公平偏好下国企高管最优显性和隐性激励组合研究
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摘要
近年来，大量“天价薪酬”事件曝光以及国家对国企负责人薪酬政策的调整使得国企高管薪酬的公平性一直备受社会各界的争议，尤其是在当前经济低迷和收入差距不断扩大的经济形势下，人们对收入分配公平的关注也越来越强烈，如何制定兼顾公平与效率的薪酬合约成为一个亟待解决的现实问题。以往基于纯自利假设的传统理论已不能为之提供很好的解释，而近年来兴起的公平偏好理论通过大量博弈实验令人信服地证明人们除了具有自利偏好之外还具有公平偏好，它克服了标准经济理论基于纯自利假设的局限性，正逐渐被引入到标准的激励理论中，成为前沿的研究课题，有望更好地解释这些企业激励难题。同时，从实践操作情况看，国企高管激励实际上显性激励和隐性激励的一系列合约组合，但相关研究主要集中在显性激励或隐性激励的某一方面，因此不能系统地揭示国企高管的激励问题。基于此，本文针对国企，在考虑国有企业委托人和代理人公平偏好特殊性的前提下，将公平偏好模型拓展至显性激励和隐性激励并行的环境中，探讨兼顾公平时国企高管最优激励组合及其公平偏好对国企高管激励组合的影响，并通过设计合理的实证模型，对一些研究结论加以检验和说明，为现实中国企高管的激励问题提供新的解释，也为完善国企高管激励机制提供新的理论指导。
本文基于Fehr&Schmidt公平偏好理论模型，先从显性激励入手，在仅实施显性激励的框架下，引入公平偏好，探讨高管和政府主管部门的公平偏好对最优激励报酬的影响。结果发现：（1）在可被第三方证实的任务目标的激励上，高管因低于公平工资而表现出的嫉妒偏好会增加最优激励报酬，而因高于公平工资而表现出的同情偏好，以及政府主管部门为维护社会公平而表现出的公平偏好都会减少最优激励报酬，从而共同促使高管薪酬向公平工资移动；（2）在不可被证实的任务目标的激励上，最优激励报酬为零，这说明显性激励对该任务目标没有积极的作用，政府主管部门只能通过降低其它任务目标上的激励报酬，来避免高管偏好于其他任务目标而放弃该任务目标。由此可见，面对国企多任务目标要求，仅实施显性激励是不够的。
本文进一步把公平偏好模型扩展为显性合约和隐性合约并行的激励组合模型，基于重复博弈的背景，探讨高管和政府主管部门公平偏好下国企高管的组合激励问题。研究结果表明：（1）在高管公平偏好的影响方面，在最优激励组合中，高管的公平偏好先影响隐性合约激励，然而在隐性合约的替代关系下间接地影响显性合约激励，最终使得显性薪酬逐渐向公平工资回归，其中，隐性合约激励的变化幅度大于显性合约。研究还发现，高管的同情偏好是实施隐性合约的重要因素，它不仅放松了一阶最优的条件，而且即使在显性合约完美的情况下，对促进隐性合约的实施也有积极的作用。（2）在政府主管部门公平偏好的影响方面，政府主管部门主要通过直接降低显性合约激励和利用隐性合约替代显性合约等两种方式来管制国企高管过高的薪酬，促进社会收入公平。在这两种方式中，政府主管部门更倾向于通过更多的隐性合约来替代显性合约激励，而且用于替代的隐性合约随着政府公平偏好的增加而增加。这反映了实施大量的隐性合约有利于在兼顾激励效率的基础上缓解政府的社会公平约束。但进一步的研究发现隐性合约的这种作用受制于政府对高管贡献的主观评估能力，若政府主管部门的主观评估能力越差，政府薪酬规制政策的效果会越差。
在实践中，高管除了在乎其薪酬与公平工资的差距之外，与团队内部其他成员的收入差距也会使得他们产生不公的心理，进而影响团队的竞争和合作。为此，本文基于重复博弈的背景，进一步把公平偏好模型拓展为多代理人激励模型，探讨国有企业高管团队内的公平偏好对不同性质和不同种类的团队合约的影响。研究结果表明，团队合约主要包括相对合约（Relative Performance Evaluation）和联合合约（Joint Performance Evaluation），（1）在团队合约性质为显性合约的情况下，实施相对合约最优的条件是高管的嫉妒偏好强度足够大或同情强度足够小；而在联合合约的模式下，只有当嫉妒偏好足够小或同情偏好足够大时，实施极端联合合约才最优。（2）在团队合约性质为隐性合约的情况下，极端联合合约的可行条件严于一般联合合约，而一般联合合约的可行条件严于相对合约，当所有合约都可行时，实施极端联合合约最优，实施联合合约优于相对合约，因为联合合约中，高管团队内成员之间的相互监督和协作有利于降低政府主管部门的期望支付成本，尤其在极端联合合约的期望支付成本最小。公平偏好对极端联合合约的可行条件没有影响，对一般联合合约的可行条件的影响不明确；而对于相对合约来说，嫉妒偏好会放松该合约的可行条件，但同情偏好却会使该合约的可行条件变紧。（3）除极端联合合约以外，无论团队合约性质为显性还是隐性合约，公平偏好对团队合约的激励效应都表现为：团队内高管的嫉妒偏好会降低政府主管部门的期望支付成本，具有正的激励效应，但同情偏好却会使得政府主管部门的期望支付成本增加，具有负的激励效应。
最后，以我国上市国有企业为样本，合理建立联立方程组、非参数回归和面板GMM等计量模型，实证检验外部薪酬差距和高管团队内薪酬差距的激励效应，并说明对显性薪酬和隐性薪酬决定的影响，所得实证结果与上述理论推导的主要结论一致。并就相关政策层面提出必要的建议。
In recent years, the exposure of the sky-high salary of executives and thegovernment's adjustment of the state-owned enterprises(SOE) executives’compensation policy make the fairness of the compensation of the executives instate-owned enterprises a controversial topic, especially under the circumstances thatthe economy continues to struggle and the income gap becomes lager, people paymore and more attention to the income distribution equity, how to design acompensation contract which both considers fairness and efficiency has becomes apractical issue to be settled. Previous traditional theories based on pure self-interestassumption cannot provide good explanation. With a lot of game experiments,Fairness Preference Theory rising in recent years proves convincingly that besidesself-interest, people also have fairness preference. It overcomes the limitations ofstandard economic theory based on pure self-interest hypothesis, and is graduallybeing introduced into the standard incentive theory and becomes a frontier researchtopic, which is likely to better explain these enterprises incentive problems.Meanwhile, from the practical operation, compensation incentives of executive inChinese SOE actually are a series of incentive contracts combined of explicit andimplicit incentive. But related research mainly concentrated on one aspect of explicitincentive or implicit incentive, thus it can’t reveal the incentive scheme for SOE’sexecutive systematically. So this paper discusses the optimal incentive combination ofSOE’s executive with consideration of fairness by introducing fairness preferencemodel into explicit incentive contract and implicit incentive contract model, andstudies the effect of fairness preference on executive compensation, then test theconclusions from the models we build by empirical methods. So it provides newexplanations to SOE’s executive incentive problem and also provides some newtheoretical guidance for improving the incentive mechanism of SOE’s operators.
Based on the Fehr&Schmidt Fairness Preference model, we start from theframework of only implementing explicit incentive and explore the impact of fairnesspreferences of executive and government on optimal incentive compensation byintroducing fairness preference. The results show:(1) In the aspect of the taskconfirmed by third party, the jealous that is caused due to owing less than fair wage,will increases the optimal incentive payment, while sympathy preference that iscaused by owing more than fair wage and the government fairness preference thatreflects maintaining social fairness will decrease the optimal incentive payment, thus making the executive compensation move to fair wage.(2) In the aspect of the tasktarget that cannot be confirmed by third party, the optimal incentive compensation iszero, which reflects explicit has no positive incentive effect on this task target, thegovernment has to lower incentive payment of other task targets in order to avoid thatexecutive prefer other task targets with giving up this one. Consequently, there isgreat limitation for the SOE multitask incentive.
So this paper further extends this fairness preference model to the explicit andimplicit contract parallel incentive compensation model, and discusses the optimalincentive combination with the fairness preference of executive and governmentbased on the repeated game background. The results show:(1) In the executivefairness preference, in optimal incentive combination, executive fairness preferencefirst influences implicit contract, then indirectly affect explicit contract incentiveunder the substitute relation of implicit contract, finally making explicit compensationgradually move to fair wage. Besides, the variation extent of implicit contract isgreater than that of explicit contract. And executive’ sympathy preference is animportant factor for implementing implicit contract, it not only relaxes th e first orderoptimal conditions, but also has positive effect for improving the execution of implicitcontract even though the explicit contract is perfect.(2) In the aspect of government,the government mainly carry out two methods——directly lower explicit contractincentive and substitute implicit contract for explicit contract——to imposerestrictions on overpaid compensation for SOE executive to promote the fairdistribution of social income. In these two methods, the government prefers thesecond, and the substitute implicit contract increases with the increase ofgovernment's fairness preference. This reveals that implementing lots of implicitcontract could help alleviate the government's restrictions of social fairness withconsideration of efficiency. But further research finds that the effect of implicitcontract is subjected to the government's subjective assessment ability on executives,the worse the government's subjective assessment ability, the worse the effect of thegovernment's salary regulation policy is.
In practice, not only executive could care the gap between his/her wage and fairwage, but also the gap between executive's wage and other team member's wage makethem unfair psychology, then influencing the competition and cooperation of the team.So, on the background of repeated game, we further extents the fairness preferencemodel to multi-agent incentive model, and explores the effect of the fairnesspreference in SOE executive team on the variety of team contract. The results showthat team contract includes relative performance evaluation (RPE) and jointperformance evaluation (JPE).(1)Assuming that team contract belong to explicit contract, implementing the optimal condition of RPE is that the jealousy preference ofexecutives is large enough or the sympathy preference is small enough. While, forjoint performance evaluation, it's optimal for implementing the extreme JPE when thejealousy preference is small enough or the sympathy preference is large enough.(2)Assuming that team contract is implicit contract, the feasible condition of extremeJPE is stricter than the ordinary JPE, and the feasible condition of ordinary JPE isstricter than the RPE. If every team contract is feasible, the extreme JPE is optimal,because the supervision and collaboration between team members could reduce theexpected payment cost of government, which makes the expected payment cost of theextreme JPE lowest. Fairness preference has no effect on the feasible condition ofextreme JPE, and its effect on ordinary JPE is unsure. However, for RPE, jealousypreference can loosen its feasible condition, and sympathy preference can tighten itsfeasible condition.(3)Except for extreme JPE, no matter team contract is implicitcontract or explicit contract, the effect of fairness preference on team contract is: thejealousy preference of executives in the team can reduce the expected payment cost ofgovernment, which has a positive incentive effect; while sympathy preference canincrease the expected payment cost o f government, which has a negative incentiveeffect.
Finally, this paper sets the econometric models of simultaneous equations,nonparametric regression and panel GMM, taking Chinese listed companies’ data assamples. The models are aimed at empirically testing the incentive effects of theexternal pay gap and the pay gap inside the executive team, and explaining theinfluence on determining explicit and implicit compensation. The empirical resultsobtained agree with the above theoretical conclusions. Fina lly we make necessaryrecommendations on relevant policies.
本文基于Fehr&Schmidt公平偏好理论模型，先从显性激励入手，在仅实施显性激励的框架下，引入公平偏好，探讨高管和政府主管部门的公平偏好对最优激励报酬的影响。结果发现：（1）在可被第三方证实的任务目标的激励上，高管因低于公平工资而表现出的嫉妒偏好会增加最优激励报酬，而因高于公平工资而表现出的同情偏好，以及政府主管部门为维护社会公平而表现出的公平偏好都会减少最优激励报酬，从而共同促使高管薪酬向公平工资移动；（2）在不可被证实的任务目标的激励上，最优激励报酬为零，这说明显性激励对该任务目标没有积极的作用，政府主管部门只能通过降低其它任务目标上的激励报酬，来避免高管偏好于其他任务目标而放弃该任务目标。由此可见，面对国企多任务目标要求，仅实施显性激励是不够的。
本文进一步把公平偏好模型扩展为显性合约和隐性合约并行的激励组合模型，基于重复博弈的背景，探讨高管和政府主管部门公平偏好下国企高管的组合激励问题。研究结果表明：（1）在高管公平偏好的影响方面，在最优激励组合中，高管的公平偏好先影响隐性合约激励，然而在隐性合约的替代关系下间接地影响显性合约激励，最终使得显性薪酬逐渐向公平工资回归，其中，隐性合约激励的变化幅度大于显性合约。研究还发现，高管的同情偏好是实施隐性合约的重要因素，它不仅放松了一阶最优的条件，而且即使在显性合约完美的情况下，对促进隐性合约的实施也有积极的作用。（2）在政府主管部门公平偏好的影响方面，政府主管部门主要通过直接降低显性合约激励和利用隐性合约替代显性合约等两种方式来管制国企高管过高的薪酬，促进社会收入公平。在这两种方式中，政府主管部门更倾向于通过更多的隐性合约来替代显性合约激励，而且用于替代的隐性合约随着政府公平偏好的增加而增加。这反映了实施大量的隐性合约有利于在兼顾激励效率的基础上缓解政府的社会公平约束。但进一步的研究发现隐性合约的这种作用受制于政府对高管贡献的主观评估能力，若政府主管部门的主观评估能力越差，政府薪酬规制政策的效果会越差。
在实践中，高管除了在乎其薪酬与公平工资的差距之外，与团队内部其他成员的收入差距也会使得他们产生不公的心理，进而影响团队的竞争和合作。为此，本文基于重复博弈的背景，进一步把公平偏好模型拓展为多代理人激励模型，探讨国有企业高管团队内的公平偏好对不同性质和不同种类的团队合约的影响。研究结果表明，团队合约主要包括相对合约（Relative Performance Evaluation）和联合合约（Joint Performance Evaluation），（1）在团队合约性质为显性合约的情况下，实施相对合约最优的条件是高管的嫉妒偏好强度足够大或同情强度足够小；而在联合合约的模式下，只有当嫉妒偏好足够小或同情偏好足够大时，实施极端联合合约才最优。（2）在团队合约性质为隐性合约的情况下，极端联合合约的可行条件严于一般联合合约，而一般联合合约的可行条件严于相对合约，当所有合约都可行时，实施极端联合合约最优，实施联合合约优于相对合约，因为联合合约中，高管团队内成员之间的相互监督和协作有利于降低政府主管部门的期望支付成本，尤其在极端联合合约的期望支付成本最小。公平偏好对极端联合合约的可行条件没有影响，对一般联合合约的可行条件的影响不明确；而对于相对合约来说，嫉妒偏好会放松该合约的可行条件，但同情偏好却会使该合约的可行条件变紧。（3）除极端联合合约以外，无论团队合约性质为显性还是隐性合约，公平偏好对团队合约的激励效应都表现为：团队内高管的嫉妒偏好会降低政府主管部门的期望支付成本，具有正的激励效应，但同情偏好却会使得政府主管部门的期望支付成本增加，具有负的激励效应。
最后，以我国上市国有企业为样本，合理建立联立方程组、非参数回归和面板GMM等计量模型，实证检验外部薪酬差距和高管团队内薪酬差距的激励效应，并说明对显性薪酬和隐性薪酬决定的影响，所得实证结果与上述理论推导的主要结论一致。并就相关政策层面提出必要的建议。
In recent years, the exposure of the sky-high salary of executives and thegovernment's adjustment of the state-owned enterprises(SOE) executives’compensation policy make the fairness of the compensation of the executives instate-owned enterprises a controversial topic, especially under the circumstances thatthe economy continues to struggle and the income gap becomes lager, people paymore and more attention to the income distribution equity, how to design acompensation contract which both considers fairness and efficiency has becomes apractical issue to be settled. Previous traditional theories based on pure self-interestassumption cannot provide good explanation. With a lot of game experiments,Fairness Preference Theory rising in recent years proves convincingly that besidesself-interest, people also have fairness preference. It overcomes the limitations ofstandard economic theory based on pure self-interest hypothesis, and is graduallybeing introduced into the standard incentive theory and becomes a frontier researchtopic, which is likely to better explain these enterprises incentive problems.Meanwhile, from the practical operation, compensation incentives of executive inChinese SOE actually are a series of incentive contracts combined of explicit andimplicit incentive. But related research mainly concentrated on one aspect of explicitincentive or implicit incentive, thus it can’t reveal the incentive scheme for SOE’sexecutive systematically. So this paper discusses the optimal incentive combination ofSOE’s executive with consideration of fairness by introducing fairness preferencemodel into explicit incentive contract and implicit incentive contract model, andstudies the effect of fairness preference on executive compensation, then test theconclusions from the models we build by empirical methods. So it provides newexplanations to SOE’s executive incentive problem and also provides some newtheoretical guidance for improving the incentive mechanism of SOE’s operators.
Based on the Fehr&Schmidt Fairness Preference model, we start from theframework of only implementing explicit incentive and explore the impact of fairnesspreferences of executive and government on optimal incentive compensation byintroducing fairness preference. The results show:(1) In the aspect of the taskconfirmed by third party, the jealous that is caused due to owing less than fair wage,will increases the optimal incentive payment, while sympathy preference that iscaused by owing more than fair wage and the government fairness preference thatreflects maintaining social fairness will decrease the optimal incentive payment, thus making the executive compensation move to fair wage.(2) In the aspect of the tasktarget that cannot be confirmed by third party, the optimal incentive compensation iszero, which reflects explicit has no positive incentive effect on this task target, thegovernment has to lower incentive payment of other task targets in order to avoid thatexecutive prefer other task targets with giving up this one. Consequently, there isgreat limitation for the SOE multitask incentive.
So this paper further extends this fairness preference model to the explicit andimplicit contract parallel incentive compensation model, and discusses the optimalincentive combination with the fairness preference of executive and governmentbased on the repeated game background. The results show:(1) In the executivefairness preference, in optimal incentive combination, executive fairness preferencefirst influences implicit contract, then indirectly affect explicit contract incentiveunder the substitute relation of implicit contract, finally making explicit compensationgradually move to fair wage. Besides, the variation extent of implicit contract isgreater than that of explicit contract. And executive’ sympathy preference is animportant factor for implementing implicit contract, it not only relaxes th e first orderoptimal conditions, but also has positive effect for improving the execution of implicitcontract even though the explicit contract is perfect.(2) In the aspect of government,the government mainly carry out two methods——directly lower explicit contractincentive and substitute implicit contract for explicit contract——to imposerestrictions on overpaid compensation for SOE executive to promote the fairdistribution of social income. In these two methods, the government prefers thesecond, and the substitute implicit contract increases with the increase ofgovernment's fairness preference. This reveals that implementing lots of implicitcontract could help alleviate the government's restrictions of social fairness withconsideration of efficiency. But further research finds that the effect of implicitcontract is subjected to the government's subjective assessment ability on executives,the worse the government's subjective assessment ability, the worse the effect of thegovernment's salary regulation policy is.
In practice, not only executive could care the gap between his/her wage and fairwage, but also the gap between executive's wage and other team member's wage makethem unfair psychology, then influencing the competition and cooperation of the team.So, on the background of repeated game, we further extents the fairness preferencemodel to multi-agent incentive model, and explores the effect of the fairnesspreference in SOE executive team on the variety of team contract. The results showthat team contract includes relative performance evaluation (RPE) and jointperformance evaluation (JPE).(1)Assuming that team contract belong to explicit contract, implementing the optimal condition of RPE is that the jealousy preference ofexecutives is large enough or the sympathy preference is small enough. While, forjoint performance evaluation, it's optimal for implementing the extreme JPE when thejealousy preference is small enough or the sympathy preference is large enough.(2)Assuming that team contract is implicit contract, the feasible condition of extremeJPE is stricter than the ordinary JPE, and the feasible condition of ordinary JPE isstricter than the RPE. If every team contract is feasible, the extreme JPE is optimal,because the supervision and collaboration between team members could reduce theexpected payment cost of government, which makes the expected payment cost of theextreme JPE lowest. Fairness preference has no effect on the feasible condition ofextreme JPE, and its effect on ordinary JPE is unsure. However, for RPE, jealousypreference can loosen its feasible condition, and sympathy preference can tighten itsfeasible condition.(3)Except for extreme JPE, no matter team contract is implicitcontract or explicit contract, the effect of fairness preference on team contract is: thejealousy preference of executives in the team can reduce the expected payment cost ofgovernment, which has a positive incentive effect; while sympathy preference canincrease the expected payment cost o f government, which has a negative incentiveeffect.
Finally, this paper sets the econometric models of simultaneous equations,nonparametric regression and panel GMM, taking Chinese listed companies’ data assamples. The models are aimed at empirically testing the incentive effects of theexternal pay gap and the pay gap inside the executive team, and explaining theinfluence on determining explicit and implicit compensation. The empirical resultsobtained agree with the above theoretical conclusions. Fina lly we make necessaryrecommendations on relevant policies.
引文
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