基于准市场的跨界流域生态补偿机制研究
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摘要
流域是地球上最重要的生态环境与社会经济复合系统。在中国,以流域跨界污染和水资源短缺为特点的流域生态问题突出。辽河流域是中国跨区域流域的代表,将其作为实证研究对象既有很强的实际意义,也具有一定的示范推广价值。国内外的研究与实践证明,建立流域生态补偿制度是解决流域生态问题的有效途径。受基本国情的影响,中国现行的生态补偿制度带有明显的“准市场”特征,以准市场模式开展跨界流域生态补偿是理论与现实的必然选择。目前,国内外对于跨界流域生态补偿准市场机制的研究非常有限。本文系统论述并发展了跨界流域生态补偿准市场机制概念,并认为跨界流域生态补偿准市场机制是综合运用“政府”和市场手段,协调流域生态保护利益相关者间的利益关系、使一部分流域生态资源这种公共物品能够通过市场进行配置的制度,以此激励相关各方从事流域生态保护与建设的积极性,实现流域生态功能的保护、恢复和增值。
本文通过构建一系列理论与计量模型,对跨界流域生态补偿准市场机制理论体系进行了研究。通过构建跨界流域生态补偿准市场结构模型,本文认为可以建立“委托—代理”的契约关系,处理“政府”与“市场”的角色定位问题,提出建设辽河流域“三级”水资源市场的设想。考虑到各级政府在推动跨界流域生态补偿及参与生态补偿市场构建过程中的重要性,本文以跨界流域生态补偿准市场中政府间“双向”利益均衡问题为切入点,通过构建跨界流域生态补偿中的政府间演化博弈模型、跨界流域生态补偿准市场中的政府间三方动态博弈模型,分析了各级政府在跨界流域生态补偿准市场中的利益均衡问题与协调机制；根据模型分析结论,提出建立辽河流域生态补偿“三层”管理协调机构的建议。本文在发展、完善跨界流域生态补偿准市场中的水资源供应链理论基础上,建立了跨界流域水资源供应链协调模型,以此处理跨界流域生态补偿准市场中各市场主体间的利益协调问题；提出了通过建立跨界流域水资源供应链转移支付机制,促进和激励流域上下游地区中各涉水主体间的主动合作；实证测算了辽河流域主要地区基于流域水资源供应链的转移支付金额。综合以上研究成果,本文在发展并完善跨界流域生态补偿准市场机制理论体系的基础上,初步设计了辽河流域生态补偿准市场机制框架。
为加强跨界流域生态补偿准市场机制的可操作性,本文构建了一个基于排污权交易原理的跨界流域混合式生态补偿标准核算计量模型,实证结果显示：沈阳市等7座城市因实际使用的排污权大于理论排污权,应支付生态补偿金；铁岭市等5座城市因实际使用的排污权小于理论排污权,应该获得生态补偿金。最后,本文完善了“复合式”财政转移支付建议,构建了一个具有较强可操作性的辽河流域生态补偿准市场机制。
River basin is one of the most important ecological and social-economic complex system. Excessive exploitation has given rise to a series of serious ecological problems, and among which, in China, the problem of Basin water resources shortage has become particularly acute. Liaohe basin is representative of the domestic large-scale cross-border river basins, which makes it a significant object of empirical study, with considerable demonstration and popularization value. The research and practice at home and abroad shows that the establishment of ecological compensation system is an effective way to solve river basin ecological problems. Influenced by the basic national conditions, China's current ecological compensation system demonstrates obvious quasi-market feature. Therefore, to enforce trans-boundary river basin ecological compensation based on quasi-market mode is the inevitable choice in theory and reality. At present, the domestic and international research on trans-boundary river basin ecological compensation quasi-market mechanism is very limited.Based on current research findings, this paper, by applying government intervention and government regulation theory, discusses and develops the concept and connotation of quasi-market mechanism for trans-boundary river basin ecological compensation, and defines the approach to constructing the quasi-market mechanism.
Based on the theoretical model established in this paper, the author makes in-depth research on the theoretical system of quasi-market mechanism for trans-boundary river basin ecological compensation. According to Holmstrom-Milgrom model, this paper believes that the contract relationship between "principal-agent" in the quasi-market mechanism are to be used to define the role of "government" and "market", and the paper proposes the establishment of Liaohe River Basin "three-level" water resource market. In view of the important role played by all levels of government in promoting trans-boundary river basin ecological compensation and in constructing ecological compensation market, this thesis starts with the study of intergovernmental "two-way" balance of interests. Through the construction of upstream and downstream intergovernmental evolutionary game model in trans-boundary river basin ecological compensation, and through the construction of three-party dynamic game model between down-stream local government and higher level government, the paper analyses the inter-governmental interest equilibrium model and coordination mechanism, and puts forward the suggestion for a three-level management coordination institute for Liaohe river basin ecological compensation.Based on water resource supply chain theory, the paper establishes trans-boundary river basin water resource supply chain coordination model, and uses the model to coordinate different interest parties in quasi-market in trans-boundary river basin ecological compensation. The paper introduces water resource supply chain transfer payment coordination mechanism, to promote active cooperation among upstream and downstream subjects involved. Meanwhile, the paper exemplifies the accounting of transfer payment in main areas of Liaohe river basin. Based on the above results, the paper initially constructs Liaohe River Basin Ecological Compensation of quasi market mechanism framework.
To improve the maneuverability of quasi-market mechanism in trans-boundary river basin ecological compensation, this thesis establishes a standard accounting model of trans-boundary river basin hybrid ecological compensation based on emission rights trading principle. Empirical study shows that7cities, such as Shenyang, have exceeded their theoretical emission rights, and should, therefore. pay the compensation money. On the contrary,5cities, such as Tieling, should be compensated due to their actual emission, which is less than what their emission rights allow. Finally. this paper also develops the combined financial transfer payment, improves the Liaohe river basin ecological compensation Quasi-market Mechanism system, which is highly maneuverable.
本文通过构建一系列理论与计量模型,对跨界流域生态补偿准市场机制理论体系进行了研究。通过构建跨界流域生态补偿准市场结构模型,本文认为可以建立“委托—代理”的契约关系,处理“政府”与“市场”的角色定位问题,提出建设辽河流域“三级”水资源市场的设想。考虑到各级政府在推动跨界流域生态补偿及参与生态补偿市场构建过程中的重要性,本文以跨界流域生态补偿准市场中政府间“双向”利益均衡问题为切入点,通过构建跨界流域生态补偿中的政府间演化博弈模型、跨界流域生态补偿准市场中的政府间三方动态博弈模型,分析了各级政府在跨界流域生态补偿准市场中的利益均衡问题与协调机制；根据模型分析结论,提出建立辽河流域生态补偿“三层”管理协调机构的建议。本文在发展、完善跨界流域生态补偿准市场中的水资源供应链理论基础上,建立了跨界流域水资源供应链协调模型,以此处理跨界流域生态补偿准市场中各市场主体间的利益协调问题；提出了通过建立跨界流域水资源供应链转移支付机制,促进和激励流域上下游地区中各涉水主体间的主动合作；实证测算了辽河流域主要地区基于流域水资源供应链的转移支付金额。综合以上研究成果,本文在发展并完善跨界流域生态补偿准市场机制理论体系的基础上,初步设计了辽河流域生态补偿准市场机制框架。
为加强跨界流域生态补偿准市场机制的可操作性,本文构建了一个基于排污权交易原理的跨界流域混合式生态补偿标准核算计量模型,实证结果显示：沈阳市等7座城市因实际使用的排污权大于理论排污权,应支付生态补偿金；铁岭市等5座城市因实际使用的排污权小于理论排污权,应该获得生态补偿金。最后,本文完善了“复合式”财政转移支付建议,构建了一个具有较强可操作性的辽河流域生态补偿准市场机制。
River basin is one of the most important ecological and social-economic complex system. Excessive exploitation has given rise to a series of serious ecological problems, and among which, in China, the problem of Basin water resources shortage has become particularly acute. Liaohe basin is representative of the domestic large-scale cross-border river basins, which makes it a significant object of empirical study, with considerable demonstration and popularization value. The research and practice at home and abroad shows that the establishment of ecological compensation system is an effective way to solve river basin ecological problems. Influenced by the basic national conditions, China's current ecological compensation system demonstrates obvious quasi-market feature. Therefore, to enforce trans-boundary river basin ecological compensation based on quasi-market mode is the inevitable choice in theory and reality. At present, the domestic and international research on trans-boundary river basin ecological compensation quasi-market mechanism is very limited.Based on current research findings, this paper, by applying government intervention and government regulation theory, discusses and develops the concept and connotation of quasi-market mechanism for trans-boundary river basin ecological compensation, and defines the approach to constructing the quasi-market mechanism.
Based on the theoretical model established in this paper, the author makes in-depth research on the theoretical system of quasi-market mechanism for trans-boundary river basin ecological compensation. According to Holmstrom-Milgrom model, this paper believes that the contract relationship between "principal-agent" in the quasi-market mechanism are to be used to define the role of "government" and "market", and the paper proposes the establishment of Liaohe River Basin "three-level" water resource market. In view of the important role played by all levels of government in promoting trans-boundary river basin ecological compensation and in constructing ecological compensation market, this thesis starts with the study of intergovernmental "two-way" balance of interests. Through the construction of upstream and downstream intergovernmental evolutionary game model in trans-boundary river basin ecological compensation, and through the construction of three-party dynamic game model between down-stream local government and higher level government, the paper analyses the inter-governmental interest equilibrium model and coordination mechanism, and puts forward the suggestion for a three-level management coordination institute for Liaohe river basin ecological compensation.Based on water resource supply chain theory, the paper establishes trans-boundary river basin water resource supply chain coordination model, and uses the model to coordinate different interest parties in quasi-market in trans-boundary river basin ecological compensation. The paper introduces water resource supply chain transfer payment coordination mechanism, to promote active cooperation among upstream and downstream subjects involved. Meanwhile, the paper exemplifies the accounting of transfer payment in main areas of Liaohe river basin. Based on the above results, the paper initially constructs Liaohe River Basin Ecological Compensation of quasi market mechanism framework.
To improve the maneuverability of quasi-market mechanism in trans-boundary river basin ecological compensation, this thesis establishes a standard accounting model of trans-boundary river basin hybrid ecological compensation based on emission rights trading principle. Empirical study shows that7cities, such as Shenyang, have exceeded their theoretical emission rights, and should, therefore. pay the compensation money. On the contrary,5cities, such as Tieling, should be compensated due to their actual emission, which is less than what their emission rights allow. Finally. this paper also develops the combined financial transfer payment, improves the Liaohe river basin ecological compensation Quasi-market Mechanism system, which is highly maneuverable.
引文
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