网络存储安全协议研究
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摘要
随着社会信息化程度的不断提高，各种数据以难以置信的速度急剧膨胀。网络的飞速发展推动了存储模式向以数据和网络为中心的网络存储模式快速发展。数据是用户的宝贵资源，数据的重要性决定了数据安全的重要性。网络存储安全是指在网络存储中，确保在传输过程中的数据和保存在存储设备上的数据的保密性、完整性、可用性、不可抵赖性以及整个网络存储系统的可靠的性能。
大规模高性能的海量存储系统对网络存储安全提出了新的挑战，尤其是近年来可信计算技术的产生，对网络存储安全又提出了新的要求。本文结合可证明安全与可信计算的思想，对网络存储协议进行了研究，主要成果有：
1.在网络存储系统中，服务器对用户的访问控制以及二者与存储设备间的数据安全传输是网络存储安全的基本要求。NASD存储系统的安全机制已经不能很好地满足现在的安全需求，针对这一情况，提出了一种高效的可信网络存储协议，协议只需两轮交互就实现了服务器与用户间的身份认证和密钥协商，同时在协议的第一轮交互中实现了对客户端平台身份的认证和平台完整性校验，改进了原来系统服务器遭受攻击易导致整个系统瘫痪的缺点，提高了系统的可靠性和协议的执行效率，在此基础上建立了用户与智能磁盘间的安全信道；利用CK模型证明了协议是SK安全的，用户与磁盘间的信道是安全信道，提高了系统数据的保密性、完整性和不可抵赖性。
2.针对OSD和SAN在构建海量存储系统方面的缺点，基于公钥基础设施PKI构建了一个网络存储系统，由CA标识和维护用户身份，由不同的服务器对用户进行身份认证与访问授权，改进了原系统不易大规模扩展和服务器的瓶颈缺点；给出了实现系统关键的网络存储协议，并利用CK模型对其进行了安全性分析。结果表明新系统具有高带宽、低延时、易扩展、规模大、安全性高、低成本的特点，是一个适合海量存储的系统。
3.融合异构网络存储系统是构建海量存储系统比较经济实用的方法，同时也带来了一些新的安全问题。基于NASD融合SAN为一种适合海量存储的安全网络存储系统SNS，满足高带宽、大规模、易扩展的海量存储需要。系统使用基于身份的分布式安全存储架构对多域存储系统进行融合，并给出了网络存储系统的相关协议，协议由可信接入认证协议和安全信道协议两部分组成。利用CK模型给出了协议的安全性分析，结果表明协议是SK安全的，所建立的信道是安全信道。因此，如果参与融合的每个域是安全的，那么新的网络存储系统也是安全的。
With the advance of informationization level, a variety of data expand at anincredible rate. The rapid development of network promotes the rapid development ofstorage prototype in the direction of data-centric and network-centric. Data is valuableresources for users, so the importance of data decides the importance of data security.The network storage security means that ensuring data confidentiality, integrity,availability and non-repudiation in the storage equipment or during the transmission,and ensuring the reliability of the entire network storage system.
The large-scale and high performance of mass storage system presents newchallenges to the network storage security. With the arising of trusted computingtechnology, new needs is raised for network storage security. With the thoughts oftrusted computing and provable security, we study the security of network storageprotocol. The main contributions are as follows:
1. The access control and secure data transmission among the servers, the disks andthe user are the basic security requirements for network storage. The current NASDcould not satisfy the security requirements for network storage system. Then, a provablysecure trusted protocol for NASD was proposed. The protocol achieves authentication,key agreement and secure channel within two rounds among the server, the disks andthe user. At the same time, the protocol could realize the platform authentication andplatform integrity verification in the first round of protocol interaction, which improvesthe efficiency of the protocol, and prevent the server from malicious attacks effectively.Finally, the analysis results show that the protocol is SK-secure in CK model, whichachieves data confidentiality, integrity and non-repudiation.
2. The OSD and SAN have their own disadvantage in the construction of massstorage system. Then, a network storage system based on the Public Key Infrastructurewas proposed. The user is identified and maintained by the CA. Such system will realizeauthentication and issue capabilities in different servers, which can improve theexpansibility and the bottleneck of the server for the original system. At the same time,a secure storage network protocol for the new system was proposed and analyzed byusing CK model. The results show that the new system has high bandwidth, low latency,expansibility, large-scale, high security and low cost, which is suitable for mass storagesystem.
3. Merging a variety of network storage systems is an economical and practicalmethod, but it also brings some new security issues. Then, a scheme for merging SAN and NASD into a new network storage system was proposed. Such system has highbandwidth, expansibility, large-scale, which is suitable for mass storage system. Thestorage system of multi-domain is merged by the distributed security storagearchitecture based on the identity. At the same time, a secure trusted storage networkprotocol for the new system was proposed. Such protocol is composed of twosub-network protocols, trusted access protocol and secure channel protocol. Finally, theCK model is used to analyze the security of the protocol. The results show that the newnetwork storage system will be secure if SAN and NASD are secure.
大规模高性能的海量存储系统对网络存储安全提出了新的挑战，尤其是近年来可信计算技术的产生，对网络存储安全又提出了新的要求。本文结合可证明安全与可信计算的思想，对网络存储协议进行了研究，主要成果有：
1.在网络存储系统中，服务器对用户的访问控制以及二者与存储设备间的数据安全传输是网络存储安全的基本要求。NASD存储系统的安全机制已经不能很好地满足现在的安全需求，针对这一情况，提出了一种高效的可信网络存储协议，协议只需两轮交互就实现了服务器与用户间的身份认证和密钥协商，同时在协议的第一轮交互中实现了对客户端平台身份的认证和平台完整性校验，改进了原来系统服务器遭受攻击易导致整个系统瘫痪的缺点，提高了系统的可靠性和协议的执行效率，在此基础上建立了用户与智能磁盘间的安全信道；利用CK模型证明了协议是SK安全的，用户与磁盘间的信道是安全信道，提高了系统数据的保密性、完整性和不可抵赖性。
2.针对OSD和SAN在构建海量存储系统方面的缺点，基于公钥基础设施PKI构建了一个网络存储系统，由CA标识和维护用户身份，由不同的服务器对用户进行身份认证与访问授权，改进了原系统不易大规模扩展和服务器的瓶颈缺点；给出了实现系统关键的网络存储协议，并利用CK模型对其进行了安全性分析。结果表明新系统具有高带宽、低延时、易扩展、规模大、安全性高、低成本的特点，是一个适合海量存储的系统。
3.融合异构网络存储系统是构建海量存储系统比较经济实用的方法，同时也带来了一些新的安全问题。基于NASD融合SAN为一种适合海量存储的安全网络存储系统SNS，满足高带宽、大规模、易扩展的海量存储需要。系统使用基于身份的分布式安全存储架构对多域存储系统进行融合，并给出了网络存储系统的相关协议，协议由可信接入认证协议和安全信道协议两部分组成。利用CK模型给出了协议的安全性分析，结果表明协议是SK安全的，所建立的信道是安全信道。因此，如果参与融合的每个域是安全的，那么新的网络存储系统也是安全的。
With the advance of informationization level, a variety of data expand at anincredible rate. The rapid development of network promotes the rapid development ofstorage prototype in the direction of data-centric and network-centric. Data is valuableresources for users, so the importance of data decides the importance of data security.The network storage security means that ensuring data confidentiality, integrity,availability and non-repudiation in the storage equipment or during the transmission,and ensuring the reliability of the entire network storage system.
The large-scale and high performance of mass storage system presents newchallenges to the network storage security. With the arising of trusted computingtechnology, new needs is raised for network storage security. With the thoughts oftrusted computing and provable security, we study the security of network storageprotocol. The main contributions are as follows:
1. The access control and secure data transmission among the servers, the disks andthe user are the basic security requirements for network storage. The current NASDcould not satisfy the security requirements for network storage system. Then, a provablysecure trusted protocol for NASD was proposed. The protocol achieves authentication,key agreement and secure channel within two rounds among the server, the disks andthe user. At the same time, the protocol could realize the platform authentication andplatform integrity verification in the first round of protocol interaction, which improvesthe efficiency of the protocol, and prevent the server from malicious attacks effectively.Finally, the analysis results show that the protocol is SK-secure in CK model, whichachieves data confidentiality, integrity and non-repudiation.
2. The OSD and SAN have their own disadvantage in the construction of massstorage system. Then, a network storage system based on the Public Key Infrastructurewas proposed. The user is identified and maintained by the CA. Such system will realizeauthentication and issue capabilities in different servers, which can improve theexpansibility and the bottleneck of the server for the original system. At the same time,a secure storage network protocol for the new system was proposed and analyzed byusing CK model. The results show that the new system has high bandwidth, low latency,expansibility, large-scale, high security and low cost, which is suitable for mass storagesystem.
3. Merging a variety of network storage systems is an economical and practicalmethod, but it also brings some new security issues. Then, a scheme for merging SAN and NASD into a new network storage system was proposed. Such system has highbandwidth, expansibility, large-scale, which is suitable for mass storage system. Thestorage system of multi-domain is merged by the distributed security storagearchitecture based on the identity. At the same time, a secure trusted storage networkprotocol for the new system was proposed. Such protocol is composed of twosub-network protocols, trusted access protocol and secure channel protocol. Finally, theCK model is used to analyze the security of the protocol. The results show that the newnetwork storage system will be secure if SAN and NASD are secure.
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