上市公司中小股东权益审计保护问题研究
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摘要
中小股东权益保护问题是资本市场寻求利益公平的核心问题，是各国证券监管的重点，也是经济学的研究热点。目前，学术理论界就如何对中小股东权益审计保护的系统研究尚属空白，而且我国的资本市场存在着中小股东权益诉求的紧迫性，“上市公司中小股东权益审计保护问题研究”顺应了中小股东权益保护的实践和研究需要，体现了公司制度的公平，对于促进中小股东权益审计保护机制在我国的形成以及提升我国独立审计质量等具有较重要的理论意义和实践价值。
本文基于委托代理等理论，运用规范研究与实证分析相结合的方法，从审计的需求和供给两个维度系统分析了中小股东权益审计保护机理，提出中小股东权益审计保护的有效性须依赖赋决定权于审计委员会的审计师选聘机制、“无过错责任原则”的归责理念及特殊普通合伙制的审计赔偿机制、社会责任审计的实施规范。
首先，本文针对控制权与现金流权的分离引起的大股东和中小股东的代理冲突分析发现中小股东自我保护形同虚设、所有权安排对中小股东权益保护的失效、中小股东权益的法律保护失衡，而审计能够缓解中小股东与大股东之间的代理问题，有效约束大股东的侵占行为，是一种有效的中小股东权益保护机制。提出审计保护机制的实现路径依赖于中小股东选择高质量的审计需求和会计师事务所提供高质量的审计供给。提供高质量审计供需应解决审计保护的关键问题：改进审计师选聘机制和审计责任追究制度、规范社会责任审计。
其次，运用上市公司2008-2010年的样本数据，选择审计声誉作为审计质量的替代变量，研究了大股东侵占与高质量审计供需的相关性，实证检验发现大股东和中小股东代理冲突越严重，上市公司越不愿聘请审计声誉好的会计师事务所，审计师发表标准审计意见的可能性越大，初步验证了中小股东权益受损越严重，对高质量审计供给和需求就越低。进一步地实证研究发现在不当股利支付政策、非公允关联交易以及非效率投资这三种常见的大股东侵占方式下，侵占越严重，对高质量的审计需求越低，而除了非公允关联交易外，高质量审计供给也与大股东的侵占程度成反比，与初步检验基本吻合。主要原因来自于审计师选聘机制和审计责任追究制度的缺陷、社会责任审计制度的缺失。
最后，针对中小股东权益审计保护的理论研究和实证检验得出的结论分别论述，要提高中小股东选择高质量审计需求的动力和会计师事务所提供高质量审计的主动性，强化审计对中小股东权益的保护作用，提出有关制度的完善措施与实务改进对策：（1）赋予审计委员会的审计师聘用和辞聘的终极决定权，以改进现有的审计师选聘机制。为此，应通过改革审计委员会的选聘机制、明确审计委员会的职责、完善审计委员会的独立董事制度和工作制度来提高审计委员会的治理效率；（2）审计法律责任界定中实施“无过错责任原则”，完善“无过错责任原则”的立法和司法的相关政策；（3）针对现有审计赔偿机制的缺陷，应积极采用特殊普通合伙制组织形式，构建完备的合伙人个人信用体系、注册会计师执业责任保险制度等会计师事务政策建议来推动特殊普通合伙事务所的健康发展；（4）构建了包括审计主体、审计内容、审计评价指标、审计程序和方法的社会责任审计模式。运用层次分析法与问卷调查法，在整合提炼现有的社会责任评价相关标准基础之上，创建了以社会责任报告为核心的社会责任管理、社会责任认知、企业战略、企业声誉、商业伙伴等4个定性和23个定量的社会责任审计评价指标，提高审计供需质量。
The protection of minor shareholders' rights is not only the core issue ofinterests fairness in capital markets and becomes the focus of securities supervisionand regulation in various countries, but also a research focus in economics. Atpresent, the systematic research concerning minor shareholders' rights auditprotection in academic fields was still in blank, while minor shareholders' appeal forinterests protection is urgent in China's capital market."The research on minorshareholders' rights audit protection in listed companies" complies with practical andresearch needs of minor shareholders' rights and interests protection, reflects justiceof company system, and is of important theoretical significance and practical valuein promoting the formation of minor shareholders' rights audit protection mechanismand enhancing independent audit quality in our country.
Based on Principal-agent Theory, the article conducts research by combiningnormative research and practical analysis, analyses the mechanism of minorshareholders' rights audit protection from two dimensions of audit demand andsupply, and puts forward research conclusions on following three aspects: theeffectiveness of minor shareholders' rights audit protection should rely on theassignment of auditor hiring mechanism to the audit committee,"No fault liability"imputation principle and the audit compensation mechanism in special generalpartnership auditing firms, and the implementation of the social responsibility auditregulations.
First of all, based on the analysis of major shareholders and minor shareholders’principal-agent conflicts caused by the separation of controlling and cash flow rights,the article finds that the self-protection of minor shareholders exists only in name,the ownership arrangement for minor shareholders' rights and interests protection isuseless, and the legal protection of minor shareholders' rights and interests isunbalanced, while independent audit is able to alleviate the principal-agent problembetween major shareholders and minor shareholders, to effectively constrain majorshareholders’ snatch behavior and becomes a good mechanism for minorshareholders' rights protection. We propose that the realization path of the auditprotection mechanism hinges on minor shareholders’ high-quality audit demand andpublic accounting firms’ high-quality audit supply, and generating high-quality auditsupply and demand is the key to solve the problem in audit protection: improving auditor hiring mechanism and audit accountability system, and regulating socialresponsibility audit.
Secondly, the research uses the sample data from listed companies from2008to2010, and selects audit reputation as proxy variable for audit quality to test thecorrelation between major shareholders’ snatch behavior and high-quality auditsupply&demand. The results found that with more serious principal-agent problemsbetween major shareholders and minor shareholders, the listed companies are moreunwilling to hire reputable auditing firms, and the auditor is more likely to publishstandard audit opinions. The result is a preliminary verification that with moreserious damage to minor shareholders' rights, the supply and demand forhigh-quality audit is less. Further empirical research found that with such threemajor shareholders’ common snatch tactics as improper dividend payments policy,unfair transaction between related parties and the inefficient investment, the moresevere snatch behavior is, the fewer companies’ demand for high-quality audit. Alsohigh-quality audit supply is in negative correlation to major shareholders’ snatchbehavior seriousness except when under the tactic of unfair transaction betweenrelated parties, which is also consistent with preliminary results. The main reasonaccount for this result lies in the defects in auditor hiring mechanism and auditaccountability system, as well as the lack of social responsibility audit regulations.
Finally, the research draws the conclusions according to theoretical researchand empirical test on minor shareholders' rights audit protection respectively, and inorder to enhance minor shareholders’ motivation in demanding for high-quality audit,improve public accounting firms’ initiative to supply high-quality audit, strengthenthe protection by minor shareholders' rights audit, we puts forward the followingmeasures for perfecting the system and suggestions on practical improvement:(1)Empowering audit committee with the ultimate entitlement to employ and dismissauditors to improve the existing auditor hiring mechanism. Therefore it is proposedto reform existing employing procedures of audit committee, outline theresponsibilities of audit committee, as well as perfecting the independent directormechanism and working mechanism of audit committee to improve its efficiency;(2)Implementing "No fault liability" imputation principle in defining audit legalresponsibility and improving legislation and judicial policies related to the "No faultliability principle";(3) Facing the defects in existing audit compensation mechanism,we propose such policy suggestions on auditing affairs to promote development ofspecial general partnership auditing firms: encouraging special general partnership auditing firms, building a comprehensive partner personal credit system andprofessional liability insurance system of CPA;(4)Building a social responsibilityaudit model which includes audit subject, audit content, audit evaluation indicators,audit procedures and methods. By using analytic hierarchy process and questionnairesurvey method, we create a series of social responsibility audit evaluation index byintegrating and refining existing related social responsibility evaluation standards toimprove the audit quality of supply and demand. The evaluation index involves4qualitative and23quantitative index like social responsibility management, whosecore is social responsibility report, social responsibility cognition, corporate strategy,corporate reputation and business partners.
本文基于委托代理等理论，运用规范研究与实证分析相结合的方法，从审计的需求和供给两个维度系统分析了中小股东权益审计保护机理，提出中小股东权益审计保护的有效性须依赖赋决定权于审计委员会的审计师选聘机制、“无过错责任原则”的归责理念及特殊普通合伙制的审计赔偿机制、社会责任审计的实施规范。
首先，本文针对控制权与现金流权的分离引起的大股东和中小股东的代理冲突分析发现中小股东自我保护形同虚设、所有权安排对中小股东权益保护的失效、中小股东权益的法律保护失衡，而审计能够缓解中小股东与大股东之间的代理问题，有效约束大股东的侵占行为，是一种有效的中小股东权益保护机制。提出审计保护机制的实现路径依赖于中小股东选择高质量的审计需求和会计师事务所提供高质量的审计供给。提供高质量审计供需应解决审计保护的关键问题：改进审计师选聘机制和审计责任追究制度、规范社会责任审计。
其次，运用上市公司2008-2010年的样本数据，选择审计声誉作为审计质量的替代变量，研究了大股东侵占与高质量审计供需的相关性，实证检验发现大股东和中小股东代理冲突越严重，上市公司越不愿聘请审计声誉好的会计师事务所，审计师发表标准审计意见的可能性越大，初步验证了中小股东权益受损越严重，对高质量审计供给和需求就越低。进一步地实证研究发现在不当股利支付政策、非公允关联交易以及非效率投资这三种常见的大股东侵占方式下，侵占越严重，对高质量的审计需求越低，而除了非公允关联交易外，高质量审计供给也与大股东的侵占程度成反比，与初步检验基本吻合。主要原因来自于审计师选聘机制和审计责任追究制度的缺陷、社会责任审计制度的缺失。
最后，针对中小股东权益审计保护的理论研究和实证检验得出的结论分别论述，要提高中小股东选择高质量审计需求的动力和会计师事务所提供高质量审计的主动性，强化审计对中小股东权益的保护作用，提出有关制度的完善措施与实务改进对策：（1）赋予审计委员会的审计师聘用和辞聘的终极决定权，以改进现有的审计师选聘机制。为此，应通过改革审计委员会的选聘机制、明确审计委员会的职责、完善审计委员会的独立董事制度和工作制度来提高审计委员会的治理效率；（2）审计法律责任界定中实施“无过错责任原则”，完善“无过错责任原则”的立法和司法的相关政策；（3）针对现有审计赔偿机制的缺陷，应积极采用特殊普通合伙制组织形式，构建完备的合伙人个人信用体系、注册会计师执业责任保险制度等会计师事务政策建议来推动特殊普通合伙事务所的健康发展；（4）构建了包括审计主体、审计内容、审计评价指标、审计程序和方法的社会责任审计模式。运用层次分析法与问卷调查法，在整合提炼现有的社会责任评价相关标准基础之上，创建了以社会责任报告为核心的社会责任管理、社会责任认知、企业战略、企业声誉、商业伙伴等4个定性和23个定量的社会责任审计评价指标，提高审计供需质量。
The protection of minor shareholders' rights is not only the core issue ofinterests fairness in capital markets and becomes the focus of securities supervisionand regulation in various countries, but also a research focus in economics. Atpresent, the systematic research concerning minor shareholders' rights auditprotection in academic fields was still in blank, while minor shareholders' appeal forinterests protection is urgent in China's capital market."The research on minorshareholders' rights audit protection in listed companies" complies with practical andresearch needs of minor shareholders' rights and interests protection, reflects justiceof company system, and is of important theoretical significance and practical valuein promoting the formation of minor shareholders' rights audit protection mechanismand enhancing independent audit quality in our country.
Based on Principal-agent Theory, the article conducts research by combiningnormative research and practical analysis, analyses the mechanism of minorshareholders' rights audit protection from two dimensions of audit demand andsupply, and puts forward research conclusions on following three aspects: theeffectiveness of minor shareholders' rights audit protection should rely on theassignment of auditor hiring mechanism to the audit committee,"No fault liability"imputation principle and the audit compensation mechanism in special generalpartnership auditing firms, and the implementation of the social responsibility auditregulations.
First of all, based on the analysis of major shareholders and minor shareholders’principal-agent conflicts caused by the separation of controlling and cash flow rights,the article finds that the self-protection of minor shareholders exists only in name,the ownership arrangement for minor shareholders' rights and interests protection isuseless, and the legal protection of minor shareholders' rights and interests isunbalanced, while independent audit is able to alleviate the principal-agent problembetween major shareholders and minor shareholders, to effectively constrain majorshareholders’ snatch behavior and becomes a good mechanism for minorshareholders' rights protection. We propose that the realization path of the auditprotection mechanism hinges on minor shareholders’ high-quality audit demand andpublic accounting firms’ high-quality audit supply, and generating high-quality auditsupply and demand is the key to solve the problem in audit protection: improving auditor hiring mechanism and audit accountability system, and regulating socialresponsibility audit.
Secondly, the research uses the sample data from listed companies from2008to2010, and selects audit reputation as proxy variable for audit quality to test thecorrelation between major shareholders’ snatch behavior and high-quality auditsupply&demand. The results found that with more serious principal-agent problemsbetween major shareholders and minor shareholders, the listed companies are moreunwilling to hire reputable auditing firms, and the auditor is more likely to publishstandard audit opinions. The result is a preliminary verification that with moreserious damage to minor shareholders' rights, the supply and demand forhigh-quality audit is less. Further empirical research found that with such threemajor shareholders’ common snatch tactics as improper dividend payments policy,unfair transaction between related parties and the inefficient investment, the moresevere snatch behavior is, the fewer companies’ demand for high-quality audit. Alsohigh-quality audit supply is in negative correlation to major shareholders’ snatchbehavior seriousness except when under the tactic of unfair transaction betweenrelated parties, which is also consistent with preliminary results. The main reasonaccount for this result lies in the defects in auditor hiring mechanism and auditaccountability system, as well as the lack of social responsibility audit regulations.
Finally, the research draws the conclusions according to theoretical researchand empirical test on minor shareholders' rights audit protection respectively, and inorder to enhance minor shareholders’ motivation in demanding for high-quality audit,improve public accounting firms’ initiative to supply high-quality audit, strengthenthe protection by minor shareholders' rights audit, we puts forward the followingmeasures for perfecting the system and suggestions on practical improvement:(1)Empowering audit committee with the ultimate entitlement to employ and dismissauditors to improve the existing auditor hiring mechanism. Therefore it is proposedto reform existing employing procedures of audit committee, outline theresponsibilities of audit committee, as well as perfecting the independent directormechanism and working mechanism of audit committee to improve its efficiency;(2)Implementing "No fault liability" imputation principle in defining audit legalresponsibility and improving legislation and judicial policies related to the "No faultliability principle";(3) Facing the defects in existing audit compensation mechanism,we propose such policy suggestions on auditing affairs to promote development ofspecial general partnership auditing firms: encouraging special general partnership auditing firms, building a comprehensive partner personal credit system andprofessional liability insurance system of CPA;(4)Building a social responsibilityaudit model which includes audit subject, audit content, audit evaluation indicators,audit procedures and methods. By using analytic hierarchy process and questionnairesurvey method, we create a series of social responsibility audit evaluation index byintegrating and refining existing related social responsibility evaluation standards toimprove the audit quality of supply and demand. The evaluation index involves4qualitative and23quantitative index like social responsibility management, whosecore is social responsibility report, social responsibility cognition, corporate strategy,corporate reputation and business partners.
引文
①《中国注册会计师职业道德基本准则》
①OECD.公司治理原则.2004年
②财政部.独立审计基本准则.1995年12月25日颁布
①最高人民法院.关于审理证券市场因虚假陈述引发的民事赔偿案件的若干规定.2003年1月9日
①Simon H119791实质性理性到程序理性,载于Philosophy and Economic Theory, edited by HabonFrank and Hollis Martin. Oxford: Oxford University press1转引自陶永谊119921旷日持久的论战)))经济学的方法论之争1第1版1西安:陕西人民出版社,22~27
①最高人民法院.《最高人民法院关于审理涉及会计师事务所在审计业务活动中民事侵权赔偿案件的若干规定》.2007年6月11日颁布
②全国人大常委会.公司法.2006年1月1日.
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