保险监管有效性分析
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摘要
保险监管的重要性不言而喻,但监管部门的权力却并非越大越好,过分扩张的监管范围和刚性的监管手段,往往会适得其反,因此,探讨现行保险制度和政策的有效性,寻找改进的空间,是本文的主要研究目的。
本文选择保险监管制度的成本和收益作为切入点,分析保险监管制度的执行成本和社会收益,通过对两者的比较,得出监管制度有效与否的结论,进而探讨监管政策的合理性,这是本文的写作思路。然而,保险监管制度内容庞杂,头绪繁多,巨细靡遗的剖析监管制度的各个方面并不现实,因此在确定研究视角的同时,笔者也通过分析保险监管分支制度的内在逻辑联系,筛选研究对象,最终将偿付能力监管、费率监管、市场行为监管和公司治理结构监管和资金运用监管纳入研究范围。
本文的写作结构包括七章,第一章引言部分,阐述了研究背景、研究意义和研究思路,对和保险监管效率相关的文献作出梳理,理顺写作脉络。本文的第二章主要内容是对国际保险监管体制进行评述,尤其是IAIS中关于保险偿付能力、保险公司治理结构、保险市场行为等方面的规定,以此作为中国保险监管政策的参照系。
本文的第三章主要阐述保险偿付能力监管政策的有效性问题。偿付能力是监管制度核心,一直为监管部门所重视,在监管体系中占据重要地位,偿付能力指标对保险公司经营管理至关重要,可以说,它是监管体系的轴心,对偿付能力的监管能够起到牵一发而动全身的作用,另外几个监管制度与其密切相关。
偿付能力监管的社会成本可以分为直接成本、间接成本与社会成本三部分。监管部门为偿付能力监管支付的人员开支、费用开支等是直接成本,这一部分开支的边际成本很小,监管部门无需增加太多开支便能够完成对偿付能力的监管,而被监管者可能会采用多种方法躲避监管,从而产生被监管者的额外开支,形成偿付能力监管的间接成本。偿付能力监管成本的重点在于其机会成本,由于监管部门有不断提高偿付能力充足率标准以保证保险公司偿付能力充足的趋势,因为这种做法对于监管部门来说更容易,也更容易操作,所以现行的保险监管偿付能力标准有可能偏高,这点在保险实践中也得到验证,偏高的标准使得保险人被迫不能进行更大规模的保险投资,影响了保险人的盈利,最终使投保人和被保险人不能受惠于保险投资,损害了他们的利益。偿付能力监管政策尽管有偏误,然而其社会收益也是十分明显的,通过对偿付能力标准的严格监管,我国保险业没有出现保险人破产现象,保险市场运行较为稳定,保险公司的资本数量也在偿付能力监管要求下不断提高,扩大了保险人的资本规模,有利于保险人的经营。对比偿付能力监管的成本和收益,可以得到结论,在防止公司破产,维护保险市场稳定方面,偿付能力监管政策是有效的,然而,偿付能力监管的社会成本还有继续降低的空间,目前的监管政策是低效的。
本文第四章重点研究保险费率监管政策的有效性。费率监管是保险监管中的热点研究问题,费率监管的社会成本相当显著,目前实施的严格管制费率的政策本意是防止恶性竞争,在保险发展的历史阶段上,费率管制确实起到应有的作用,然而,随着保险业的不断前进,依然采用费率的严格管制手段,显得不合时宜,它削弱了后进入保险市场的保险企业的竞争力,可能会引发垄断现象的发生,不利于保险市场的长远发展。费率管制还使消费者不能依靠价格信号选择保险产品,这使得价格机制在保险市场上的作用被抹杀,结果是投保人和被保险人不能充分行使他们的选择权。另外,在严格的费率管制前提下,监管者出于对新型产品的不了解,可能不会批准保险人的产品创新,从而打击了保险人产品创新的积极性,使保险人因循守旧,不能根据宏观经济环境的变化和投保人、被保险人的需求设计新险种,由此造成保险险种老化,不再适应市场需求,保险供给和保险需求产生矛盾,阻碍了保险市场的发展。然而费率监管并非全无好处,它也取得了一定社会收益,如：在一定程度上制止了逆选择和道德风险；防止竞相降价的恶性竞争的发生；促使监管者提高监管水平。然而和费率监管政策造成的社会成本相比,其社会收益显得微乎其微,而且,采用其它监管政策同样可以达到上述目的,因此,可以得到结论：费率监管是无效的。
第五章的写作内容是保险市场行为监管和公司治理结构监管。市场行为监管和公司治理结构监管是IAIS的监管重点,市场行为监管、偿付能力监管和公司治理结构监管构成了保险监管的三支柱。保险市场行为可以依据行为主体和行为内容划分为几个类别,有鉴于保险市场的实际情况,笔者将写作重点放在保险中介行为、违约行为、欺诈行为方面。
目前的保险市场行为监管制度取得了一定收效,而其成本只有直接社会成本和监管带来的交易成本增量两部分,总体来说,监管收益要大于监管成本,因此对保险市场行为的监管是一种有效的监管,应该加强市场行为监管力度,为偿付能力监管打好基础。
公司治理结构监管对保险市场良性发展有很大益处,监管部门有必要加强保险公司治理结构监管,理顺保险公司内部机制,建立合理有效科学的权力划分体系,解决股东、董事会、高管之间的利益冲突,才能使保险公司经营管理活动安全而高效,使投保人和被保险人从中得益。同时,规范的保险公司治理结构直接影响保险公司偿付能力,影响整个宏观保险市场。
本文第六章是关于保险资金运用监管政策有效性的分析。保险资金运用监管的安全性是监管部门的指导原则,然而,过分重视保险投资的安全性却是以牺牲保险资金的盈利性为代价的,这正是保险投资监管的成本所在。由于对保险资金运用有诸多限制,导致保险公司错失许多投资良机,降低资金使用效率,间接影响了偿付能力,而投资渠道和投资结构的局限性更使这一问题雪上加霜,因此保险资金运用监管政策的成本实际上是巨大的,这彻底暴露了我国的保险资金运用监管的低效率,当然,这不能全部归咎于监管部门对资金运用的严格监管,金融市场宏观环境对保险投资有重要影响。但是监管部门应该在保证资金安全性的前提下,尽力拓宽资金运用渠道,放松投资结构的限制十分必要。
通过以上几个方面的分析,总体来说,现行的保险监管措施虽然部分有效,但其效率却相对低下,有鉴于此,笔者在第七章内提出一些政策和建议以供参考。
首先,变革监管理念势在必行,监管部门以往的“头疼医头,脚疼医脚”的模式对保险业发展有百害而无一利,对可能出现的状况缺乏预见性,对已经出现的监管问题一味采用堵的办法,这使得监管部门在监管过程中显得十分被动,因此,变“亡羊补牢”为“曲突徙薪”以及变“威逼”为“利诱”对于监管部门格外重要,此外,监管部门还应该维持政策的独立性,不能过多地受到社会舆论的影响,如：过于注重维护投保人和被保险人的权益,忽视了保险人合法权益的保护。
其次,实现以上监管观念的变革,提高监管水平是必要条件。监管者的专业水平和专业素养应该高于被监管者,这样才能从宏观层面上把握政策走向,从而制定高效的监管政策,遗憾的是,目前我国监管部门还没有达到这样的高度,出现了被监管者的专业水平高于监管者的现象,由此产生的结果有两个,一是监管者被保险公司牵着鼻子走,四处救火；二是监管者不顾保险业发展的固有规律,利用行政手段强行推行监管政策,妨碍保险业发展。所以,监管者应该正视自身的缺陷,切实提高监管水平,吸纳一批具有丰富保险工作经验的人员进入监管队伍,建立与学界专家互动,听取其意见的长效机制。
最后,笔者认为,解决现存的监管效率低下的问题,还要采取一些实际措施,包括：放松费率的严格监管；坚持对偿付能力的监管,并深化监管内涵；建立保险市场的退出机制；加强对市场行为的监管,完善市场约束机制。
本文在研究过程中,由于研究水平和研究时间所限,没有考虑再保险政策,这是笔者在后续研究中的努力方向。
Understood the importance of insurance regulation, but the regulatory authority is not the bigger the better, overextended the scope of regulation and rigid regulatory means, often counterproductive, therefore, investigate the current insurance system and the effectiveness of policies seeking to improve space is the main research purposes.
This article choosing an insurance regulatory system costs and benefits as a starting point to analyze the insurance regulatory system implementation costs and social benefits, both by comparison, the validity of the conclusions of regulatory regimes, and then discuss the reasonableness of regulatory policy, which is article writing ideas. However, the contents of complex insurance regulatory system, many things to attend, a tremendous amount of analysis of various aspects of the regulatory regime is not realistic, and therefore identify research perspectives at the same time, I also branches of insurance supervision system by analyzing the internal logic of contact, screening study, eventually solvency regulation, rate regulation, market conduct regulation and corporate governance structure and regulatory supervision of funds included in the study.
This structure consists of seven chapters of writing the first chapter introduction, describes the research background, significance and research ideas, and insurance regulatory efficiency on the relevant literature to sort, straighten out the writing context. The second chapter is the main content is reviewed international insurance regulatory system, especially in the IAIS solvency of insurance, the insurance company governance structure, market behavior and other aspects of the insurance provisions, as China Insurance Regulatory policy frame of reference.
In the third chapter describes the validity of the insurance solvency regulatory policy issues. Solvency regulatory system is the core, has been valued by regulatory authorities in the regulatory system occupies an important position, solvency of insurance company management indicators is critical, you can say that it is the axis of the regulatory system of solvency regulation can indeed affect the whole body to play the role of several other closely related regulatory regimes.
The social cost of solvency regulation can be divided into direct costs, indirect costs and social costs of three parts. Regulatory authorities for the payment of personnel costs solvency regulation, expenses and other direct costs, the marginal cost of this part of the expenditure is small, too much spending without increasing the regulatory authorities will be able to complete the solvency regulation, but may be used by regulators a variety of methods to escape regulation, resulting in additional expenses being regulated, forming solvency regulation of overheads. Cost of solvency regulation focused on its opportunity cost, due to regulatory departments to continuously improve standards in order to ensure solvency ratio insurance company solvency adequacy trend, because this approach is easier for regulators, but also easier to operate, so the existing insurance regulatory solvency standards might be too high, this practice has also been in the insurance verification, high standards make insurers cannot be forced to invest a larger insurers, affecting the profitability of insurers, and ultimately enable the insured and the insured are not covered by the insurance investment, harm their interests. Despite solvency regulatory policy bias, but it's also very obvious social benefits, through the strict supervision of solvency standards, China's insurance industry does not appear the phenomenon of insurer bankruptcy, more stable operation of the insurance market, insurance companies, the amount of capital is also solvency under increasing regulatory requirements, expanding the size of the insurer's capital, is conducive to the insurer's business. Compare costs and benefits of solvency regulation, it can be concluded, in preventing bankruptcy and maintain insurance market stability, solvency regulatory policy to be effective, however, the social cost of solvency regulation also continue to reduce space, the current regulatory policy is inefficient.
This chapter focuses on the effectiveness of regulatory policy premium rate. Rate regulation of insurance regulation is a hot research issue, rate regulation quite significant social costs, the current implementation of strict control policy rates was intended to prevent vicious competition in the insurance history of the development phase, the rate regulation does play proper role, however, as the insurance industry continues to advance, still using the rates strict control measures, it is outdated, it weakens after entering the insurance market competitiveness of insurance companies, may lead to a monopoly phenomenon, not conducive to long-term development of the insurance market. Rate regulation also gives consumers cannot rely on price signals to select insurance products, which makes the price mechanism's role in the insurance market is denied, the result is insured and the insured person cannot fully exercise their right to choose. In addition, under the premise of strict rate regulation, regulators do not understand out of new products, may not approve the insurer's product innovations which dealt a blow to the enthusiasm of the insured product innovation, so that the insurer conservative, not based on macro-changes in the economic environment and the insured, the insured person needs to design new types of insurance, insurance coverage resulting aging, no longer meet market demand, supply and demand for insurance conflict, hindering the development of the insurance market. However, rate regulation is not without benefits, it also made some social benefits, such as:a certain extent, to stop the adverse selection and moral hazard; prevent vicious competition competing price occurrence; prompting regulators to improve regulatory standards. However, regulatory policies and rates compared to the social costs caused by its social benefits appears to be minimal, and that the use of other regulatory policies can also achieve the above object, therefore, it can be concluded:rate regulation is invalid.
Chapter V of writing contents insurance market conduct regulation and corporate governance structure regulation. Market conduct regulation and corporate governance regulation is the IAIS's regulatory focus, market conduct supervision, solvency regulation and corporate governance regulation constitutes the three pillars of insurance regulation. Insurance market behavior can be based on the content and behavior of actors is divided into several categories, in view of the actual situation of the insurance market, the author will focus on writing insurance intermediary acts, breach of fraud.
The current behavior of the insurance market has made some effective regulatory regime, and its cost is only bring direct social costs and regulatory incremental transaction costs in two parts, in general, the regulatory revenue is greater than the cost of regulation, so the insurance market conduct regulation is An effective supervision, should strengthen market conduct supervision, to lay the foundation for the solvency regulation.
The corporate governance structure of regulation on the sound development of the insurance market has great benefits, regulatory authorities need to strengthen regulatory governance structure of insurance companies, insurance companies streamline internal mechanism, establish reasonable and effective scientific division of powers system to address the shareholders, the Board of Directors, executives between conflicts of interest in order to make the insurance company safe and efficient operation and management activities, so that the insured and the insured benefit. Meanwhile, standardized corporate governance structure directly affects the insurance solvency of insurance companies, affecting the entire macro-insurance market.
This Chapter is about the use of insurance funds analysis of the effectiveness of regulatory policies. Insurance funds are regulated safety regulatory guidelines, however, too much emphasis on the security of the insurance investment of insurance funds, but at the expense of profitability for the price, this is where the cost of the insurance investment regulation. Because of the use of insurance funds have many limitations, the insurance company missed many investment opportunities, reduce capital efficiency and indirectly affect the solvency and investment channels and the limitations of the investment structure more so that this problem worse, so the regulatory policies of insurance funds the cost is actually enormous, which completely exposed the country's insurance funds regulatory inefficiency, of course, it cannot all be attributed to regulatory authorities for the strict supervision of the use of funds, financial market investment macroeconomic environment has an important influence on the insurance. However, regulatory authorities should ensure that the funds under the premise of safety, try to broaden the investment channels, relaxing restrictions on the investment structure is necessary.
Through the analysis of the above aspects, in general, the existing insurance regulatory measures, though partially effective, but its efficiency is relatively low, the view of this, in the seventh chapter the author put forward some policies and suggestions for reference.
First, the concept of regulation change is imperative that regulators previous "headache medicine head, feet hurt the disease" model of the insurance industry a hundred harm, for lack of predictability situation that may arise on the already emerging blindly adopt regulatory issues blocking approach, which makes regulatory authorities in the regulatory process appears to be very passive, therefore, becomes "too late" to " Qutuxixin" and change "coercion" to "incentives" particularly important for the regulatory authorities, in addition, regulatory authorities should also maintain policy independence cannot be too much affected by public opinion, such as:too much focus on protecting the insured and the insured person's rights and interests, ignoring the legitimate rights and interests of the insurance protection.
Secondly, to achieve the above regulatory concept of change, improve regulatory standards is a necessary condition. Regulators professionalism and professionalism should be higher than the regulated, so as to grasp the macro level policy direction in order to establish efficient regulatory policy, unfortunately, China's regulators have not yet reached this level, there has been professional regulators higher than regulators phenomenon, the resulting outcome are the two regulators led by the nose by the insurance company, four fire; Second, regulators despite the inherent law of development of the insurance industry, the use of administrative means to force the implementation of regulatory policies, hinder the development of the insurance industry. Therefore, regulators should face up to their own shortcomings, and effectively improve the level of supervision, to absorb a number of rich work experience personnel to enter the insurance supervision team to establish interaction with academic experts to hear their views on long-term mechanism.
Finally, I believe that to solve the existing regulatory inefficiencies, but also to take some practical measures, including:relaxation rates strict supervision; insist on solvency regulation, and deepen regulatory connotation; establish insurance market exit mechanism; strengthen the behavior of the market supervision, improve market discipline mechanism.
Based on the research process, due to the level of research and research time constraints, did not consider the reinsurance policy, which is the author's efforts in the direction of future research.
本文选择保险监管制度的成本和收益作为切入点,分析保险监管制度的执行成本和社会收益,通过对两者的比较,得出监管制度有效与否的结论,进而探讨监管政策的合理性,这是本文的写作思路。然而,保险监管制度内容庞杂,头绪繁多,巨细靡遗的剖析监管制度的各个方面并不现实,因此在确定研究视角的同时,笔者也通过分析保险监管分支制度的内在逻辑联系,筛选研究对象,最终将偿付能力监管、费率监管、市场行为监管和公司治理结构监管和资金运用监管纳入研究范围。
本文的写作结构包括七章,第一章引言部分,阐述了研究背景、研究意义和研究思路,对和保险监管效率相关的文献作出梳理,理顺写作脉络。本文的第二章主要内容是对国际保险监管体制进行评述,尤其是IAIS中关于保险偿付能力、保险公司治理结构、保险市场行为等方面的规定,以此作为中国保险监管政策的参照系。
本文的第三章主要阐述保险偿付能力监管政策的有效性问题。偿付能力是监管制度核心,一直为监管部门所重视,在监管体系中占据重要地位,偿付能力指标对保险公司经营管理至关重要,可以说,它是监管体系的轴心,对偿付能力的监管能够起到牵一发而动全身的作用,另外几个监管制度与其密切相关。
偿付能力监管的社会成本可以分为直接成本、间接成本与社会成本三部分。监管部门为偿付能力监管支付的人员开支、费用开支等是直接成本,这一部分开支的边际成本很小,监管部门无需增加太多开支便能够完成对偿付能力的监管,而被监管者可能会采用多种方法躲避监管,从而产生被监管者的额外开支,形成偿付能力监管的间接成本。偿付能力监管成本的重点在于其机会成本,由于监管部门有不断提高偿付能力充足率标准以保证保险公司偿付能力充足的趋势,因为这种做法对于监管部门来说更容易,也更容易操作,所以现行的保险监管偿付能力标准有可能偏高,这点在保险实践中也得到验证,偏高的标准使得保险人被迫不能进行更大规模的保险投资,影响了保险人的盈利,最终使投保人和被保险人不能受惠于保险投资,损害了他们的利益。偿付能力监管政策尽管有偏误,然而其社会收益也是十分明显的,通过对偿付能力标准的严格监管,我国保险业没有出现保险人破产现象,保险市场运行较为稳定,保险公司的资本数量也在偿付能力监管要求下不断提高,扩大了保险人的资本规模,有利于保险人的经营。对比偿付能力监管的成本和收益,可以得到结论,在防止公司破产,维护保险市场稳定方面,偿付能力监管政策是有效的,然而,偿付能力监管的社会成本还有继续降低的空间,目前的监管政策是低效的。
本文第四章重点研究保险费率监管政策的有效性。费率监管是保险监管中的热点研究问题,费率监管的社会成本相当显著,目前实施的严格管制费率的政策本意是防止恶性竞争,在保险发展的历史阶段上,费率管制确实起到应有的作用,然而,随着保险业的不断前进,依然采用费率的严格管制手段,显得不合时宜,它削弱了后进入保险市场的保险企业的竞争力,可能会引发垄断现象的发生,不利于保险市场的长远发展。费率管制还使消费者不能依靠价格信号选择保险产品,这使得价格机制在保险市场上的作用被抹杀,结果是投保人和被保险人不能充分行使他们的选择权。另外,在严格的费率管制前提下,监管者出于对新型产品的不了解,可能不会批准保险人的产品创新,从而打击了保险人产品创新的积极性,使保险人因循守旧,不能根据宏观经济环境的变化和投保人、被保险人的需求设计新险种,由此造成保险险种老化,不再适应市场需求,保险供给和保险需求产生矛盾,阻碍了保险市场的发展。然而费率监管并非全无好处,它也取得了一定社会收益,如：在一定程度上制止了逆选择和道德风险；防止竞相降价的恶性竞争的发生；促使监管者提高监管水平。然而和费率监管政策造成的社会成本相比,其社会收益显得微乎其微,而且,采用其它监管政策同样可以达到上述目的,因此,可以得到结论：费率监管是无效的。
第五章的写作内容是保险市场行为监管和公司治理结构监管。市场行为监管和公司治理结构监管是IAIS的监管重点,市场行为监管、偿付能力监管和公司治理结构监管构成了保险监管的三支柱。保险市场行为可以依据行为主体和行为内容划分为几个类别,有鉴于保险市场的实际情况,笔者将写作重点放在保险中介行为、违约行为、欺诈行为方面。
目前的保险市场行为监管制度取得了一定收效,而其成本只有直接社会成本和监管带来的交易成本增量两部分,总体来说,监管收益要大于监管成本,因此对保险市场行为的监管是一种有效的监管,应该加强市场行为监管力度,为偿付能力监管打好基础。
公司治理结构监管对保险市场良性发展有很大益处,监管部门有必要加强保险公司治理结构监管,理顺保险公司内部机制,建立合理有效科学的权力划分体系,解决股东、董事会、高管之间的利益冲突,才能使保险公司经营管理活动安全而高效,使投保人和被保险人从中得益。同时,规范的保险公司治理结构直接影响保险公司偿付能力,影响整个宏观保险市场。
本文第六章是关于保险资金运用监管政策有效性的分析。保险资金运用监管的安全性是监管部门的指导原则,然而,过分重视保险投资的安全性却是以牺牲保险资金的盈利性为代价的,这正是保险投资监管的成本所在。由于对保险资金运用有诸多限制,导致保险公司错失许多投资良机,降低资金使用效率,间接影响了偿付能力,而投资渠道和投资结构的局限性更使这一问题雪上加霜,因此保险资金运用监管政策的成本实际上是巨大的,这彻底暴露了我国的保险资金运用监管的低效率,当然,这不能全部归咎于监管部门对资金运用的严格监管,金融市场宏观环境对保险投资有重要影响。但是监管部门应该在保证资金安全性的前提下,尽力拓宽资金运用渠道,放松投资结构的限制十分必要。
通过以上几个方面的分析,总体来说,现行的保险监管措施虽然部分有效,但其效率却相对低下,有鉴于此,笔者在第七章内提出一些政策和建议以供参考。
首先,变革监管理念势在必行,监管部门以往的“头疼医头,脚疼医脚”的模式对保险业发展有百害而无一利,对可能出现的状况缺乏预见性,对已经出现的监管问题一味采用堵的办法,这使得监管部门在监管过程中显得十分被动,因此,变“亡羊补牢”为“曲突徙薪”以及变“威逼”为“利诱”对于监管部门格外重要,此外,监管部门还应该维持政策的独立性,不能过多地受到社会舆论的影响,如：过于注重维护投保人和被保险人的权益,忽视了保险人合法权益的保护。
其次,实现以上监管观念的变革,提高监管水平是必要条件。监管者的专业水平和专业素养应该高于被监管者,这样才能从宏观层面上把握政策走向,从而制定高效的监管政策,遗憾的是,目前我国监管部门还没有达到这样的高度,出现了被监管者的专业水平高于监管者的现象,由此产生的结果有两个,一是监管者被保险公司牵着鼻子走,四处救火；二是监管者不顾保险业发展的固有规律,利用行政手段强行推行监管政策,妨碍保险业发展。所以,监管者应该正视自身的缺陷,切实提高监管水平,吸纳一批具有丰富保险工作经验的人员进入监管队伍,建立与学界专家互动,听取其意见的长效机制。
最后,笔者认为,解决现存的监管效率低下的问题,还要采取一些实际措施,包括：放松费率的严格监管；坚持对偿付能力的监管,并深化监管内涵；建立保险市场的退出机制；加强对市场行为的监管,完善市场约束机制。
本文在研究过程中,由于研究水平和研究时间所限,没有考虑再保险政策,这是笔者在后续研究中的努力方向。
Understood the importance of insurance regulation, but the regulatory authority is not the bigger the better, overextended the scope of regulation and rigid regulatory means, often counterproductive, therefore, investigate the current insurance system and the effectiveness of policies seeking to improve space is the main research purposes.
This article choosing an insurance regulatory system costs and benefits as a starting point to analyze the insurance regulatory system implementation costs and social benefits, both by comparison, the validity of the conclusions of regulatory regimes, and then discuss the reasonableness of regulatory policy, which is article writing ideas. However, the contents of complex insurance regulatory system, many things to attend, a tremendous amount of analysis of various aspects of the regulatory regime is not realistic, and therefore identify research perspectives at the same time, I also branches of insurance supervision system by analyzing the internal logic of contact, screening study, eventually solvency regulation, rate regulation, market conduct regulation and corporate governance structure and regulatory supervision of funds included in the study.
This structure consists of seven chapters of writing the first chapter introduction, describes the research background, significance and research ideas, and insurance regulatory efficiency on the relevant literature to sort, straighten out the writing context. The second chapter is the main content is reviewed international insurance regulatory system, especially in the IAIS solvency of insurance, the insurance company governance structure, market behavior and other aspects of the insurance provisions, as China Insurance Regulatory policy frame of reference.
In the third chapter describes the validity of the insurance solvency regulatory policy issues. Solvency regulatory system is the core, has been valued by regulatory authorities in the regulatory system occupies an important position, solvency of insurance company management indicators is critical, you can say that it is the axis of the regulatory system of solvency regulation can indeed affect the whole body to play the role of several other closely related regulatory regimes.
The social cost of solvency regulation can be divided into direct costs, indirect costs and social costs of three parts. Regulatory authorities for the payment of personnel costs solvency regulation, expenses and other direct costs, the marginal cost of this part of the expenditure is small, too much spending without increasing the regulatory authorities will be able to complete the solvency regulation, but may be used by regulators a variety of methods to escape regulation, resulting in additional expenses being regulated, forming solvency regulation of overheads. Cost of solvency regulation focused on its opportunity cost, due to regulatory departments to continuously improve standards in order to ensure solvency ratio insurance company solvency adequacy trend, because this approach is easier for regulators, but also easier to operate, so the existing insurance regulatory solvency standards might be too high, this practice has also been in the insurance verification, high standards make insurers cannot be forced to invest a larger insurers, affecting the profitability of insurers, and ultimately enable the insured and the insured are not covered by the insurance investment, harm their interests. Despite solvency regulatory policy bias, but it's also very obvious social benefits, through the strict supervision of solvency standards, China's insurance industry does not appear the phenomenon of insurer bankruptcy, more stable operation of the insurance market, insurance companies, the amount of capital is also solvency under increasing regulatory requirements, expanding the size of the insurer's capital, is conducive to the insurer's business. Compare costs and benefits of solvency regulation, it can be concluded, in preventing bankruptcy and maintain insurance market stability, solvency regulatory policy to be effective, however, the social cost of solvency regulation also continue to reduce space, the current regulatory policy is inefficient.
This chapter focuses on the effectiveness of regulatory policy premium rate. Rate regulation of insurance regulation is a hot research issue, rate regulation quite significant social costs, the current implementation of strict control policy rates was intended to prevent vicious competition in the insurance history of the development phase, the rate regulation does play proper role, however, as the insurance industry continues to advance, still using the rates strict control measures, it is outdated, it weakens after entering the insurance market competitiveness of insurance companies, may lead to a monopoly phenomenon, not conducive to long-term development of the insurance market. Rate regulation also gives consumers cannot rely on price signals to select insurance products, which makes the price mechanism's role in the insurance market is denied, the result is insured and the insured person cannot fully exercise their right to choose. In addition, under the premise of strict rate regulation, regulators do not understand out of new products, may not approve the insurer's product innovations which dealt a blow to the enthusiasm of the insured product innovation, so that the insurer conservative, not based on macro-changes in the economic environment and the insured, the insured person needs to design new types of insurance, insurance coverage resulting aging, no longer meet market demand, supply and demand for insurance conflict, hindering the development of the insurance market. However, rate regulation is not without benefits, it also made some social benefits, such as:a certain extent, to stop the adverse selection and moral hazard; prevent vicious competition competing price occurrence; prompting regulators to improve regulatory standards. However, regulatory policies and rates compared to the social costs caused by its social benefits appears to be minimal, and that the use of other regulatory policies can also achieve the above object, therefore, it can be concluded:rate regulation is invalid.
Chapter V of writing contents insurance market conduct regulation and corporate governance structure regulation. Market conduct regulation and corporate governance regulation is the IAIS's regulatory focus, market conduct supervision, solvency regulation and corporate governance regulation constitutes the three pillars of insurance regulation. Insurance market behavior can be based on the content and behavior of actors is divided into several categories, in view of the actual situation of the insurance market, the author will focus on writing insurance intermediary acts, breach of fraud.
The current behavior of the insurance market has made some effective regulatory regime, and its cost is only bring direct social costs and regulatory incremental transaction costs in two parts, in general, the regulatory revenue is greater than the cost of regulation, so the insurance market conduct regulation is An effective supervision, should strengthen market conduct supervision, to lay the foundation for the solvency regulation.
The corporate governance structure of regulation on the sound development of the insurance market has great benefits, regulatory authorities need to strengthen regulatory governance structure of insurance companies, insurance companies streamline internal mechanism, establish reasonable and effective scientific division of powers system to address the shareholders, the Board of Directors, executives between conflicts of interest in order to make the insurance company safe and efficient operation and management activities, so that the insured and the insured benefit. Meanwhile, standardized corporate governance structure directly affects the insurance solvency of insurance companies, affecting the entire macro-insurance market.
This Chapter is about the use of insurance funds analysis of the effectiveness of regulatory policies. Insurance funds are regulated safety regulatory guidelines, however, too much emphasis on the security of the insurance investment of insurance funds, but at the expense of profitability for the price, this is where the cost of the insurance investment regulation. Because of the use of insurance funds have many limitations, the insurance company missed many investment opportunities, reduce capital efficiency and indirectly affect the solvency and investment channels and the limitations of the investment structure more so that this problem worse, so the regulatory policies of insurance funds the cost is actually enormous, which completely exposed the country's insurance funds regulatory inefficiency, of course, it cannot all be attributed to regulatory authorities for the strict supervision of the use of funds, financial market investment macroeconomic environment has an important influence on the insurance. However, regulatory authorities should ensure that the funds under the premise of safety, try to broaden the investment channels, relaxing restrictions on the investment structure is necessary.
Through the analysis of the above aspects, in general, the existing insurance regulatory measures, though partially effective, but its efficiency is relatively low, the view of this, in the seventh chapter the author put forward some policies and suggestions for reference.
First, the concept of regulation change is imperative that regulators previous "headache medicine head, feet hurt the disease" model of the insurance industry a hundred harm, for lack of predictability situation that may arise on the already emerging blindly adopt regulatory issues blocking approach, which makes regulatory authorities in the regulatory process appears to be very passive, therefore, becomes "too late" to " Qutuxixin" and change "coercion" to "incentives" particularly important for the regulatory authorities, in addition, regulatory authorities should also maintain policy independence cannot be too much affected by public opinion, such as:too much focus on protecting the insured and the insured person's rights and interests, ignoring the legitimate rights and interests of the insurance protection.
Secondly, to achieve the above regulatory concept of change, improve regulatory standards is a necessary condition. Regulators professionalism and professionalism should be higher than the regulated, so as to grasp the macro level policy direction in order to establish efficient regulatory policy, unfortunately, China's regulators have not yet reached this level, there has been professional regulators higher than regulators phenomenon, the resulting outcome are the two regulators led by the nose by the insurance company, four fire; Second, regulators despite the inherent law of development of the insurance industry, the use of administrative means to force the implementation of regulatory policies, hinder the development of the insurance industry. Therefore, regulators should face up to their own shortcomings, and effectively improve the level of supervision, to absorb a number of rich work experience personnel to enter the insurance supervision team to establish interaction with academic experts to hear their views on long-term mechanism.
Finally, I believe that to solve the existing regulatory inefficiencies, but also to take some practical measures, including:relaxation rates strict supervision; insist on solvency regulation, and deepen regulatory connotation; establish insurance market exit mechanism; strengthen the behavior of the market supervision, improve market discipline mechanism.
Based on the research process, due to the level of research and research time constraints, did not consider the reinsurance policy, which is the author's efforts in the direction of future research.
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① 国际保险监督官协会(IAIS)保险监管核心原则(ICP)(2003年10月,中译本)第25条。
② 国际保险监督官协会(IAIS)保险监管核心原则(ICP)(2003年10月,中译本)第26条。
③ 国际保险监督官协会(IAIS)保险监管核心原则(ICP)(2003年10月,中译本)第27条。
① 《保险公司偿付能力管理规定》2008年6月30日中国保险监督管理委员会主席办公会审议通过,自2008年9月1日起施行。
① The relation between capital structure, interest rate sensitivity, and market value in the property-liability insurance industry, Journal of Risk and Insurance. Vol.62. No.4.
② Corporate insurance and the underinvestment problem, Journal of Risk and Insurance. Vol.54, No.1, Mar.,1987
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