商品供应链中零售商逆向控制研究
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摘要
在建立市场经济体制的过程中,我国的零供关系发生了重大变化,零售商的逆向控制行为逐渐增强。零售商在供应链中逐渐占据主导地位,是计划经济向市场经济转轨和卖方市场向买方市场转变的结果。同时,由于零售商不断回收营销要素的控制权,而使得这种转变具有必然性。借助于这一基础,零售商开始对上游的供应商实施逆向控制。尽管国家采取了立法与规范市场等诸多措施,但并没有出现供零矛盾缓和的迹象。本文就商品供应链中零售商的逆向控制问题进行了专门研究,认为这种现象的出现具有深厚的背景和基础,这也使得本文的研究具有极强的现实意义和理论意义。
本文界定和阐述了逆向控制的基本涵义、实施途径和形成机理,并运用新产业组织理论中的实证方法测度了我国供零行业的市场势力。具体而言,逆向控制是由于零售商具有了一定的市场势力而对上游制造商(供应商)形成的一定程度的影响力和制约能力,其实施途径主要是依靠纵向约束手段和自有品牌营销策略。本文结合加尔布雷斯假说和抗衡势力理论,具体测度了我国供零行业的市场势力。分析结果表明,零售商的溢价达到27%左右,而供应商仅有0.94%,即零售商相对于供应商拥有了相对市场势力。零售商的这种市场势力挤压了供应商的利润和定价偏离边际成本的能力,这即是抗衡势力和逆向控制的体现。
本文还运用现代分析方法特别是博弈论的方法剖析了相关行为可能带来的福利变化。具体来说,主要是从通道费和自有品牌营销这两个方面进行了分析。在收取通道费方面,阐述了通道费产生的原因、定义及其现实存在的形式,然后根据隐藏行动的道德风险模型得出了通道费的最优量,并在此基础上分三种情况讨论了净福利的变化,即零售商有买方势力而无卖方势力；零售商有买方势力且卖方势力；双边垄断。从分析结果看,三种情况下的福利变化并不一致。本文还以国美电器为案例分析了通道费收取的效应,从而与现实产生一定的对照。在自有品牌营销方面,结合自有品牌的定义,分析了零售商经营自有品牌的优势与策略,然后用屈臣氏为案例分析了该种行为下所产生的影响。
在零售商对供应商实施逆向控制的过程中,零售商是否因此获得更高收益而供应商则受损是不可回避且至关重要的问题。本文采用财务报表的分析方法,具体分析了部分上市的零售和供应公司近年的财务报表,从盈利能力、负债能力、获利能力、变现能力四个方面就此进行了对比和分析。结果显示,在各个方面,都存在着供应商比零售商盈利能力弱的问题；同时,供应商之间实力相差较大,但整体情况较零售商弱。除此之外,本文还分析了零售企业的规模经济状况,计量结果也显示零售商的确运用了规模经济优势,因此零售商之间的兼并和重组势必将进一步扩大其实施逆向控制的基础和能力。
针对零售商对供应商实施逆向控制问题,本文提出了以《反垄断法》及其他相关法律为核心的政府规制措施,并将其进一步具体化为构建有序竞争格局与推广关系营销这两种对策。在构建有序竞争格局方面,要规范通道费的收取,密切关注零售行业重组尤其是外资零售商的兼并重组,培育本土化大型零售企业。在推广关系营销方面,要着眼于构筑长期稳定连续的合作关系,营造多赢局面,最终将供零博弈转化为供零合作。
In the process of building market economy, the relationship between suppliers and retailers experiences great change that retailers have increased its ability to implement converse controlling. The trend that retailers dominate the supply chain is the invariably outcome. At the same time, this trend was enhanced by the retailers reclaim the control of marketing factors. Depending on this basis, retailers start to implement converse controlling. Although the government has taken amount of measures such as acting the laws and drawing many policies to regulate the market, this contradiction between retailers and suppliers was not alleviated. This essay takes the converse controlling as the analyses object and supposes the phenomenon that retailer dominates the supply chain is the natural result of the transition from planned economy to market economy, which makes this research got fully operation significance and theory significance.
This article elucidates and definite the basic meaning of converse controlling and its implementing way and operating mechanism. In addition, the paper measures the market power of suppliers and retailers. Concretely speaking, converse controlling is the retailers influence the suppliers depending on the market power, which involves three basic meanings----it is just a counteraction in nature which has inevitability and negative influence. Combined with Galbraith Hypotheses and competing power, the paper measures the market power of retailers and suppliers. The analyses shows the retailers'premiums is about27%while the suppliers' is0.94%, which means the retailers boast the comparative market power. The comparative market power abates the suppliers'net profit and its ability to determine the price. What's more, that reflects the competing power and converse controlling.
This paper also uses the modern economic analysis such as game theory which analyses the welfare change because of relative conduction. The empirical result prompts the further research of the Conduct of the converse controlling, especially through games technical explains the welfare changes of the related to act may result in.This article analyses two aspects:the and the marketing of the own brands.On the base of analysis the charge of the channels fee, the article profoundly clarify the reason、the definition and form of the reality exist, then under moral risk model of the hidden action gets the most cost-effective measure of the channels fee. On the base of all the contents, the article divides into three categories to discussed the net benefits:the retailers have the buyer influence power not the seller influence power; the retailers have the buyer influence power and the seller influence power; the bilateral monopoly. From the result of the analysis, three cases of change are not consistent. The article further analyses the effect of the channels fee as a contrast with the reality. On the base of analysis the marketing of the own brands, the article gives the relevant definition of the own brands,and analyze the advantages and strategies of the retailers.Then analysis the influence resulted by the sort of the behavior with Cases of the Watson.
In the analysis of the retailers'converse controlling, the problems of the retailers are therefore higher income and the suppliers are damaged inevitable and important problems. The article through analysis the financial statements, concretely analysis the past several years of financial statements of the part sale retail enterprises and suppliers, practice contrasts and analysis from the Profitability、the debt capacity、the Profitability and the liquidity and so on. All the results displays that the profitability of the suppliers weaker than the retailers. Also showed that the supplier have the big difference among themselves.Besides, the article especial analysis the scale economies of the retail businesses, the measurement result also shows the retailer is really use of the scale economic advantages, the mergers and restructuring of the retailers will expand its basis and power to implementation the reverse control.
In this paper, in allusion to the reverse control implemented by retailers to suppliers and based on Conclusions and related principles, government regulation measures with the core of Anti-monopoly Law and its related laws have been presented, which will been specified into two measures:constructing orderly competition and promoting relationship marketing. Constructing orderly competition include regulating collection of channels fee, giving close attention to merger and recombination of retail business especially foreign retailers, cultivating the large retail enterprise localization. Promoting relationship marketing include being focus on building long-term stability continuous relations of cooperation, creating multi-win situation, transferring retailers and suppliers game into retailers and suppliers cooperation.
本文界定和阐述了逆向控制的基本涵义、实施途径和形成机理,并运用新产业组织理论中的实证方法测度了我国供零行业的市场势力。具体而言,逆向控制是由于零售商具有了一定的市场势力而对上游制造商(供应商)形成的一定程度的影响力和制约能力,其实施途径主要是依靠纵向约束手段和自有品牌营销策略。本文结合加尔布雷斯假说和抗衡势力理论,具体测度了我国供零行业的市场势力。分析结果表明,零售商的溢价达到27%左右,而供应商仅有0.94%,即零售商相对于供应商拥有了相对市场势力。零售商的这种市场势力挤压了供应商的利润和定价偏离边际成本的能力,这即是抗衡势力和逆向控制的体现。
本文还运用现代分析方法特别是博弈论的方法剖析了相关行为可能带来的福利变化。具体来说,主要是从通道费和自有品牌营销这两个方面进行了分析。在收取通道费方面,阐述了通道费产生的原因、定义及其现实存在的形式,然后根据隐藏行动的道德风险模型得出了通道费的最优量,并在此基础上分三种情况讨论了净福利的变化,即零售商有买方势力而无卖方势力；零售商有买方势力且卖方势力；双边垄断。从分析结果看,三种情况下的福利变化并不一致。本文还以国美电器为案例分析了通道费收取的效应,从而与现实产生一定的对照。在自有品牌营销方面,结合自有品牌的定义,分析了零售商经营自有品牌的优势与策略,然后用屈臣氏为案例分析了该种行为下所产生的影响。
在零售商对供应商实施逆向控制的过程中,零售商是否因此获得更高收益而供应商则受损是不可回避且至关重要的问题。本文采用财务报表的分析方法,具体分析了部分上市的零售和供应公司近年的财务报表,从盈利能力、负债能力、获利能力、变现能力四个方面就此进行了对比和分析。结果显示,在各个方面,都存在着供应商比零售商盈利能力弱的问题；同时,供应商之间实力相差较大,但整体情况较零售商弱。除此之外,本文还分析了零售企业的规模经济状况,计量结果也显示零售商的确运用了规模经济优势,因此零售商之间的兼并和重组势必将进一步扩大其实施逆向控制的基础和能力。
针对零售商对供应商实施逆向控制问题,本文提出了以《反垄断法》及其他相关法律为核心的政府规制措施,并将其进一步具体化为构建有序竞争格局与推广关系营销这两种对策。在构建有序竞争格局方面,要规范通道费的收取,密切关注零售行业重组尤其是外资零售商的兼并重组,培育本土化大型零售企业。在推广关系营销方面,要着眼于构筑长期稳定连续的合作关系,营造多赢局面,最终将供零博弈转化为供零合作。
In the process of building market economy, the relationship between suppliers and retailers experiences great change that retailers have increased its ability to implement converse controlling. The trend that retailers dominate the supply chain is the invariably outcome. At the same time, this trend was enhanced by the retailers reclaim the control of marketing factors. Depending on this basis, retailers start to implement converse controlling. Although the government has taken amount of measures such as acting the laws and drawing many policies to regulate the market, this contradiction between retailers and suppliers was not alleviated. This essay takes the converse controlling as the analyses object and supposes the phenomenon that retailer dominates the supply chain is the natural result of the transition from planned economy to market economy, which makes this research got fully operation significance and theory significance.
This article elucidates and definite the basic meaning of converse controlling and its implementing way and operating mechanism. In addition, the paper measures the market power of suppliers and retailers. Concretely speaking, converse controlling is the retailers influence the suppliers depending on the market power, which involves three basic meanings----it is just a counteraction in nature which has inevitability and negative influence. Combined with Galbraith Hypotheses and competing power, the paper measures the market power of retailers and suppliers. The analyses shows the retailers'premiums is about27%while the suppliers' is0.94%, which means the retailers boast the comparative market power. The comparative market power abates the suppliers'net profit and its ability to determine the price. What's more, that reflects the competing power and converse controlling.
This paper also uses the modern economic analysis such as game theory which analyses the welfare change because of relative conduction. The empirical result prompts the further research of the Conduct of the converse controlling, especially through games technical explains the welfare changes of the related to act may result in.This article analyses two aspects:the and the marketing of the own brands.On the base of analysis the charge of the channels fee, the article profoundly clarify the reason、the definition and form of the reality exist, then under moral risk model of the hidden action gets the most cost-effective measure of the channels fee. On the base of all the contents, the article divides into three categories to discussed the net benefits:the retailers have the buyer influence power not the seller influence power; the retailers have the buyer influence power and the seller influence power; the bilateral monopoly. From the result of the analysis, three cases of change are not consistent. The article further analyses the effect of the channels fee as a contrast with the reality. On the base of analysis the marketing of the own brands, the article gives the relevant definition of the own brands,and analyze the advantages and strategies of the retailers.Then analysis the influence resulted by the sort of the behavior with Cases of the Watson.
In the analysis of the retailers'converse controlling, the problems of the retailers are therefore higher income and the suppliers are damaged inevitable and important problems. The article through analysis the financial statements, concretely analysis the past several years of financial statements of the part sale retail enterprises and suppliers, practice contrasts and analysis from the Profitability、the debt capacity、the Profitability and the liquidity and so on. All the results displays that the profitability of the suppliers weaker than the retailers. Also showed that the supplier have the big difference among themselves.Besides, the article especial analysis the scale economies of the retail businesses, the measurement result also shows the retailer is really use of the scale economic advantages, the mergers and restructuring of the retailers will expand its basis and power to implementation the reverse control.
In this paper, in allusion to the reverse control implemented by retailers to suppliers and based on Conclusions and related principles, government regulation measures with the core of Anti-monopoly Law and its related laws have been presented, which will been specified into two measures:constructing orderly competition and promoting relationship marketing. Constructing orderly competition include regulating collection of channels fee, giving close attention to merger and recombination of retail business especially foreign retailers, cultivating the large retail enterprise localization. Promoting relationship marketing include being focus on building long-term stability continuous relations of cooperation, creating multi-win situation, transferring retailers and suppliers game into retailers and suppliers cooperation.
引文
①马克思：《资本论》,人民出版社1975年版,第298页。
②斯蒂格勒把亚当·斯密的分工程度取决于市场范围的思想概括为斯密定理。见斯蒂格勒：《产业组织和政府管制》,上海人民出版社、上海三联书店1996年版,第22页。
①正是在卖方市场向买方市场转化的过程中,这种反作用被进一步放大,从而使得商业资本对产业资本具有了一定的控制能力,这也是本文所研究的逆向控制的根本来源。
②马克思：《资本论》,人民出版社1975年版,第305页。
①关于交换对生产反作用的分析,见马克思：《资本论》(第二卷),人民出版社1975年版,第十四、十五章。
①参见安德鲁·马斯一科莱尔、迈克尔·D.温斯顿、杰里·R.格林：《微观经济》(上),中国社会科学出版社2001年版,第187页。
①参见任建洲主编：《建立市场体系：30年市场化改革进程》,中国发展出版社2008年版,第342页。
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②斯蒂格勒把亚当·斯密的分工程度取决于市场范围的思想概括为斯密定理。见斯蒂格勒：《产业组织和政府管制》,上海人民出版社、上海三联书店1996年版,第22页。
①正是在卖方市场向买方市场转化的过程中,这种反作用被进一步放大,从而使得商业资本对产业资本具有了一定的控制能力,这也是本文所研究的逆向控制的根本来源。
②马克思：《资本论》,人民出版社1975年版,第305页。
①关于交换对生产反作用的分析,见马克思：《资本论》(第二卷),人民出版社1975年版,第十四、十五章。
①参见安德鲁·马斯一科莱尔、迈克尔·D.温斯顿、杰里·R.格林：《微观经济》(上),中国社会科学出版社2001年版,第187页。
①参见任建洲主编：《建立市场体系：30年市场化改革进程》,中国发展出版社2008年版,第342页。
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