dwight Co.,560F.2d1325,1330,195U.S.P.Q.218,220-221(7th Cir.1977).
    177178SquirtCo v. Seven-Up Co.,628F.2d1086,207U.S.P.Q.897,900(8th Cir.1980).Co-Rect Products, Inc. v. Marvy! Advertising Photography, Inc.,780F.2d1324,1330,228U.S.P.Q.429(8th Cir.1985).
    179AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Bop.s,599F.2d341,204U.S.P.Q.808(9th Cir.1979)(Sleekcraft eight factors).
    180Team Tires Plus, Ltd. v. Tires Plus, Inc.,394F.3d831,73U.S.P.Q.2d1473(10th Cir.2005).
    181182Frehling v. Int'l Select Group,192F.3d1330,1335,52U.S.P.Q.2d1447(11th Cir.1999).In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours&Co.,476F.2d1357,1361,177U.S.P.Q.563(C.C.P.A.1973).
    183Carl Karcher Enters., Inc. v. Stars Rests. Corp.,35U.S.P.Q.2d1125,1128(T.T.A.B.1995).
    184Lloyd Schuhfabric Myer&Co. GmbH v.Klijsen Handel BV, Case C-342/97(ECJ).
    185Mattel U.S.A., Inc. v.3894207Canada Inc,23C.P.R.395(T.M.O.B.2002).
    186参见中华人民共和国最高人民法院民事判决书[2008]民提字第52号。
    187参见中华人民共和国最高人民法院民事判决书[2009]民三终字第3号。在该案中,最高法院认为虽然被告所用标识与拉科斯特公司的系列注册商标均为鳄鱼图形,具有一定相似性,但鳄鱼头部朝向、体型、鳞片、颜色均与拉科斯特公司主张权利的鳄鱼图形不同。而且,双方之间的诉争商标在相关市场中具有特殊的形成和发展历程,有特殊的使用和共存方式。同时,鳄鱼国际公司的行为没有刻意模仿名牌奢侈品的故意,主观上并无利用拉科斯特公司的品牌声誉并引起消费者混淆的故意。法院总结说,在认定商标是否侵权时仅仅比对标识本省的近似性是不够的,还必须综合考量鳄鱼国际公司的主观意图、双方共存和使用的实力与现状等因素,综合相关市场实际,进行公平合理判断。值得注意的是,我国商标侵权评估现状主要是依据“相同∕近似”标准,即在相同或类似商品上使用相同或近似商标即为侵权,因此我国司法实践中主要是依据混淆可能性评估商标近似或商品类似,这一点上区别于其他国家。
    188Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss&Co.,799F.2d867,230U.S.P.Q.831(2d Cir.1986).
    189Resorts of Pinehurst, Inc. v. Pinehurst Np.ional Corp.,148F.3d417,47U.S.P.Q.2d1465(4th Cir1998)(大量的实际混淆证据支持简易判决中的可能性混淆和侵权认定). See Restatement Third, Unfair Competition§23, comment b (1995)(实际混淆证据的存在是现实市场背景下实际使用两个足以引起混淆产生的相似性名称的直接证据……令人信服的大量实际混淆证据通常来说是决定性的).
    190Frostig v. Saga Enterprises, Inc.,272Or.565,539P.2d154,188U.S.P.Q.715(1975)(在证明了实际混淆的情况下,法院作为一种法律事实裁决争议名称间不存在相似性的做法是不恰当的); Chart House, Inc. v. Bornstein,636F.2d9,208U.S.P.Q.865,(1st Cir.1980)(法官仅依据个人对案件的评论作出双方当事人间的争议物品不存在混淆可能性的裁决是不合适的,因为法庭插入个人证据性评论是违法法律的基本原则的).
    191World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick Littrell's New World Carpets,438F.2d482,168U.S.P.Q.609(5th Cir.1971).
    192Beacon Mut. Ins. Co. v. OneBeacon Ins. Group,376F.3d8,71U.S.P.Q.2d1641(1st Cir.2004); TCPIP Holding Co., Inc.v. Haar Communicp.ions, Inc.,244F.3d88,102,57U.S.P.Q.2d1969(2d Cir.2001).
    193Morningside Group Ltd. v. Morningside Capital Group, L.L.C.,182F.3d133,51U.S.P.Q.2d1183(2d Cir.1999).
    194B. D. Communications, Inc. v. Dial Media, Inc.,429F. Supp.1011,195U.S.P.Q.332(S.D.N.Y.1977)(案中认为孤立地或最低限度指示性错误的通信交流是不充分的); Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. R.H. Cosmetics Corp.,204U.S.P.Q.155,1979WL24882(T.T.A.B.1979)(案中认为在五年的时间里由于个体的粗心或疏忽而存在的十封指示性错误信件不会引起任何法律后果).
    195Lang v. Retirement Living Publishing Co.,949F.2d576,21U.S.P.Q.2d1041,1046(2d Cir.1991).
    196George&Co. v. Imagination Entm't Ltd.,575F.3d383,398,91U.S.P.Q.2d1786(4th Cir.2009).
    197198U.S. Structures, Inc. v. J.P. Structures, Inc.,130F.3d1185,45U.S.P.Q.2d1027,1030(6th Cir.1997).International Ass'n of Machinists&Aero. Workers v. Winship Green Nursing Ctr.,103F.3d196,41U.S.P.Q.2d1251(1stCir.1996).
    199Olay Co. v. Cococare Products, Inc.,218U.S.P.Q.(BNA)1028,1040(S.D.N.Y.1982).
    200Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Disc. Drugs,675F.2d1160,216U.S.P.Q.599,604(11th Cir.1982).
    201田平安:《民事诉讼法原理》,福建:厦门大学出版社,2007年版,第247页。
    202Richard L. Kirkpp.rick, supra note66,§7:5.
    203田平安,同前注[201],第250页。
    204J. Thomas McCarthy, supra note34,§23:15.
    205Nora Beverages v. Perrier Group,269F.3d114,124,60U.S.P.Q.2d1038,1044(2d Cir.2001).
    206Fun-Damental Too, Ltd. v. Gemmy Industries Corp.,111F.3d993,42U.S.P.Q.2d1348(2d Cir.1997).
    207Kos v. Andrx,369F.3d700,720,70U.S.P.Q.2d1874,1890(3d Cir.2004).
    208J. Thomas McCarthy, supra note34,§23:15
    209Id,§23:15.
    210Richard L. Kirkpp.rick, supra note66,§7:10.
    211212Dep.h Tobacco, Inc. v. Black Dep.h USA,31U.S.P.Q.2d1899,1905-06(C.D. Cal.1993).Richard L. Kirkpp.rick, supra note66,§7:10.
    213Exxon Corp. v. Tex. Motor Exch. of Houston, Inc.,628F.2d500,507,208U.S.P.Q.384,389-90(5th Cir.1980).
    214Shashank Upadhye, supra note99, p.596.
    215J. Thomas McCarthy, supra note34,§23:15.
    216Richard L. Kirkpp.rick, supra note66,§7:10.
    217Reed-Union Corp. v. Turtle Wax, Inc.,869F. Supp.1304,1311(N.D. Ill.1994), aff'd in part,77F.3d909,912,37
    U.S.P.Q.2d1718,1720-21(7th Cir.1996).
    218Richard L. Kirkpp.rick, supra note66,§7:10.
    219ConAgra, Inc. v. George A. Hormel&Co.,784F. Supp.700,725(D. Neb.1992), aff'd,990F.2d368,370,26U.S.P.Q.2d
    2123016,1318(8th Cir.1993).Miles Labs., Inc. v. Np.urally Vitamin Supplements, Inc.,1U.S.P.Q.2d1445,1460(T.T.A.B.1986).
    221Id, supra note219, at731.
    222James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefep.er, Inc.,540F.2d266,279,192U.S.P.Q.555,565(7th Cir.1976).
    223Richard L. Kirkpp.rick, supra note66,§7:10.
    224Exxon Corp. v. Tex. Motor Exch. of Houston, Inc.,628F.2d500,507,208U.S.P.Q.384,390(5th Cir.1980); Mut. ofOmaha Ins. Co. v. Novak,648F. Supp.905,911,231U.S.P.Q.963,966(D. Neb.1986), aff'd,836F.2d397,400,5U.S.P.Q.2d1314,1317(8th Cir.1987)(10%-11%).
    225Richard L. Kirkpp.rick, supra note66,§7:10.
    226Perlman,“The Restatement of the Law of Unfair Competition: A Work in Progress,” The Trademark Reporter.Vol80,1990, p.472.ZA转引自J. Thomas McCarthy, supra note34,§23:17.
    227Fort James v. Royal Paper,83U.S.P.Q.2d1624,1629(T.T.A.B.2007).
    228A&H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc.,237F.3d198,57U.S.P.Q.2d1097(3d Cir.2000).
    229Richard L. Kirkpp.rick, supra note66,§8:3.
    230231Aetna Casualty&Surety Co. v. Aetna Auto Finance, Inc.,123F.2d582,51U.S.P.Q.435(5th Cir.1941).Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc.,94F.3d376,39U.S.P.Q.2d1990,1996(7th Cir.1996).
    232Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA,109F.3d1394,1405-06,42U.S.P.Q.2d1184(9th Cir.1997).
    233Perlman, supra note226, p.472.
    234J. Thomas McCarthy, supra note34,§23:107.(事实上,该观点在立法中也可以找到理论根据。例如,《法国知识产权法典》L.716—1条规定:“侵害商标所有人权利的,构成侵权,并应承担民事责任。凡违反L.713—2条、L.713—3条及L.713—4条的行为构成侵害商标权的行为。”又如,TRIPS协定第45条第2款规定:“在适当情况下,即使侵权人不知道或没有正当理由应当知道自身从事了侵权活动,成员仍可以授权司法当局责令其返还所得利润或支付法定损害赔偿额。”)
    235Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Delta Cotton Coop., Inc.,457F.3d1269,1278,79U.S.P.Q.2d1576(Fed. Cir.2006).
    236Dodge Stp.ionery Co. v. Dodge,145Cal.380,78P.879(1904).转引自Richard L. Kirkpp.rick, supra note66,§8:1.
    237黄晖,前注[1],2001年版,第237页。
    238Roffler Indus., Inc. v. KMS Research Labs, Inc.,213U.S.P.Q.258,262(T.T.A.B.1982).
    239Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Shinohara Shoji,754F.2d591,596,225U.S.P.Q.540,543(5th Cir.1985).
    240Kevin Blum, Ariel Fox, Christina J.Hayes, and James,“Consistency of Confusion? A Fifteen-Year Revisiting of BartonBeebe's Empirical Analysis of Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement”, Stanford Technology Law Review, Vol3,2010.
    241Richard L. Kirkpp.rick, supra note66,§2:4.
    243Lone Star Steakhouse&Saloon, Inc. v. Alpha of Va., Inc.,43F.3d922,33U.S.P.Q.2d1481,1489(4th Cir.1995).
    244Soc'y of Fin. Exam'rs v. Np.'l Ass'n of Certified Fraud Exam'rs, Inc.,41F.3d233,33U.S.P.Q.2d1328,1332n.15(5th Cir.1995).
    245Frisch's Rest., Inc. v. Shoney's, Inc.,759F.2d1261,1266,225U.S.P.Q.1169,1172(6th Cir.1985).
    246Visible Sys. Corp. v. Unisys Corp.,551F.3d65,73,89U.S.P.Q.2d1194(1st Cir.2008).
    247248Yankee Publ'g, Inc. v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc.,809F. Supp.267,273,25U.S.P.Q.2d1752,1756(S.D.N.Y.1992).Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc.,973F.2d1033,24U.S.P.Q.2d1161,1168(2d Cir.1992).
    249Thane Int'l v. Trek Bicycle,305F.3d894,901,64U.S.P.Q.2d1564,1567(9th Cir.2002).
    250Eclipse Assocs. Ltd. v. Dp.a Gen. Corp.,894F.2d1114,1118,13U.S.P.Q.2d1885,1888(9th Cir.1990).
    251Richard L. Kirkpp.rick, supra note66,§2:5.
    252Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indus., Inc.,30F.3d466,31U.S.P.Q.2d1592,1599n.11(3d Cir.1994).
    253Orient Express Trading Co. v. Federp.ed Dep't Stores, Inc.,842F.2d650,6U.S.P.Q.2d1308,1312(2d Cir.1988).
    254Kos v. Andrx,369F.3d700,711,70U.S.P.Q.2d1874,1884(3d Cir.2004).
    255Lambda Elecs. Corp. v. Lambda Tech., Inc.,515F. Supp.915,211U.S.P.Q.75,85(S.D.N.Y.1981).转引自Richard L.Kirkpp.rick, supra note66,§2:6.
    256Thompson Med. Co. v. Pfizer, Inc.,753F.2d208,225U.S.P.Q.124,129(2d Cir.1985).
    257Homeowners Group, Inc. v. Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc.,931F.2d1100,1110,18U.S.P.Q.2d1587,1595(6th Cir.1991).
    258Interstellar Starship Servs. Ltd. v. Epix, Inc.,304F.3d936,942,64U.S.P.Q.2d1514,1518(9th Cir.2002).
    259依据我国最高人民法院《关于审理商标民事纠纷案件适用法律若干问题的解释》(简称《商标司法解释》)第八条规定:“商标法所称相关公众,是指与商标所标识的某种商品或者服务有关的消费者和与前述商品或者服务的营销有密切关系的其他经营者。”而依据美国商标法15USC§1125(c)(2)(A)对驰名商标的界定“被美国普通消费公众广泛确认为商标所有人的商品或服务的来源指示的商标”可以看出,美国的相关公众即为普通消费公众,并不包括生产领域的经营者和销售领域的销售者。贴附商标的产品只有辗转到消费者的手中,才真正发挥出来了产品的效用。在此过程中,产品的生产者、销售者、消费者对商标所行使的注意力程度是不同的。生产者是商标的使用者,对自身的产品与商标非常了解,即使行为人对其模仿的近乎完美,生产者也很容易分辨识别。销售者在采购产品时,对于同类产品的生产商及其使用的商标也是非常清楚的,因此通常销售者对产品的来源也不会发生混淆。而消费者由于自身知识的有限性,不可能对所需的各种产品信息有全面和深入的了解,即使其在购买行为中行使了很大的注意力程度,仍然可能对产品的来源或赞助关系产生混淆。由此可知,消费者混淆的概率远远大于生产者和销售者。因此,笔者认为在判定商标侵权时,不应以具有专业知识的生产者和销售者的注意力为标准,而是应以普通消费公众的注意力程度为依据。
    260冯珏:“汉德公式的解读与反思”,《中外法学》,2008年第4期,第520页。
    261McLean v. Fleming,96U.S.245,24L. Ed.828(1878).美国其他法院也对“合理谨慎消费者”作出了各种不同的描述:美国联邦地区法院纽约南区法院认为合理谨慎消费者是一个具有“普通智力”的非“文盲”;马萨诸塞州地区法院认为合理谨慎消费者是一个“用最小程度的努力就可以解决自身混淆问题并且对特定市场来说具有普通智力的人”;第二巡回上诉法院认为他必须具有法律意义上应具备的足够高的智商。参见J. Thomas McCarthy, supra note34,§23:92.
    262United States v.88Cases, Bireley's Orange Beverage,187F.2d967(3d Cir.1951), cert. denied,342U.S.861,96L. Ed.
    648,72S. Ct.88(1951).转引自J. Thomas McCarthy, supra note34,§23:92.
    263Florence Mfg. Co. v. J. C. Dowd&Co.,178F.73(2d Cir.1910).转引自J. Thomas McCarthy, supra note34,§23:92.
    264Stork Restaurant v. Sahati,166F.2d348,76U.S.P.Q.374(9th Cir.1948).
    265American Chicle Co. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,208F.2d560,99U.S.P.Q.362(2d Cir.1953).
    266Life Savers Corp. v. Curtiss Candy Co.,182F.2d4,8,85U.S.P.Q.440(7th Cir.1950).
    267笔者认为,“混淆可能”与“混淆可能性”并非是同义语,但是二者之间存在一定的逻辑关系。“混淆可能”既包括客观条件下如争议商标间非常相似而引起的消费者混淆可能,又包含消费者因自身主观条件如疏忽大意或漠不关心情形下的混淆可能。而“混淆可能性”更多地针对的是一种客观事实,消费者因自身原因引起的混淆可能并不能完全囊括其中,如因消费者自身非常愚蠢而对标记非常清晰的商标产生误认。“混淆可能”是一种潜在的混淆,而“混淆可能性”所蕴含的是一种较大程度的客观混淆可能,因此单纯的混淆可能并不一定能够达到混淆可能性的程度。例如,联合国贸发会议贸易与可持续发展委员会在诠释“混淆可能性”时指出,“可能性”是消费者发生实际混淆的较大可能性(a significacant probability)。美国Marrero法官认为:“一些混淆始终是可能的:但是在潜在的可能性与较大的可能性之间必须存在一些标准量。”依据麦卡锡教授的观点,纯粹的“混淆可能”是不够的,“混淆可能”是“混淆可能性”的必要不充分条件。参见J. Thomas McCarthy, supra note34,§23:92,§23:3.
    268J. Thomas McCarthy, supra note34,§23:94.
    269Harms, L.T. C, The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: A Case Book, Gereva, Switzerland: World IntellectualProperty Organization press,2008, p.82.
    270McCormick&Co. v. B. Manischewitz Co.,206F.2d744,98U.S.P.Q367,(6thCir.1953).转引自孔祥俊,前注[150],第283页。
    271Geoffrey, Inc. v.Stratton,16U.S.P.Q.(BNA)1691,1696,C.D.Cal.1990; Intellectual Property and Information Wealth,PeterK. Yu, Praeger, Trademark and Unfair Competition, volume3ed.,2007,p.51.转引自孔祥俊,前注[150],第284页。
    272[瑞士]索绪尔:《普通语言学教程》,巴斯金译,北京:中国社会科学出版社,1999年版,第16页。
    273乐国安:《当代美国认识心理学》,北京:中国社会科学出版社,2001年版,第2页。
    274Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law, Michigan Law Review, Vol103,2005,p.2025.
    275Mountain Road Props., Inc. v. Battaini,806F. Supp.498,25U.S.P.Q.2d1813,1815(D. Vt.1992).
    276[美]德尔I.霍金斯等著:《消费者行为学》,符国群译,北京:机械工业出版社,2007年版,第6页。
    277Thomas R. Lee, Glenn L. Christensen and Eric D.DeRosia,“Trademarks, Consumer Psychology, and the SophisticatedConsumer”, Emory law Journal, Vol57,2008, p.575.
    279当然,这并不是说高度警觉地履行来源识别判断的消费者绝不会被混淆。如果初级用户的商标与高级用户相同,即使消费者进行了彻底的、高度警觉的检查,也无法排除自身的来源混淆。此外,最近的研究表明,如果争议商标具有相同的语义,那么行使高水平注意力的消费者较行使低水平注意力的消费者而言可能更容易被混淆。
    280[美]德尔I.霍金斯等著,前注[276],第15页。
    281同上注,第219页。(深刻影响消费者动机的理论有两种,马斯洛的需要层次理论和麦古尼的心理学动机理论。
    283[美]德尔I.霍金斯等著,前注[276],第288页。
    284Thomas R. Lee, Glenn L. Christensen and Eric D.DeRosia, supra note277, p.575.285
    287Michael J. Houston&Michael L. Rothschild, Conceptual and Methodological Perspectives on Involvement, in ResearchFronters in Marering: Dialoguse and Directions, Chicago: American Markering Association,1978, pp.184,187.
    288[美]斯蒂格勒:《价格理论》,李青元等译,北京:商务印书馆,1992年版,第43页。
    289Utpal M. Dholakia,“A Motivational Process Model of Product Involvement and Consumer Risk Perception”, EuropeanJournal of Marketing, Vol35,2001,pp.1340-1362.
    291[美]德尔I.霍金斯等著,前注[276],第226页。
    293John T. Cacioppo&Richard E. Petty, The Need for Cognition, Journal of personality and Social Psychology, Vol42,1982, p116.转引自Thomas R. Lee, Glenn L. Christensen and Eric D.DeRosia, supra note277, p.575.
    294Barton Beebe, supra note274, p.2025.
    295Thomas R. Lee, Glenn L. Christensen and Eric D.DeRosia, supra note277, p.575.
    296[美]德尔I.霍金斯等著,前注[276],第288页。
    297Deborah J. Maclnnis&Bernard J. Jaworski, Information Processing from Advertisements: Toward an IntegrativeFramework, Journal Marketing, Vol53,1989, p.7.转引自Thomas R. Lee, Glenn L. Christensen and Eric D.DeRosia, supranote277, p.575.
    298[美]德尔I.霍金斯等著,前注[276],第290页。
    299Deborah J. Maclnnis&Bernard J. Jaworski, supra note297, p.7.
    300Arie W. Kruglanski et al, Separate or Equal?: Bimodal Notions of Persuasion and a Single Process “Unimodel,” in ShellyChaiken&Yaacov Trope eds., Dual-process Theories in Social Psychology, NewYork: Guilfod Press,1999,pp.293.298.转引自Thomas R. Lee, Glenn L. Christensen and Eric D.DeRosia, supra note277, p.575.
    301Yany Gregoire,“The Impact of Aging on Consumer Responses: What Do We Know?”, in Elizabeth C. Hirschman&Morris B. Holbrook eds., Advances in Consumer Resports,Vol30,2003, pp.19-22.转引自Thomas R. Lee, Glenn L.Christensen and Eric D.DeRosia, supra note277, p.575.
    302Arie W. Kruglanski et al., supra note300, p.398.
    303H.D. Lee Co. v. Maidenform, Inc.,87U.S.P.Q.2d1715,1726(T.T.A.B.2008).
    304Daddy's Junky Music Stores, Inc. v. Big Daddy's Family Music Ctr.,109F.3d275,42U.S.P.Q.2d1173,1182(6th Cir.1997).
    306Recot, Inc. v. Becton,214F.3d1322,54U.S.P.Q.2d1894(Fed. Cir.2000).
    307Checkpoint Sys.,Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc.,269F.3d270,284(3d Cir.2001).转引自J. Thomas McCarthy,
    supra note34,§23:95.
    308309McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc.,599F.2d1126,1137,202U.S.P.Q.81,92(2d Cir.1979).Magnaflux Corp. v. Sonoflux Corp.,231F.2d669,109U.S.P.Q.313(C.C.P.A.1956).
    310品牌忠诚的概念由学者Copeland首次提出,并在国内外相关文献中存在多种版本的定义。美国著名营销学家Richard L. Oliver将品牌忠诚界定为:一种对偏爱产品或服务的深深承诺,不管市场环境的变化和营销力量的影响,在未来都持续一致地购买和光顾并不发生行为转换,因此产生了购买同一品牌或品牌系列的行为。从消费者心理学角度看:品牌名称是消费者在信息搜索过程中搜集到的一种重要信息,而消费者大脑中存储的这种品牌信息更容易受到扩散激活。品牌代表着记忆中的核心结点,其他相关信息都是以品牌为中心组织起来的。因此,消费者在购物选择时会表现出一定的品牌忠诚。我国学者徐萍认为,品牌忠诚是指由于商品质量、价格、性能等诸多因素的影响,使消费者对某种品牌产生信赖、偏爱和感情,表现为对该品牌商品长期使用、重复购买的行为。参见徐萍主编:《消费心理学教程》,上海:上海财经大学出版社,2008年第3版,第284页。
    311Richard L. Kirkpatrick, supra note66,§6:4.
    312In re Majestic,315F.3d1311,1316-17,65U.S.P.Q.2d1201,1204-05(Fed. Cir.2003).
    313Karen J. Connelly, S.Y.K., LLC v. Value Vision Media, Inc.,2004WL2569494(D. Minn. Nov.9,2004).
    314Reed-Union Corp. v. Turtle Wax, Inc.,869F. Supp.1304(N.D. Ill.1994).
    315Telebrands Corp. v. E. Mishan&Sons,46U.S.P.Q.2d1493,1508(S.D.N.Y.1997).
    316Star Industries v. Bacardi&Co.,412F.3d373(2d Cir.2005).
    317Luigino’s, Inc. v. Stouffer Corp.,170F.3d827,831(8th Cir.1999).
    318Star Industries, Inc. v. Bacardi&Co.,412F.3d373(2d Cir.2005).
    320Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. H. Douglas Enterprises, Ltd.,774F.2d at1146.
    321Black&Decker, Inc. v. North American Philips Corp..632F.Supp. at193.
    322Electropix v. Liberty Livewire Corp.,178F. Supp.2d1125,60U.S.P.Q.2d1346(C.D. Cal.2001).
    323Carlisle Chem. Works, Inc. v. Hardman&Holden, Ltd.,434F.2d1403,168U.S.P.Q.110(C.C.P.A.1970).
    324Glenn L. Christensen&Jerry C. Olson,“Involved with What? The Impact of Heterogeneity in Goal Hierarchies on HighEnduring Involvement”, in Mary C. Gilly&Joan Meyers-Levy eds., Advances in Consumer Research, Vol20,2000,pp.392-393.转引自Thomas R. Lee, Glenn L. Christensen and Eric D.DeRosia, supra note277, p.575.
    325Astra Pharmaceutical Products, Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc.,718F.2d1201(1st Cir.1983).
    326YKK Corp. v. Jungwoo Zipper Co.,213F. Supp.2d1195(C.D. Cal.2002).
    327Girl Scouts of the United States v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group.,808F. Supp.1112.
    329Schieffelin&Co. v. Jack Co. of Boca,850F. Supp.232,250(S.D.N.Y.1994).
    330Id, Supra note314.
    332Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Canarsie Kiddie Shop, Inc.,559F. Supp.1189,1199(E.D.N.Y.1983).
    333Nina Ricci, S.A.R.L. v. Gemcraft Ltd.,612F. Supp.1529-30(S.D.N.Y.1985).
    334J. Thomas McCarthy, supra note34,§23:99.
    335336Eli Lilly v. Natural Answers,233F.3d456,464,56U.S.P.Q.2d1942(7th Cir.2000).In re1st USA Realty Prof'ls, Inc.,84U.S.P.Q.2d1581,1588(T.T.A.B.2007).
    337Kemp v. Bumble Bee Seafoods, Inc.,398F.3d1049,73U.S.P.Q.2d2002(8th Cir.2005).(本案认为,老练专业的食品购买者对于争议商标产生实际混淆的证据,可以证明普通消费者的混淆。当甚至是专业购买者都被混淆时,该事实就可以作为行使了较低注意力、未进行仔细检查的普通消费者有可能混淆的证据,并且该证据具有很强的证明力。)
    338Country Floors, Inc. v. Gepner,930F.2d1056,18U.S.P.Q.2d1577(3d Cir.1991).
    339Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Products, Inc.,930F.2d277,18U.S.P.Q.2d1417(3d Cir.1991)(本案认为,当产品以有辨别能力的专业购买者和偶尔购买的普通消费者为双重销售目标时,法院必须将那些偶尔购买汽车零部件的普通消费者的注意力水品作为认定混淆可能性时的标准)
    340Astra Pharmaceutical Products, Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc.,718F.2d1201,220U.S.P.Q.786(1st Cir.1983).
    341Checkpoint Systems, Inc. v. Check Point Software Technologies, Inc.,269F.3d270,60U.S.P.Q.2d1609(3d Cir.2001).
    342Continental Plastic Containers Inc. v. Owens Brockway Plastic Products, Inc.,141F.3d1073,46U.S.P.Q.2d1277(Fed.Cir.1998).(案中认为,向被告行销加仑塑料壶的批发商从事的并不是有关果汁的交易,他们之间从事的是塑料壶交易。虽然塑料壶的外形可能对果汁的来源引起混淆,但是对确定塑料壶的来源混淆来说是不相关的)
    343Perini Corp. v. Perini Construction, Inc.,915F.2d121.127(4th Cir.1990).
    344Rudolf Callmann, Louis Altman, Callmann on Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies, in Louis Altman andMalla Pollack eds., Thomson-West press,1997,§21:12.
    345Kiki Undies Corp. v. Promenade Hosiery Mills, Inc.,411F.2d1097(2d Cir.1969).(在该案中,被告在女士紧身衣上使用的KIKI商标与原告在裤袜上使用的商标非常相似并在外观上完全相同,被告将其紧身衣放在了与原告透明包装在尺寸、外形上都非常相似的包装中。法院认为,原告与被告使用的商标不仅仅是相似的,而且是相同的。在这种情况下,虽然相关证据并没有证明购买者在购物过程中是理性的,但是法院认为普通消费者注意力因素与案件具有很小的相关性。)
    346Therma-Scan, Inc. v. Thermoscan, Inc.,295F.3d623,638(6th Cir.2002).
    347Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc.,915F.2d121,127(4th Cir.1990).
    348J. Thomas McCarthy, supra note34,§23:6.
    349SecuraComm Consulting, Inc. v. SecuraCom Inc.,984F. Supp.286(D.N.J.1997).
    350Nissan Motor v. Nissan Computer,378F.3d1002,1019,72U.S.P.Q.2d1078,1089(9th Cir.2004).
    351黄晖,前注[1],第86页。
    352J. Thomas McCarthy, supra note34,§23:7.
    353Frehling v. Int'l Select Group,192F.3d1330,1335,52U.S.P.Q.2d1447(11th Cir.1999).
    354刘孔中:《商标法上混淆之虞之研究》,台湾:五南图书出版公司,1997年版,第13页。转引自彭学龙:《商标法的符号学分析》,北京:法律出版社,2007年版,第171页。
    355文学:《商标使用与商标保护研究》,北京:法律出版社,2008年版,第64页。
    356郑成思:《知识产权法》,北京:法律出版社,2003年版,第196页。
    357曾陈明汝:《商标法原理》,北京:中国人名大学出版社,2003年版,第27页。
    358吴汉东:《知识产权法》,北京:中国政法大学出版社,2004年版,第246页。
    359[日]田村善之,前注[52],第58页。
    360Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab.,335F.3d141,148,67U.S.P.Q.2d1420.转引自文学,前注[355],第65页。
    361Richard L. Kirkpp.rick, supra note66,§3:2.
    362Penguin Books Ltd. v. Eberhard,48U.S.P.Q.2d1280,1287(T.T.A.B.1998).
    363Playtex v. Ga.-Pac.,390F.3d158,163,73U.S.P.Q.2d1127,1131(2d Cir.2004).
    364365Kenner Parker Toys, Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc.,963F.2d350,353,22U.S.P.Q.2d1453,1456(Fed. Cir.1992).Chi. Corp. v. N. Am. Chi. Corp.,20U.S.P.Q.2d1715,1717n.4(T.T.A.B.1991).
    366Id, supra note364.
    367KP Permanent v. Lasting Impression,125S. Ct.542,550,72U.S.P.Q.1833,1838(2004).
    368In re Coors Brewing Co.,343F.3d1340,1345,68U.S.P.Q.2d1059(Fed. Cir.2003).
    369J. Thomas McCarthy, supra note34,§11:73.
    370Landers, Frary&Clark v. Universal Cooler Corp.,85F.2d46(2d Cir.1936).
    371Checkpoint Systems, Inc. v. Check Point Software Technologies, Inc.,269F.3d270,60U.S.P.Q.2d1609(3d Cir.2001).
    372Visible Sys. Corp. v. Unisys Corp.,551F.3d65,74,89U.S.P.Q.2d1194(1st Cir.2008).
    373J. Thomas McCarthy, supra note34,11:74.
    374曾陈明汝,前注[357],第26页。
    375J. Thomas McCarthy, supra note34,§11:83.
    376刘孔中,前注[354],第14页。
    377George&Co. v. Imaginp.ion Entm't Ltd.,575F.3d383,393,91U.S.P.Q.2d1786(4th Cir.2009).(衡量商标强度的因素有两个:(1)商标在显著性频谱上的位置;(2)商标在市场中的认知度价值。第一个因素涉及的时商标最初使用时的内在潜力,而第二个因素识别的是商标涉诉时实际消费者将该商标与特定产品或服务相关联的认可度)
    378McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc.,599F.2d1126,202U.S.P.Q.81(2d Cir.1979).
    379J. Thomas McCarthy, supra note34,§11:83.
    380Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria's Secret Stores Brand Management, Inc.,618F.3d1025,96U.S.P.Q.2d1585(9th Cir.2010).
    381Abercrombie&Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc.,537F.2d4,189U.S.P.Q.769(2d Cir.1976).
    382曾陈明汝,前注[357],第120页。
    383J. Thomas McCarthy, supra note34,§12:1.
    384曾陈明汝,前注[357],第120页。
    387388Racemark Int'l, Inc. v. Specialty Prods., Inc.,217U.S.P.Q.772,778(N.D.N.Y.1982).E.S. Originals, Inc. v. Stride Rite Corp.,656F. Supp.484,2U.S.P.Q.2d1934,1937n.7(S.D.N.Y.1987).
    389J. Thomas McCarthy, supra note34,§11:5.
    390Sullivan v. CBS,385F.3d772,776,72U.S.P.Q.2d1586,1558(7th Cir.2004).
    391Arrow Distilleries, Inc. v. Globe Brewing Co.,117F.2d347,48U.S.P.Q.157(4th Cir.1941).
    392例如,我国《商标法》第十一条规定:“下列标志不得作为商标注册:(一)仅有本商品的通用名称、图形、型号的;(二)仅仅直接表示商品的质量、主要原料、功能、用途、重量、数量及其他特点的;(三)缺乏显著特征的。”《欧共体商标指令》第3条第1款规定:“下列标志不得作为商标注册或注册无效:……(b)缺乏显著性特征的;(c)在商业活动中仅用于表明商品类别、质量、数量、用途、价值、原产地、生产日期或服务提供时间,或者商品或服务其他特征的符号或标志;(d)在日常用语或商业惯例中通用的符号或标志……”
    393Source Services Corp. v. Source Telecomputing Corp.,635F. Supp.600,230U.S.P.Q.290(N.D. Ill.1986).
    394Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab,335F.3d141,147-48,67U.S.P.Q.2d1420,1425-26(2d Cir.2003).
    395[美]威廉·M﹒兰德斯、理查德·A﹒波斯纳,前注[16],第240页。
    397OBX-Stock, Inc. v. Bicast, Inc.,558F.3d334,339-40,89U.S.P.Q.2d1928,1931(4th Cir.2009).
    398Monarch Licensing, Ltd. v. Ritam Int'l, Ltd.,24U.S.P.Q.2d1456,1461(S.D.N.Y.1992).
    399Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co.,113F.3d373,42U.S.P.Q.2d1641(2d Cir.1997).
    400Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co.,561F.2d75,195U.S.P.Q.281(7th Cir.1977), cert. denied,434U.S.1025,54L. Ed.2d772,98S. Ct.751,196U.S.P.Q.592(1978).
    401Western Publishing Co. v. Rose Art Industries, Inc.,910F.2d57,15U.S.P.Q.2d1545,1547(2d Cir.1990).
    402Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc.,469U.S.189,105S. Ct.658,83L. Ed.2d582,224U.S.P.Q.327(1985).
    403Folsom and Teply, A Comparp.ive View of the Law of Trademarked Generic Words,6Hastings Int'l&Comp. L. Rev.1
    4(014982).Oxford Industries, Inc. v. JBJ Fabrics, Inc.,6U.S.P.Q.2d1756(S.D.N.Y.1988).
    405James Burrough, Ltd. v. Sign of Beefep.er, Inc.,540F.2d266,192U.S.P.Q.555(7th Cir.1976).
    406R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. R. Seelig&Hille,201U.S.P.Q.856(T.T.A.B.1978).
    407Kenner Parker Toys, Inc. v. Rose Art Industries, Inc.,963F.2d350,22U.S.P.Q.2d1453,1456(Fed. Cir.1992).
    408Dreyfus Fund, Inc. v. Royal Bank of Canada,525F. Supp.1108,213U.S.P.Q.872(S.D.N.Y.1981).
    409田平安,前注[201],第250页。
    410Boston Duck Tours, LP v. Super Duck Tours, LLC,531F.3d1,87U.S.P.Q.2d1385(1st Cir.2008).
    411L.C. Licensing, Inc. v. Berman,86U.S.P.Q.2d1883,1888(T.T.A.B.2008).
    412Richard L. Kirkpp.rick, supra note66,§3:5.
    413AM Gen. Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.,311F.3d796,814-15(7th Cir.2002).
    414Restatement Third of Unfair Competition§13,1995.
    415肖莎:“五粮液大战七粮液”,《法治周末》,2011年4月28日,第10版。
    416曾陈明汝,前注[357],第54页。
    417Harms, L.T.C., The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: A Case Book, Geneva, Switzerland: World IntellectualProperty press,2008, p.42.
    418LTJ Diffusion v. Sadas Vert baudet,FSR34.(2003).引自Harms, L.T.C,supra note147.
    419GoTo.com v. Walt Disney,202F.3d1199,53U.S.P.Q.2d1652,1656(9th Cir.2000).
    420旧中国民国时期“最高法院”1932年上字第1073号判例。转引自曾陈明汝,前注[357],第193页。
    421Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int'l Inc.,174F.3d1308,1330,50U.S.P.Q.2d1161(Fed. Cir.1999).
    422孔祥俊,前注[150],第249页。
    423424In re Coors Brewing Co.,343F.3d1340,1344,68U.S.P.Q.2d1059(Fed. Cir.2003).Saxlehner v. Eisner&Mendelson Co.,179U.S.19,45L. Ed.60,21S. Ct.7(1900).
    425Kos v. Andrx,369F.3d700,713,70U.S.P.Q.2d1874,1885(3d Cir.2004).
    426427Kemp v. Bumble Bee Seafoods, Inc.,398F.3d1049,73U.S.P.Q.2d2002(8th Cir.2005).Baker v. Master Printers Union,34F. Supp.808,811,47U.S.P.Q.69(D.N.J.1940).
    428Centraz Industies, Inc. v. Spartan Chemical Company, Inc.,77U.S.P.Q.2d1698,2006WL236413(T.T.A.B.2006).
    429TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Commc'ns,244F.3d88,101,57U.S.P.Q.2d1969(2d Cir.2001).
    430OHIM,The Manual concerning Opposition, Part2, Chapter2C, P.4.
    431[日]田村善之著,前注[52],第121页。
    432孔祥俊,前注[150],第237-238页。
    433WIPO, supra note156, pp.80-81.
    434Id, supra note12, n.23.
    4351938年侵权法重述第729条所列的四个因素为:(1)商标名称或商业名称之间在外观、文字使用的发音、所涉图片或设计的口译以及暗示的含义方面的相似性程度;(2)行为人采用该名称时的意图;(3)其他人行销产品或服务的使用方式和营销途径;(4)购买者在购买行为中有可能行使的注意力程度。
    436曾陈明汝,前注[357],第55页。
    437Kemp v. Bumble Bee Seafoods, Inc.,398F.3d1049,73U.S.P.Q.2d2002(8th Cir.2005).
    438冯珏,前注[260],第520页。
    439Storck USA, L.P. v. Farley Candy Co.,785F. Supp.730,22U.S.P.Q.2d1204,1207(N.D. Ill.1992).
    440Boston P.hletic Ass'n v. Sullivan,867F.2d22,30,9U.S.P.Q.2d1690,1696(1st Cir.1989).
    441Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Repcoparts USA, Inc.,218U.S.P.Q.81,85(T.T.A.B.1983).
    442China Healthways Institute, Inc. v. Wang,491F.3d1337,83U.S.P.Q.2d1123(Fed. Cir.2007).
    443444Opryland USA, Inc. v. Grep. Am. Music Show, Inc.,970F.2d847,23U.S.P.Q.2d1471,1473(Fed. Cir.1992).San Fernando Elec. Mfg. Co. v. JFD Elec. Components Corp.,565F.2d683,685,196U.S.P.Q.1,3(C.C.P.A.1977).
    445Arrow Fastener Co. v. Stanley Works,59F.3d384,35U.S.P.Q.2d1449,1456(2d Cir.1995).
    446曾陈明汝,前注[357],第194页。
    447Price Candy Co. v. Gold Medal Candy Corp.,220F.2d759,105U.S.P.Q.266(C.C.P.A.1955).
    448In re Electrolyte Laborp.ories, Inc.,913F.2d930,16U.S.P.Q.2d1239(Fed. Cir.1990).
    449450Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp.,222F.3d943,55U.S.P.Q.2d1842(Fed. Cir.2000).Paul Sachs Originals Co. v. Sachs,217F. Supp.407,137U.S.P.Q.240(S.D. Cal.1963).
    451In re Chp.am Intern. Inc.,380F.3d1340,71U.S.P.Q.2d1944(Fed. Cir.2004).
    452Clorox Chemical Co. v. Chlorit Mfg. Corp.,25F. Supp.702(D.N.Y.1938).
    453454Kwik-Site Corp. v. Clear View Mfg. Co.,758F.2d167,178,225U.S.P.Q.805,813(6th Cir.1985).Playtex v. Ga.-Pac.,390F.3d158,165,73U.S.P.Q.2d1127,1132(2d Cir.2004).
    455Paco Rabanne Parfums, S.A. v. Norco Enterprises, Inc.,680F.2d891,217U.S.P.Q.105(2d Cir.1982).
    456Internp.ional Kennel Club, Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc.,846F.2d1079,6U.S.P.Q.2d1977(7th Cir.1988).
    457参见中华人民共和国最高人民法院民事判决书(2008)年民提字第52号。
    458Frehling v. Int'l Select Group,192F.3d1330,1335,52U.S.P.Q.2d1447(11th Cir.1999).
    459Id, supra note12.转引自李明德:《欧盟知识产权法》,北京:法律出版社,2010年版,第492页。
    460Id, supra note11.
    461刘孔中,前注[354],第13页。
    462Duluth News-Tribune v. Mesabi Publ. Co.,84F.3d1093,38U.S.P.Q.2d1937(8th Cir.1996).
    463Bon Ami Co. v. McKesson&Robbins, Inc.,93F.2d915(C.C.P.A.1938).
    464In re Np.'l Dp.a Corp.,753F.2d1056,224U.S.P.Q.749,752(Fed. Cir.1985).
    465In re Coors Brewing Co.,343F.3d1340,1345,68U.S.P.Q.2d1059(Fed. Cir.2003).
    466Visible Sys. Corp. v. Unisys Corp.,551F.3d65,74,89U.S.P.Q.2d1194(1st Cir.2008).
    467刘孔中,前注[354],第14页。
    468J&J Snack Foods Corp. v. McDonald's Corp.,932F.2d1460,18U.S.P.Q.2d1889(Fed. Cir.1991).
    469470McDonald's Corp. v. McBagel's, Inc.,649F. Supp.1268,1U.S.P.Q.2d1761(S.D.N.Y.1986).McDonald's Corp. v. McKinley,13U.S.P.Q.2d1895(T.T.A.B.1989).
    4717-Eleven, Inc. v. Lawrence I. Wechsler,83U.S.P.Q.2d1715,2007WL1431084(T.T.A.B.2007).
    472Eveready Bp.tery Company, Inc. v. Green Planet, Inc.,91U.S.P.Q.2d1511,2009WL2176668(T.T.A.B.2009)(.本案中,
    商标局认为异议者已经使用并注册了很多包含SCHICK音节商标的事实本身并不足以证实家族商标的存在)
    473American Standard, Inc. v. Scott&Fetzer Co.,200U.S.P.Q.457,461(T.T.A.B.1978).
    474475Marion Laborp.ories, Inc. v. Biochemical/Diagnostics, Inc.,6U.S.P.Q.2d1215(T.T.A.B.1988).Spraying Systems Co. v. Delavan, Inc.,975F.2d387,24U.S.P.Q.2d1181(7th Cir.1992).
    476Creamette Co. v. Merlino,299F.2d55,132U.S.P.Q.381(9th Cir.1962).
    477Sports Authority Michigan Inc. v. PC Authority Inc.,63U.S.P.Q.2d1782,1801–1802,2002WL31039597(TTAB2002).
    478张玉敏:《知识产权法》,北京:法律出版社,2005年版,第306页。
    479曾陈明汝,前注[357],第58页。
    480Parke, Davis&Co. v. G.F. Harvey Co.,31C.C.P.A.879,141F.2d132,60U.S.P.Q.572(1944).
    481Schering-Plough Health Care Prods. Inc. v. Ing-Jing Huang,84U.S.P.Q.2d1323,2007WL1751193(T.T.A.B.2007).
    482Schering-Plough Health Care Prods. Inc. v. Ing-Jing Huang,84U.S.P.Q.2d1323,2007WL1751193(T.T.A.B.2007).
    483Sperry Rand Corporp.ion v. Remvac Systems Corporp.ion,172U.S.P.Q.415,1971WL16604(T.T.A.B.1971).
    484Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway&Sons,523F.2d1331,186U.S.P.Q.436(2d Cir.1975).
    485Pp.hfinder Commc'ns Corp. v. Midwest Commc'ns Co.,593F. Supp.281,284,224U.S.P.Q.203,205(N.D. Ill.1984).
    486黄晖:《商标法》,北京:法律出版社,2004年版,第134页。
    487曾陈明汝,前注[357],第55页。
    488参见绍兴市中级人民法院(2006)绍中民二初字第83号。
    489490In re Energy Telecomms.&Elec. Ass'n,222U.S.P.Q.350(T.T.A.B.1983).G. D. Searle&Co. v. Chas. Pfizer&Co.,265F.2d385,121U.S.P.Q.74(7th Cir.1959).
    491Interlego AG v. Abrams/Gentile Entertainment Inc.,63U.S.P.Q.2d1862,2002WL31039614(TTAB2002).
    492OHIM, The Manual concerning Opposition, Part2, Chapter2C,P.17.
    493彭学龙,前注[354],第233页。
    494Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft v. Chrysler Corp.,169U.S.P.Q.686(T.T.A.B.1971).
    495张玉敏,前注[478],第285页。
    496Richard L. Kirkpatrick, supra note66,4§3.
    497参见中华人民共和国最高人民法院民事裁定书(2007)民三监字第37—1号。49810/1999(EN);394/1999(EN);1631/2000(FR).参见OHIM, supra note492,P.23.
    499Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc.,346F. Supp.1183,175U.S.P.Q.56(E.D.N.Y.1972).500570/2000(EN);1087/2001(EN);649/2000(EN).参见OHIM, supra note492,P.23.
    501有学者认为图形商标可以分为两种:具象图形商标和抽象图形商标。而这种设计商标往往被认为是抽象图形商标。所谓具象的图形商标,一般指该图形可以识别为具体的图形。比较这类图形商标时,既要考虑具体表现形式存在的差别,又要考虑两者同属一类事物的事实。所谓抽象的图形商标,一般是指难以识别的抽象图形,如几何图形即属抽象的图形。比较这类商标时,要特别注意图形中的显著性部分。参见刘春田:《知识产权法》,北京:高等教育出版社北京大学出版社2003年版,第253页;黄晖,前注[486],第137页。
    502张玉敏,前注[478],第286页。
    503刘春田,前注[501],第253页。
    504J. Thomas McCarthy, supra note34,23§25.
    505146/1999(EN).参见OHIM, supra note492, P.17.
    506507Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. PEK, Inc.,184U.S.P.Q.559(T.T.A.B.1974).Hupp Corp. v. AER Corp.,157U.S.P.Q.537,540(T.T.A.B.1968).
    508Fort James v. Royal Paper,83U.S.P.Q.2d1624,1628-29(T.T.A.B.2007).
    509参见中华人民共和国最高人民法院民事判决书(2009)民三终字第3号。在该案中,拉科斯特公司主张权利的注册商标中,其鳄鱼头朝西,嘴巴大张,躯干及尾部上布满块状鳞片或装饰有横向条纹。而鳄鱼国际公司的鳄鱼头朝左,被诉标识一中的鳄鱼图形躯干上的鳞片呈立体状,被诉标识二中的鳄鱼图形整体颜色为黄绿色或黄色,嘴巴张
    515曾陈明汝,前注[357],第55页。
    516Restatement Third of Unfair Competition§21,1995.
    517Standard Oil Co. v. Standard Oil Co.,252F.2d65,116U.S.P.Q.176(10th Cir.1958).转引自J. Thomas McCarthy, supranote34,23§26.
    518Scotch Whisky Ass'n v. Majestic Distilling Co.,958F.2d594,22U.S.P.Q.2d1050,1053(4th Cir.1992).
    520Hancock v. American Steel&Wire Co.,203F.2d737,97U.S.P.Q.330(C.C.P.A.1953).
    521TBC Corp. v. Holsa, Inc.,126F.3d1470,44U.S.P.Q.2d1315(Fed. Cir.1997).
    522Revlon, Inc. v. Jerell, Inc.,713F. Supp.93,11U.S.P.Q.2d1612,1616(S.D.N.Y.1989)(案中认为,在确定混淆可能性过程中,商标在内涵与含义方面的差异性是关键性因素。甚至当争议商标间使用了具有相同含义的相同文字时,不同的内涵本省可以成为决定性因素)
    523Top Tobacco, L.P. v. North P.lantic Operp.ing Co., Inc.,509F.3d380,85U.S.P.Q.2d1251(7th Cir.2007).
    524参见北京市第一中级人民法院行政判决书(2004)一中行初字第180号。在该案中,法院认为引证商标为汉字拼音商标,其所对应的汉字不仅是“东北虎”,因此拼音商标与图形商标及文字不具有唯一对称关系。同时,被异议商标以卡通虎与足球为主要区别标志,与引证商标具有不同的特性,不容易引起相关消费者群体的混淆可能性。
    525In re Sloppy Joe's Internp.ional Inc.,43U.S.P.Q.2d1350(T.T.A.B.1997).
    526Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp.,818F.2d254,2U.S.P.Q.2d1677,1679(2d Cir.1987).
    527Moose Creek, Inc. v. Abercrombie&Fitch Co.,331F. Supp.2d1214,73U.S.P.Q.2d1287(C.D. Cal.2004).
    528Puma-Sportschuhfabriken v. Garan, Inc.,224U.S.P.Q.1064,1066(T.T.A.B.1984)(.本案中,即使争议商标中一个puma而另一个是mountain lion,但是野生猫科动物设计制造了相同的商业印象。)
    529Riceland Foods, Inc. v. Pac. E. Trading Corp.,26U.S.P.Q.2d1883,1885(T.T.A.B.1993).
    530J. Thomas McCarthy, supra note34,23§36.
    531黄晖,前注[486],第70页。
    532Enrique Bernp. F.,S.A. v. Guadalajara, Inc.,210F.3d439,443,54U.S.P.Q.2d1497(5th Cir.2000).
    533In re Buckner Enters. Corp.,6U.S.P.Q.2d1316,1317(T.T.A.B.1987).
    534黄晖,前注[486],第71页。
    535J. Thomas McCarthy, supra note34,23§36.
    536In re Tia Maria, Inc.,188U.S.P.Q.524,525–26(T.T.A.B.1975).转引自J. Thomas McCarthy, supra note34,23§36.
    537Bottega Veneta, Inc. v. Volume Shoe Corpo,226U.S.P.Q.964,970,1985WL72094(T.T.A.B.1985).
    538曾陈明汝,前注[357],第196页。
    539孔祥俊,前注[150],第227页。
    540Shen Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Ritz Hotel, Ltd.,393F.3d1238,1244,73U.S.P.Q.2d1350(Fed. Cir.2004).
    541Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Inc Case C-39/97[1998] E.C.R.I-5507.转引自李明德等:《欧盟知识产权法》,北京:法律出版社,2010年版,第495页。
    542Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co.,314F.2d149,159,136U.S.P.Q.508(9th Cir.1963).
    543Sullivan v. CBS Corp.,385F.3d772,778,32Media L. Rep.(BNA)2516,72U.S.P.Q.2d1586(7th Cir.2004).
    544545Eli Lilly v. Np.ural Answers,233F.3d456,463,56U.S.P.Q.2d1942(7th Cir.2000).P.ec, Inc. v. Société Np.ionale Industrielle Aérospp.iale,798F. Supp.411,413,24U.S.P.Q.2d1951,1953(S.D. Tex.1992).
    546M.P. McKenna,“The Normp.ive Foundp.ions of Trademark Law”, Notre Dame L. Rev., Vol82,2007, pp.1839-1841.
    547J. Thomas McCarthy, supra note34,24§3.
    548Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney&Co.,247F.407(2d Cir.1917), cert. denied,245U.S.672,38S. Ct.222(1918).
    549Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson,26F.2d972(2d Cir.1928).
    551Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co.,314F.2d149,136U.S.P.Q.508(9th Cir.1963).
    553Id, supra note460.
    554Richard L. Kirkpp.rick, supra note66,§5:4.
    555《尼斯分类》第2条第1款明确规定:“在对任何特定的商标提供保护的范围方面,本分类对各国都不具有约束力。”
    556《新加坡商标法条约》第9条第2款规定:“(1)商品或服务,不得因为商标主管机关在任何注册或公告中将其列入《尼斯分类》的同一类别中,而被认为是相互类似;(2)商品或服务,不得因为商标主管机关在任何注册或公告中将其列入《尼斯分类》的不同类别中,而被认定为相互间不具有类似性。”
    557比荷卢《统一商标法》第13条规定:“商标注册的管理分类不得作为判断商品或者服务是否类似的标准。”
    558National Football League v. Jasper Alliance Corp.,16U.S.P.Q.2d1212, n.5(T.T.A.B.1990).
    559国家工商行政管理总局商标评审委员会编:《法务通讯》,2007年合订本,第52页。
    560Id, supra note11.
    561Packard Press, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,227F.3d1352,56U.S.P.Q.2d1351(Fed. Cir.2000).
    562参见北京市高级人民法法院(2005)高行终字第27号行政判决书。
    563Champions Golf Club v. Champions Golf Club,78F.3d1111,38U.S.P.Q.2d1161(6th Cir.1996).
    564曾陈明汝,前注[357],第197页。
    565566McDonald's Corp. v. McKinley,13U.S.P.Q.2d1895(T.T.A.B.1989).Id, supra note460.
    567Stork Restaurant v. Sahp.i,166F.2d348,76U.S.P.Q.374(9th Cir.1948).
    568KOS Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Andrx Corp.,369F.3d700,70U.S.P.Q.2d1874(3d Cir.2004).
    569Plus Products v. Plus Discount Foods, Inc.,722F.2d999,222U.S.P.Q.373(2d Cir.1983).
    570Nautilus v. Icon,372F.3d1330,1345,71U.S.P.Q.2d1173,1184-85(Fed. Cir.2004).
    571孔祥俊:“论反不正当竞争法中的竞争关系”,《工商行政管理》,1999年第19期,第19页。
    572573Ball v. American Trial Lawyers Assn.,14Cal. App.3d289,303,92Cal. Rptr.228(2d Dist.1971).Continental Motors Corp. v. Continental Avip.ion Corp.,375F.2d857,153U.S.P.Q.313(5th Cir.1967).
    574AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Bop.s,599F.2d341,204U.S.P.Q.808(9th Cir.1979).
    575576Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp.,796F.2d254,230U.S.P.Q.791(9th Cir.1986).Id, supra note170.
    577A&H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc.,237F.3d198,57U.S.P.Q.2d1097(3d Cir.2000).
    578Philadelphia Storage Bp.tery Co. v. Mindlin,163Misc.52,296N.Y.S.176(1937).
    579580Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp.,818F.2d254,2U.S.P.Q.2d1677(2d Cir.1987).Sweetarts v. Sunline, Inc.,380F.2d923,154U.S.P.Q.459(8th Cir.1967).
    582Nikon Inc. v. Ikon Corp.,987F.2d91,95,25U.S.P.Q.2d2021,2025(2d Cir.1993).
    583James Burrough, Ltd. v. Sign of Beefep.er, Inc.,540F.2d266,192U.S.P.Q.555(7th Cir.1976).
    584Saab-Scania Aktiebolag v. Sparkomp.ic Corp.,26U.S.P.Q.2d1709,1711-12(T.T.A.B.1993).
    585Federp.ed Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544F.2d1098,1103,192U.S.P.Q.24,29(C.C.P.A.1976).
    586J. Thomas McCarthy, supra note34,§24:53.50.
    587Brookfield Communicp.ions, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp.,174F.3d1036,1057,50U.S.P.Q.2d1545,1559
    (9th Cir.1999).
    588589GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co.,202F.3d1199,53U.S.P.Q.2d1652(9th Cir.2000).Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber,29F. Supp.2d1161,50U.S.P.Q.2d1840(C.D. Cal.1998).
    590Entrepreneur Media, Inc. v. Smith,279F.3d1135,61U.S.P.Q.2d1705(9th Cir.2002).
    591592J. C. Hall Co. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc.,340F.2d960,144U.S.P.Q.435(C.C.P.A.1965).Yarmuth-Dion, Inc. v. D'ion Furs, Inc.,835F.2d990,5U.S.P.Q.2d1262,1265(2d Cir.1987).
    593Carling Brewing Co. v. Philip Morris, Inc.,297F. Supp.1330,160U.S.P.Q.303(N.D. Ga.1968).
    594Schenley Distillers, Inc. v. General Cigar Co.,427F.2d783,166U.S.P.Q.142(C.C.P.A.1970).
    595Elec. Realty Assocs., Inc. v. Extra Risk Assocs., Inc.,217U.S.P.Q.810,815(T.T.A.B.1982).
    596Mason Eng'g&Design Corp. v. Mp.eson Chem. Corp.,225U.S.P.Q.956,962(T.T.A.B.1985).597187F.3d p.1310,51U.S.P.Q.2d, p.1933.
    598599Dwinell-Wright Co. v. White House Milk Co.,132F.2d822,825,56U.S.P.Q.120(2d Cir.1943).Pp.sy's Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc.,317F.3d209,65U.S.P.Q.2d1442(2d Cir.2003).
    600Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Field&Stream Licenses Co.,294F.3d383,63U.S.P.Q.2d1417(2d Cir.2002).
    601孔祥俊,前注[150],第32页。
    602邓宏光:“《商标法》亟需解决的实体问题:从‘符号保护’到‘防止混淆’”,《学术论坛》,2007年第11期,第
    147页。
    603《最高人民法院关于审理商标民事纠纷案件适用法律若干问题的解释》第9条第2款规定:“商标法第52条第(一)项规定的商标近似,是指被控侵权的商标与原告的注册商标相比较,其文字的字形、读音、含义或者图形的构图及颜色,或者其各要素组合后的整体结构相似,或者其立体形状、颜色组合近似,易使相关公众对商品的来源产生误认或者认为其来源与原告注册商标的商品有特定的联系。”第11条规定:“商标法第52条第(一)项规定的类似商品,是指在功能、用途、生产部门、销售渠道、消费对象等方面相同,或者相关公众一般认为其存在特定联系、容易造成混淆的商品。”
    604《商标法(修订送审稿)》(工商法字[2009]227号)第62条:“有下列情形之一的,均属侵权注册商标专用权:(一)未经商标注册人的许可,在同一种商品或者类似商品上使用其与注册商标相同或者类似的商标的;(二)销售侵犯注册商标专用权的商品的;(三)伪造、擅自制造他人注册商标标识或者销售伪造、擅自制造的注册商标标识的;(四)未经商标注册人同意,更换其注册商标并就将该更换商标有投入市场的;(五)在同一种或者类似商品上,将与他人注册商标相同或者近似的标志作为商品名称或者商品装潢使用,可能使相关公众产生混淆的;(六)故意为侵权他人商标专用权行为提供仓储、运输、邮寄、隐匿、生产工具、生产技术或者经营场地等便利条件的,或者故意制造或者销售与他人注册商标近似的商标标识的;(七)将与他人注册商标相同或者近似的文字作为企业名称中的字号在同一种或者类似商品上突出使用,或者以其他方式突出其标识作用的使用,可能使相关公众产生混淆的;(八)在不相同或者不类似商品上使用的商标与他人已经在中国注册的驰名商标相同或者近似,误导公众,可能不正当利用或者损害驰名商标显著性或者声誉的;(九)将与他人注册商标相同或近似的文字注册为域名,并且通过该域名进行相关商品交易的电子商务,可能使相关公众产生混淆的;(十)给他人的注册商标专用权造成其他损害的。”
    605N. Stephan Kinsella, supra note27, p.12.
    606刘春田:《中国知识产权二十年》,北京:专利文献出版社,1998年版,第16页。
    607Lior Zemer, supra note26, p.60.
    608N. Stephan Kinsella, supra note27, p.12.
    609J. Thomas McCarthy, supra note34,§2:2.
    610刘春田,前注[501],第267页。
    611曾陈明汝,前注[357],第22页。
    612张玉敏,前注[478],第299页。我国其他学者都给出了类似的含义限定。例如,吴汉东教授认为,“商标,俗称牌子,是生产经营者在其商品或者服务项目上使用的,由文字、图形或其组合构成的,具有显著性、便于识别商品或者服务来源的专用标记。”参见吴汉东:《知识产权法》,北京:中国政法大学出版社,2004年版,第230页。刘春田教授认为,“所谓商标是指商品的生产者、经营者或者服务的提供者为了证明自己、区别他人在自己的商品或者服务上使用的可视性标志,即由文字、图形、字母、三维标志和颜色组合,以及上述要素的组合所构成的标志。”参见刘春田,前注[501],第237页。
    613Smith v. Chanel, Inc.,402F.2d562,159U.S.P.Q.388(9th Cir.1968).
    614刘春田,前注[501],第239页。
    615Frehling v. Int'l Select Group,192F.3d1330,1335,52U.S.P.Q.2d1447(11th Cir.1999).
    616刘孔中,前注[354],第13页。
    617TRIPS协定第16条第1款规定:“注册商标所有人具有排除任何第三方当事人在商业活动中未经其许可在相同或相似商品上使用相同或近似商标的行为,并且这种使用行为有可能引起混淆可能性。对于在相同商品上使用相同商标的情形,可以直接推定为存在混淆可能性。”
    618邓宏光,前注[602],第148页。
    619彭学龙:“论‘混淆可能性’——兼评《中华人民共和国商标法修改草案》(征求意见稿)”,《法律科学》,2008年第1期,第137页。
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    621董葆霖:《商标法律详解》,北京:中国工商出版社,2004年版,第4页。
    622Jason J. Bosland, supra note36, p.7.
    623Jason J. Bosland, supra note36, p.5.
    624625Jason J. Bosland, supra note36, p.6.F.M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance378(2d ed.1980).
    626Rogers,“The Lanham Act and the Social Function of Trademarks,”14Law&Contemp. Probs.173,175(1949).
    627United Stp.es v. Hon,904F.2d803,14U.S.P.Q.2d1959,1961(2d Cir.1990).
    628Frankfurter, J., in Mishawaka Rubber&Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co.,316U.S.203,86L. Ed.1381,62S. Ct.
    6120922,53U.S.P.Q.323(1942), reh'g denied,316U.S.712,86L. Ed.1777,62S. Ct.1287(1942).Ralph Brown, Jr.,“Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection ofTrade symbols’, YALE Law Journal, Vol57,
    1948, pp.1165,1187.
    630孔祥俊,前注[150],第646页。
    631曾陈明汝,前注[357],第22页。
    632张玉敏:“维护公平竞争是商标法的根本宗旨”,《法学论坛》,2008年第2期,第31页。
    633Bonito Bop.s, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Bop.s, Inc.,489U.S.141,103L. Ed.2d118,109S. Ct.971,9U.S.P.Q.2d1847
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    634Elizabeth F. Judge, Daniel Gervial, Intellectual Property: The Law in Canada,Thomson Carswell,p.257.转引自孔祥俊,前注[150],第258页。
    635Deutsche Renault AG v. Audi AG,Case C-317/91,1995,1CMLR461.
    636Veryfine Prods., Inc. v. Colon Bros., Inc.,799F. Supp.240,25U.S.P.Q.2d1897,1905(D.P.R.1992).
    637杨立新:《简明类型侵权法讲座》,北京:高等教育出版社,2003年版,第65-78页。转引自彭学龙:“商标混淆类型分析与我国商标侵权制度的完善”,《法学》,2008年第5期,第109页。
    639Lone Star Steakhouse&Saloon, Inc. v. Alpha of Va., Inc.,43F.3d922,33U.S.P.Q.2d1481,1489(4th Cir.1995).
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    118Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Inc Case C-39/97[1998] E.C.R.I-5507.

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