季节性农产品供应链内部融资问题研究
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摘要
本文旨在研究供应链内部融资与季节性农产品发展的关系。在我国,农产品尤其是季节性农产品分散经营,农民独立决策,导致农产品市场波动剧烈。这种剧烈波动一方面增加了农民决策的风险,影响农民的种植积极性,致使农民收入增加缓慢,拉大城乡居民收入差距；另一方面农产品价格的剧烈波动不利于农产品供应链的稳定运行,削弱供应链的竞争力,影响整个国民经济的正常运行,进而影响我国农产品的国际竞争力。因此,探寻一种稳定农产品价格、降低农产品市场风险、平稳增加农民收入、稳定国民经济运行的农产品生产运营方式对农民、农业、农村和国民经济的发展至关重要。而以供应链内部融资为主导的农产品资金供给方式能够稳定农产品的供给,为农民提供稳定的资金来源,维持供应链的平稳运行,进而稳定农产品价格,带来农业的健康稳定发展。农业的稳健发展一方面增加了农民的收入,缩小城乡差距,促进社会和谐；另一方面也使以农产品为主要原料的相关产业健康发展,进而稳定物价水平,促进经济的持续健康发展。
从现实层面上看,目前我国季节性农产品资金的来源主要有正规资金和非正规资金。正规资金包括个人储蓄、银行贷款、政府补贴等,这些资金在部分农产品,尤其是政府扶持的农产品发展方面起到了很好的支持作用,但是我们也同时看到,受国家财政收支和经济政策的影响,这部分资金与农产品的发展并不同步,并不能完全满足季节性农产品快速发展的要求。非正规资金包括民间借贷、合会,各种基金会的融资、地下钱庄和典当业等方式,这些资金在一定范围内对一定区域的特定农产品的发展起到了很好的促进作用,但由于非正规资金的资本来源不明,逐利取向明显,往往会出现在某种农产品价格上涨时疯狂进入,以推高农产品价格牟取暴利,而在农产品价格下降时疯狂抛售,导致农产品价格下跌严重,所以非正规资金虽然能在一定程度上促进农业的发展,但这种发展实际上以增加农产品价格的剧烈波动为代价,而价格的剧烈波动对于农民、农业、农村经济的发展都是不利的。因此,为农产品寻找一种长久的、稳定的、完善的资金供给方式对于农产品的健康发展和经济的可持续增长具有非常重要的意义。而农产品供应链内部的资金供给可以为农产品的发展提供较为持续的资金来源、较低的融资成本、较完善的金融风险规避。供应链内部的融资一方面为农产品的发展提供了稳定的资金来源,促进了农业的发展；另一方面,从生产源头到消费市场建立了一条稳定的供应渠道,避免了农产品价格的大幅波动,促进了经济的持续健康发展。
与以往的研究相比,本文的创新之处在于：用农产品自我发展的力量去解决农产品发展中的资金问题。认为在农产品发展过程中,尤其在季节性农产品发展过程中,资金的困境完全可以通过供应链资金流动的方式,通过上中下游供应链资金的合理调配实现农产品持续、健康、稳定的发展。同时本文通过模型来论证上述结论的可行性和合理性,通过博弈分析的方式解决供应链内部资金供给的风险,提出相应对策建议。并通过实例来验证供应链内部资金解决方案的可行性和良好的发展前景。
从整体结构来看,本文采用了现状描述—模型分析—确立方案—实证检验的研究思路。主要内容如下：
首先,本文对季节性农产品的特点、资金投入、资金需求进行了描述,并分析了目前季节性农产品的资金供给情况。在此基础上分析了季节性农产品供应链的特点、作用及在目前农村发展的状况。由于从1980年开始在农村实施的家庭单户作业方式,导致农业的投入完全靠农民个体完成,这虽然在一定程度上发挥了农民的积极性,促进了农业一定程度的发展,但是却不能够适应目前的机械化作业方式。尤其是随着农业产业化的发展,金融资本在农村经济发展中发挥的作用越来越大,尤其是国外资本开始进入我国的农业发展领域,这种个体作业的方式必将被更先进的方式所取代。而供应链作业方式将是其未来可能的发展方向,但是实行供应链作业方式后,资金是由供应链上各个厂家独自解决还是由供应链实行一体化的资金解决方案,这将是各个供应链必须面对并解决的问题。因此,必须寻找合适的资金解决方案,才能充分发挥供应链对农产品尤其是季节性农产品的促进作用。
其次,本文对季节性农产品的资金供给方式进行了分析。农产品的资金供给方式主要有个人储蓄、银行贷款、政府补贴、民间借贷、呈会、各种基金会的融资、地下钱庄和典当等。前三种方式我们称其为正规融资渠道,这部分资金在农村经济发展中起到了重要的作用,但是并不能完全满足农村对资金的需求,因此才衍生出后五种非正规的资金供给方式。非正规融资渠道由于其非法性,受到正规融资渠道的压制,其对农产品发展的促进作用有限。因此必须发展一种正规的、能够持续投入到农产品的发展中的资金供给方式以促进农产品的持续健康快速发展。而供应链内部资金供给方式能解决这个问题。
然后,本文采用模型分析方式,对实行供应链内部资金供给模式和其他模式下农户收益、销售商收益、社会收益进行了比较,认为实行供应链资金的自我供给能够给农户带来较低的融资成本、稳定农产品的销售、增加其资本收益；能够给销售商带来稳定的供应渠道、质量较高的产品并有利于节约交易成本；能够为社会提供高质量、价格稳定的农产品并能够促进农村经济发展,进而促进社会均衡发展。通过模型分析了供应链内部融资的条件以及何种农产品适合运用农产品内部融资的方式。在分析了供应链内部融资的收益后,进一步研究了供应链内部融资可能给供应链各方带来的风险,运用博弈论的方法对这些风险进行了分析研究,提出了相应的风险控制方法,认为只要供应链各方按照合适的方案进行利润和成本的分摊,采取激励和惩罚相结合的供应链管理方法,是可以实现供应链的长久发展的。
最后,本文以我国烟草业的发展实证检验了本文的研究成果。并对供应链内部资金解决方案对促进季节性农产品发展的远景进行了分析,认为供应链内部资金供给是可以促进我国农业现代化的发展的,并能在很大程度上解决农村金融发展的不足,从而促进农业的发展,提高农村经济发展水平。
This paper intends to analyze the relation between supply chain internal financing and seasonal agricultural development. In China, agricultural products, especially the seasonal agricultural products, operate and manage by farmers themselves, which leads to volatile markets for agricultural products. On the one hand, this volatility increases the risk of farmers' decisions, affects the enthusiasm of farmers planting, which resulting in farmers'income increases slowly and widening the income gap between the urban and rural residents; on the other hand, agricultural price volatility is not conducive to the stable operation of agricultural supply chain, which reduces the competitiveness of the supply chain and affects the normal operation of the entire national economy. In the end this will affect the international competitiveness of Chinese agricultural products. Therefore, it's urgent for rural and national development to find a stable fund supply way of reducing risk of agricultural markets, increasing farmers'income constantly, to farmers, agriculture equilibrium agricultural price. And the agricultural finance supply chain can provide stable fund for farmers and maintain the smooth functioning of the supply chain, therefore to stabilize the prices of agricultural products and to bring healthy and stable development of agriculture. On the one hand, stable agriculture development will increase the income of farmers, reduce rural-urban gap and promote social harmony; the other hand, the agricultural related products will develop quickly, stabilize the CPI. This will promote economic healthy and sustainable development.
In the real world,,at present, the fund of seasonal agricultural supply chain roots in formal and informal finance in our country. Formal finance includes personal savings, bank loans, government subsidies. These funds has played an important supporting role in some agricultural products, especially government-supported agricultural products. However, these funds are not synchronized with the development of agricultural products and can not fully meet the requirements of the rapid development of seasonal agricultural products for the state fiscal and economic policy. Informal funds include private loans, Rotating Savings and Credit Association, foundations of finance, underground banks and pawn, etc., these funds have played an important role in promoting a certain region-specific agricultural development partly. However informal financial capital is to seek profit. They get into the product field when this prodoct's pirce is getting higher, which will push the price higher. They will get out after winning more profit. And this will cause price drop seriously. This situation will destroy agricultral development perennially. Therefore, to find a long-term, stable, perfect way of agricultural funds supplying for the healthy development of agricultural products, sustainable economic growth is very important. The internal funds supply between agricultural supply chain is more sustainable, lower financing costs, reducing financial risk for agricultural development. The internal fund exchange between agricultural supply chain provide a stable source of funding to promote the development of agriculture. On the other hand, it establishes a stable supply channel to avoid sharp price fluctuations, promote the sustained and healthy economic development.
Compared with previous research, this paper's innovation is:to use the power of self-development of agricultural products to solve the problem of agricultural development funds. Thought in the agricultural development process, especially in the seasonal agricultural development, the plight of funds can be sovled by supply chain capital flow from the terminal to the middle and lower. The feasibility and rationality of these conclusions are demonstrated by model and solved the risk and countermeasures through the game theory. Its feasibility is verified by example and proved good prospects for agriculture development.
About the whole structure, this paper describes the status quo-model analysis-to establish programs-empirical research ideas.
First, the paper describes characteristics of seasonal agricultural products, capital investment, capital requirements and analyses the current fund supply situation of seasonal agricultural products. Based on this, further analyses the characteristics of seasonal agricultural supply chain and the role, status of the current rural development. From1980, the implementation of rural households in single-family practices leads to investment in agriculture full completed by individual farmers. Although it inspired enthusiasm of farmers and promoted agricultural development to some extend, it can not adapt the current mechanized way. Especially, with agriculture industrialization developing, the financial capital in rural economic development play a more important role as foreign capital began to enter China's agricultural development. This individual will be replaced by more advanced methods. The supply chain practices will be its possible future direction. But after the implementation of supply chain practices, the method of funds supply is firstly be sovled by various supply chain. Various manufacturers solve by themselves alone or the implementation of integrated financial supply chain. Therefore, we must find the right financial solution to promote seasonal agricultural products development.
Secondly, the paper analyzes the method of seasonal agricultural capital supply. Capital supply of agricultural products are from personal savings, bank loans, government subsidies, private loans, rotating savings and credit association, foundations of finance, underground banks and pawn. Formal finance has played an important role in the rural economic development. But it does not fully meet the demand for capital in rural areas. Informal finance was derived to satisfy the supply of agriculture financial capital. Because of its illegality, informal finance was pressed by formal finance. Its effect in promoting agricultural development is limited. We must develop a formal, sustained development of agricultural products into the supply of funds to promote healthy and rapid development of agricultural products. The funding exchange between supply chain can solve this problem.
Then, this paper uses modeling methods to compare the gains of the farmers, the vendors and the sociaty between self-funding supply and external funding supply. It's thought that self-funding supply can lower financing cost, improve sales of agriculture and probability for the farmers, and bring better quality, stable raw-material supply to improve profits for the vendors. And the society benefits from this method in high quality and low price product. It will promotes the rural development to achieve balanced society development. It analyzes the condition and agricultural type used self-funding supply. And it also analyzes the possible risk of self-funding supply and it's solution by game theory. It can achieve long-term development of supply chain only if the parties share profit and cost in accordance with the appropriate contribution, encouraged and punished by their performance appraisal in supply chain development.
Finally, the conculsion is tested by tobacco industry development in China. Self-funding supply chain's develpment is analyzed and thought it can promote the development of China's agricultural modernization, largely solve the lack of rural financial development. It's a feasible way to promote agricultural development and improve the rural economic development.
从现实层面上看,目前我国季节性农产品资金的来源主要有正规资金和非正规资金。正规资金包括个人储蓄、银行贷款、政府补贴等,这些资金在部分农产品,尤其是政府扶持的农产品发展方面起到了很好的支持作用,但是我们也同时看到,受国家财政收支和经济政策的影响,这部分资金与农产品的发展并不同步,并不能完全满足季节性农产品快速发展的要求。非正规资金包括民间借贷、合会,各种基金会的融资、地下钱庄和典当业等方式,这些资金在一定范围内对一定区域的特定农产品的发展起到了很好的促进作用,但由于非正规资金的资本来源不明,逐利取向明显,往往会出现在某种农产品价格上涨时疯狂进入,以推高农产品价格牟取暴利,而在农产品价格下降时疯狂抛售,导致农产品价格下跌严重,所以非正规资金虽然能在一定程度上促进农业的发展,但这种发展实际上以增加农产品价格的剧烈波动为代价,而价格的剧烈波动对于农民、农业、农村经济的发展都是不利的。因此,为农产品寻找一种长久的、稳定的、完善的资金供给方式对于农产品的健康发展和经济的可持续增长具有非常重要的意义。而农产品供应链内部的资金供给可以为农产品的发展提供较为持续的资金来源、较低的融资成本、较完善的金融风险规避。供应链内部的融资一方面为农产品的发展提供了稳定的资金来源,促进了农业的发展；另一方面,从生产源头到消费市场建立了一条稳定的供应渠道,避免了农产品价格的大幅波动,促进了经济的持续健康发展。
与以往的研究相比,本文的创新之处在于：用农产品自我发展的力量去解决农产品发展中的资金问题。认为在农产品发展过程中,尤其在季节性农产品发展过程中,资金的困境完全可以通过供应链资金流动的方式,通过上中下游供应链资金的合理调配实现农产品持续、健康、稳定的发展。同时本文通过模型来论证上述结论的可行性和合理性,通过博弈分析的方式解决供应链内部资金供给的风险,提出相应对策建议。并通过实例来验证供应链内部资金解决方案的可行性和良好的发展前景。
从整体结构来看,本文采用了现状描述—模型分析—确立方案—实证检验的研究思路。主要内容如下：
首先,本文对季节性农产品的特点、资金投入、资金需求进行了描述,并分析了目前季节性农产品的资金供给情况。在此基础上分析了季节性农产品供应链的特点、作用及在目前农村发展的状况。由于从1980年开始在农村实施的家庭单户作业方式,导致农业的投入完全靠农民个体完成,这虽然在一定程度上发挥了农民的积极性,促进了农业一定程度的发展,但是却不能够适应目前的机械化作业方式。尤其是随着农业产业化的发展,金融资本在农村经济发展中发挥的作用越来越大,尤其是国外资本开始进入我国的农业发展领域,这种个体作业的方式必将被更先进的方式所取代。而供应链作业方式将是其未来可能的发展方向,但是实行供应链作业方式后,资金是由供应链上各个厂家独自解决还是由供应链实行一体化的资金解决方案,这将是各个供应链必须面对并解决的问题。因此,必须寻找合适的资金解决方案,才能充分发挥供应链对农产品尤其是季节性农产品的促进作用。
其次,本文对季节性农产品的资金供给方式进行了分析。农产品的资金供给方式主要有个人储蓄、银行贷款、政府补贴、民间借贷、呈会、各种基金会的融资、地下钱庄和典当等。前三种方式我们称其为正规融资渠道,这部分资金在农村经济发展中起到了重要的作用,但是并不能完全满足农村对资金的需求,因此才衍生出后五种非正规的资金供给方式。非正规融资渠道由于其非法性,受到正规融资渠道的压制,其对农产品发展的促进作用有限。因此必须发展一种正规的、能够持续投入到农产品的发展中的资金供给方式以促进农产品的持续健康快速发展。而供应链内部资金供给方式能解决这个问题。
然后,本文采用模型分析方式,对实行供应链内部资金供给模式和其他模式下农户收益、销售商收益、社会收益进行了比较,认为实行供应链资金的自我供给能够给农户带来较低的融资成本、稳定农产品的销售、增加其资本收益；能够给销售商带来稳定的供应渠道、质量较高的产品并有利于节约交易成本；能够为社会提供高质量、价格稳定的农产品并能够促进农村经济发展,进而促进社会均衡发展。通过模型分析了供应链内部融资的条件以及何种农产品适合运用农产品内部融资的方式。在分析了供应链内部融资的收益后,进一步研究了供应链内部融资可能给供应链各方带来的风险,运用博弈论的方法对这些风险进行了分析研究,提出了相应的风险控制方法,认为只要供应链各方按照合适的方案进行利润和成本的分摊,采取激励和惩罚相结合的供应链管理方法,是可以实现供应链的长久发展的。
最后,本文以我国烟草业的发展实证检验了本文的研究成果。并对供应链内部资金解决方案对促进季节性农产品发展的远景进行了分析,认为供应链内部资金供给是可以促进我国农业现代化的发展的,并能在很大程度上解决农村金融发展的不足,从而促进农业的发展,提高农村经济发展水平。
This paper intends to analyze the relation between supply chain internal financing and seasonal agricultural development. In China, agricultural products, especially the seasonal agricultural products, operate and manage by farmers themselves, which leads to volatile markets for agricultural products. On the one hand, this volatility increases the risk of farmers' decisions, affects the enthusiasm of farmers planting, which resulting in farmers'income increases slowly and widening the income gap between the urban and rural residents; on the other hand, agricultural price volatility is not conducive to the stable operation of agricultural supply chain, which reduces the competitiveness of the supply chain and affects the normal operation of the entire national economy. In the end this will affect the international competitiveness of Chinese agricultural products. Therefore, it's urgent for rural and national development to find a stable fund supply way of reducing risk of agricultural markets, increasing farmers'income constantly, to farmers, agriculture equilibrium agricultural price. And the agricultural finance supply chain can provide stable fund for farmers and maintain the smooth functioning of the supply chain, therefore to stabilize the prices of agricultural products and to bring healthy and stable development of agriculture. On the one hand, stable agriculture development will increase the income of farmers, reduce rural-urban gap and promote social harmony; the other hand, the agricultural related products will develop quickly, stabilize the CPI. This will promote economic healthy and sustainable development.
In the real world,,at present, the fund of seasonal agricultural supply chain roots in formal and informal finance in our country. Formal finance includes personal savings, bank loans, government subsidies. These funds has played an important supporting role in some agricultural products, especially government-supported agricultural products. However, these funds are not synchronized with the development of agricultural products and can not fully meet the requirements of the rapid development of seasonal agricultural products for the state fiscal and economic policy. Informal funds include private loans, Rotating Savings and Credit Association, foundations of finance, underground banks and pawn, etc., these funds have played an important role in promoting a certain region-specific agricultural development partly. However informal financial capital is to seek profit. They get into the product field when this prodoct's pirce is getting higher, which will push the price higher. They will get out after winning more profit. And this will cause price drop seriously. This situation will destroy agricultral development perennially. Therefore, to find a long-term, stable, perfect way of agricultural funds supplying for the healthy development of agricultural products, sustainable economic growth is very important. The internal funds supply between agricultural supply chain is more sustainable, lower financing costs, reducing financial risk for agricultural development. The internal fund exchange between agricultural supply chain provide a stable source of funding to promote the development of agriculture. On the other hand, it establishes a stable supply channel to avoid sharp price fluctuations, promote the sustained and healthy economic development.
Compared with previous research, this paper's innovation is:to use the power of self-development of agricultural products to solve the problem of agricultural development funds. Thought in the agricultural development process, especially in the seasonal agricultural development, the plight of funds can be sovled by supply chain capital flow from the terminal to the middle and lower. The feasibility and rationality of these conclusions are demonstrated by model and solved the risk and countermeasures through the game theory. Its feasibility is verified by example and proved good prospects for agriculture development.
About the whole structure, this paper describes the status quo-model analysis-to establish programs-empirical research ideas.
First, the paper describes characteristics of seasonal agricultural products, capital investment, capital requirements and analyses the current fund supply situation of seasonal agricultural products. Based on this, further analyses the characteristics of seasonal agricultural supply chain and the role, status of the current rural development. From1980, the implementation of rural households in single-family practices leads to investment in agriculture full completed by individual farmers. Although it inspired enthusiasm of farmers and promoted agricultural development to some extend, it can not adapt the current mechanized way. Especially, with agriculture industrialization developing, the financial capital in rural economic development play a more important role as foreign capital began to enter China's agricultural development. This individual will be replaced by more advanced methods. The supply chain practices will be its possible future direction. But after the implementation of supply chain practices, the method of funds supply is firstly be sovled by various supply chain. Various manufacturers solve by themselves alone or the implementation of integrated financial supply chain. Therefore, we must find the right financial solution to promote seasonal agricultural products development.
Secondly, the paper analyzes the method of seasonal agricultural capital supply. Capital supply of agricultural products are from personal savings, bank loans, government subsidies, private loans, rotating savings and credit association, foundations of finance, underground banks and pawn. Formal finance has played an important role in the rural economic development. But it does not fully meet the demand for capital in rural areas. Informal finance was derived to satisfy the supply of agriculture financial capital. Because of its illegality, informal finance was pressed by formal finance. Its effect in promoting agricultural development is limited. We must develop a formal, sustained development of agricultural products into the supply of funds to promote healthy and rapid development of agricultural products. The funding exchange between supply chain can solve this problem.
Then, this paper uses modeling methods to compare the gains of the farmers, the vendors and the sociaty between self-funding supply and external funding supply. It's thought that self-funding supply can lower financing cost, improve sales of agriculture and probability for the farmers, and bring better quality, stable raw-material supply to improve profits for the vendors. And the society benefits from this method in high quality and low price product. It will promotes the rural development to achieve balanced society development. It analyzes the condition and agricultural type used self-funding supply. And it also analyzes the possible risk of self-funding supply and it's solution by game theory. It can achieve long-term development of supply chain only if the parties share profit and cost in accordance with the appropriate contribution, encouraged and punished by their performance appraisal in supply chain development.
Finally, the conculsion is tested by tobacco industry development in China. Self-funding supply chain's develpment is analyzed and thought it can promote the development of China's agricultural modernization, largely solve the lack of rural financial development. It's a feasible way to promote agricultural development and improve the rural economic development.
引文
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5数据来源于中央农村工作领导小组副组长陈锡文2011年1月30日的国新办发布会
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