集体土地产权流转及其市场体系研究
摘要
中国土地市场作为要素市场的重要组成部分,随着20世纪80年代以来的土地使用制度改革逐步建立。在此过程中,国有土地使用权从所有权中分离出来,逐步进入市场化配置的轨道,而集体土地权属状况及其流转问题却在长时间内裹足不前。在目前的土地管理法律制度框架内,农民集体土地权利设定简单,与国有土地使用权体系相比处弱居变。在实行市场经济的中国,农村集体土地所有权与国有所有权的转换仍然保留着计划经济的等级特点,即农村集体土地不能直接进入市场,必须先通过国家征收才能进入市场。由此可见,集体土地产权流转在法律上是受到限制的,市场价格机制被排除在城市化、工业化土地资源的配置之外,这不仅会导致土地资源利用效率低下,还会产生农民土地财产权益受损,影响社会经济的稳定和可持续发展。基于此,本文从建立健全统一、开放、竞争、有序的现代市场体系出发,根据“同地、同权、同价”的研究设想,试图从产权流转的角度,对集体土地产权流转与集体土地市场、价格的内在关系进行系统、深入研究,探究集体土地市场发育滞后、低效的原因,并寻求有效的解决路径。
作为理论推导的前提和逻辑演绎的起点,本文首先提出了研究的分析框架。明晰的产权是市场建立的前提,如果产权制度不能清晰地界定土地产权,交易双方权能的行使就无法有效地进行,也就无法通过市场实现资源的有效配置。而产权流转是集体土地市场形成、发育的基础。只有通过产权流转,集体土地才有可能突破既定格局的规模和集中,才能通过市场提高资源的配置效率。如果由于产权制度的缺陷导致产权不能流转或流转受到不当限制,不仅侵害了当事人的权益,而且会使资源流动受阻,导致有效竞争的缺乏,不利于市场机制发挥作用。各个产权束在不同路径的流转形成了不同的集体土地产权流转方式,从而构成了完整的集体土地市场体系,其对应的市场价格则是产权收益高低的反映。但如果产权受到不当的限制或产权残缺会使土地产权流转受阻,导致市场体系不健全和市场价格的扭曲,从而影响到市场的资源配置效率。由此,形成了“产权-流转-市场-价格”系统的分析框架。
集体土地产权流转是集体土地产权制度变迁和创新的产物。因此有必要对集体土地产权制度的历史变迁进行梳理和分析,以期为未来的集体土地产权制度改革提供借鉴和参考。分析发现,产权对经济发展的激励作用是客观存在的,新的土地产权制度的形成必须要克服原有土地产权制度的弊端,且制度变迁的收益要大于其发生的成本。中国集体土地产权制度当前出现了不适应生产力发展和市场经济需要的情况,存在集体土地产权主体界定不清、集体土地产权不稳定、不安全以及产权残缺的问题。这些产权弊端滋生出高额的交易费用,致使部分产权处于公共域中,并成为他人攫取的对象,导致了产权侵害的发生。
土地作为不动产,其实体是不能移转的,土地市场上流转的实际是土地产权,土地价格实质上是土地产权在市场上的交易价格。因此,对集体土地产权流转的分析是本研究的基础。产权只有在市场上流转,才能使资源从效率低的利用方向流向效率高的利用方向,从而在市场机制“看不见的手”的作用下实现资源配置的帕累托改进。相反,如果产权的流转受到不当限制,则不仅侵害了当事人的权益,而且使资源流动受阻,影响到资源的配置效率。本研究着重对集体土地产权流转的制度规定、流转类型及存在的制度障碍进行研究,揭示了集体土地产权流转不畅的根本原因在于集体土地产权残缺造成产权转让过程中交易成本过高。这种产权缺陷不仅剥夺了农民分享土地增殖收益的权利,还导致了严重的土地权力腐败。
集体土地产权在不同路径的流转形成了不同的集体土地产权流转方式,从而构成了完整的集体土地市场体系。本研究根据产权流转的路径将集体土地市场体系分为农地内部流转市场、农地外部流转市场和集体建设用地流转市场三个组成部分,每个部分再按照产权结构区分为使用权市场和所有权市场。深入分析目前的中国集体土地市场可以发现,产权缺乏导致了农村集体农地的比较利益低下,从而使农地流转市场供需不平衡,也正是产权制度的缺陷导致了农民集体土地产权容易受到侵害,因而产生了集体农地流转的弱市场现象；而集体建设用地由于现行产权制度的不当限制更是不可能够像国有建设用地那样直接进入土地市场流转。海门市的实证分析说明,如果放松对集体土地产权的限制,使集体土地可以直接进入市场,有助于提升集体土地市场化程度,能够促进集体土地市场的发育与完善,也有利于形成城乡一体化的土地市场体系。
土地产权在市场上流转是以土地价格的形式表现出来的,透过土地价格也能反映土地市场效率的高低。本研究将产权模型引入集体土地产权流转与集体土地市场价格体系的分析中,揭示了交易成本、产权公共域与集体土地市场价格之间的内在关系。根据现代产权理论和资源价值理论,本研究构建了集体土地资源不同价值形态的产权流转与市场价格之间崭新的关系框架。农地农用产权对应的是农地的经济收益价值,形成了农地农用的经济收益价格；与农地的发展权对应的是农地的社会保障价值,成为农地发展权价格的来源,其价格加上农地的经济收益价格就等于农地转用为建设用地后的生地价格；而农地的公共产权则体现了农地的公共产权价值,对应了农地的公共产权价格,最终形成了农地的完整价格。在我国的城市化和工业化进程中,由于现行集体土地产权制度的缺陷,集体土地产权受到严重侵害,不仅使集体土地价格处于扭曲状态,还对整个社会福利造成了损失。这一点在江都市农地非农化价格的实证分析中得到了证实。实证分析显示：农地农用产权价格、发展权价格和公共产权价格在完全价格中的比重分别为18.50%、63.30%和18.20%,说明农地发展权和公共产权是相当重要的,如果在征地过程中按照农地完全价格对农民进行补偿,那么农民的土地财产权益可以增加30倍以上。另外,集体土地直接进入市场,有助于降低土地发展商的用地成本,也有利于缓解目前城镇土地市场的用地窘境。
基于上述分析,论文最终得出了一些针对性的政策启示,首先就是要改革、完善集体土地产权制度,包括明晰产权主体、稳定承包权、允许集体土地产权直接进入市场、设立农地发展权和公共产权；其次要对征地制度进行改革,应该遵循公共利益原则,按照市场价格来征收土地。还需要建立健全集体土地市场,构建一个城乡一体化的土地市场体系,以解决长期以来城乡二元土地市场分割、城乡地价扭曲的弊端。土地收益分配制度也急需完善,应按照土地产权与价值、价格的关系框架,不断提高农民的土地收益。此外,还需要加大对农业的补贴力度,建立健全集体土地产权流转的配套制度,提高农地农用的比较利益,抑制过度的农地非农化,确保国家粮食安全。只有这样,才能使集体土地产权真正流转起来,不断提高土地资源配置效率,使农民可以平等地位参与“土地运作”,参与工业化、城市化进程,共享改革开放和经济发展的成果,促进社会经济又好又快地发展。
As one important part of factor markets, land market is worked up in China with the reform of land use institution since1980s. Use right of state-owned land is separated from its ownership and is gradually entered into the path of market allocation in the course, while property right and its transfer of collective land don't have any progress for a long time. Under the current frame of land management law and institution, it is simply set up for the property rights of collective land, which is weaker and more changeful than state-owned land. Today, market economy is adopted in China, but it still has character of planned economy that the ownership transfer from collective land to state-owned land. Collective land can't be directly put into land market before it is expropriated by government. Therefore, it is concluded that collective land's transfer is restricted by the present law and market mechanism is excluded in the land allocation with the development of urbanization and industrialization, which leads to not only low efficiency of land resource use, but also loss of peasant'land revenue, and it will effect stability and sustainable development of the social economy. On the base of the analysis, this thesis starts from the build of a uniform, open, competitive and ordinal modern market system, and according to assumption of "same land, same right and same price", it try to study on the relation among property rights'transfer and market and price of the collective land from the aspect of property rights, in order to inquire the reasons making land market develop slowly and non-efficiently and to look for effective methods.
It is precondition of theory ratiocination and beginning of logic illation that this thesis firstly put forward analysis frame. Transparent property right is presupposition of market foundation. If the property rights can not be distinctly defined by property rights institution, it is impossible for both sides of transaction to exert their rights, and resoures can not be effectively allocated by market. And property rights transfer is groundwork for the foundation and development of land market. Only through the transfer, can the collective land break through present scales, the allocation effect be improved through the market. If the property rights can not be transferred or have improper limit in the market because of the institution, not only party's rights and interests are infracted, but also resources flow is cumbered, which can lead to scarce of effective competition and adverse impact on market mechanism. Transfer of various property right boudles forms different transfer manners of collective land's property rights, which makes up of whole market system of collective land, and the market price is reflection of the property right's income. However, if the property rights is irrelevantly limited or have deformity, the transfer will be suffocated, which result in morbidity of market system and distortion of market price, affecting the market efficiency of resource allocation. Therefore, it can be established the analysis frame "property right-transfer-market-price" of collective land.
and it applies property right model into analyzing property right transfer and market system of collective land, to open out inherence connection among transaction cost, pubic domain of property right and price of collective land market, and to set up a whole analysis frame of "property right-transfer-market-price" of collective land. According to modern property rights theory and resource value theory, this thesis builds one new relationship among different property rights, value and price. Corresponding with economic income value, the property rights of farmland which is used for agriculture comes into being economic price of farmland used for agriculture; while social security value is corresponding with development right of farmland, which becomes source of price of farmland's development right, and the price will equal to the price of mature land which is transferred from farmland to construction land if it is plus the economic income price; and the public property right of farmland indicates its value of public property right, corresponding with the price of public property right, forming a full price of farmland finally. Based on this, the thesis put forward three hypothesis needed to be validated.(1)Because of disfigurement or improper limitation of property right institution, it has obstruct that transfer of collective land's property rights.(2)If the disfigurement can be reformed and the limitation can be loosen, and the collective land is dealt with as same as state-owned land, it is helpful to cultivate market competing mechanism and inspiriting mechanism which can promote growth and improvement of collective land's market.(3)Due to the existence of transaction cost, some property rights are placed into public domain which leads collective land's market price not to fully reveal its value functions, resulting in price distortion and efficiency loss of collective land.
The transfer of collective land's property rights is outcome of change and innovation of collective land property rights institution. So it is necessary to analyze its change history to provide some reference for future reform. It is found that property right has encouragement for economic growth, and forming a new land property right institution should overcome the disadvantage of former institution as well as the income should exceed the cost of the institution change. There are some problems in the collective land's property right institution of China which can't be suit with the development of production and the demand of market economy, such as illegibility of partner of the property rights, instability, insecurity and deformity of the property rights. These problems create high transaction cost to put some property rights into public domain which can be snatched by others, bringing on happening of property right infraction.
As a real estate, land's substantiality can not be moved, it is land property rights that transfer in the land market, and in fact, land price is the price of land property rights transfer in the market. Therefore, it is basis of this research that analysis of transfer of collective land's property rights. Only when property rights transfer in the market, can resource flow from low to high efficiency, as to achieve pareto improvement of resource allocation under the market mechanism which is looked as "an invisible hand". On the contrast, if the transfer has improper limitation, it not only harms the rights and interests of parties, but also obstructs the transfer of resources and has some effect on allocation efficiency of resources. The thesis study on transfer institution, transfer kinds and its institution obstruction of collective land's property rights, in order to reveal that the deep reason is the high transaction cost induced by deformity of the property rights, which deprives the peasants'right to share land increasing income and results in serious land right corruption.
Various transfer routes form various transfer manners of collevtive land's property rights, which are component of whole collective land's market system. By the transfer routes, the thesis devides the market system into three proportions, farmland domestic transfer market, farmland external transfer market and collective construction land transfer market. Eevery proportion can be distinguished into use right market and ownership market by the structure of property rights. It can be discovered that the absence of property rights leads to the low comparative advantage of rural collective land after analyzing current collective land market in China, this make unbalance of supply and demand of farmland transfer market. It is this disadvantage of property right institution that makes for the infraction of rights. So the result is that the weak market of collective land's transfer. While collective construction land can't be directly transferred in the land market as state-owned land because of improper limitation of current property right institution. It is shown by the practical analysis of Haimen city that it is helpful to improve the market level of collective land if loosing the limitation of the collective land's property rights and making the land directly enter into market, this also can promote the development and improvement of collective land's market and form land market system which includes urban and rural area.
Land price is the expressive form when land property rights transfer in the market, which can reflect the efficiency of land market. This thesis applies property right model into analyzing property right transfer and market price system of collective land, to open out inherence connection among transaction cost, pubic domain of property right and price of collective land market. According to modern property rights theory and resource value theory, this thesis builds one new relationship among different property rights, value and price. Corresponding with economic income value, the property rights of farmland which is used for agriculture comes into being economic price of farmland used for agriculture; while social security value is corresponding with development right of farmland, which becomes source of price of farmland's development right, and the price will equal to the price of mature land which is transferred from farmland to construction land if it is plus the economic income price; and the public property right of farmland indicates its value of public property right, corresponding with the price of public property right, forming a full price of farmland finally. In the course of urbanization and industrialization in China, because of the disadvantage of current collective land's property rights institution, the rights are badly aggrieved which leading to not only the price distortion of collective land but also loss of whole social welfare. This has been proved by the price of land from agriculture to non-agriculture in the practical analysis of Jiangdu city. It also shows that the ratio of the price of farmland used for agriculture, the price of development right and the price of public property rights to complete price is18.50%,63.30%and18.20%respectively, which illuminates that it is very important for the development right and public property right of farmland and the peasants'income from land can be increased by30times if it is compensated by the complete price in the course of land expropriation. In addition, it is good for reducing land cost of land developers and relaxing land use situation of urban land market if the collective land can be entered into market directly.
According to the above analysis, some policies revelation are concluded. Firstly, the property rights institution of collective land should be reformed and improved, including perspicuity owner of the property rights, stability of contractual management right, permission the property rights into land market, and instauration development right and public property right of farmland. Moreover, the institution of land expropriation should be reformed to compensate by market price following the principal of public interest. The collective market should be build up and improved, and it is necessary to establish one land market system including urban and rural area to solve question of market segmentation and price distortion in the two areas. And it need to be improved that the institution of land income distribution. Households can get more land income according to the new frame of "property right-value-price". In addition, China should put more subsidy into agriculture and set up a set of institution to coordinate with the transfer of collective land's property rights, in order to mend the farmland's comparative advantage for agricultural use and to control excessive transfer from farmland to construction land, which is guarantee for the grain security. On the cases, the property rights can be transferred in the market and the efficiency of land resource allocation can be improved which can make peasants participate in the progress of land development and industrialization and urbanization under equal status, and share the achievement of innovation and open and economic growth, in order to promote better development of society and economy.
作为理论推导的前提和逻辑演绎的起点,本文首先提出了研究的分析框架。明晰的产权是市场建立的前提,如果产权制度不能清晰地界定土地产权,交易双方权能的行使就无法有效地进行,也就无法通过市场实现资源的有效配置。而产权流转是集体土地市场形成、发育的基础。只有通过产权流转,集体土地才有可能突破既定格局的规模和集中,才能通过市场提高资源的配置效率。如果由于产权制度的缺陷导致产权不能流转或流转受到不当限制,不仅侵害了当事人的权益,而且会使资源流动受阻,导致有效竞争的缺乏,不利于市场机制发挥作用。各个产权束在不同路径的流转形成了不同的集体土地产权流转方式,从而构成了完整的集体土地市场体系,其对应的市场价格则是产权收益高低的反映。但如果产权受到不当的限制或产权残缺会使土地产权流转受阻,导致市场体系不健全和市场价格的扭曲,从而影响到市场的资源配置效率。由此,形成了“产权-流转-市场-价格”系统的分析框架。
集体土地产权流转是集体土地产权制度变迁和创新的产物。因此有必要对集体土地产权制度的历史变迁进行梳理和分析,以期为未来的集体土地产权制度改革提供借鉴和参考。分析发现,产权对经济发展的激励作用是客观存在的,新的土地产权制度的形成必须要克服原有土地产权制度的弊端,且制度变迁的收益要大于其发生的成本。中国集体土地产权制度当前出现了不适应生产力发展和市场经济需要的情况,存在集体土地产权主体界定不清、集体土地产权不稳定、不安全以及产权残缺的问题。这些产权弊端滋生出高额的交易费用,致使部分产权处于公共域中,并成为他人攫取的对象,导致了产权侵害的发生。
土地作为不动产,其实体是不能移转的,土地市场上流转的实际是土地产权,土地价格实质上是土地产权在市场上的交易价格。因此,对集体土地产权流转的分析是本研究的基础。产权只有在市场上流转,才能使资源从效率低的利用方向流向效率高的利用方向,从而在市场机制“看不见的手”的作用下实现资源配置的帕累托改进。相反,如果产权的流转受到不当限制,则不仅侵害了当事人的权益,而且使资源流动受阻,影响到资源的配置效率。本研究着重对集体土地产权流转的制度规定、流转类型及存在的制度障碍进行研究,揭示了集体土地产权流转不畅的根本原因在于集体土地产权残缺造成产权转让过程中交易成本过高。这种产权缺陷不仅剥夺了农民分享土地增殖收益的权利,还导致了严重的土地权力腐败。
集体土地产权在不同路径的流转形成了不同的集体土地产权流转方式,从而构成了完整的集体土地市场体系。本研究根据产权流转的路径将集体土地市场体系分为农地内部流转市场、农地外部流转市场和集体建设用地流转市场三个组成部分,每个部分再按照产权结构区分为使用权市场和所有权市场。深入分析目前的中国集体土地市场可以发现,产权缺乏导致了农村集体农地的比较利益低下,从而使农地流转市场供需不平衡,也正是产权制度的缺陷导致了农民集体土地产权容易受到侵害,因而产生了集体农地流转的弱市场现象；而集体建设用地由于现行产权制度的不当限制更是不可能够像国有建设用地那样直接进入土地市场流转。海门市的实证分析说明,如果放松对集体土地产权的限制,使集体土地可以直接进入市场,有助于提升集体土地市场化程度,能够促进集体土地市场的发育与完善,也有利于形成城乡一体化的土地市场体系。
土地产权在市场上流转是以土地价格的形式表现出来的,透过土地价格也能反映土地市场效率的高低。本研究将产权模型引入集体土地产权流转与集体土地市场价格体系的分析中,揭示了交易成本、产权公共域与集体土地市场价格之间的内在关系。根据现代产权理论和资源价值理论,本研究构建了集体土地资源不同价值形态的产权流转与市场价格之间崭新的关系框架。农地农用产权对应的是农地的经济收益价值,形成了农地农用的经济收益价格；与农地的发展权对应的是农地的社会保障价值,成为农地发展权价格的来源,其价格加上农地的经济收益价格就等于农地转用为建设用地后的生地价格；而农地的公共产权则体现了农地的公共产权价值,对应了农地的公共产权价格,最终形成了农地的完整价格。在我国的城市化和工业化进程中,由于现行集体土地产权制度的缺陷,集体土地产权受到严重侵害,不仅使集体土地价格处于扭曲状态,还对整个社会福利造成了损失。这一点在江都市农地非农化价格的实证分析中得到了证实。实证分析显示：农地农用产权价格、发展权价格和公共产权价格在完全价格中的比重分别为18.50%、63.30%和18.20%,说明农地发展权和公共产权是相当重要的,如果在征地过程中按照农地完全价格对农民进行补偿,那么农民的土地财产权益可以增加30倍以上。另外,集体土地直接进入市场,有助于降低土地发展商的用地成本,也有利于缓解目前城镇土地市场的用地窘境。
基于上述分析,论文最终得出了一些针对性的政策启示,首先就是要改革、完善集体土地产权制度,包括明晰产权主体、稳定承包权、允许集体土地产权直接进入市场、设立农地发展权和公共产权；其次要对征地制度进行改革,应该遵循公共利益原则,按照市场价格来征收土地。还需要建立健全集体土地市场,构建一个城乡一体化的土地市场体系,以解决长期以来城乡二元土地市场分割、城乡地价扭曲的弊端。土地收益分配制度也急需完善,应按照土地产权与价值、价格的关系框架,不断提高农民的土地收益。此外,还需要加大对农业的补贴力度,建立健全集体土地产权流转的配套制度,提高农地农用的比较利益,抑制过度的农地非农化,确保国家粮食安全。只有这样,才能使集体土地产权真正流转起来,不断提高土地资源配置效率,使农民可以平等地位参与“土地运作”,参与工业化、城市化进程,共享改革开放和经济发展的成果,促进社会经济又好又快地发展。
As one important part of factor markets, land market is worked up in China with the reform of land use institution since1980s. Use right of state-owned land is separated from its ownership and is gradually entered into the path of market allocation in the course, while property right and its transfer of collective land don't have any progress for a long time. Under the current frame of land management law and institution, it is simply set up for the property rights of collective land, which is weaker and more changeful than state-owned land. Today, market economy is adopted in China, but it still has character of planned economy that the ownership transfer from collective land to state-owned land. Collective land can't be directly put into land market before it is expropriated by government. Therefore, it is concluded that collective land's transfer is restricted by the present law and market mechanism is excluded in the land allocation with the development of urbanization and industrialization, which leads to not only low efficiency of land resource use, but also loss of peasant'land revenue, and it will effect stability and sustainable development of the social economy. On the base of the analysis, this thesis starts from the build of a uniform, open, competitive and ordinal modern market system, and according to assumption of "same land, same right and same price", it try to study on the relation among property rights'transfer and market and price of the collective land from the aspect of property rights, in order to inquire the reasons making land market develop slowly and non-efficiently and to look for effective methods.
It is precondition of theory ratiocination and beginning of logic illation that this thesis firstly put forward analysis frame. Transparent property right is presupposition of market foundation. If the property rights can not be distinctly defined by property rights institution, it is impossible for both sides of transaction to exert their rights, and resoures can not be effectively allocated by market. And property rights transfer is groundwork for the foundation and development of land market. Only through the transfer, can the collective land break through present scales, the allocation effect be improved through the market. If the property rights can not be transferred or have improper limit in the market because of the institution, not only party's rights and interests are infracted, but also resources flow is cumbered, which can lead to scarce of effective competition and adverse impact on market mechanism. Transfer of various property right boudles forms different transfer manners of collective land's property rights, which makes up of whole market system of collective land, and the market price is reflection of the property right's income. However, if the property rights is irrelevantly limited or have deformity, the transfer will be suffocated, which result in morbidity of market system and distortion of market price, affecting the market efficiency of resource allocation. Therefore, it can be established the analysis frame "property right-transfer-market-price" of collective land.
and it applies property right model into analyzing property right transfer and market system of collective land, to open out inherence connection among transaction cost, pubic domain of property right and price of collective land market, and to set up a whole analysis frame of "property right-transfer-market-price" of collective land. According to modern property rights theory and resource value theory, this thesis builds one new relationship among different property rights, value and price. Corresponding with economic income value, the property rights of farmland which is used for agriculture comes into being economic price of farmland used for agriculture; while social security value is corresponding with development right of farmland, which becomes source of price of farmland's development right, and the price will equal to the price of mature land which is transferred from farmland to construction land if it is plus the economic income price; and the public property right of farmland indicates its value of public property right, corresponding with the price of public property right, forming a full price of farmland finally. Based on this, the thesis put forward three hypothesis needed to be validated.(1)Because of disfigurement or improper limitation of property right institution, it has obstruct that transfer of collective land's property rights.(2)If the disfigurement can be reformed and the limitation can be loosen, and the collective land is dealt with as same as state-owned land, it is helpful to cultivate market competing mechanism and inspiriting mechanism which can promote growth and improvement of collective land's market.(3)Due to the existence of transaction cost, some property rights are placed into public domain which leads collective land's market price not to fully reveal its value functions, resulting in price distortion and efficiency loss of collective land.
The transfer of collective land's property rights is outcome of change and innovation of collective land property rights institution. So it is necessary to analyze its change history to provide some reference for future reform. It is found that property right has encouragement for economic growth, and forming a new land property right institution should overcome the disadvantage of former institution as well as the income should exceed the cost of the institution change. There are some problems in the collective land's property right institution of China which can't be suit with the development of production and the demand of market economy, such as illegibility of partner of the property rights, instability, insecurity and deformity of the property rights. These problems create high transaction cost to put some property rights into public domain which can be snatched by others, bringing on happening of property right infraction.
As a real estate, land's substantiality can not be moved, it is land property rights that transfer in the land market, and in fact, land price is the price of land property rights transfer in the market. Therefore, it is basis of this research that analysis of transfer of collective land's property rights. Only when property rights transfer in the market, can resource flow from low to high efficiency, as to achieve pareto improvement of resource allocation under the market mechanism which is looked as "an invisible hand". On the contrast, if the transfer has improper limitation, it not only harms the rights and interests of parties, but also obstructs the transfer of resources and has some effect on allocation efficiency of resources. The thesis study on transfer institution, transfer kinds and its institution obstruction of collective land's property rights, in order to reveal that the deep reason is the high transaction cost induced by deformity of the property rights, which deprives the peasants'right to share land increasing income and results in serious land right corruption.
Various transfer routes form various transfer manners of collevtive land's property rights, which are component of whole collective land's market system. By the transfer routes, the thesis devides the market system into three proportions, farmland domestic transfer market, farmland external transfer market and collective construction land transfer market. Eevery proportion can be distinguished into use right market and ownership market by the structure of property rights. It can be discovered that the absence of property rights leads to the low comparative advantage of rural collective land after analyzing current collective land market in China, this make unbalance of supply and demand of farmland transfer market. It is this disadvantage of property right institution that makes for the infraction of rights. So the result is that the weak market of collective land's transfer. While collective construction land can't be directly transferred in the land market as state-owned land because of improper limitation of current property right institution. It is shown by the practical analysis of Haimen city that it is helpful to improve the market level of collective land if loosing the limitation of the collective land's property rights and making the land directly enter into market, this also can promote the development and improvement of collective land's market and form land market system which includes urban and rural area.
Land price is the expressive form when land property rights transfer in the market, which can reflect the efficiency of land market. This thesis applies property right model into analyzing property right transfer and market price system of collective land, to open out inherence connection among transaction cost, pubic domain of property right and price of collective land market. According to modern property rights theory and resource value theory, this thesis builds one new relationship among different property rights, value and price. Corresponding with economic income value, the property rights of farmland which is used for agriculture comes into being economic price of farmland used for agriculture; while social security value is corresponding with development right of farmland, which becomes source of price of farmland's development right, and the price will equal to the price of mature land which is transferred from farmland to construction land if it is plus the economic income price; and the public property right of farmland indicates its value of public property right, corresponding with the price of public property right, forming a full price of farmland finally. In the course of urbanization and industrialization in China, because of the disadvantage of current collective land's property rights institution, the rights are badly aggrieved which leading to not only the price distortion of collective land but also loss of whole social welfare. This has been proved by the price of land from agriculture to non-agriculture in the practical analysis of Jiangdu city. It also shows that the ratio of the price of farmland used for agriculture, the price of development right and the price of public property rights to complete price is18.50%,63.30%and18.20%respectively, which illuminates that it is very important for the development right and public property right of farmland and the peasants'income from land can be increased by30times if it is compensated by the complete price in the course of land expropriation. In addition, it is good for reducing land cost of land developers and relaxing land use situation of urban land market if the collective land can be entered into market directly.
According to the above analysis, some policies revelation are concluded. Firstly, the property rights institution of collective land should be reformed and improved, including perspicuity owner of the property rights, stability of contractual management right, permission the property rights into land market, and instauration development right and public property right of farmland. Moreover, the institution of land expropriation should be reformed to compensate by market price following the principal of public interest. The collective market should be build up and improved, and it is necessary to establish one land market system including urban and rural area to solve question of market segmentation and price distortion in the two areas. And it need to be improved that the institution of land income distribution. Households can get more land income according to the new frame of "property right-value-price". In addition, China should put more subsidy into agriculture and set up a set of institution to coordinate with the transfer of collective land's property rights, in order to mend the farmland's comparative advantage for agricultural use and to control excessive transfer from farmland to construction land, which is guarantee for the grain security. On the cases, the property rights can be transferred in the market and the efficiency of land resource allocation can be improved which can make peasants participate in the progress of land development and industrialization and urbanization under equal status, and share the achievement of innovation and open and economic growth, in order to promote better development of society and economy.
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