非公平规避性质探究：经理人报酬契约有效性实验研究
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摘要
激励理论是当代经济学和管理学的核心和研究重点,已有传统的委托-代理理论在自利假设下构建了一套系统的激励理论的分析框架,然而低业绩报酬敏感性等诸多激励悖论的出现使我们不得不重新审视经典的委托-代理模型,尝试用心理学规律来弱化理论的理想假设,并寻求拓展理论模型的行为博弈方法。大量的研究结果表明人们在自利之外还存在普遍非公平规避心理偏好,非公平规避理论解释了许多传统激励理论无法解释的现象,而如何将非公平规避因子合理引入传统的委托-代理模型、构建行为委托-代理理论的分析框架已成为该领域研究工作的重点和难点,显然发掘非公平规避的性质特征对开辟行为委托-代理理论研究的新视角具有重要意义。
本文以行为经济学、实验经济学、行为博弈理论和委托-代理理论为指导,以我国市场中对企业绩效有着至关重要影响的经理人这一特殊群体为研究对象,通过实施参照依赖实验、独裁博弈实验、最后通牒博弈实验、抽彩赌博法、模型推演和实验室可控动态博弈联机委托-代理实验,探索了非公平规避的性质,考察了非公平规避与风险规避的关系,解决了非公平规避因子引入传统委托-代理模型的合理性问题,验证了行为委托-代理模型均衡解的有效性。
本文的主要研究成果如下：
1.发掘了非公平规避的内在性质
通过设计、实施参照依赖实验,发现人们的嫉妒偏好和自豪偏好均呈现出先敏感性递减,经过拐点后敏感性递增的特征,嫉妒偏好与自豪偏好几乎具有相同的拐点特征；同情偏好呈现敏感性递减的特征,不存在拐点；三者的边际效用不等,嫉妒偏好表现最为陡峭,同情偏好表现最为平缓,嫉妒偏好的边际效用几乎是同情偏好边际效用的10倍,而自豪偏好的边际效用几乎是同情偏好边际效用的2倍。
2.发现了不利的非公平规避与风险态度显著相关的证据
实施修改后的独裁博弈、最后通牒博弈实验和抽彩赌博法测度了被试的有利的非公平规避、不利的非公平规避和风险态度,发现人们的风险规避与不利的非公平规避显著正相关,相关系数为0.51,即风险规避较强的人,表现出较高的嫉妒偏好水平；而风险规避与有利的非公平规避不存在显著相关；嫉妒偏好与同情偏好之间不存在显著相关,嫉妒偏好并不总是大于同情偏好。
3.将非公平规避因子合理引入传统委托-代理模型并分析了模型的均衡解
将有利的非公平规避和不利的非公平规避分别单独引入标准的委托-代理模型,通过模型数理推导,发现无论在对称信息下还是在非对称信息下,嫉妒偏好对最优产出分享比例、固定工资、委托人期望效用都产生重要影响；在锦标机制下,当代理人的工资结构和受监控力度一定时,代理人最优效率努力水平随风险规避的增加而减小,随嫉妒偏好的增大而增大,随同情偏好的增加而减小。
4.实施不同风险规避下非公平规避经理人的实验室动态联机委托-代理博弈实验,验证了模型最优解的有效性
运用z-Tree实验经济学软件操控实验室可控实验,考察了在不同风险规避度和非公平规避度的组合下,参与人选择理论最优解的显著性,实验结果显示股东在95%水平的置信区间显著的选择了理论最优的薪酬合同,经理人在95%水平的置信区间显著的选择了理论最优的努力水平,而且他们在95%水平的置信区间显著的同时选择了理论最优的薪酬合同和努力水平；实验中股东和经理人表现出较强的学习效应。
Incentive theory is the core and research priorities of the contemporary economics and management. The existing traditional principal-agent theory constructed a system of incentive theory analysis framework based on self-interest assumption, but results of the low sensitivity between compensation and performance and many other incentive paradox make us have to re-examine the classic principal agent model, and try to use the law of psychological theory to weaken the ideal assumptions to seek behavioral game approach that develops the theoretical model. Lots of research shows people are generally inequity-averse besides self-interest, and the inequity-averse theory explains a lot of phenomena while traditional incentive theory could not. But how to pull the inequity-averse factor in the traditional principal-agent theory, construct behavioral principal-agent theory analysis framework have become the focus and difficulty in the study of this field. Obviously, discovering the characteristics of inequity-averse has a great significance to open up a new perspective for the study of the behavioral principal-agent theory.
Under the guidance of behavioral economics, experimental economics, behavioral game theory and principal-agent theory, using this special group of managers who have a critical impact on business performance In our markets as the research object, through implementing reference-dependent experiment, dictator game experiment, ultimatum game experiment, lottery questions, model deduction and laboratory controlled dynamic online principal-agent game experiments, this thesis explores the characteristics of inequity-averse, investigates the relation between inequity-averse and risk attitude, solves the problem of rationality of pulling the inequity-averse factor in the traditional principal-agent model and verifies the validity of behavioral principal-agent model's equilibrium solution.
Main research results in this paper are listed here.
1. Explore the internal qualities of inequity aversion.
Through designing and implementing reference-dependent experiment, we find disadvantage inequity-averse and pride preference both show a decreased sensitivity to the first, and then show a increased sensitivity after a turning point, and jealousy preference disadvantage inequity-averse and pride preference almost have the same Inflection point feature. Advantage inequity-averse shows a decreased sensitivity and has no any turning point. The three marginal utilities differ from each other, and disadvantage inequity-averse is the most steep while advantage inequity-averse is the most gentle. The marginal utility of disadvantage inequity-averse is almost10times that of advantage inequity-averse, and pride preference's marginal utility is almost2times that of advantage inequity-averse.
2. Find the evidence that disadvantage inequity-averse is significantly associated with risk-averse.
We measure the advantage inequity-averse, disadvantage inequity-averse and risk attitude of the subjects by implementing dictator game, ultimatum game and lottery questions. Then we find people's risk-averse is significantly associated with their disadvantage inequity-averse, and the correlation is0.51, that is, people who show stronger risk-averse show higher disadvantage inequity-averse. While risk-averse is not significantly associated with advantage inequity-averse, and disadvantage inequity-averse is not significantly associated with advantage inequity-averse, and disadvantage inequity-averse is not always greater than advantage inequity-averse.
3. Pull inequity-averse factor in traditional principal-agent model in reason and analyze the equilibrium solution.
We pull disadvantage inequity-averse and advantage inequity-averse in the classic principal-agent model separately, and find whether under the symmetric information or under asymmetric information, disadvantage inequity-averse has an important impact to optimal output sharing rate, fixed wage and the principal's expected utility by the mathematical deduction. Under championship mechanism, when the agent's wage structure and monitoring efforts keep constant, the agent's optimal efficiency level of effort decreases with the increase in risk-averse, increases with the increase in disadvantage inequity-averse, decreases with the increase in advantage inequity-averse.
4. Implement laboratory controlled dynamic online principal-agent game experiments about the agent with inequity-averse under different risk-averse level and verify the validity of the optimal solution.
We use z-Tree experimental economics software to control laboratory controlled experiments, and under the combination of different degree of risk-averse and disadvantage inequity-averse, investigate the significance of subjects choosing the optimal solution. Experiment results show shareholders significantly choose the optimal theoretical compensation contract at95%level of confidence interval, and managers significantly choose the optimal theoretical effort at95%level of confidence interval, and they simultaneously significantly choose the optimal theoretical compensation contract and he optimal theoretical effort at95%level of confidence interval.Moreover, shareholders and managers behave a strong learning effect in our experiment.
本文以行为经济学、实验经济学、行为博弈理论和委托-代理理论为指导,以我国市场中对企业绩效有着至关重要影响的经理人这一特殊群体为研究对象,通过实施参照依赖实验、独裁博弈实验、最后通牒博弈实验、抽彩赌博法、模型推演和实验室可控动态博弈联机委托-代理实验,探索了非公平规避的性质,考察了非公平规避与风险规避的关系,解决了非公平规避因子引入传统委托-代理模型的合理性问题,验证了行为委托-代理模型均衡解的有效性。
本文的主要研究成果如下：
1.发掘了非公平规避的内在性质
通过设计、实施参照依赖实验,发现人们的嫉妒偏好和自豪偏好均呈现出先敏感性递减,经过拐点后敏感性递增的特征,嫉妒偏好与自豪偏好几乎具有相同的拐点特征；同情偏好呈现敏感性递减的特征,不存在拐点；三者的边际效用不等,嫉妒偏好表现最为陡峭,同情偏好表现最为平缓,嫉妒偏好的边际效用几乎是同情偏好边际效用的10倍,而自豪偏好的边际效用几乎是同情偏好边际效用的2倍。
2.发现了不利的非公平规避与风险态度显著相关的证据
实施修改后的独裁博弈、最后通牒博弈实验和抽彩赌博法测度了被试的有利的非公平规避、不利的非公平规避和风险态度,发现人们的风险规避与不利的非公平规避显著正相关,相关系数为0.51,即风险规避较强的人,表现出较高的嫉妒偏好水平；而风险规避与有利的非公平规避不存在显著相关；嫉妒偏好与同情偏好之间不存在显著相关,嫉妒偏好并不总是大于同情偏好。
3.将非公平规避因子合理引入传统委托-代理模型并分析了模型的均衡解
将有利的非公平规避和不利的非公平规避分别单独引入标准的委托-代理模型,通过模型数理推导,发现无论在对称信息下还是在非对称信息下,嫉妒偏好对最优产出分享比例、固定工资、委托人期望效用都产生重要影响；在锦标机制下,当代理人的工资结构和受监控力度一定时,代理人最优效率努力水平随风险规避的增加而减小,随嫉妒偏好的增大而增大,随同情偏好的增加而减小。
4.实施不同风险规避下非公平规避经理人的实验室动态联机委托-代理博弈实验,验证了模型最优解的有效性
运用z-Tree实验经济学软件操控实验室可控实验,考察了在不同风险规避度和非公平规避度的组合下,参与人选择理论最优解的显著性,实验结果显示股东在95%水平的置信区间显著的选择了理论最优的薪酬合同,经理人在95%水平的置信区间显著的选择了理论最优的努力水平,而且他们在95%水平的置信区间显著的同时选择了理论最优的薪酬合同和努力水平；实验中股东和经理人表现出较强的学习效应。
Incentive theory is the core and research priorities of the contemporary economics and management. The existing traditional principal-agent theory constructed a system of incentive theory analysis framework based on self-interest assumption, but results of the low sensitivity between compensation and performance and many other incentive paradox make us have to re-examine the classic principal agent model, and try to use the law of psychological theory to weaken the ideal assumptions to seek behavioral game approach that develops the theoretical model. Lots of research shows people are generally inequity-averse besides self-interest, and the inequity-averse theory explains a lot of phenomena while traditional incentive theory could not. But how to pull the inequity-averse factor in the traditional principal-agent theory, construct behavioral principal-agent theory analysis framework have become the focus and difficulty in the study of this field. Obviously, discovering the characteristics of inequity-averse has a great significance to open up a new perspective for the study of the behavioral principal-agent theory.
Under the guidance of behavioral economics, experimental economics, behavioral game theory and principal-agent theory, using this special group of managers who have a critical impact on business performance In our markets as the research object, through implementing reference-dependent experiment, dictator game experiment, ultimatum game experiment, lottery questions, model deduction and laboratory controlled dynamic online principal-agent game experiments, this thesis explores the characteristics of inequity-averse, investigates the relation between inequity-averse and risk attitude, solves the problem of rationality of pulling the inequity-averse factor in the traditional principal-agent model and verifies the validity of behavioral principal-agent model's equilibrium solution.
Main research results in this paper are listed here.
1. Explore the internal qualities of inequity aversion.
Through designing and implementing reference-dependent experiment, we find disadvantage inequity-averse and pride preference both show a decreased sensitivity to the first, and then show a increased sensitivity after a turning point, and jealousy preference disadvantage inequity-averse and pride preference almost have the same Inflection point feature. Advantage inequity-averse shows a decreased sensitivity and has no any turning point. The three marginal utilities differ from each other, and disadvantage inequity-averse is the most steep while advantage inequity-averse is the most gentle. The marginal utility of disadvantage inequity-averse is almost10times that of advantage inequity-averse, and pride preference's marginal utility is almost2times that of advantage inequity-averse.
2. Find the evidence that disadvantage inequity-averse is significantly associated with risk-averse.
We measure the advantage inequity-averse, disadvantage inequity-averse and risk attitude of the subjects by implementing dictator game, ultimatum game and lottery questions. Then we find people's risk-averse is significantly associated with their disadvantage inequity-averse, and the correlation is0.51, that is, people who show stronger risk-averse show higher disadvantage inequity-averse. While risk-averse is not significantly associated with advantage inequity-averse, and disadvantage inequity-averse is not significantly associated with advantage inequity-averse, and disadvantage inequity-averse is not always greater than advantage inequity-averse.
3. Pull inequity-averse factor in traditional principal-agent model in reason and analyze the equilibrium solution.
We pull disadvantage inequity-averse and advantage inequity-averse in the classic principal-agent model separately, and find whether under the symmetric information or under asymmetric information, disadvantage inequity-averse has an important impact to optimal output sharing rate, fixed wage and the principal's expected utility by the mathematical deduction. Under championship mechanism, when the agent's wage structure and monitoring efforts keep constant, the agent's optimal efficiency level of effort decreases with the increase in risk-averse, increases with the increase in disadvantage inequity-averse, decreases with the increase in advantage inequity-averse.
4. Implement laboratory controlled dynamic online principal-agent game experiments about the agent with inequity-averse under different risk-averse level and verify the validity of the optimal solution.
We use z-Tree experimental economics software to control laboratory controlled experiments, and under the combination of different degree of risk-averse and disadvantage inequity-averse, investigate the significance of subjects choosing the optimal solution. Experiment results show shareholders significantly choose the optimal theoretical compensation contract at95%level of confidence interval, and managers significantly choose the optimal theoretical effort at95%level of confidence interval, and they simultaneously significantly choose the optimal theoretical compensation contract and he optimal theoretical effort at95%level of confidence interval.Moreover, shareholders and managers behave a strong learning effect in our experiment.
引文
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