财政分权对于我国公共教育供给数量与区域差异的影响
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摘要
财政分权是世界性的趋势，随着经济水平的提升，各国愈来愈倾向于将财政权力下放给地方政府。理论研究表明，在完善的机制设计的基础上，财政分权可以有效激励地方政府，使地方政府的行为能够尽可能满足当地居民的需要。
然而，以上论述的前提是完善的机制设计。但现实中，由于机制设计上存在各种各样的问题，财政分权可能并未取得其理论上的效果。以我国来说，1994年分税制改革在提升了中央财权的同时，却将大部分事权下放给地方政府，这可能会产生地方政府行为方面的扭曲。财政支出方面的分权可能使地方政府减少公共服务的供给，比如公共教育。而且，现有文献对于该问题关注较少。
本文首先分析了产生该现象的主要原因：我国地方政府官员间的晋升锦标赛使地区间竞争日趋激烈，而财政分权为地方政府提供了足够的竞争空间，在资源有限的情况下，地方政府更倾向于投资基础设施来提高经济增长率，从而忽略了具有正外部性的公共教育供给。本文还构建了理论模型对于我国分权与集权下的情况分别进行了分析，而后基于全国地级和省级行政单位的面板数据进行实证研究，结果证明财政分权确实减少了公共教育供给，而且在省级层面上更为严重。
并且，本文进一步进行了不同教育阶段和不同地区教育供给的比较。由于其较高的正外部性与较长的投资收益期，小学教育受财政分权的负面影响要大于中学教育；而在经济较不发达的地区，财政分权的负面影响较为严重。
然后，基于由全国地级数据所计算得到的省内区域差异指标，本文还进行了财政分权对公共教育供给区域差异影响的研究，发现省以下财政分权程度，无论是支出分权还是收入分权，均可以降低省内公共教育供给相对规模指标的区域差异，但是会提高省内公共教育供给绝对水平指标的区域差异。
在对于全国情况的研究中，我们发现，全国的财政支出分权程度，会降低全国教育供给区域差异；然而财政收入分权程度，对于全国的公共教育供给区域差异有负面作用。这说明，收入分权无助于缩小地区公共服务差异，中央政府应在保证自身财力的同时，通过转移支付平衡地区间公共服务供给的差异。
依据理论模型与实证分析结果，以及四省农村义务教育“两免一补”资助措施的案例分析，本文对改进地方公共教育供给提出了财政体制等方面的政策建议。
Fiscal decentralization (FD) is currently a world-wide trend. With economicdevelopment, a large number of countries tend to transfer more fiscal authorities to localgovernments. Previous theoretical research shows that, in a sound political and fiscalsystem, FD can effectively motivate local governments to act for local citizens.
However, in reality, because of various problems in mechanism design, FD doesnot have the positive effects which are mentioned in theories. In China’s case, whiletax-sharing reform in1994increased fiscal revenue of central government, it alsoincreased the fiscal expenditure burden of local governments, which could causedistortion to actions of local government. Specifically, FD on expenditure could makelocal governments to decrease public services provisions, like public education.
We first discuss main reasons of this situation: under tournament competitionamong local government officials, FD on expenditure and decentralization of educationexpenditure, local governments tend to invest more in infrastructure but less in publicservices. Then we build theoretical models, and do empirical tests based on1996-2007prefectural and1985-2007provincial data in China. The results show that fiscaldecentralization does decrease education provision. We find that negative effects of FDon public education provision are worse in provincial level than provincial level; and wealso find the effects worse in primary education in comparison of different educationlevels, and worst in central China in comparison of different regions.
Based on inter-prefectural inequality indicators of education provision of allprovinces in China, we do empirical research on how FD affects inter-regionalinequality of public education provisions, and we find that FD could decrease inequalityof relative education provision, but increase inequality of absolute education provision.And in the scope of whole country, we find FD on expenditure decreases inter-regionalinequality of education provision, which FD on revenue could increase.
From theoretical models, empirical results, and case study of “Liang Mian Yi Bu”in four provinces, we provide policy suggestions on improving education provisions.
然而，以上论述的前提是完善的机制设计。但现实中，由于机制设计上存在各种各样的问题，财政分权可能并未取得其理论上的效果。以我国来说，1994年分税制改革在提升了中央财权的同时，却将大部分事权下放给地方政府，这可能会产生地方政府行为方面的扭曲。财政支出方面的分权可能使地方政府减少公共服务的供给，比如公共教育。而且，现有文献对于该问题关注较少。
本文首先分析了产生该现象的主要原因：我国地方政府官员间的晋升锦标赛使地区间竞争日趋激烈，而财政分权为地方政府提供了足够的竞争空间，在资源有限的情况下，地方政府更倾向于投资基础设施来提高经济增长率，从而忽略了具有正外部性的公共教育供给。本文还构建了理论模型对于我国分权与集权下的情况分别进行了分析，而后基于全国地级和省级行政单位的面板数据进行实证研究，结果证明财政分权确实减少了公共教育供给，而且在省级层面上更为严重。
并且，本文进一步进行了不同教育阶段和不同地区教育供给的比较。由于其较高的正外部性与较长的投资收益期，小学教育受财政分权的负面影响要大于中学教育；而在经济较不发达的地区，财政分权的负面影响较为严重。
然后，基于由全国地级数据所计算得到的省内区域差异指标，本文还进行了财政分权对公共教育供给区域差异影响的研究，发现省以下财政分权程度，无论是支出分权还是收入分权，均可以降低省内公共教育供给相对规模指标的区域差异，但是会提高省内公共教育供给绝对水平指标的区域差异。
在对于全国情况的研究中，我们发现，全国的财政支出分权程度，会降低全国教育供给区域差异；然而财政收入分权程度，对于全国的公共教育供给区域差异有负面作用。这说明，收入分权无助于缩小地区公共服务差异，中央政府应在保证自身财力的同时，通过转移支付平衡地区间公共服务供给的差异。
依据理论模型与实证分析结果，以及四省农村义务教育“两免一补”资助措施的案例分析，本文对改进地方公共教育供给提出了财政体制等方面的政策建议。
Fiscal decentralization (FD) is currently a world-wide trend. With economicdevelopment, a large number of countries tend to transfer more fiscal authorities to localgovernments. Previous theoretical research shows that, in a sound political and fiscalsystem, FD can effectively motivate local governments to act for local citizens.
However, in reality, because of various problems in mechanism design, FD doesnot have the positive effects which are mentioned in theories. In China’s case, whiletax-sharing reform in1994increased fiscal revenue of central government, it alsoincreased the fiscal expenditure burden of local governments, which could causedistortion to actions of local government. Specifically, FD on expenditure could makelocal governments to decrease public services provisions, like public education.
We first discuss main reasons of this situation: under tournament competitionamong local government officials, FD on expenditure and decentralization of educationexpenditure, local governments tend to invest more in infrastructure but less in publicservices. Then we build theoretical models, and do empirical tests based on1996-2007prefectural and1985-2007provincial data in China. The results show that fiscaldecentralization does decrease education provision. We find that negative effects of FDon public education provision are worse in provincial level than provincial level; and wealso find the effects worse in primary education in comparison of different educationlevels, and worst in central China in comparison of different regions.
Based on inter-prefectural inequality indicators of education provision of allprovinces in China, we do empirical research on how FD affects inter-regionalinequality of public education provisions, and we find that FD could decrease inequalityof relative education provision, but increase inequality of absolute education provision.And in the scope of whole country, we find FD on expenditure decreases inter-regionalinequality of education provision, which FD on revenue could increase.
From theoretical models, empirical results, and case study of “Liang Mian Yi Bu”in four provinces, we provide policy suggestions on improving education provisions.
引文
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