制度效应与控股股东支持行为研究
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摘要
控股股东支持行为是近年来公司金融研究的热点领域之一。在最初的相关研究框架下,控股股东支持(propping)是指弱法律保护环境下控股股东为帮助上市公司应对不利的经济冲击向其输送利益的行为,目的是为了提升上市公司业绩避免其违约、退市或破产,由于与控股股东的掏空行为方向相反,因此也被称为负掏空(negative tunneling)。但是,国外文献主要依赖于对新兴市场经济国家的法律环境与制度的先验分类,因而具有一定的局限性。国内学者基于制度层面系统地对我国上市公司控股股东支持行为的考察也还比较薄弱。我国新兴加转轨的制度环境与证券市场实践为我们从制度矩阵视角系统地研究我国上市公司控股股东支持行为提供了天然的场景。
论文首先阐明了研究的背景和意义,确立了本文的研究思路和研究框架。接着,对与本文研究主题相关的文献进行了梳理与评述,既为论文创新方向的突破奠定了文献基础,同时也为本文实证研究主要变量的测度方法、实证检验模型及控制变量的合理选择找到了研究依据。其次,从现代公司契约理论、控股股东行为理论与内部资本市场理论等方面夯实了本文的主要理论基础,沿着Berle和Means开创的LLSV发展的研究主线,分析了现代公司代理问题的研究范式与内容的演化。此外,对我国证券市场股票发审制度、ST制度等进行了总结,这为后面的研究作了制度背景铺垫。这些制度安排使得上市资格成为一种有价值的“壳”资源,我国上市公司的大股东控制与“一股独大”的特征正是控股股东各种行为得以存在的客观条件。
然后,在对相关文献和理论进行了系统回顾和分析的基础上,以我国证券市场上市公司近年的数据为基础,按照“制度—行为”的逻辑主线,运用单变量检验方法、普通最小二乘法、变量交互效应检验模型及二阶段最小二乘法等多种计量模型与案例研究方法,基于大制度分析框架论证了政治制度对控股股东支持行为有外部干预效应、证券市场制度对控股股东支持行为有机会主义效应及企业制度对控股股东支持行为有内部寻租效应,证明了企业集团形式有外部制度的替代效果与内部资本的配置作用。本文侧重于“制度影响行为”的效应分析,研究结论有一定的理论价值与现实指导意义。
本文主要的理论与实证研究结论如下：
从理论上分析政府作用的两种观点——发展观和政治观出发,实证结果证实了控股股东支持行为中存在政府干预效应。分样本检验结果表明不同控股股东产权性质下的结果有一定差异,冗员率与上市公司的中央国有控股股东支持的正相关不显著,GDP、金融市场变量与上市公司的民营控股股东支持的相关性不显著,而所有解释变量与上市公司的地方政府控股股东支持都存在显著相关性。
由于公司控股股东在股权再融资中有巨大的潜在利益,因此,控股股东有支持上市公司盈余管理的动机,也正是基于获得再融资机会的考虑,所以支持性盈余管理是一种机会主义支持。实证结果证实了控股股东的“支持性盈余管理”假说和“机会主义支持”假说。
为避免失去上市资格以及防止集团内财务危机的扩散,控股股东有支持财务困境公司脱困的激励。实证研究表明,ST状态与控股股东支持性资产重组频率显著正相关,并且与资产收购、资产剥离、资产转换与债务重组显著正相关；由于控股股东“保壳”动机的存在,集团控股股东能够通过内部资本市场对集团内ST公司进行支持帮助其脱困,因此企业集团具有盈余溢出效应。
上市公司经理游说能力影响控股股东支持行为。本文从经理在企业服务的时间、任总经理的时间和担任集团或控股股东单位职务情况等四个方面构建了经理游说能力指数,实证结果表明,经理游说能力的相对指数值越大,则经理的游说能力相对于其他成员公司的经理越强,从而对集团控股股东的支持行为和资源配置影响越大。
集团控股股东通过内部资本市场支持成员企业的创新研发。从新兴市场经济体的企业集团在创新中的制度替代与组织作用这一现实出发,实证研究发现,集团控制型民营高科技上市公司R&D投入对现金流具有敏感性,而对外部股权融资不敏感；在受到现金流约束时,企业集团内部资本市场为成员企业获得更多的财务资源起到基础制度作用；集团内上市公司R&D投入随着所获取的内部资金的增加而增加,集团控股股东对成员企业的资金支持会随着所有权的上升而增加。
最后,本文指出新兴市场的政府干预应注重解决分配公平问题和缔约自由,同时要注意防范上市公司在成长过程中对控股股东支持的路径依赖与内部资本市场的搭便车问题。
The controlling shareholder's propping is one of the most hot areas of research on corporate financial in recent years. In the initial research framework, propping may be an important part of how firms operate in countries with weak legal environments and propping occurs when there is a negative shock to themacroeconomy. Purpose is to enhance the performance of listed companies to avoid default, delisting or bankruptcy, the controlling shareholder prop up companies in the opposite direction with tunneling; it is also known as negative tunneling, so tunneling and propping are basically symmetric behaviors.However, foreign literatures have certain limitations due to entirely dependence on a priori classification about the legal environments and institutions of emerging markets.Domestic researchs on controlling shareholders'propping of listed companies in China based on the institutional level are still relatively weak. China's emerging and transitional institutional environment and securities practice provide a natural scene for us to examine the propping behaviour from the perspective of institutions matrix.
Firstly, this paper clarifies the background and significance, and establishes a framework for ideas and research. Then, with this analysis and comments on the literature relevant to the subject, this paper find foundation for the innovation, but slso defines measurement methods of the main varibles, empirical model and control variables. Secondly, from the modern corporate contract theory, behavioral theory of the controlling shareholder and the internal capital market theory and other aspects reinforces the main theoretical basis of this article, along the the main line of research Berle and Means pioneered LLSV developed, analyzes research paradigm and content evolution of the company's agency problems. In addition, summarizes share-issue and ST regulation in China's securities market, which made the background for the study. These institutional arrangements made listing become a valuable "shell" resources, China's major shareholders control of listed companies and "dominance" is the objective conditions for controlling shareholder's behavior existing.
Then, this paper makes empirical analysis based on China's stock market listed companies data in recent years, according to the logic of the system-behavior, using univariate testing methods, OLS, variable interaction effect of test model and TSLS and other kinds of econometric models and case study methods,from large institutional analysis framework demonstrates the external intervention effects of the political institution, the stock market institution for opportunistic effects and effects of rent-seeking of internal stucture on the controlling shareholder propping, confirms that the business group acts as a substitute for external institution and plays a role of internal capital allocation. This paper focuses on the behavioral effects of the institutional analysis, and research findings have some theoretical value and practical significance.
Through theoretical and empirical research, this paper obtaimed the following conclusions:
To begin with theoretical analysis of the role of government from two perspectives-political and development concept, empirical results show that the existence of government intervention effects on controlling shareholders to prop. Sub-sample test results show that the different property rights nature of controlling shareholders results in some differences, the positive correlation between overstaffing and the state-owned controlling shareholder propping is not significant, and the correlation between GDP, financial market variables and the private controlling shareholders propping not significant, and there is a significant correlation between all explanatory variables and the local government controlling shareholders propping.
As the controlling shareholder has a huge potential benefit in the equity refinancing. Therefore, the controlling shareholders has the motivation of propping up earnings management, is also based on, so the propping of earnings management is opportunistic due to consideration of the opportunity to reissue. Empirical results confirm the controlling shareholders'propping up earnings management hypothesis and opportunistic propping hypothesis.
To avoid losing listing status and to prevent the spread of financial crisis within the group, the controlling shareholder has incentives to prop up the turnaround of affiliates in distress. Empirical results show the correlation between ST status and assets recombination frequency is significant, and also asset acquisitions, divestitures, debt restructuring, asset conversion. As the controlling shareholders'shell-protection motivation exists, the controlling shareholder through internal capital markets within the group to rescue the company, socalled a surplus spillover effects in business group.
Manager lobbying power influence behavior of controlling shareholders. This paper constructs manager lobbying power index based on following information:tenure, time-in-position, whether the manager is listed as one of firm's executives, and membership on the firm's board of directors. The empirical results show that the larger managers lobbying, the stronger the manager lobbying power relative to other members, and thus the greater impact on propping of the controlling shareholder of the group and the allocation of resources.
To begin with function of substitute for innovation institution in emerging markets and organizational role business group plays, empirical study shows that R&D investment in group-controlled private high-tech listed companies is sensitive to cash flow and insensitive to external equity financing; By cash flow constraints internal capital market for affiliates to obtain more financial resources play a fundamental role in the system; Listed companies within the business group R&D investment with internal funds obtained increases, the controlling shareholder proping will increase with the rise in ownership.
Finally, this paper points out that government intervention inemerging markets should focus on distributive justice and contracting freedom, it should be noticed that the path dependence on propping from controlling shareholder for listed companies in the process of growing and the free-rider problem in internal capital market.
论文首先阐明了研究的背景和意义,确立了本文的研究思路和研究框架。接着,对与本文研究主题相关的文献进行了梳理与评述,既为论文创新方向的突破奠定了文献基础,同时也为本文实证研究主要变量的测度方法、实证检验模型及控制变量的合理选择找到了研究依据。其次,从现代公司契约理论、控股股东行为理论与内部资本市场理论等方面夯实了本文的主要理论基础,沿着Berle和Means开创的LLSV发展的研究主线,分析了现代公司代理问题的研究范式与内容的演化。此外,对我国证券市场股票发审制度、ST制度等进行了总结,这为后面的研究作了制度背景铺垫。这些制度安排使得上市资格成为一种有价值的“壳”资源,我国上市公司的大股东控制与“一股独大”的特征正是控股股东各种行为得以存在的客观条件。
然后,在对相关文献和理论进行了系统回顾和分析的基础上,以我国证券市场上市公司近年的数据为基础,按照“制度—行为”的逻辑主线,运用单变量检验方法、普通最小二乘法、变量交互效应检验模型及二阶段最小二乘法等多种计量模型与案例研究方法,基于大制度分析框架论证了政治制度对控股股东支持行为有外部干预效应、证券市场制度对控股股东支持行为有机会主义效应及企业制度对控股股东支持行为有内部寻租效应,证明了企业集团形式有外部制度的替代效果与内部资本的配置作用。本文侧重于“制度影响行为”的效应分析,研究结论有一定的理论价值与现实指导意义。
本文主要的理论与实证研究结论如下：
从理论上分析政府作用的两种观点——发展观和政治观出发,实证结果证实了控股股东支持行为中存在政府干预效应。分样本检验结果表明不同控股股东产权性质下的结果有一定差异,冗员率与上市公司的中央国有控股股东支持的正相关不显著,GDP、金融市场变量与上市公司的民营控股股东支持的相关性不显著,而所有解释变量与上市公司的地方政府控股股东支持都存在显著相关性。
由于公司控股股东在股权再融资中有巨大的潜在利益,因此,控股股东有支持上市公司盈余管理的动机,也正是基于获得再融资机会的考虑,所以支持性盈余管理是一种机会主义支持。实证结果证实了控股股东的“支持性盈余管理”假说和“机会主义支持”假说。
为避免失去上市资格以及防止集团内财务危机的扩散,控股股东有支持财务困境公司脱困的激励。实证研究表明,ST状态与控股股东支持性资产重组频率显著正相关,并且与资产收购、资产剥离、资产转换与债务重组显著正相关；由于控股股东“保壳”动机的存在,集团控股股东能够通过内部资本市场对集团内ST公司进行支持帮助其脱困,因此企业集团具有盈余溢出效应。
上市公司经理游说能力影响控股股东支持行为。本文从经理在企业服务的时间、任总经理的时间和担任集团或控股股东单位职务情况等四个方面构建了经理游说能力指数,实证结果表明,经理游说能力的相对指数值越大,则经理的游说能力相对于其他成员公司的经理越强,从而对集团控股股东的支持行为和资源配置影响越大。
集团控股股东通过内部资本市场支持成员企业的创新研发。从新兴市场经济体的企业集团在创新中的制度替代与组织作用这一现实出发,实证研究发现,集团控制型民营高科技上市公司R&D投入对现金流具有敏感性,而对外部股权融资不敏感；在受到现金流约束时,企业集团内部资本市场为成员企业获得更多的财务资源起到基础制度作用；集团内上市公司R&D投入随着所获取的内部资金的增加而增加,集团控股股东对成员企业的资金支持会随着所有权的上升而增加。
最后,本文指出新兴市场的政府干预应注重解决分配公平问题和缔约自由,同时要注意防范上市公司在成长过程中对控股股东支持的路径依赖与内部资本市场的搭便车问题。
The controlling shareholder's propping is one of the most hot areas of research on corporate financial in recent years. In the initial research framework, propping may be an important part of how firms operate in countries with weak legal environments and propping occurs when there is a negative shock to themacroeconomy. Purpose is to enhance the performance of listed companies to avoid default, delisting or bankruptcy, the controlling shareholder prop up companies in the opposite direction with tunneling; it is also known as negative tunneling, so tunneling and propping are basically symmetric behaviors.However, foreign literatures have certain limitations due to entirely dependence on a priori classification about the legal environments and institutions of emerging markets.Domestic researchs on controlling shareholders'propping of listed companies in China based on the institutional level are still relatively weak. China's emerging and transitional institutional environment and securities practice provide a natural scene for us to examine the propping behaviour from the perspective of institutions matrix.
Firstly, this paper clarifies the background and significance, and establishes a framework for ideas and research. Then, with this analysis and comments on the literature relevant to the subject, this paper find foundation for the innovation, but slso defines measurement methods of the main varibles, empirical model and control variables. Secondly, from the modern corporate contract theory, behavioral theory of the controlling shareholder and the internal capital market theory and other aspects reinforces the main theoretical basis of this article, along the the main line of research Berle and Means pioneered LLSV developed, analyzes research paradigm and content evolution of the company's agency problems. In addition, summarizes share-issue and ST regulation in China's securities market, which made the background for the study. These institutional arrangements made listing become a valuable "shell" resources, China's major shareholders control of listed companies and "dominance" is the objective conditions for controlling shareholder's behavior existing.
Then, this paper makes empirical analysis based on China's stock market listed companies data in recent years, according to the logic of the system-behavior, using univariate testing methods, OLS, variable interaction effect of test model and TSLS and other kinds of econometric models and case study methods,from large institutional analysis framework demonstrates the external intervention effects of the political institution, the stock market institution for opportunistic effects and effects of rent-seeking of internal stucture on the controlling shareholder propping, confirms that the business group acts as a substitute for external institution and plays a role of internal capital allocation. This paper focuses on the behavioral effects of the institutional analysis, and research findings have some theoretical value and practical significance.
Through theoretical and empirical research, this paper obtaimed the following conclusions:
To begin with theoretical analysis of the role of government from two perspectives-political and development concept, empirical results show that the existence of government intervention effects on controlling shareholders to prop. Sub-sample test results show that the different property rights nature of controlling shareholders results in some differences, the positive correlation between overstaffing and the state-owned controlling shareholder propping is not significant, and the correlation between GDP, financial market variables and the private controlling shareholders propping not significant, and there is a significant correlation between all explanatory variables and the local government controlling shareholders propping.
As the controlling shareholder has a huge potential benefit in the equity refinancing. Therefore, the controlling shareholders has the motivation of propping up earnings management, is also based on, so the propping of earnings management is opportunistic due to consideration of the opportunity to reissue. Empirical results confirm the controlling shareholders'propping up earnings management hypothesis and opportunistic propping hypothesis.
To avoid losing listing status and to prevent the spread of financial crisis within the group, the controlling shareholder has incentives to prop up the turnaround of affiliates in distress. Empirical results show the correlation between ST status and assets recombination frequency is significant, and also asset acquisitions, divestitures, debt restructuring, asset conversion. As the controlling shareholders'shell-protection motivation exists, the controlling shareholder through internal capital markets within the group to rescue the company, socalled a surplus spillover effects in business group.
Manager lobbying power influence behavior of controlling shareholders. This paper constructs manager lobbying power index based on following information:tenure, time-in-position, whether the manager is listed as one of firm's executives, and membership on the firm's board of directors. The empirical results show that the larger managers lobbying, the stronger the manager lobbying power relative to other members, and thus the greater impact on propping of the controlling shareholder of the group and the allocation of resources.
To begin with function of substitute for innovation institution in emerging markets and organizational role business group plays, empirical study shows that R&D investment in group-controlled private high-tech listed companies is sensitive to cash flow and insensitive to external equity financing; By cash flow constraints internal capital market for affiliates to obtain more financial resources play a fundamental role in the system; Listed companies within the business group R&D investment with internal funds obtained increases, the controlling shareholder proping will increase with the rise in ownership.
Finally, this paper points out that government intervention inemerging markets should focus on distributive justice and contracting freedom, it should be noticed that the path dependence on propping from controlling shareholder for listed companies in the process of growing and the free-rider problem in internal capital market.
引文
①[美]阿道夫A伯利、加德纳C米恩斯：《现代公司与私有财产》第127-128页,商务印书馆2005年版。
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