农业生产经营组织模式对农户食品安全生产行为的影响研究
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摘要
食品安全一直是百姓关心、社会关注、政府重视的热点话题。2009年6月1食品安全一直是百姓关心、社会关注、政府重视的热点话题。2009年6月1日起正式实施《中华人民共和国食品安全法》,意味着我国正式将食品安全问题提升到法律高度。但是近年来食品安全事件层出不穷,严重危害着消费者的身体健康和生命安全。农产品质量安全是食品安全的首要屏障,农户是否实施安全的生产行为势必影响农产品的安全状况。小规模且分散的食品生产经营方式难以保障食品安全,单靠政府的力量解决农产品质量安全问题是远远不够的,在加强政府监管的同时应提高农业生产经营的组织化程度。
信息不对称以及缺乏有效监管,是导致农产品出现质量安全问题的重要原因。在交易重复率增加的前提下,甄别农户交易的风险类型并提供与之匹配的生产经营模式,能够达到影响和激励农户进行安全生产的目的。农产品流通中存在多个上下游关系和相互价值的交换,农户向农业生产经营组织输送产品或服务,农业生产经营组织向农户提供并反馈各种信息。信息反馈的过程中,农户现有的生产环境、资源禀赋将会产生改观,农户在生产技术、生产行为上的改革便成了一种可能。在本研究中,我们从农户的视角,以生产经营组织对农户食品安全生产行为的影响为逻辑起点,将生产经营组织导入、生产经营组织模式、生产经营组织活动主体的内部特征纳入同一个分析框架。文章主要按照以下逻辑展开：首先从生产经营组织和食品安全的角度审视农户的生产行为,分析生产经营组织对农户食品安全生产行为的影响,包括农户是否加入生产经营组织和农户所加入的农业生产经营组织模式；进一步选取“农户+农民合作经济组织+企业”的生产经营组织模式,以激励与约束机制为重点,研究农业生产经营组织的内部特征对农户食品安全生产行为的影响；利用案例分析,研究农民专业合作社以及农业企业内部的食品安全管理机制。具体研究内容如下：
研究内容一：葡萄产业的宏观现状、葡萄生产经营组织、农户生产行为情况。
该部分为后面章节的实证分析奠定研究背景。通过对江苏省葡萄主产区的研究发现,葡萄产业近几年发展较快,但与国内外发达地区比还有较大差距。虽然出现了一批葡萄种植大户和企业,但是多数农户种植规模较小,各项管理行为缺乏规范。由于葡萄生产病虫害比较严重,农药残留超标控制压力较大,食品安全状况仍不理想。农户的田间操作未能按照技术规范,优质标准化生产尚未普及。农户仍主要采用市场交易的方式,加入农业生产经营组织的比例不高且时间不长。
研究内容二：农业生产经营组织与农户安全生产行为之间的关系分析
以新古典经济学、信息经济学、行为经济学等理论为基础,探讨农业生产经营对农户食品安全生产行为的影响及影响路径并对农业生产经营组织的食品质量安全管理机制进行分析。研究发现：第一,农业生产经营组织给农户带来生产环境和资源禀赋的改变,促使农户发生生产技术和生产行为的改革；第二,不同的农业生产经营组织模式对农户的约束方式也将产生差异,会对农户的安全生产行为产生不同影响；第三,农民合作经济组织作为农业生产经营组织的一种,自身具有控制食品安全的动力来源,内在机制包括激励与约束两方面。
研究内容三：农业生产经营组织对农户食品安全生产行为影响的实证研究
以实地调研数据为依据,运用关联性分析、OLS和FGLS模型分析农业生产经营组织与农户食品安全生产行为之间的关系。得到的基本结论是：第一,农户的食品安全生产行为因加入农业生产经营组织以及加入农业生产经营组织模式的不同产生差异,其中农户施用农药的间隔期与农户所加入农业生产经营组织模式的关联性更强；第二,在其它影响农户食品安全生产行为的因素中,农户家庭劳动人口的最高文化程度、家中是否有村干部以及所处地区不同均影响农户的食品安全生产行为；第三,合作社模式在某种程度上比专业技术协会模式更能提高农户生产行为的安全性；第四,在不考虑内生性的模型中,农户是否参加农业生产经营组织对其食品安全生产行为的影响被高估,所参加的农业生产经营组织模式对其食品安全生产行为的影响被低估。
研究内容四：农业生产经营组织内部特征对农户食品安全生产行为影响实证研究
基于前面的研究结论,进一步运用Tobit模型分析农业生产经营组织的内部特征与葡萄种植户食品安全生产行为之间的关系。选取“农户+农民合作经济组织+企业”的农业生产经营组织模式,将农民合作经济组织质量安全控制机制分为激励与约束机制。研究结果显示：农业生产经营组织的激励机制和约束机制对葡萄种植户的安全生产行为影响程度是不同的,在控制了其他因素的情况下,约束机制对农户生产行为的安全性作用比激励机制的作用大。
研究内容五：农业生产经营组织内部的食品安全管理机制
选取合作社和企业这两种农业生产经营组织,运用案例分析其食品安全管理机制。农民专业合作社作为一种新型农业经营主体,在农产品质量安全的控制方面具有举足轻重的作用。葡萄企业基于管理集中的生产组织模式、技术精专的运作方式、同质的种植模式、信息充分沟通的产品市场分布,具备提供优质高端葡萄的能力。
Food safety is a hotspot concerned by common people, society and government at all times."Food Safety Law of the People's Republic of China" is applied on June1st,2009, which means we will solve the problem of food safety by law. But food safety problems break out in a high frequency in recent years which brings great threat and harms to the consumers'health and life. The quality and safety of agri-products is the first barrier of food safety. Farmers'food quality safety production behavior affects the safety situation. Small scale and dispersive food production mode can't guarantee food safety well, and government strength is not the only way to solve the problem of agri-products quality and safety, consummating the systematization of agricultural production and management organization is the complement of strengthening governmental management during to solve the problem of food safety.
Information asymmetry and lack of effective supervise lead to the problem of agri-products quality and safety. On the premise of raised deal repeat rates, discriminating the risk type of farmers" deal and supplying the suited deal mode can affect and encourage farmers to conduct safe production. There are many relations between upriver and downriver and exchange of values in agri-products transaction. Farmer supplies products and services to agricultural production and management organization while agricultural production and management organization feeds different in formations back to farmer. During the process of feed back, farmers' present production environment and resource gift are changed, and the innovation of farmers*'production technology and behavior will happen. In this study we will start with the impact of agricultural production and management organization on grape farmers" food safety production behavior and we will analyze agricultural production and management participation, agricultural production and management organization modes and inner characters of agricultural production and management organization on the whole. This paper will spread as the following logic:First, we'll look at farmers'production behavior from the perspective of agricultural production and management and food safety, analyze the impact of agricultural production and management organization on farmers' food quality safety production behavior, including the agricultural production and management participation, agricultural production and management organization modes. Then we select the agricultural production and management organization mode of "farmers+farmer cooperative economics organizations+corporations" and analyze the farmers' food safety production behavior influenced by inside characters of farmer cooperative organizations setting encourage and control mechanism as the keynote. At last we analyze the internal food safety management mechanism of farmer cooperatives and pivotal cooperation under close agricultural production and management mode. The specific contents are as follows:
Part1:situation of grape industry, the micro description of grape agricultural production and management organization and farmer production behavior
This section aims to lay the foundation of the following empirical analysis. By analyzing the main grape producing regions in Jiangsu province, we find that grape industry develops rapidly these years, but still has a big gap with developed regions in and abroad our country. There are many professional grape farmers and corporations, but the scale is not big, management behave is not standard. Because the harm of illness and insects are very serious, the pressure of controlling pesticide residuals is fairly high, the situation of food safety is not ideal. Farmers' planting operations are not according with the technical standard, high grade and standard production has not been popularized. Spot market is the main dealing modes which are adopted by the farmer, and the time of attendance is not very long.
Part2:the analysis of interaction between agricultural production and management organization and farmers'safety production behavior
Based on new classical economics, information economics, and behavior economics and so on, we can find the inner and inter logical relations between agricultural production and management organization and farmers'safety production behavior. We will discuss the impact and way of agricultural production and management organization on farmers' food quality safety production behavior, including the food quality and safety controlling mechanism. It shows that:first agricultural production and management can bring change about farmers' present production environment and resource gift, which leads to the innovation of farmers' production technology and behavior. Different agricultural production and management organization modes have different restrain ways to farmers and impact. Rural cooperative organizations have the driving force of controlling food safety including encouragement and control.
Part3:the impact of agricultural production and management organization on grape farmers' food safety production behavior
By using the relevance analysis, OLS medel and FGLS model, this paper discusses the inter-relationship between agricultural production and management organization and grape farmers' food safety production behavior. Three main conclusions are as follows:Firstly, grape farmers' food safety production behavior is influenced by agricultural production and management participation and agricultural production and management organization mode. Second, labour education level in the family, villge leader and reagion are also influence grape farmers'food safety production behavior. Third, the production behavior of farmers who joined the cooperative association was comparatively safer.Four, in the mode which didn't controls the endogeniety problem, the effect of agricultural production and management participation is overestimated, and the effect of agricultural production and management organization mode is underestimated.
Part4:the impact of inside characters of agricultural production and management organizations on grape farmers'food safety production behavior
Based on the above conclusion, this paper discusses the inter-relations between agricultural production and management organizations and grape farmers'food safety production behavior using the Tobit model. We select the agricultural production and management organization mode of "farmers+farmer cooperative economics organizations+corporations", assort the quality safety controlling merchanism of farmer cooperative economics organizations into encouragement and restriction. The results show that:the impacts of encouragement and restriction on grape farmers' food safety production behavior are different. Effect of encouragement merchanism on safety level of farmers' production behavior is greater on the condition of controlling other facts.
Part5:internal food safety management mechanism of agricultural production and management organization
We analyze the food safety management mechanism of farmer cooperatives and pivotal cooperation. Farmer cooperatives had an important effect on agri-products quality safety control. Pivotal cooperation under close agricultural production and management mode has concentrated production organizatiom mode, high level operation mode, homogeneous production mode, well informationed market distribution, has the ability to supply high-quality grape.
信息不对称以及缺乏有效监管,是导致农产品出现质量安全问题的重要原因。在交易重复率增加的前提下,甄别农户交易的风险类型并提供与之匹配的生产经营模式,能够达到影响和激励农户进行安全生产的目的。农产品流通中存在多个上下游关系和相互价值的交换,农户向农业生产经营组织输送产品或服务,农业生产经营组织向农户提供并反馈各种信息。信息反馈的过程中,农户现有的生产环境、资源禀赋将会产生改观,农户在生产技术、生产行为上的改革便成了一种可能。在本研究中,我们从农户的视角,以生产经营组织对农户食品安全生产行为的影响为逻辑起点,将生产经营组织导入、生产经营组织模式、生产经营组织活动主体的内部特征纳入同一个分析框架。文章主要按照以下逻辑展开：首先从生产经营组织和食品安全的角度审视农户的生产行为,分析生产经营组织对农户食品安全生产行为的影响,包括农户是否加入生产经营组织和农户所加入的农业生产经营组织模式；进一步选取“农户+农民合作经济组织+企业”的生产经营组织模式,以激励与约束机制为重点,研究农业生产经营组织的内部特征对农户食品安全生产行为的影响；利用案例分析,研究农民专业合作社以及农业企业内部的食品安全管理机制。具体研究内容如下：
研究内容一：葡萄产业的宏观现状、葡萄生产经营组织、农户生产行为情况。
该部分为后面章节的实证分析奠定研究背景。通过对江苏省葡萄主产区的研究发现,葡萄产业近几年发展较快,但与国内外发达地区比还有较大差距。虽然出现了一批葡萄种植大户和企业,但是多数农户种植规模较小,各项管理行为缺乏规范。由于葡萄生产病虫害比较严重,农药残留超标控制压力较大,食品安全状况仍不理想。农户的田间操作未能按照技术规范,优质标准化生产尚未普及。农户仍主要采用市场交易的方式,加入农业生产经营组织的比例不高且时间不长。
研究内容二：农业生产经营组织与农户安全生产行为之间的关系分析
以新古典经济学、信息经济学、行为经济学等理论为基础,探讨农业生产经营对农户食品安全生产行为的影响及影响路径并对农业生产经营组织的食品质量安全管理机制进行分析。研究发现：第一,农业生产经营组织给农户带来生产环境和资源禀赋的改变,促使农户发生生产技术和生产行为的改革；第二,不同的农业生产经营组织模式对农户的约束方式也将产生差异,会对农户的安全生产行为产生不同影响；第三,农民合作经济组织作为农业生产经营组织的一种,自身具有控制食品安全的动力来源,内在机制包括激励与约束两方面。
研究内容三：农业生产经营组织对农户食品安全生产行为影响的实证研究
以实地调研数据为依据,运用关联性分析、OLS和FGLS模型分析农业生产经营组织与农户食品安全生产行为之间的关系。得到的基本结论是：第一,农户的食品安全生产行为因加入农业生产经营组织以及加入农业生产经营组织模式的不同产生差异,其中农户施用农药的间隔期与农户所加入农业生产经营组织模式的关联性更强；第二,在其它影响农户食品安全生产行为的因素中,农户家庭劳动人口的最高文化程度、家中是否有村干部以及所处地区不同均影响农户的食品安全生产行为；第三,合作社模式在某种程度上比专业技术协会模式更能提高农户生产行为的安全性；第四,在不考虑内生性的模型中,农户是否参加农业生产经营组织对其食品安全生产行为的影响被高估,所参加的农业生产经营组织模式对其食品安全生产行为的影响被低估。
研究内容四：农业生产经营组织内部特征对农户食品安全生产行为影响实证研究
基于前面的研究结论,进一步运用Tobit模型分析农业生产经营组织的内部特征与葡萄种植户食品安全生产行为之间的关系。选取“农户+农民合作经济组织+企业”的农业生产经营组织模式,将农民合作经济组织质量安全控制机制分为激励与约束机制。研究结果显示：农业生产经营组织的激励机制和约束机制对葡萄种植户的安全生产行为影响程度是不同的,在控制了其他因素的情况下,约束机制对农户生产行为的安全性作用比激励机制的作用大。
研究内容五：农业生产经营组织内部的食品安全管理机制
选取合作社和企业这两种农业生产经营组织,运用案例分析其食品安全管理机制。农民专业合作社作为一种新型农业经营主体,在农产品质量安全的控制方面具有举足轻重的作用。葡萄企业基于管理集中的生产组织模式、技术精专的运作方式、同质的种植模式、信息充分沟通的产品市场分布,具备提供优质高端葡萄的能力。
Food safety is a hotspot concerned by common people, society and government at all times."Food Safety Law of the People's Republic of China" is applied on June1st,2009, which means we will solve the problem of food safety by law. But food safety problems break out in a high frequency in recent years which brings great threat and harms to the consumers'health and life. The quality and safety of agri-products is the first barrier of food safety. Farmers'food quality safety production behavior affects the safety situation. Small scale and dispersive food production mode can't guarantee food safety well, and government strength is not the only way to solve the problem of agri-products quality and safety, consummating the systematization of agricultural production and management organization is the complement of strengthening governmental management during to solve the problem of food safety.
Information asymmetry and lack of effective supervise lead to the problem of agri-products quality and safety. On the premise of raised deal repeat rates, discriminating the risk type of farmers" deal and supplying the suited deal mode can affect and encourage farmers to conduct safe production. There are many relations between upriver and downriver and exchange of values in agri-products transaction. Farmer supplies products and services to agricultural production and management organization while agricultural production and management organization feeds different in formations back to farmer. During the process of feed back, farmers' present production environment and resource gift are changed, and the innovation of farmers*'production technology and behavior will happen. In this study we will start with the impact of agricultural production and management organization on grape farmers" food safety production behavior and we will analyze agricultural production and management participation, agricultural production and management organization modes and inner characters of agricultural production and management organization on the whole. This paper will spread as the following logic:First, we'll look at farmers'production behavior from the perspective of agricultural production and management and food safety, analyze the impact of agricultural production and management organization on farmers' food quality safety production behavior, including the agricultural production and management participation, agricultural production and management organization modes. Then we select the agricultural production and management organization mode of "farmers+farmer cooperative economics organizations+corporations" and analyze the farmers' food safety production behavior influenced by inside characters of farmer cooperative organizations setting encourage and control mechanism as the keynote. At last we analyze the internal food safety management mechanism of farmer cooperatives and pivotal cooperation under close agricultural production and management mode. The specific contents are as follows:
Part1:situation of grape industry, the micro description of grape agricultural production and management organization and farmer production behavior
This section aims to lay the foundation of the following empirical analysis. By analyzing the main grape producing regions in Jiangsu province, we find that grape industry develops rapidly these years, but still has a big gap with developed regions in and abroad our country. There are many professional grape farmers and corporations, but the scale is not big, management behave is not standard. Because the harm of illness and insects are very serious, the pressure of controlling pesticide residuals is fairly high, the situation of food safety is not ideal. Farmers' planting operations are not according with the technical standard, high grade and standard production has not been popularized. Spot market is the main dealing modes which are adopted by the farmer, and the time of attendance is not very long.
Part2:the analysis of interaction between agricultural production and management organization and farmers'safety production behavior
Based on new classical economics, information economics, and behavior economics and so on, we can find the inner and inter logical relations between agricultural production and management organization and farmers'safety production behavior. We will discuss the impact and way of agricultural production and management organization on farmers' food quality safety production behavior, including the food quality and safety controlling mechanism. It shows that:first agricultural production and management can bring change about farmers' present production environment and resource gift, which leads to the innovation of farmers' production technology and behavior. Different agricultural production and management organization modes have different restrain ways to farmers and impact. Rural cooperative organizations have the driving force of controlling food safety including encouragement and control.
Part3:the impact of agricultural production and management organization on grape farmers' food safety production behavior
By using the relevance analysis, OLS medel and FGLS model, this paper discusses the inter-relationship between agricultural production and management organization and grape farmers' food safety production behavior. Three main conclusions are as follows:Firstly, grape farmers' food safety production behavior is influenced by agricultural production and management participation and agricultural production and management organization mode. Second, labour education level in the family, villge leader and reagion are also influence grape farmers'food safety production behavior. Third, the production behavior of farmers who joined the cooperative association was comparatively safer.Four, in the mode which didn't controls the endogeniety problem, the effect of agricultural production and management participation is overestimated, and the effect of agricultural production and management organization mode is underestimated.
Part4:the impact of inside characters of agricultural production and management organizations on grape farmers'food safety production behavior
Based on the above conclusion, this paper discusses the inter-relations between agricultural production and management organizations and grape farmers'food safety production behavior using the Tobit model. We select the agricultural production and management organization mode of "farmers+farmer cooperative economics organizations+corporations", assort the quality safety controlling merchanism of farmer cooperative economics organizations into encouragement and restriction. The results show that:the impacts of encouragement and restriction on grape farmers' food safety production behavior are different. Effect of encouragement merchanism on safety level of farmers' production behavior is greater on the condition of controlling other facts.
Part5:internal food safety management mechanism of agricultural production and management organization
We analyze the food safety management mechanism of farmer cooperatives and pivotal cooperation. Farmer cooperatives had an important effect on agri-products quality safety control. Pivotal cooperation under close agricultural production and management mode has concentrated production organizatiom mode, high level operation mode, homogeneous production mode, well informationed market distribution, has the ability to supply high-quality grape.
引文
① 来源于《中华人民共和国农民专业合作社法》(2006年)第二条。
① 来源于《中华人民共和国农民专业合作社法》(2006年)第二条。
① 资料来源：《老方葡萄合作社发展概况》2010。
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① 来源于《中华人民共和国农民专业合作社法》(2006年)第二条。
① 资料来源：《老方葡萄合作社发展概况》2010。
[1].保罗·萨缪尔森、威廉·诺德豪斯著,萧深主译.经济学(第17版)[M].北京：人民邮电出版社,2004年
[2].陈曦.农民专业合作社在农产品质量安全工作中的作用[J].黑龙江畜牧兽医,2005(5)：6-8
[3].程恩富,胡乐明.新制度主义经济学[M].经济日报出版社,2005
[4].但斌,刘飞.绿色供应链及其体系结构研究[J].中国机械工程,2000(11)：1232-1234
[5].费孝通.乡土中国[M],上海,三联书店,1985
[6].冯忠泽,李庆江.农户农产品质量安全认知及影响因素分析[J].农业经济问题,2007(4)：22-26
[7].高锁平,裴红罗.农民专业合作社：控制农产品质量安全的有效载体——以浙江临海市上盘西兰花合作社为例[J].农村经济,2011(1)：127-129
[8].郭红东.农业龙头企业与农户订单安排及履约机制研究[M].北京：中国农业出版社.2005：119
[9].何坪华,凌远云,周德翼.食品价值链及其对食品企业质量安全信用行为的影响[J].农业经济问题,2009(48-53)
[10].黄小原,李宝家.供应链集成化动态模型与控制[J].系统工程学报,2001(4)
[11].黄宗智.长江三角洲小农家庭与乡村发展[M].北京：中华数据出版发行,2000：1-2
[12].黄祖辉.新型农业经营主体：现状、约束与发展思路——以浙江省为例的分析[J].中国农村经济,2010(10)：16-26
[13].胡定寰,陈志钢,孙庆珍.合同生产模式对农户收入和食品安全的影响——以山东省苹果产业为例[J].中国农村经济,2006(11)：17-25
[14].霍丽玥.我国食品安全管理与控制体系研究[D].南京农业大学硕士论文.2004： 2-3
[15].廖祖君.农民合作经济组织的激励机制及其演变路径[J].经济体制改革,2010(3)：89-92
[16].廖祖君.农民合作经济组织人力资源激励机制评价[J].农村经济,2010(1)：112-114
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[18].罗倩文.我国农民合作经济组织内部合作行为及激励机制研究[D].西南大学博十学位论文,2009
[19].吕美晔,王凯.山区农户绿色农产品生产的意愿研究——安徽皖南山区茶叶生产的实证分析[J].农业技术经济,2004(5)：33-37
[20].吕志轩.质量安全背景下农业龙头企业对合同关系的选择问题——约束条件、治理机制及其绩效分析[J].山西财经大学学报,2009(2)：228-229
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[22].马述忠,黄祖辉.农户、政府及转基因农产品——对我国农民转基因作物种植意向的分析[J].中国农村经济,2003(4)：34-40
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