农业信贷与保险互联对农户收入影响研究
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摘要
我国改革开放以来,中央先后共发布了多个解决三农问题的中央一号文件,从2004年起的中央一号文件对农村金融问题,特别是农村金融体制改革日益重视。然而我国农村金融领域的改革并没有彻底改善农业信贷配置低效率问题,农村信贷难问题已成为制约农村经济发展的“瓶颈”：一方面,农业的天然弱质性使得其农业信贷存在高风险,而农村信贷机构从自身资金安全性角度考虑,谨慎投放农村市场的信贷资金,由此造成信贷配给；另一方面,资本的逐利性决定了资本从低收益领域、地区或产业持续流向高收益领域、地区或产业。研究有必要引导资金流回农村,提高金融机构对农村经济发展的资金支持力度。
2009年中央一号文件提出探索建立农村信贷与农业保险相结合的银保互动机制,为提高农户信贷可获得性提供了一个新途径,但是目前对其具体实施方案、效果都没有进一步的理论研究与实证支撑,因此研究农业信贷与保险互联能为现阶段稳步推进深化农村金融改革提供科学依据,具有一定的理论意义和实践价值。
本文研究总体目标是探讨农业信贷保险互联如何改善农业信贷配给,提高农户收入。围绕这一总体目标,以“个体声誉信号博弈”等相关理论为基础,系统构建了农业信贷与保险互联理论分析框架,综合运用实地入户调查,马尔科夫向量自回归、Bioprobit、平均处理效应模型以及有序Probit等计量经济学方法,对农业信贷配给类型、农业信贷配置效率等进行了深入的定性与定量剖析,选择自然灾害影响类似的经济发达地区江苏省高淳县与经济欠发达地区湖北孝感云梦县、随县作为样本,在江苏湖北581户农户调查数据的基础上,实证检验农业信贷保险互联对农户收入的影响。
全文共分为7个部分,论文包括以下几个研究内容：(1)农业信贷配给类型与其影响信贷配置效率分析；(2)农业信贷保险互联对农户信贷行为影响研究；(3)农业信贷保险互联对农户收入、政府补贴影响实证研究。
论文从研究农业信贷配给类型出发,采用我国1979-2009年的存款利率、农业信贷额、农业产出时间序列数据,以及调研的农户数据,研究农业信贷配给类时间序列区间变化特征、截面特征,以及农业配置效率区间特征,研究结果表明：在经济平稳区间,农业信贷机构实施了传统的信贷配给,以价格配给为主；在经济增长区间,农业信贷供给增加,主要以农户风险配给为主；在经济处于衰退区间,主要以价格配给、数量配给为主,风险配给程度降低。截面特征为以价格配给为主,风险配给与交易成本配给成为当前非价格配给的主要类型。农业信贷配置效率呈现明显的区间波动状态特征,经济平稳环境下信贷配置效率最高,总体上信贷配置效率得到改善,经济处于平稳期期间适当放宽利率有利于提高农业信贷配置效率,经济增长与衰退区间还需要要存款利率控制,因此有必要引入农业信贷与保险互联机制,分散农业信贷中的风险,降低农业信贷利率,改善农户的信贷配给,提高农业信贷配置效率。
接着,本文回答了“如何引导农户主动参与农业信贷保险互联”,分析农户社会资本与自身禀赋中的风险偏好对其信贷、保险、以及信贷保险互联行为的影响,然后基于实验经济学方法,设计了基准组与实验组,采用有序Probit模型,实证检验农户参与信贷保险互联的影响因素。研究结果表明：在控制社会资本影响后,我们发现区域经济结构的差别对农户的信贷保险互联决策中起着重要作用；风险偏好变量对农户的信贷与保险互联、信贷迁移决策起着正向作用,意味实现农户主动参与率的提高,需要引导农户实现由风险规避型向风险偏好型进行转变,培育农户的“企业家精神”。
在此基础上,本文构建了农业信贷与保险互联的抵押品替代与个体声誉信号传递博弈分析框架,以存在信贷需求的154户农户数据为例,检验了“农业信贷+人身意外险+政策性农业保险+财政补贴”模式中,农业信贷保险互联对农户风险配给的影响。研究结果表明：农业信贷与保险互联合约作为抵押品的一部分,通过声誉机制,显著改善农户风险配给,提高其信贷可获得性。
再基于前面两部分的研究,回答“农户参与这种互联是否会提高其收入,以及这个过程中对政府补贴会产生何种程度的影响”,本部分首先采用平均处理效应模型(Average Treatment Model)下的Match模型,比较禀赋如年龄、地区、土地、农业生产投资这些变量相近的农户,分析参与农业信贷互联所产生的农业生产收入差别,研究农业信贷与保险互联通过两种途径对农户收入产生的影响：一是改善农户信贷配给的间接效应、二是激励农户采用新技术的直接效应；其次研究农户增收给政府的政策性农业保险补贴带来的影响。研究结果表明：农业信贷保险互联是能够显著提高农户收入,实现农户增收17.21%,并提高农户农业保险保费支付意愿,有效地降低了政府补贴的压力。
最后,基于研究结论,论文给出了政策建议,如加快农业保险立法,完善巨灾风险准备金机制,统筹设计“一揽子农贷”与“一揽子农险”互联,推进农户、专业合作社、村镇信用建设提高其组织声誉等,并对进一步深入研究的内容及方法做了展望。
Since China's reform and opening up, the CPC Central Committee has issued successive series of No.1Central Document files to solve rural development problems, from2004onwards, No.1Central Document files focus rural finance areas, especially issues of the rural financial system reforms. However, China's rural financial reforms did not improve the low allocation of agricultural credit, rural credit problems become the "bottleneck" while restricting the development of the rural economy:on the one hand, the natural inferiority of the agricultural poses high risk to agriculture credit, meanwhile the rural credit institutions carefully lend their funds from the view of their own funds' security thus resulting credit rationing, on the other hand, based on the nature of profit-driven, capital continued to flow from the field of high-yield areas, regions or industries to the opposite. It's necessary to study how to change this situation, to guide capital flows back to rural areas, improve the financial institutions' funding support for rural economic development.
2009No.l Central Document file proposed to explore the establishment of inter-linked agricultural credit and agricultural insurance as bank and insurance interactive mechanism, provides a new way to improve the availability of farmers credit, yet there's not further theoretical research or empirical support sheds no lights its specific implementation procedures and effects, so the study of inter-linked agricultural credit and insurance can provide a scientific basis of steady progress in deepening the rural financial reform, thus has some theoretical and practical value.
The overall objective of this study is to explore the inter-linked Agricultural Credit and Insurance how to improve the agricultural credit rationing, increase farmers'income. Around this overall objective, based on individual reputation signaling game theory, systemly builds the inter-linked Agricultural Credit and Insurance theory framework, combining the integrated use of household surveys in the field, econometric methods of Markov vector autoregression models, Bioprobit model,average treatment effect models, ordered Probit etc, provides qualitative and quantitative in-depth analysis of agricultural credit rationing types with agricultural credit allocation efficiency.
Selecting sampling areas with similar natural disasters effects, as the economically developed areas like the GaoChun County of JiangSu Province, and economically less developed areas like YunMeng county of XiaoGan city and Sui county in HuBei province.Based on the581household survey data, we proceed the empirical test of the inter-linked Agricultural Credit and Insurance's effectiveness on farmers'income.
The full text is composed of seven parts, includes the following contents:(1) agricultural credit rationing types and its influence on credit allocation efficiency;(2) the inter-linked Agricultural Credit and Insurance's impact on farmers' credit behavior;(3) the empirical study of the inter-linked Agricultural Credit and Insurance's impact on the famers'income and government subsidies programe.
This thesis starts from the point of analysis of agricultural credit rationing types by employing time series data such as deposit rates in China1979-2009, agricultural credit, agricultural output as well as survey data from rural households, to reveal the agricultural credit rationing type time series and cross-section regimes' characteristics. Togethe with agricultural allocative efficiency regimes'characteristics, the results show that:in the regime of stable economic, agricultural credit institutions have implemented a traditional credit rationing, price rationing; in the regime of economic growth, the increase in the supply of agricultural credit, mainly lead to farmers risk rationing; in the regime of economy recession, mainly composed of price rationing, quantity rationing and minimize risk rationing. Rationing types'cross-section feature is characterized by price rationing,and non-price rationing risk rationing, transaction cost rationing which are the component of non-price rationing. Agricultural credit allocative efficiency showed obvious characteristics of the regime changing features. in the regime of stable economic, the highest efficiency of credit allocation was achived, the overall efficiency of credit allocation is improved; in the regime of the stable economy,liberlized interest rates help to improve the allocation efficiency of agricultural credit, in the regimes of economic growth and recession, deposit interest rates need to be controled, it is necessary to introduce the inter-linked agriculture credit and insurance mechanism, decentralizing agricultural credit risk, reducing agricultural credit interest rates, improving credit rationing of farmers, at lat improving agricultural credit allocation efficiency.
Then, answering to the question "how to guide farmers to actively participate in the inter-linked Agricultural Credit and Insurance, we analyze farmers' social capital and risk preferences,and their impact to farmers'credit, insurance, and inter-linked Agricultural Credit and Insurance behavior, and then based on experimental economics, design the benchmark group and the experimental group using the Ordered Probit Model,running empirical Test of factors which influence farmers involving in the inter-linked Agricultural Credit and Insurance. The results show that:after controling of the social capital effect, we found that the regional economic structuredifference plays an important role in farmers decision of joining the inter-linked Agricultural Credit and Insurance; risk preference variable plays a positive role in farmers credit migration decision-making, which means the realization of motivating farmers' initiative and improve the participation rate, we need to guide farmers from Risk Aversion to Risk Preference while cultivating farmers entrepreneurship.
On this basis, we constructed the inter-linked Agricultural Credit and Insurance's collateral substitution and individual reputation signaling game analysis framework, Taken survey data of154farmers who have credit demand for example, inspecting the "agricultural credit+personal accident insurance+policy crop insurance+financial subsidy" model of the inter-linked Agricultural Credit and Insurance's impact on farmers' risk rationing. The results show that:as part of the collateral,the inter-linked Agricultural Credit and Insurance contractssignificantly improve farmers risk rationing through the reputation mechanism,, thus improve their credit availability.
Based on the previous two study,answing questions as "whether farmers'participation in the inter-linked Agricultural Credit and Insurance would increase their income, and any influence upon government subsidies programe", this part of the thesis first employs the Match model under the average treatment effect model comparing farmers which have similar endowments such as age, region, land, agricultural production and investment, analysis income increasement of famers'partcipation in the inter-linked Agricultural Credit and Insurance, studying the two ways affecting the farmers' income:First, the indirect effects of improving farmers credit rationing, second, the direct effects of motivating farmers to adopt new technologies; then study farmers' income increasement affecting the Government's agricultural insurance subsidies' programe. The results show that:the inter-linked Agricultural Credit and Insurance improves the income of farmers significantly by17.21%, and increases farmers' willingness to pay of agricultural insurance premium which reducing the pressure on government subsidies programe.
Finally, based on the research finding, this paper gives policy recommendations such as accelerationg the agriculture insurance ledislation,improving catastrophic risk reserve mechanism, co-ordinate the design package of agricultural credit and agricultural insurance, promoting progress of farmers's professional cooperatives and village credit construction program to improve its organizational reputation, and puts forward the further study of the content and method.
2009年中央一号文件提出探索建立农村信贷与农业保险相结合的银保互动机制,为提高农户信贷可获得性提供了一个新途径,但是目前对其具体实施方案、效果都没有进一步的理论研究与实证支撑,因此研究农业信贷与保险互联能为现阶段稳步推进深化农村金融改革提供科学依据,具有一定的理论意义和实践价值。
本文研究总体目标是探讨农业信贷保险互联如何改善农业信贷配给,提高农户收入。围绕这一总体目标,以“个体声誉信号博弈”等相关理论为基础,系统构建了农业信贷与保险互联理论分析框架,综合运用实地入户调查,马尔科夫向量自回归、Bioprobit、平均处理效应模型以及有序Probit等计量经济学方法,对农业信贷配给类型、农业信贷配置效率等进行了深入的定性与定量剖析,选择自然灾害影响类似的经济发达地区江苏省高淳县与经济欠发达地区湖北孝感云梦县、随县作为样本,在江苏湖北581户农户调查数据的基础上,实证检验农业信贷保险互联对农户收入的影响。
全文共分为7个部分,论文包括以下几个研究内容：(1)农业信贷配给类型与其影响信贷配置效率分析；(2)农业信贷保险互联对农户信贷行为影响研究；(3)农业信贷保险互联对农户收入、政府补贴影响实证研究。
论文从研究农业信贷配给类型出发,采用我国1979-2009年的存款利率、农业信贷额、农业产出时间序列数据,以及调研的农户数据,研究农业信贷配给类时间序列区间变化特征、截面特征,以及农业配置效率区间特征,研究结果表明：在经济平稳区间,农业信贷机构实施了传统的信贷配给,以价格配给为主；在经济增长区间,农业信贷供给增加,主要以农户风险配给为主；在经济处于衰退区间,主要以价格配给、数量配给为主,风险配给程度降低。截面特征为以价格配给为主,风险配给与交易成本配给成为当前非价格配给的主要类型。农业信贷配置效率呈现明显的区间波动状态特征,经济平稳环境下信贷配置效率最高,总体上信贷配置效率得到改善,经济处于平稳期期间适当放宽利率有利于提高农业信贷配置效率,经济增长与衰退区间还需要要存款利率控制,因此有必要引入农业信贷与保险互联机制,分散农业信贷中的风险,降低农业信贷利率,改善农户的信贷配给,提高农业信贷配置效率。
接着,本文回答了“如何引导农户主动参与农业信贷保险互联”,分析农户社会资本与自身禀赋中的风险偏好对其信贷、保险、以及信贷保险互联行为的影响,然后基于实验经济学方法,设计了基准组与实验组,采用有序Probit模型,实证检验农户参与信贷保险互联的影响因素。研究结果表明：在控制社会资本影响后,我们发现区域经济结构的差别对农户的信贷保险互联决策中起着重要作用；风险偏好变量对农户的信贷与保险互联、信贷迁移决策起着正向作用,意味实现农户主动参与率的提高,需要引导农户实现由风险规避型向风险偏好型进行转变,培育农户的“企业家精神”。
在此基础上,本文构建了农业信贷与保险互联的抵押品替代与个体声誉信号传递博弈分析框架,以存在信贷需求的154户农户数据为例,检验了“农业信贷+人身意外险+政策性农业保险+财政补贴”模式中,农业信贷保险互联对农户风险配给的影响。研究结果表明：农业信贷与保险互联合约作为抵押品的一部分,通过声誉机制,显著改善农户风险配给,提高其信贷可获得性。
再基于前面两部分的研究,回答“农户参与这种互联是否会提高其收入,以及这个过程中对政府补贴会产生何种程度的影响”,本部分首先采用平均处理效应模型(Average Treatment Model)下的Match模型,比较禀赋如年龄、地区、土地、农业生产投资这些变量相近的农户,分析参与农业信贷互联所产生的农业生产收入差别,研究农业信贷与保险互联通过两种途径对农户收入产生的影响：一是改善农户信贷配给的间接效应、二是激励农户采用新技术的直接效应；其次研究农户增收给政府的政策性农业保险补贴带来的影响。研究结果表明：农业信贷保险互联是能够显著提高农户收入,实现农户增收17.21%,并提高农户农业保险保费支付意愿,有效地降低了政府补贴的压力。
最后,基于研究结论,论文给出了政策建议,如加快农业保险立法,完善巨灾风险准备金机制,统筹设计“一揽子农贷”与“一揽子农险”互联,推进农户、专业合作社、村镇信用建设提高其组织声誉等,并对进一步深入研究的内容及方法做了展望。
Since China's reform and opening up, the CPC Central Committee has issued successive series of No.1Central Document files to solve rural development problems, from2004onwards, No.1Central Document files focus rural finance areas, especially issues of the rural financial system reforms. However, China's rural financial reforms did not improve the low allocation of agricultural credit, rural credit problems become the "bottleneck" while restricting the development of the rural economy:on the one hand, the natural inferiority of the agricultural poses high risk to agriculture credit, meanwhile the rural credit institutions carefully lend their funds from the view of their own funds' security thus resulting credit rationing, on the other hand, based on the nature of profit-driven, capital continued to flow from the field of high-yield areas, regions or industries to the opposite. It's necessary to study how to change this situation, to guide capital flows back to rural areas, improve the financial institutions' funding support for rural economic development.
2009No.l Central Document file proposed to explore the establishment of inter-linked agricultural credit and agricultural insurance as bank and insurance interactive mechanism, provides a new way to improve the availability of farmers credit, yet there's not further theoretical research or empirical support sheds no lights its specific implementation procedures and effects, so the study of inter-linked agricultural credit and insurance can provide a scientific basis of steady progress in deepening the rural financial reform, thus has some theoretical and practical value.
The overall objective of this study is to explore the inter-linked Agricultural Credit and Insurance how to improve the agricultural credit rationing, increase farmers'income. Around this overall objective, based on individual reputation signaling game theory, systemly builds the inter-linked Agricultural Credit and Insurance theory framework, combining the integrated use of household surveys in the field, econometric methods of Markov vector autoregression models, Bioprobit model,average treatment effect models, ordered Probit etc, provides qualitative and quantitative in-depth analysis of agricultural credit rationing types with agricultural credit allocation efficiency.
Selecting sampling areas with similar natural disasters effects, as the economically developed areas like the GaoChun County of JiangSu Province, and economically less developed areas like YunMeng county of XiaoGan city and Sui county in HuBei province.Based on the581household survey data, we proceed the empirical test of the inter-linked Agricultural Credit and Insurance's effectiveness on farmers'income.
The full text is composed of seven parts, includes the following contents:(1) agricultural credit rationing types and its influence on credit allocation efficiency;(2) the inter-linked Agricultural Credit and Insurance's impact on farmers' credit behavior;(3) the empirical study of the inter-linked Agricultural Credit and Insurance's impact on the famers'income and government subsidies programe.
This thesis starts from the point of analysis of agricultural credit rationing types by employing time series data such as deposit rates in China1979-2009, agricultural credit, agricultural output as well as survey data from rural households, to reveal the agricultural credit rationing type time series and cross-section regimes' characteristics. Togethe with agricultural allocative efficiency regimes'characteristics, the results show that:in the regime of stable economic, agricultural credit institutions have implemented a traditional credit rationing, price rationing; in the regime of economic growth, the increase in the supply of agricultural credit, mainly lead to farmers risk rationing; in the regime of economy recession, mainly composed of price rationing, quantity rationing and minimize risk rationing. Rationing types'cross-section feature is characterized by price rationing,and non-price rationing risk rationing, transaction cost rationing which are the component of non-price rationing. Agricultural credit allocative efficiency showed obvious characteristics of the regime changing features. in the regime of stable economic, the highest efficiency of credit allocation was achived, the overall efficiency of credit allocation is improved; in the regime of the stable economy,liberlized interest rates help to improve the allocation efficiency of agricultural credit, in the regimes of economic growth and recession, deposit interest rates need to be controled, it is necessary to introduce the inter-linked agriculture credit and insurance mechanism, decentralizing agricultural credit risk, reducing agricultural credit interest rates, improving credit rationing of farmers, at lat improving agricultural credit allocation efficiency.
Then, answering to the question "how to guide farmers to actively participate in the inter-linked Agricultural Credit and Insurance, we analyze farmers' social capital and risk preferences,and their impact to farmers'credit, insurance, and inter-linked Agricultural Credit and Insurance behavior, and then based on experimental economics, design the benchmark group and the experimental group using the Ordered Probit Model,running empirical Test of factors which influence farmers involving in the inter-linked Agricultural Credit and Insurance. The results show that:after controling of the social capital effect, we found that the regional economic structuredifference plays an important role in farmers decision of joining the inter-linked Agricultural Credit and Insurance; risk preference variable plays a positive role in farmers credit migration decision-making, which means the realization of motivating farmers' initiative and improve the participation rate, we need to guide farmers from Risk Aversion to Risk Preference while cultivating farmers entrepreneurship.
On this basis, we constructed the inter-linked Agricultural Credit and Insurance's collateral substitution and individual reputation signaling game analysis framework, Taken survey data of154farmers who have credit demand for example, inspecting the "agricultural credit+personal accident insurance+policy crop insurance+financial subsidy" model of the inter-linked Agricultural Credit and Insurance's impact on farmers' risk rationing. The results show that:as part of the collateral,the inter-linked Agricultural Credit and Insurance contractssignificantly improve farmers risk rationing through the reputation mechanism,, thus improve their credit availability.
Based on the previous two study,answing questions as "whether farmers'participation in the inter-linked Agricultural Credit and Insurance would increase their income, and any influence upon government subsidies programe", this part of the thesis first employs the Match model under the average treatment effect model comparing farmers which have similar endowments such as age, region, land, agricultural production and investment, analysis income increasement of famers'partcipation in the inter-linked Agricultural Credit and Insurance, studying the two ways affecting the farmers' income:First, the indirect effects of improving farmers credit rationing, second, the direct effects of motivating farmers to adopt new technologies; then study farmers' income increasement affecting the Government's agricultural insurance subsidies' programe. The results show that:the inter-linked Agricultural Credit and Insurance improves the income of farmers significantly by17.21%, and increases farmers' willingness to pay of agricultural insurance premium which reducing the pressure on government subsidies programe.
Finally, based on the research finding, this paper gives policy recommendations such as accelerationg the agriculture insurance ledislation,improving catastrophic risk reserve mechanism, co-ordinate the design package of agricultural credit and agricultural insurance, promoting progress of farmers's professional cooperatives and village credit construction program to improve its organizational reputation, and puts forward the further study of the content and method.
引文
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[198]严浩坤,2008：《中国跨区域资本流动：理论分析与实证研究》,杭州：浙江大学(博士论文)。
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[202]余津津,2003：《现代西方声誉理论述评》,《当代财经》第11期。
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[204]张建杰,2008：《农户社会资本及对其信贷行为的影响——基于河南省397户农户调查的实证分析》,《农业经济问题》第9期。
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[216]朱年磊,2005：《信号传递博弈和纳什均衡问题》,曲阜：曲阜师范大学(硕士论文)。
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