中国地方政府规制行为及其对产业效率的影响研究
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摘要
随着中央和地方分权过程以及经济的迅速发展,掌握大量经济资源和行政权力的地方政府表现出滥用规制权力的倾向,实施了许多违背市场规律的行为,典型的表现有：短期行为、税收上的涸泽而渔、过度规制、市场分割、保护落后产业、易被俘获和腐败等等,这些现象对现有的理论提出了挑战。行为经济学、反垄断经济学、政府规制理论以及行政管理学的发展提供了打开政府决策过程的“黑箱”的研究工具。本文利用有关理论和工具搭建了一个地方政府规制行为的分析框架,通过研究地方政府及官员的目标体系、决策行为模式,认识到地方官员有限理性行为人的本性,通过研究规制行为特征,注意到地方政府规制行为的外部性,梳理了地方政府运用行政权力对市场及其竞争关系进行限制或替代的各种行为,分析了政府规制行为影响产业发展的作用机制,测度了政府规制行为对不同产业资源配置的效率影响,提出了地方政府规制改革的思路。
全文分为五个部分,第一部分是导论,说明了研究背景,就一些基础概念进行定义和描述,对相关研究文献进行梳理评论。第二部分是2、3、4章,分别从政府目标、多重委托代理和竞争条件下的一般均衡分析三个不同视角研究地方政府的规制行为,重点说明中央与地方关系、地方政府目标体系、地方政府间的竞争如何影响规制行为。第三部分是第5、6章,重点讨论地方政府规制行为的非理性和时间不一致性,对背弃规制承诺、腐败和届际机会主义行为做出了原创性的解释和说明。第四部分是第7、8章,说明了政府规制对产业效率的影响机制和影响效应。第五部分是第9章,分析归纳了规制与产业发展的互动关系,在总结全文的基础上对地方政府规制改革提出了建议。
本文在以下方面力求创新：
第一,分析了有限理性官员的短视和机会主义。借助行为经济学的视角,放宽了地方政府决策者的理性假设,将地方政府的人格化代表地方官员定位为有限理性的行为人。官员的有限理性来源于不确定性、利己动机和个体理性与集体理性的偏离。地方政府官员实施规制行为时有以下倾向：上级偏好主导、行为短期化、风险规避、机会主义。政府官员作为行为人存在短视偏差,而且由于任期制、考核机制的作用以及官员政治生命周期的特殊性,官员的短视偏差得到强化。通过双曲线贴现模型的推演,研究了政府规制行为为中的时间不一致性,短视偏差的存在使地方政府官员低估远期成本而高估即期收益，产生非理性行为,在规制政策制定和执行中会进行相机抉择。因届别更替产生的机会主义行为本文定义为届际机会主义。源于行为主体的有限理性和届际间的契约不完备的这种机会主义倾向因政府官员的任期制和政绩考核体制被强化和放大，因缺乏监督机制和代际补偿机制而延续。文章利用叠代博弈模型证明特殊的机会主义是可以消除的实现届际合作关键是有决策者首先做出长远考虑的利他举动,从而在各届间形成稳定的预期，建立和完善互相补偿的惯例的制度就能实现可持续发展
第二，研究了地方官员复杂的目标体系与变化的效用。利用共同委托代理理论和多目标决策理论,区分了地方政府目标的差异，从多重委托代理角度研究显示，地方政府的目标体系具有多重性、短期性、冲突性和动态性的特点。区分了中央治国者和地方政府官员的不同效用函数。解释了腐败作为非理性行为产生的原因：短视偏差的存在使官员低估腐败的长期成本，在短期收益的诱惑下容易失去理性，违背初衷走上腐败的不归路。研究了官员的风险偏好、效用函数的结构、腐败惩戒到来的的时间等因素对腐败行为的影响机制。指出单纯提高惩戒力度对防治腐败效果有限。
第三,归纳了地方政府规制行为特点及外部性表现。用一般均衡模型分析地方政府间的竞，意识到地区间的禀赋异质性加上地方官员行为决策的个体差异带来不同地区规制方式的不同。,归纳了地方政府规制行为的六个特点：一是规制过度与规制不足共存；二是选择性规制；三是规制政策不连续；四是经济规制分权与社会性规制集权；五是行政垄断表现突出：六是不同层级政府的规制行为偏好不一。地方政府往往通过直接干预或放松社会性规制来影响要还给价格，导致生产成本的非市场化：通过对产业进入退出规制，阻碍技术进步使产业升级非市场化；通过市场的分割导致交易成本增加。注意到部分事业单位同时作为规制机构和市场竞争主体在双重身份下的垄断行为。选择代表性产业效率作为研究对象,对地区垄断势力和行业垄断势力的交织作用和斗争过程进行了描述分析。认识到产业发展对政府规制的反作用，描述了规制变革的产业组织动力。
With the process of administrative decentralization between central government and local government, China experienced a period of rapid economy development. On the other hand, local governments perform an inclination of regulation power abuse. Contrary to the laws of the market mechanisms, typical behaviors of local government are market segmentation, over taxing or over protection to industry, short-term behavior, etc. These kinds of performance post a challenge to existing theory explanation The development of behavioral economics and antitrust economics and the theory of government regulation offer research tools to open the "black box" of the government decision-making process.
This dissertation is trying to construct a framework to study regulation behavior of local government. In the nature of bounded rationality, local offcials perform regulation behavior in their own characteristics. By study goal system and the behavior patterns, theises noticed the regulation externality that the local government restricts market competition by administrative power abuse. Analyzed the mechanism that how the government regulation behavior affect the industry development, and measured the efficiency of the typical different industries, this dissertation put forward the corresponding optimization measures for the reform on the local government regulation.
This dissertation is divided into five parts. The first part is the introduction, in which some basic concepts are defined, literature are listed and reviewed to make clear the research background. The second part is Chapter2,3and Chapter4. The main work of this part is to study regulation behaivor form prospectives of goal system, common agency and general equilibrium in competition. Research on the goal system of local government described the behavioral inclination of local government. Study reveled that the local government offcials got the nature of Bounded Rationality and the externalities can't be ignored. The third part is composed by Chapters5and6.This part disscuss the time inconsistency of local government regulation. Reaearch focus on the irrational behavior of local government such as betrayed regulation commitments, corruption and inter-session opportunistic behavior. The fourth part, Chapter7and8, indicates how the government regulation behavior handcap the market mechanisms and the industry efficiency. The fifth part is Chapter9, analyzed the interaction between regulation and industrial development, and made recommendations in the concluding remarks on the basis of the reform of local government regulation.
Innovation of this paper is in the following ways
First, reveal the the officials' nature of bounded rationality and cognition bias of myopia and opportunistic This paper relaxs the assumption that local government decision-makers arc of rationality from the perspective of behavioral economics, and indicate that local officials bounded rationality derived from uncertainty, self-serving motives and the deviation between individual rationality and collective rationality Local government officials have the following propensity:compliance to superior administrative power, preference for short-term income, risk aversion and opportunism. The cognition bias of myopia is strengthened by the tenure system, assessment mechanisms, as well as the unique political life cycle of officials. By using hyperbolic discounting model, this paper makes the deduction that the time inconsistency of regulation may derived from the underestimation to the long-term costs and overestimation to current income. Local officials'regulatory policy formulation and implementation will be discretionary And special opportunistic behavior defined herein as inter-session opportunism This opportunistic tendency of government officials that derived from bounded rationality and incomplete contract is strengthened and enlarged by the tenure system and performance evaluation system. This opportunistic tendency lasted due to lacking of monitoring mechanisms and intergenerational retroactive compensation mechanisms. Deduction from the overlapping generation game model proved that this particular opportunism could be eliminated and cooperation of different sessions of local goverment could be achieved. Only can one decision-maker firstly made decision for long-term consideration out of altruistic move, the cooperation of sessions can be established in the basis of stable expectation and intergenerational retroactive compensation, and the sustainable development can be reached.
Secondly, research revealed that local officials got intricate target system and changing utility function. From the perspectives of common agency and Multi-objective decision-making theory, this paper made the distinction between the goals and utility function of local government and those of central government. And reveal that the goals system of local governments got conflict and dynamic characteristics. Thesis made the original explanation of corruption:as a non-rational behavior, corruption derived from myopia cognition bias. In detail, the officials may underestimate the future long-term costs of corruption, overestimate short-term gains in the same time, so that act undue irrational wrongdoings contrary to the original intention. Research also focus on the the mechanisms how the factors such as risk appetite of officials and the structure of the utility function influence corruption behavior.
Thirdly, this paper generalized the characteristics of local government regulation behavior and the manifestations of regulation externality. To study the competition among local governments by using general equilibrium model, we can find the differences in regulation behaivor of different local administration owing to endowment heterogeneity and different ways of decision-making The six characteristics of the local government regulation behavior are:1coexisting of both regulatory excessive and insufficiency;2selective regulation;3. the discontinuous regulation policy,4. the decentralization of economic regulation and centralization of social regulation system;5. the administrative monopoly;6. different level of government regulation with different behavioral preferences. Local governments often directly intervene pricing system, and relax social regulation to lower prices, lead to the non-market cost pricing. Enter and exit regulation also hinder technological progress.The increase in transaction costs is caused by market segmentation. Noted that the monopolistic behavior of some NGO which both as the regulatory agencies and market competitors at the same time. Described the interaction between the regional monopoly forces and industry monopoly power by study typical industries, this thesis recognized the reaction to the industrial development by government regulation, and described the changing power comes from the development of industrial organization.
全文分为五个部分,第一部分是导论,说明了研究背景,就一些基础概念进行定义和描述,对相关研究文献进行梳理评论。第二部分是2、3、4章,分别从政府目标、多重委托代理和竞争条件下的一般均衡分析三个不同视角研究地方政府的规制行为,重点说明中央与地方关系、地方政府目标体系、地方政府间的竞争如何影响规制行为。第三部分是第5、6章,重点讨论地方政府规制行为的非理性和时间不一致性,对背弃规制承诺、腐败和届际机会主义行为做出了原创性的解释和说明。第四部分是第7、8章,说明了政府规制对产业效率的影响机制和影响效应。第五部分是第9章,分析归纳了规制与产业发展的互动关系,在总结全文的基础上对地方政府规制改革提出了建议。
本文在以下方面力求创新：
第一,分析了有限理性官员的短视和机会主义。借助行为经济学的视角,放宽了地方政府决策者的理性假设,将地方政府的人格化代表地方官员定位为有限理性的行为人。官员的有限理性来源于不确定性、利己动机和个体理性与集体理性的偏离。地方政府官员实施规制行为时有以下倾向：上级偏好主导、行为短期化、风险规避、机会主义。政府官员作为行为人存在短视偏差,而且由于任期制、考核机制的作用以及官员政治生命周期的特殊性,官员的短视偏差得到强化。通过双曲线贴现模型的推演,研究了政府规制行为为中的时间不一致性,短视偏差的存在使地方政府官员低估远期成本而高估即期收益，产生非理性行为,在规制政策制定和执行中会进行相机抉择。因届别更替产生的机会主义行为本文定义为届际机会主义。源于行为主体的有限理性和届际间的契约不完备的这种机会主义倾向因政府官员的任期制和政绩考核体制被强化和放大，因缺乏监督机制和代际补偿机制而延续。文章利用叠代博弈模型证明特殊的机会主义是可以消除的实现届际合作关键是有决策者首先做出长远考虑的利他举动,从而在各届间形成稳定的预期，建立和完善互相补偿的惯例的制度就能实现可持续发展
第二，研究了地方官员复杂的目标体系与变化的效用。利用共同委托代理理论和多目标决策理论,区分了地方政府目标的差异，从多重委托代理角度研究显示，地方政府的目标体系具有多重性、短期性、冲突性和动态性的特点。区分了中央治国者和地方政府官员的不同效用函数。解释了腐败作为非理性行为产生的原因：短视偏差的存在使官员低估腐败的长期成本，在短期收益的诱惑下容易失去理性，违背初衷走上腐败的不归路。研究了官员的风险偏好、效用函数的结构、腐败惩戒到来的的时间等因素对腐败行为的影响机制。指出单纯提高惩戒力度对防治腐败效果有限。
第三,归纳了地方政府规制行为特点及外部性表现。用一般均衡模型分析地方政府间的竞，意识到地区间的禀赋异质性加上地方官员行为决策的个体差异带来不同地区规制方式的不同。,归纳了地方政府规制行为的六个特点：一是规制过度与规制不足共存；二是选择性规制；三是规制政策不连续；四是经济规制分权与社会性规制集权；五是行政垄断表现突出：六是不同层级政府的规制行为偏好不一。地方政府往往通过直接干预或放松社会性规制来影响要还给价格，导致生产成本的非市场化：通过对产业进入退出规制，阻碍技术进步使产业升级非市场化；通过市场的分割导致交易成本增加。注意到部分事业单位同时作为规制机构和市场竞争主体在双重身份下的垄断行为。选择代表性产业效率作为研究对象,对地区垄断势力和行业垄断势力的交织作用和斗争过程进行了描述分析。认识到产业发展对政府规制的反作用，描述了规制变革的产业组织动力。
With the process of administrative decentralization between central government and local government, China experienced a period of rapid economy development. On the other hand, local governments perform an inclination of regulation power abuse. Contrary to the laws of the market mechanisms, typical behaviors of local government are market segmentation, over taxing or over protection to industry, short-term behavior, etc. These kinds of performance post a challenge to existing theory explanation The development of behavioral economics and antitrust economics and the theory of government regulation offer research tools to open the "black box" of the government decision-making process.
This dissertation is trying to construct a framework to study regulation behavior of local government. In the nature of bounded rationality, local offcials perform regulation behavior in their own characteristics. By study goal system and the behavior patterns, theises noticed the regulation externality that the local government restricts market competition by administrative power abuse. Analyzed the mechanism that how the government regulation behavior affect the industry development, and measured the efficiency of the typical different industries, this dissertation put forward the corresponding optimization measures for the reform on the local government regulation.
This dissertation is divided into five parts. The first part is the introduction, in which some basic concepts are defined, literature are listed and reviewed to make clear the research background. The second part is Chapter2,3and Chapter4. The main work of this part is to study regulation behaivor form prospectives of goal system, common agency and general equilibrium in competition. Research on the goal system of local government described the behavioral inclination of local government. Study reveled that the local government offcials got the nature of Bounded Rationality and the externalities can't be ignored. The third part is composed by Chapters5and6.This part disscuss the time inconsistency of local government regulation. Reaearch focus on the irrational behavior of local government such as betrayed regulation commitments, corruption and inter-session opportunistic behavior. The fourth part, Chapter7and8, indicates how the government regulation behavior handcap the market mechanisms and the industry efficiency. The fifth part is Chapter9, analyzed the interaction between regulation and industrial development, and made recommendations in the concluding remarks on the basis of the reform of local government regulation.
Innovation of this paper is in the following ways
First, reveal the the officials' nature of bounded rationality and cognition bias of myopia and opportunistic This paper relaxs the assumption that local government decision-makers arc of rationality from the perspective of behavioral economics, and indicate that local officials bounded rationality derived from uncertainty, self-serving motives and the deviation between individual rationality and collective rationality Local government officials have the following propensity:compliance to superior administrative power, preference for short-term income, risk aversion and opportunism. The cognition bias of myopia is strengthened by the tenure system, assessment mechanisms, as well as the unique political life cycle of officials. By using hyperbolic discounting model, this paper makes the deduction that the time inconsistency of regulation may derived from the underestimation to the long-term costs and overestimation to current income. Local officials'regulatory policy formulation and implementation will be discretionary And special opportunistic behavior defined herein as inter-session opportunism This opportunistic tendency of government officials that derived from bounded rationality and incomplete contract is strengthened and enlarged by the tenure system and performance evaluation system. This opportunistic tendency lasted due to lacking of monitoring mechanisms and intergenerational retroactive compensation mechanisms. Deduction from the overlapping generation game model proved that this particular opportunism could be eliminated and cooperation of different sessions of local goverment could be achieved. Only can one decision-maker firstly made decision for long-term consideration out of altruistic move, the cooperation of sessions can be established in the basis of stable expectation and intergenerational retroactive compensation, and the sustainable development can be reached.
Secondly, research revealed that local officials got intricate target system and changing utility function. From the perspectives of common agency and Multi-objective decision-making theory, this paper made the distinction between the goals and utility function of local government and those of central government. And reveal that the goals system of local governments got conflict and dynamic characteristics. Thesis made the original explanation of corruption:as a non-rational behavior, corruption derived from myopia cognition bias. In detail, the officials may underestimate the future long-term costs of corruption, overestimate short-term gains in the same time, so that act undue irrational wrongdoings contrary to the original intention. Research also focus on the the mechanisms how the factors such as risk appetite of officials and the structure of the utility function influence corruption behavior.
Thirdly, this paper generalized the characteristics of local government regulation behavior and the manifestations of regulation externality. To study the competition among local governments by using general equilibrium model, we can find the differences in regulation behaivor of different local administration owing to endowment heterogeneity and different ways of decision-making The six characteristics of the local government regulation behavior are:1coexisting of both regulatory excessive and insufficiency;2selective regulation;3. the discontinuous regulation policy,4. the decentralization of economic regulation and centralization of social regulation system;5. the administrative monopoly;6. different level of government regulation with different behavioral preferences. Local governments often directly intervene pricing system, and relax social regulation to lower prices, lead to the non-market cost pricing. Enter and exit regulation also hinder technological progress.The increase in transaction costs is caused by market segmentation. Noted that the monopolistic behavior of some NGO which both as the regulatory agencies and market competitors at the same time. Described the interaction between the regional monopoly forces and industry monopoly power by study typical industries, this thesis recognized the reaction to the industrial development by government regulation, and described the changing power comes from the development of industrial organization.
引文
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