经营者集中附加限制性条件法律制度研究
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摘要
对合并交易进行反垄断审查，是世界各国反垄断执法的核心内容，附加限制性条件制度则是反垄断法中的合并控制制度的核心内容之一。合并交易可能导致的反竞争效果，很多情况下可以通过对交易附加限制性条件来避免，通过附加限制性条件可以实现市场有效竞争与企业扩大规模和实现规模经济的适度平衡。
本文主要采取比较研究、案例研究、实证研究等方法，以美国、欧盟等世界主要反垄断司法辖区的立法与执法经验为基础，同时结合国际竞争网络组织（ICN）以及经济合作与发展组织（OECD）等国际组织的研究成果，对经营者集中附加限制性条件制度进行了比较全面的分析与梳理。
本文的研究目的是对经营者集中附加限制性条件制度进行系统的分析，为我国反垄断立法与执法的完善提供指引。基于这一整体研究目标，本文的体系安排以附加限制性条件的行政执法为出发点，围绕着附条件执法程序而展开。文章首先分析附条件制度在合并控制制度中的定位，从而对该制度的功能在整体上有个清晰认识。在此基础上，基于限制性条件的不同类型，文章从限制性条件如何确定、如何实施，以及如何变动几个执法核心环节分别进行论述，并对附条件的国际协调进行了专章分析。文章最后基于前面的研究，对中国的立法与执法现状进行评价，并提出了完善建议。全文大致内容如下：
第一章，附加限制性条件制度的定位。这一章以经营者集中附加限制性条件制度整体为分析对象，考察该制度在反垄断法律制度中的角色。本章以合并交易可能导致的反竞争效果为核心，围绕反竞争效果的认定、抗辩与救济，对合并控制的制度体系进行了梳理。通过这一体系我们可以认识到，附加限制性条件是合并控制的核心环节之一，是对交易可能导致反竞争效果进行救济的根本途径，是在维护市场有效竞争与促进企业健康发展之间进行平衡的重要法律手段。通过附加限制性条件，可以在避免市场有效竞争因合并交易而严重受损的同时，最大程度的维系企业的发展利益。
第二章，限制性条件的类型。限制性条件的不同类型是附加限制性条件制度体系建构的重要因素，这一章对限制性条件的类型进行了梳理。结构性条件与行为性条件是最普遍的分类方式。结构性条件一般强调对合并企业特定资产产权的处分，行为性条件则是对合并后企业行为的约束。典型的结构性条件是剥离合并企业既存的独立业务单位，有些结构性条件则涉及剥离合并企业那些不构成独立业务单位的部分资产组合，包括剥离知识产权、剥离合并企业持有的其他企业的股份或者放弃对其他企业的特定股东权益。行为性条件的形式具有开放性，以条件实现的直接目的为基础，可以划分为“促进横向竞争的行为性条件”与“控制合并交易结果的行为性条件”。开放承诺、非歧视条款、购买承诺、防火墙条款、透明度条款、反报复条款，以及限制再雇用核心员工条款等是行为性条件的典型体现形式。
第三章，限制性条件的确定。这一章就合并审查中，如何对集中交易附加特定的限制性条件进行分析。合并案件审查过程中，合并企业是提出限制性条件建议的义务人，执法部门一般基于有效性、比例性、可执行性、可监督性以及不产生新的竞争问题等标准对附条件建议进行评估，市场测试是最重要的评估方法。结构性条件一般更受执法部门的青睐，但近年美、欧等司法辖区对行为性条件的态度也日渐积极。结构性条件一般适用于横向集中，行为性条件一般适用于非横向集中，有些案件可能同时附加结构性条件与行为性条件，以便尽可能地实现市场的有效竞争。
第四章，限制性条件的实施。这一章讨论了限制性条件的实施问题。如何切实保障限制性条件的落实是经营者集中附条件的关键，本章分别论述了结构性条件与行为性条件的实施保障机制。就结构性条件而言，主要的保障措施包括：控制待剥离资产的买家资格，不同的资产剥离时限要求，确保待剥离资产在过渡期内的独立，委托剥离受托人与监督受托人，以及设置替代性剥离方案。其中，定资先行与买家先行是对资产剥离提出不同时限要求的重要规则。行为性条件的实施保障主要通过委托监督受托人以及针对条件执行中的争议设置仲裁机制来实现。
第五章，限制性条件的变动。为确保限制性条件的持续有效，设置合理的条件变动机制是美欧等司法辖区的普遍做法，这一章对限制性条件变动的申请、审批以及变动的具体内容进行了分析。因市场环境变化或其他因素，限制性条件在实施过程中可能无法继续实施，或者不适合继续实施。限制性条件的变动申请一般由合并企业提出。执法部门对变动申请的审查标准与确定限制性条件所适用的标准一致，侧重考察市场变化带来的影响。如有必要，执法部门会通过市场测试去评估新条件的合理性。限制性条件的变动体现为条件的终止、变更和替换。行为性条件的变动最为常见，并且形式多样。结构性条件的变动往往与剥离期限的延长相关，有时也涉及待剥离资产的变更以及最初确定的资产买家人选的变更。
第六章，附加限制性条件的国际协调。随着经济全球化的深入发展，反垄断执法的国际协调日益重要。近十多年来，以美欧双边合作为代表的经营者集中附条件国际协调，已经取得了很大的进展。附条件国际协调的个案合作中，执法部门之间深入的信息交流以及积极礼让原则的适用是最重要的两条途径。而不同司法辖区执法部门的有效合作，很大程度上依赖于合并企业的配合，特别是合并企业是否愿意放弃相关敏感信息的保密要求，以及是否协调好在不同辖区申报的时间安排。
第七章，中国立法、执法现状与完善建议。这一章基于前六章对限制性条件制度体系的梳理，对我国相关立法与执法现状进行了分析，指出了存在的主要问题，并提出了系统的完善建议。
立法方面，目前我国已经形成了经营者集中附条件制度的一些基本规则，特别是结构性条件方面的规则相对完善，但仍存在制度体系不够健全、部分规则过于原则等问题。下一步我国应通过更为公开的立法程序，采纳更为多元的规则形式，逐步建立起完善的经营者集中附条件制度体系。我国可以进一步细化限制性条件的类型，明确限制性条件建议的程序、实体要求以及执法部门评估的标准，确定定资先行、买家先行、皇冠宝石规则，逐步探索限制性条件执行中的争议仲裁机制，并完善限制性条件变动的申请与评估制度。此外，执法部门还可以通过建立案件跟访制度、行业信息采集制度、受托人信息采集制度以及个案专家咨询制度等配套制度，间接促进经营者集中附条件制度的完善。
执法方面，从目前12起附条件案件的整体情况来看，商务部执法水平的进步非常明显，部分案件中限制性条件的独特性也显示了我国执法部门的日渐自信。目前的问题是部分案件限制性条件与反竞争效果的关联度不高、限制性条件的透明度仍待提高、限制性条件实施的保障措施仍待完善、对限制性条件的变动机制重视不够、附条件案件的后续信息披露不足。下一步执法部门应扩大执法透明度；谨慎选择行为性条件，尽量避免适用“控制合并交易结果的行为性条件”；重视反竞争效果的及时、明晰告知；注重对限制性条件建议的市场测试；避免基于不构成限制性条件的承诺无条件批准交易；加强限制性条件实施的保障机制；适当把握限制性条件特定信息的保密；重视限制性条件变动机制的设置；尽量明确执法部门对限制性条件执行的后续监督职权。
Merger control is one of the core elements of antitrust law enforcement. Mergerremedies are the core content of merger control. Merger remedies can preventanticompetitive effects of mergers. Through merger remedies, governments canmaintain the balance between effective competition in the market and economics ofscale in enterprises.
In this paper, based on methods of comparative research, case study and empiricalresearch, the author undertakes to provide an outline of a model merger remediesregime for China, by analyzing the US and EU experience of legislation and lawenforcement, as well as research reports of international organizations such as ICNand OECD.
This paper aims to provide policy proposals on the legislation and enforcementof China’s antimonopoly law, based on a systemic analysis of merger remedies inother jurisdictions. For this purpose, this paper focuses on the analysis of thelaw enforcement procedure of merger remedies,such as how to determine remedies, howto implement remedies, how to modify remedies, and how international cooperationin merger remedies is conducted. At the end of this paper, the author also conductsan analysis of legislation and practices of merger remedies in China, and providessuggestions on how to improve China’s merger remedies regime.
The contents of this paper is summarized as follows:
Chapter one, the role of merger remedies. In this chapter, the author analyzesthe role of merger remedies in antitrust law. The author provides a comprehensivepicture of merger control, by specifying the rules in defining an anticompetitiveeffect, the rules in pleading, and the rules in merger remedies. Merger remedies,being the core content of merger control, are the fundamental way to remedy ananticompetitive effect. They are important legal measures to maintain the balancebetween effective competition and development of enterprises. In other words,through merger remedies, governments can make competition in the market workablewhile preserving the benefits of enterprise development.
Chapter two, the different types of remedies. This chapter analyzes differenttypes of remedies which are the foundation of the system of merger remedies. Structural remedies and conduct remedies are the main types of remedies. Structuralremedies normally emphasize intervention in assets ownership of enterprises, whileconduct remedies restrict the conduct of enterprises. Existing stand-alone businessunit is the most favored form of asset divestiture. Structural remedies involvedin asset divestiture such as intellectual property rights divestiture andshareholding divestiture. The form of conduct remedies varies. According to the goalof remedies, conduct remedies are divided into two types of remedies i.e.“measuresfacilitating horizontal rivalry” and “measures controlling merger outcomes”.Access commitment, non-discrimination provisions, purchasing commitment, firewallprovisions, transparency provisions, anti-retaliation provisions and restrictionson reacquisition of scarce personnel assets are typical forms of conduct remedies.
Chapter three, the judging of remedies. This chapter analyzed how to determineremedies in merger cases. In the process of merger review, to propose remedies isan obligation of enterprises. Antitrust agencies appraise remedies propositionsaccording to the principles of efficiency, proportionality, executable and easy tomonitor and not raise any competition problem. The Market Test is the most importantmethod used in judging remedies proposals. In the past, antitrust agencies preferstructural remedies over conduct remedies. In recent years, U.S. and EU agenciesare changing their traditional attitude towards conduct remedies. Structuralremedies are usually used in horizontal mergers while conduct remedies are usuallyused in vertical mergers. In some cases, structural remedies and conduct remediesare used in the same case.
Chapter four, the implementation of remedies. This chapter discusses the issuesin implementing remedies. How to guarantee the implementation of remedies is a keyissue, and this chapter analyzes the rules in safeguarding the implementation ofstructural remedies and conduct remedies. Quality control of the buyer and the timingof assets divestiture, preservation of the independence of the assets in the interimperiod, entrusting divestiture trustee and monitoring trustee, setting up crownjewel provisions are the rules in safeguarding the implementation of structuralremedies. Entrusting monitoring trustees and setting up arbitration mechanisms arethe rules of safeguarding the implementation of conduct remedies.
Chapter five, the modification of remedies. Setting up modification mechanismsare measures often used by antitrust agencies of the U.S and EU to ensure theeffectiveness of remedies. This chapter discusses the application, review andcontents of remedy modification. Because of changing market conditions or othercauses, it is possible that remedies can not be enforced. Therefore, enterprisesoften suggest modification of remedies. The review standards applied by agenciesare the same as the standards applied in the process of determining remedies, andare mainly focused on changing market conditions. If necessary, Antitrust agenciesmay apply the market test to determine the effectiveness of modified remedies. Theforms of modification of remedies are waived, only to modify and substitute remedies.The modification of conduct remedies is most common and its form varies. In somecases, it is possible that agencies agree on extending the divestiture deadline orto change the proposed buyer.
Chapter six, the international cooperation of merger remedies. With thedevelopment of economic globalization, international cooperation between antitrustagencies is increasingly important. Over the past decade, the bilateral cooperationof merger remedies such as between the U.S and EU have made great progress. In theinternational cooperation of merger remedies, different countries often exchangeinformation and positive comity. The effective cooperation of different countriesin merger remedies mainly relies on the cooperation of enterprises, especially onenterprises’ willingness to disclose confidential information and reasonablearrangement of merger notification timeframe in different countries.
Chapter seven, suggestions for Chinese legislation and practices. Based on theanalysis of the institution of merger remedies, this chapter discusses the Chineselegislation and practices, analyzes the issues and provides suggestions.
Although in China, there are rules on merger remedies, especially structuralremedies, the rules are still inadequate. China should formulate more rules in mergerremedies through a more open legislative process and adopt more varied forms of rules.China should further distinguish the types of remedies, and set up procedures forremedy proposals and the standards of appraisals. China should set up the rules of“up front buyer”,“fix it first”,“crown jewel” and arbitration mechanisms. China should improve the rules in the notification and review of the modifiedremedies. On the other hand, Chinese agencies can promote merger remedies by settingup rules in post-merger monitoring, rules in collecting industry information andtrustee information, and rules in expert consultation.
In practice, Mofcom has made great progress in handling twelve cases with theuse of remedies showing confidences in enforcing antimonopoly law. However, issuesremain in the enforcement law of Mofcom. Specification on the relevance betweenanticompetitive effects and remedies, on the transparency of remedies, and on themodification mechanisms of remedies is required. Mofcom should provide greatertransparency of remedies and carefully select conduct remedies, especially“measures controlling merger outcome”. Mofcom should emphasize the notificationof anticompetitive effects to the enterprises in a timely manner, and emphasize themarket test of proposed remedies. Mofcom should prevent applying commitments thatare not remedies. It should strengthen the safeguard institutions remedy enforcement,maintain the confidentiality of discreet information of remedies, emphasize themodification of remedies, and clarify the power of Mofcom in monitoring theimplementation of remedies.
本文主要采取比较研究、案例研究、实证研究等方法，以美国、欧盟等世界主要反垄断司法辖区的立法与执法经验为基础，同时结合国际竞争网络组织（ICN）以及经济合作与发展组织（OECD）等国际组织的研究成果，对经营者集中附加限制性条件制度进行了比较全面的分析与梳理。
本文的研究目的是对经营者集中附加限制性条件制度进行系统的分析，为我国反垄断立法与执法的完善提供指引。基于这一整体研究目标，本文的体系安排以附加限制性条件的行政执法为出发点，围绕着附条件执法程序而展开。文章首先分析附条件制度在合并控制制度中的定位，从而对该制度的功能在整体上有个清晰认识。在此基础上，基于限制性条件的不同类型，文章从限制性条件如何确定、如何实施，以及如何变动几个执法核心环节分别进行论述，并对附条件的国际协调进行了专章分析。文章最后基于前面的研究，对中国的立法与执法现状进行评价，并提出了完善建议。全文大致内容如下：
第一章，附加限制性条件制度的定位。这一章以经营者集中附加限制性条件制度整体为分析对象，考察该制度在反垄断法律制度中的角色。本章以合并交易可能导致的反竞争效果为核心，围绕反竞争效果的认定、抗辩与救济，对合并控制的制度体系进行了梳理。通过这一体系我们可以认识到，附加限制性条件是合并控制的核心环节之一，是对交易可能导致反竞争效果进行救济的根本途径，是在维护市场有效竞争与促进企业健康发展之间进行平衡的重要法律手段。通过附加限制性条件，可以在避免市场有效竞争因合并交易而严重受损的同时，最大程度的维系企业的发展利益。
第二章，限制性条件的类型。限制性条件的不同类型是附加限制性条件制度体系建构的重要因素，这一章对限制性条件的类型进行了梳理。结构性条件与行为性条件是最普遍的分类方式。结构性条件一般强调对合并企业特定资产产权的处分，行为性条件则是对合并后企业行为的约束。典型的结构性条件是剥离合并企业既存的独立业务单位，有些结构性条件则涉及剥离合并企业那些不构成独立业务单位的部分资产组合，包括剥离知识产权、剥离合并企业持有的其他企业的股份或者放弃对其他企业的特定股东权益。行为性条件的形式具有开放性，以条件实现的直接目的为基础，可以划分为“促进横向竞争的行为性条件”与“控制合并交易结果的行为性条件”。开放承诺、非歧视条款、购买承诺、防火墙条款、透明度条款、反报复条款，以及限制再雇用核心员工条款等是行为性条件的典型体现形式。
第三章，限制性条件的确定。这一章就合并审查中，如何对集中交易附加特定的限制性条件进行分析。合并案件审查过程中，合并企业是提出限制性条件建议的义务人，执法部门一般基于有效性、比例性、可执行性、可监督性以及不产生新的竞争问题等标准对附条件建议进行评估，市场测试是最重要的评估方法。结构性条件一般更受执法部门的青睐，但近年美、欧等司法辖区对行为性条件的态度也日渐积极。结构性条件一般适用于横向集中，行为性条件一般适用于非横向集中，有些案件可能同时附加结构性条件与行为性条件，以便尽可能地实现市场的有效竞争。
第四章，限制性条件的实施。这一章讨论了限制性条件的实施问题。如何切实保障限制性条件的落实是经营者集中附条件的关键，本章分别论述了结构性条件与行为性条件的实施保障机制。就结构性条件而言，主要的保障措施包括：控制待剥离资产的买家资格，不同的资产剥离时限要求，确保待剥离资产在过渡期内的独立，委托剥离受托人与监督受托人，以及设置替代性剥离方案。其中，定资先行与买家先行是对资产剥离提出不同时限要求的重要规则。行为性条件的实施保障主要通过委托监督受托人以及针对条件执行中的争议设置仲裁机制来实现。
第五章，限制性条件的变动。为确保限制性条件的持续有效，设置合理的条件变动机制是美欧等司法辖区的普遍做法，这一章对限制性条件变动的申请、审批以及变动的具体内容进行了分析。因市场环境变化或其他因素，限制性条件在实施过程中可能无法继续实施，或者不适合继续实施。限制性条件的变动申请一般由合并企业提出。执法部门对变动申请的审查标准与确定限制性条件所适用的标准一致，侧重考察市场变化带来的影响。如有必要，执法部门会通过市场测试去评估新条件的合理性。限制性条件的变动体现为条件的终止、变更和替换。行为性条件的变动最为常见，并且形式多样。结构性条件的变动往往与剥离期限的延长相关，有时也涉及待剥离资产的变更以及最初确定的资产买家人选的变更。
第六章，附加限制性条件的国际协调。随着经济全球化的深入发展，反垄断执法的国际协调日益重要。近十多年来，以美欧双边合作为代表的经营者集中附条件国际协调，已经取得了很大的进展。附条件国际协调的个案合作中，执法部门之间深入的信息交流以及积极礼让原则的适用是最重要的两条途径。而不同司法辖区执法部门的有效合作，很大程度上依赖于合并企业的配合，特别是合并企业是否愿意放弃相关敏感信息的保密要求，以及是否协调好在不同辖区申报的时间安排。
第七章，中国立法、执法现状与完善建议。这一章基于前六章对限制性条件制度体系的梳理，对我国相关立法与执法现状进行了分析，指出了存在的主要问题，并提出了系统的完善建议。
立法方面，目前我国已经形成了经营者集中附条件制度的一些基本规则，特别是结构性条件方面的规则相对完善，但仍存在制度体系不够健全、部分规则过于原则等问题。下一步我国应通过更为公开的立法程序，采纳更为多元的规则形式，逐步建立起完善的经营者集中附条件制度体系。我国可以进一步细化限制性条件的类型，明确限制性条件建议的程序、实体要求以及执法部门评估的标准，确定定资先行、买家先行、皇冠宝石规则，逐步探索限制性条件执行中的争议仲裁机制，并完善限制性条件变动的申请与评估制度。此外，执法部门还可以通过建立案件跟访制度、行业信息采集制度、受托人信息采集制度以及个案专家咨询制度等配套制度，间接促进经营者集中附条件制度的完善。
执法方面，从目前12起附条件案件的整体情况来看，商务部执法水平的进步非常明显，部分案件中限制性条件的独特性也显示了我国执法部门的日渐自信。目前的问题是部分案件限制性条件与反竞争效果的关联度不高、限制性条件的透明度仍待提高、限制性条件实施的保障措施仍待完善、对限制性条件的变动机制重视不够、附条件案件的后续信息披露不足。下一步执法部门应扩大执法透明度；谨慎选择行为性条件，尽量避免适用“控制合并交易结果的行为性条件”；重视反竞争效果的及时、明晰告知；注重对限制性条件建议的市场测试；避免基于不构成限制性条件的承诺无条件批准交易；加强限制性条件实施的保障机制；适当把握限制性条件特定信息的保密；重视限制性条件变动机制的设置；尽量明确执法部门对限制性条件执行的后续监督职权。
Merger control is one of the core elements of antitrust law enforcement. Mergerremedies are the core content of merger control. Merger remedies can preventanticompetitive effects of mergers. Through merger remedies, governments canmaintain the balance between effective competition in the market and economics ofscale in enterprises.
In this paper, based on methods of comparative research, case study and empiricalresearch, the author undertakes to provide an outline of a model merger remediesregime for China, by analyzing the US and EU experience of legislation and lawenforcement, as well as research reports of international organizations such as ICNand OECD.
This paper aims to provide policy proposals on the legislation and enforcementof China’s antimonopoly law, based on a systemic analysis of merger remedies inother jurisdictions. For this purpose, this paper focuses on the analysis of thelaw enforcement procedure of merger remedies,such as how to determine remedies, howto implement remedies, how to modify remedies, and how international cooperationin merger remedies is conducted. At the end of this paper, the author also conductsan analysis of legislation and practices of merger remedies in China, and providessuggestions on how to improve China’s merger remedies regime.
The contents of this paper is summarized as follows:
Chapter one, the role of merger remedies. In this chapter, the author analyzesthe role of merger remedies in antitrust law. The author provides a comprehensivepicture of merger control, by specifying the rules in defining an anticompetitiveeffect, the rules in pleading, and the rules in merger remedies. Merger remedies,being the core content of merger control, are the fundamental way to remedy ananticompetitive effect. They are important legal measures to maintain the balancebetween effective competition and development of enterprises. In other words,through merger remedies, governments can make competition in the market workablewhile preserving the benefits of enterprise development.
Chapter two, the different types of remedies. This chapter analyzes differenttypes of remedies which are the foundation of the system of merger remedies. Structural remedies and conduct remedies are the main types of remedies. Structuralremedies normally emphasize intervention in assets ownership of enterprises, whileconduct remedies restrict the conduct of enterprises. Existing stand-alone businessunit is the most favored form of asset divestiture. Structural remedies involvedin asset divestiture such as intellectual property rights divestiture andshareholding divestiture. The form of conduct remedies varies. According to the goalof remedies, conduct remedies are divided into two types of remedies i.e.“measuresfacilitating horizontal rivalry” and “measures controlling merger outcomes”.Access commitment, non-discrimination provisions, purchasing commitment, firewallprovisions, transparency provisions, anti-retaliation provisions and restrictionson reacquisition of scarce personnel assets are typical forms of conduct remedies.
Chapter three, the judging of remedies. This chapter analyzed how to determineremedies in merger cases. In the process of merger review, to propose remedies isan obligation of enterprises. Antitrust agencies appraise remedies propositionsaccording to the principles of efficiency, proportionality, executable and easy tomonitor and not raise any competition problem. The Market Test is the most importantmethod used in judging remedies proposals. In the past, antitrust agencies preferstructural remedies over conduct remedies. In recent years, U.S. and EU agenciesare changing their traditional attitude towards conduct remedies. Structuralremedies are usually used in horizontal mergers while conduct remedies are usuallyused in vertical mergers. In some cases, structural remedies and conduct remediesare used in the same case.
Chapter four, the implementation of remedies. This chapter discusses the issuesin implementing remedies. How to guarantee the implementation of remedies is a keyissue, and this chapter analyzes the rules in safeguarding the implementation ofstructural remedies and conduct remedies. Quality control of the buyer and the timingof assets divestiture, preservation of the independence of the assets in the interimperiod, entrusting divestiture trustee and monitoring trustee, setting up crownjewel provisions are the rules in safeguarding the implementation of structuralremedies. Entrusting monitoring trustees and setting up arbitration mechanisms arethe rules of safeguarding the implementation of conduct remedies.
Chapter five, the modification of remedies. Setting up modification mechanismsare measures often used by antitrust agencies of the U.S and EU to ensure theeffectiveness of remedies. This chapter discusses the application, review andcontents of remedy modification. Because of changing market conditions or othercauses, it is possible that remedies can not be enforced. Therefore, enterprisesoften suggest modification of remedies. The review standards applied by agenciesare the same as the standards applied in the process of determining remedies, andare mainly focused on changing market conditions. If necessary, Antitrust agenciesmay apply the market test to determine the effectiveness of modified remedies. Theforms of modification of remedies are waived, only to modify and substitute remedies.The modification of conduct remedies is most common and its form varies. In somecases, it is possible that agencies agree on extending the divestiture deadline orto change the proposed buyer.
Chapter six, the international cooperation of merger remedies. With thedevelopment of economic globalization, international cooperation between antitrustagencies is increasingly important. Over the past decade, the bilateral cooperationof merger remedies such as between the U.S and EU have made great progress. In theinternational cooperation of merger remedies, different countries often exchangeinformation and positive comity. The effective cooperation of different countriesin merger remedies mainly relies on the cooperation of enterprises, especially onenterprises’ willingness to disclose confidential information and reasonablearrangement of merger notification timeframe in different countries.
Chapter seven, suggestions for Chinese legislation and practices. Based on theanalysis of the institution of merger remedies, this chapter discusses the Chineselegislation and practices, analyzes the issues and provides suggestions.
Although in China, there are rules on merger remedies, especially structuralremedies, the rules are still inadequate. China should formulate more rules in mergerremedies through a more open legislative process and adopt more varied forms of rules.China should further distinguish the types of remedies, and set up procedures forremedy proposals and the standards of appraisals. China should set up the rules of“up front buyer”,“fix it first”,“crown jewel” and arbitration mechanisms. China should improve the rules in the notification and review of the modifiedremedies. On the other hand, Chinese agencies can promote merger remedies by settingup rules in post-merger monitoring, rules in collecting industry information andtrustee information, and rules in expert consultation.
In practice, Mofcom has made great progress in handling twelve cases with theuse of remedies showing confidences in enforcing antimonopoly law. However, issuesremain in the enforcement law of Mofcom. Specification on the relevance betweenanticompetitive effects and remedies, on the transparency of remedies, and on themodification mechanisms of remedies is required. Mofcom should provide greatertransparency of remedies and carefully select conduct remedies, especially“measures controlling merger outcome”. Mofcom should emphasize the notificationof anticompetitive effects to the enterprises in a timely manner, and emphasize themarket test of proposed remedies. Mofcom should prevent applying commitments thatare not remedies. It should strengthen the safeguard institutions remedy enforcement,maintain the confidentiality of discreet information of remedies, emphasize themodification of remedies, and clarify the power of Mofcom in monitoring theimplementation of remedies.
引文
①王晓晔主编：《中华人民共和国反垄断法详解》，北京：知识产权出版社2008年版，第188页。
①Fran ois Lévêque and Howard Shelanski, Merger remedies in American and European Union competition law,Cheltenham, Glos: E. Elgar Pub.,2003.
②韩伟：《后危机时代的竞争制度拓展——美国律协第58届反垄断法春季大会综述》，《经济法论丛》第20卷，武汉大学出版社2011年版，第349-352页。
③Stephen Davies&Bruce Lyons, Mergers and Merger Remedies in the EU, Cheltenham: Edward ElgarPublishing Limited,2007,
④韩立余：《经营者集中救济制度》，高等教育出版社2011年版。
②参见[美]乔治·J.施蒂格勒：《产业组织和政府管制》，潘振民译，上海三联书店1989年版，第3页。
③参见王晓晔：《企业合并中的反垄断问题》，法律出版社1996年版，第8—15页。
④参见王晓晔：《竞争法学》，社会科学文献出版社2007年版，第329页。
①单飞跃、卢代富等：《需要国家干预：经济法视域的解读》，法律出版社2005年版，第120-137页。
①韩伟：《美国横向合并指南的最新修订及启示》，《现代法学》2011年第3期。
②韩伟：《美国横向合并指南的最新修订及启示》，《现代法学》2011年第3期。
①A Study of the Commission’s Divestiture Process.
②Statement of the Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of Competition on Negotiating Merger Remedies.
③Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies.
④Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
⑤Best Practice Guidelines: The Commission’s Model Texts for Divestiture Commitments and the TrusteeMandate under the EC Merger Regulation.
⑥DG COMP, European Commission, Merger Remedies Study.
①Merger Remedies:Competition Comission Guidelines.
②Guidelines for M&A Remedies.
③Information Bulletin on Merger Remedies in Canada.
④Competition Bureau Merger Remedies Study.
①DG COMP, European Commission, Merger Remedies Study.
②Stephen Davies&Bruce Lyons, Mergers and Merger Remedies in the EU, Cheltenham: Edward ElgarPublishing Limited,2007, pp.13-17.
③[美]马西莫·莫塔：《竞争政策——理论与实践》，沈国华译，上海：上海财经大学出版社2006版，第224页。
④Merger remedies review project: report for the fourth ICN annual conference(2005).
⑤史建三等：《企业并购反垄断审查比较研究》，法律出版社2010年版，第317页。
①Stephen Davies&Bruce Lyons, Mergers and Merger Remedies in the EU,(Cheltenham: Edward ElgarPublishing Limited,2007), pp.41-43.
①Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies.
②A Study of the Commission’s Divestiture Process, available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/mergers.shtm
③Bayer/Aventis Crop Science, Case COMP/M.2547, Commission decision of April17,2002(2004O.J. L107/1),para.1145.
①Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies.
②Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies.
③Siemens/VA Tech, Case COMP/M.3653Commission decision of July13.
①Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
②Toshiba/Westinghouse, Case COMP/M.4153Commission decision of September19.
③Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
④Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies.
⑤Merger remedies review project: report for the fourth ICN annual conference(2005).
⑥Merger Remedies:Competition Comission Guidelines.
⑦Guidelines for M&A Remedies.
⑧Merger remedies review project: report for the fourth ICN annual conference(2005).
①参见王晓晔著：《欧共体竞争法》，中国法制出版社，2001年版，第338页。
②Merger remedies review project: report for the fourth ICN annual conference(2005).
①BSkyB/Kirch Pay TV, Case COMP/JV.37, Commission decision of March212000.
②Lufthansa/Swiss, Case COMP/M.3770, Commission decision of July4,2005, paras.191and199.
③Gaz de France/Suez, Case COMP/M.4180, Commission decision of November14,2006(2007O.J. L88/47),paras.1156-1160.
④Shell/DEA, Case COMP/M.2389, Commission decision of December20,2001(2003O.J. L15/35), Annex1-3.
⑤DaimlerChrysler/Deutsche Telekom, Case COMP/M.2903, Commission decision of April30,2003(2003O.J.L300/62), para.67.
①United States v.3D Systems Corp.,2002-2Trade Cas.73,738(D.D.C.2001).
②Piaggio/Aprilia, Case COMP/M.3570, Commission decision of November22,2004, paras.63-66.
③General Electric/Instrumentarium, Case COMP/M.3083, Commission decision of September2,2003(2004O.J.L109/1), para.347.
④NewsCorp/Premiere, Case COMP/M.5121, Commission decision of June25,2008para.103.
①Matra/Aerospatiale, Case Ⅳ/M.1309, Commission decision of April28,1999, para.76.
②Evraz/Highveld, Case COMP/M.4494, Commission decision of February20,2007.
③Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies.
①United States v. Comcast Corp.,1:11-cv-00106, Competitive Impact Statement3033(D.D.C2011).
②VEBA/VIAG, Case COMP/M.1673, Commission decision of June13,2000(2001O.J. L88/1), paras.215-225.
③Lagardere/Natexis/VUP, Case COMP/M.2978, Commission decision of January7,2004.
④Bombardier/ADtranz, Case Ⅳ/M.2139, Commission decision of April3,2001(2002O.J. L69/50), para.97.
①Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies.
②United States v. Northrop Grumman Corp.,1:02-cv-02432, Competitive Impact Statement18-19(D.D.C.2002).
③United States v. Ticketmaster Entm’t, Inc.,2010-2Trade Cas.77,113(D.D.C.2010).
④United States v. MCI Commc’ns Corp.,1994-2Trade Cas.70,730(D.D.C.1994)
⑤United States v. Ticketmaster Entm’t, Inc.,2010-2Trade Cas.77,113(D.D.C.2010).
①Guinness/Grand Metropolitan，Case Ⅳ/M.938, Commission decision of October15,1997(1998O.J. L288/24),paras.184-192.
②Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, Case Ⅳ/M.877, Commission decision of July30,1997(1997O.J. L336/16), para.54.
③Orkla/Chips, Case COMP/M.3658, Commission decision of March3,2005.
④Amer/Salomon, Case COMP/M.3765, Commission decision of October12,2005, paras.172-176.
①United States v. Aetna, Inc.,1999-2Trade Cas.72,730(N.D. Tex.1999).
②United States v. AlliedSignal, Inc.,2000-2Trade Cas.73,023(D.D.C.2000);
①Gotz Drauz, Remedies under the Merger Regulation,1996Fordham Corp. L. Inst.221(Barry E. Hawk, ed.1997).
①ENI/EDP/GDP, Case COMP/M.3440, Commission decision of December9,2004, para.913.
①Linde/BOC, Case IV/M.4141, Commission decision of June6,2006paras.255-256.
②Siemens/STET, Case IV/M.468, Commission decision of February17,1995(1995O.J. L161/27), para.62
③Case IV/M.1225, Commission decision of November25,1998(1999O.J. L254/9), para.101.
①Case COMP/M.5529, Commission decision of January21,2010, paras.176,181-187and654.
②Case COMP/M.5529, Commission decision of January21,2010, paras.182.
①Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
②Nordic Satellite Distribution, Case IV/M.490, Commission decision of July19.1995(1996O.J. L53/20), para.154.
①Case COMP/M.4439, Commission decision of June27,2007(2008O.J. C47/09), paras.1186-1226.
②Agfa-Gevaert/DuPont, Case Ⅳ/M.986, Commission decision of February11,1998(1998O.J. L211/22), paras.111-116.
③Germany v. Parliament and Council, Case C-380/03,2006E.C.R. Ⅰ-11573, para.144.
④easyJet v. Commission, Case T-177/04,2006E.C.R. Ⅱ-1931, para.133.
⑤BaByliss SA v. Commission, Case T-114/02,2003E.C.R. Ⅱ-1279, para.173.
①Alcatel/Finmeccanica/Alcatel Alenia Space&Telespazio, Case COMP/M.3680, Commission decision of April28,2005, paras.117-118and120-129.
②Bayer/Aventis Crop Science, Case COMP/M.2547, Commission decision of April17,2002(2004O.J. L107/1),para.1071.
③Apollo/Bakelite, Case COMP/M.3593, Commission decision of April11,2004, paras.159-163.
④Unilever/BestFoods, Case COMP/M.1990, Commission decision of September28,2000, para.177.
⑤Cytec/USB Surface Specialties, Case COMP/M.3558, Commission decision of December17,2004, para.42.
①Lesaffre/GBI UK, Case COMP/M.5020, Commission decision of July11,2008, para.60.
②Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
③ENI/EDP/GDP, Case COMP/M.3440, Commission decision of December9,2004, paras.610-913.
④EDP v. Commission, Case T-87/05,2005E.C.R.Ⅱ-3745, paras.62.65.72.102.
⑤Ryanair/Aer Lingus, Case COMP/M.4439, Commission decision of June27,2007(2008O.J. C47/09), paras.1227-1233.
⑥F. Lévêque and H. Shelanski (eds), Merger Remedies in American and European Union Competition Law,Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar,160-171.
①Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
②MCI WorldCom/Sprint, Case COMP/M.1741, Commission decision of June28.2000(2003O.J. L300/1), paras402,403.
③Royal Philips Electronics NV v. Commission, Case T-119/02,2003E.C.R.Ⅱ-1433, para.216.
①Group4Falck/Securicor, Case COMP/M.3396, Commission decision of May28,2004, para.148.
②TotalFina/Elf Aquitaine, Case IV/M.1628, Commission decision of February9,2000(2001O.J. L143/1),319,362.
①Lufthansa/Swiss, Case COMP/M.3770, Commission decision of July4,2005, para.202.
②尚明主编：《中华人民共和国反垄断法理解与适用》，法律出版社2007年版，第261页。
③Alison Jones&Brenda Sufrin, EC Competition Law, New York: Oxford University Press,2008, pp.1079-1080.
④Philip Marsden, Handbook of research in trans-Atlantic antitrust, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited,2006, pp.108-152.
⑤Policy Roundtables: Merger Remedies(2003), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/45/34305995.pdf
⑥Fran ois Lévêque&Howard Shelanski, Merger remedies in American and European Union competition law,(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited,2003), pp.129-134
⑦[美]马西莫·莫塔：《竞争政策——理论与实践》，沈国华译，上海：上海财经大学出版社2006版，第330页。
①Jeremy J. Calsyn, Patrick R. Bock,“Merger control remedies: A more flexible administration?”24Antitrust(2010), p.15
②ARD v. Commission, Case T-158/00,2003E.C.R.Ⅱ-3825, para.193.
③Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies.
④Lufthansa/SN AirHolding, Case COMP/M.5335.
⑤Ticketmaster/Live Nation Final Judgment., available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ticket.htm.
⑥Google/ITA Proposed Final Judgment, available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/google.html.
⑦PepsiCo Decision and Order. available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0910133/index.shtm.
①7U.S.C.§§291-92.
②Final Judgment in United States v. Dairy Farmers of America,2001-1Trade Cas.73,136(E.D. Pa.2000).
①Statoil/Conoco Phillips, Case COMP/M.4919, Commission decision of May17,2008.
②Statoil/Conoco Phillips, Case COMP/M.4919, Commission decision of May17,2008.
①Statoil/Conoco Phillips, Case COMP/M.4919, Commission decision of May17,2008.
②Statoil/Conoco Phillips, Case COMP/M.4919, Commission decision of May17,2008.
③Statoil/Conoco Phillips, Case COMP/M.4919, Commission decision of Mayt17,2008.
④Statoil/Conoco Phillips, Case COMP/M.4919, Commission decision of Mayt17,2008.
①Statoil/Conoco Phillips, Case COMP/M.4919, Commission decision of Mayt17,2008.
①Woolworths/Danks, Public Competition Assessment, available athttp://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/142.
②Woolworths/Danks, Public Competition Assessment, available athttp://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/142.
③Woolworths/Danks, Public Competition Assessment, available athttp://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/142.
①Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies.
①SEB/Moulinex, Case COMP/M.2621, Commission decision of January8,2002.
②Solvay/Montedison-Ausimont, Case COMP/M/2690, Commission decision of April9,2002, para.198.
③TotalFina/Elf Aquitaine, Case COMP/M.1628, Commission decision of February9,2000(2001, O.J. L143/1).
④Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
⑤SEB/Moulinex, Case COMP/M.2621, Commission decision of January8,2002.
⑥Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
⑦Mobil/JV Dissolution, Case COMP/M.1822, Commission dicision of February2,2000.
⑧Exxon/Mobil, Case Ⅳ/M.1383, Commission decision of September29,1999(2004O.J. L103/1), para.844.
⑨Exxon/Mobil, Case Ⅳ/M.1383, Commission decision of September29,1999(2004O.J. L103/1), para.844.
①Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies.
②FirstGroup PLC and Laidlaw International INC. Sell off School Bus Contract in Alaska to Resolve AntitrustConcerns, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2007/226377.htm
①Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
②Case M4187Metso/Aker Kvaerner.
③Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies.
④Statement of the Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of Competition on Negotiating Merger Remedies.
⑤A Study of the Commission’s Divestiture Process.
⑥K+S Aktiengesellschaft/Morton International Decision&Order，http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0910086/index.shtm
①Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
②Case M2544Masterfoods/Royal Canin.
①Logan M. Breed and David J. Michnal: Merger Remedies: the DOJ's New Guide to Old Differences with theFTC,19Antitrust,2005, p.37
②Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
③Frequently Asked Questions About Merger Consent Order Provisions.
①韩伟：《经营者集中附条件批准下的待剥离资产处置》，《中国社会科学院研究生院学报》2011年第5期。
②韩伟：《经营者集中附条件批准下的待剥离资产处置》，《中国社会科学院研究生院学报》2011年第5期。
③Merger Remedies Study.
①Order to Hold Separate and Maintain Assets, available athttp://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/c3938.shtm
②Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies.
①Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
②Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
③Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
①William Blumenthal,“Reconciling the Debate over Merger Remedies: A Discussant’s Proposed Decision Rule”,69George Washington Law Review.978.
②Casey R. Triggs,“Shielding Consumers from Risk: FTC Divestiture Policy”,17-FALL Antitrust75.
③Peter Roth QC and Vivien Rose, European Community Law of Competition, Oxford University Press (2008),731-732.
④Merger Remedies Study.
⑤William J. Baer, Prepared Remarks Before The Conference Board, Washington, D.C. October29,1996,available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/hsrspeec.shtm
⑥Joe Sims,“Negotiated Merger Remedies: How well do They Solve Competition Problems?”,69GeorgeWashington Law Review.932.
⑦尚明主编：《企业合并反垄断控制》，法律出版社2008年版，第87页。
①[德]曼弗里德·诺伊曼：《竞争政策——历史、理论及实践》，谷爱俊译，北京大学出版社2003年版，第162页。
①卫新江：《欧盟、美国企业合并反垄断规制比较研究》，北京大学出版社2005年版，第103页。
②Information Bulletin on Merger Remedies in Canada.
③Gordon Blanke, The use and utility of international arbitration in EC commission merger remedies, Groningen:Europa Law Publishing,2006, p.5.
①Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
①Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies.
②Verbund/Allianz, Case COMP/M.2947of11June2003.
③UK Competition Commission, Understanding past merger remedies: report on case study research, updatedAugust2008.
④See also Stéphanie Yon, Olivier Fréget, e-Competitions, No12542.
①Jonas S Brueckner and Thomas Hoehn, Monitoring Compliance with Merger Remedies--the Role of theMonitoring Trustee, Competition Law International, September,2010.
②Friesland Foods/Campina, Case COMP/M.5046, Commission decision of December17,2008para.1836.
①Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
①Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies.
②Elf Aquitaine-Thyssen/Minol, Case IV/M.235, Elf Aquitaine-Thyssen/Minol, September4,1992;[1992]O.J.C232/5.
③Telia/Sonera, Case COMP/M.2803, Telia/Sonera,July10,2002;[2002] O.J.C201/19.
④Reuters/Telerate, Case COMP/M.3692,May23,2005;[2005]O.J.C154/10.
⑤ARD v. Commission, Case T-158/00, September30，2003E.C.R. Ⅱ-3825, paras.295-297.
⑥Merger remedies review project: report for the fourth ICN annual conference(2005).
①L.G. R. di Brozolo,“Antitrust: A Paradigm of the Relations between Mandatory Rules and Arbitration-A FreshLook at the “Second Look’”[2004] Int. A. L. R.23at35.
①CaseT-158/00, ARD v Commission [2003]E.C.R.II-3825.
②C. J. Cook and C. S. Kerse, EC Merger Control (London: Sweet&Maxwell,2005),pp.299.
③Lufthansa/Eurowings, Case COMP/M.3940,,December22,2005.
④Alcan/Pechiney(II), Case COMP/M.3225,,September29,2003;[2003]O.J.C299/19.
⑤GE/Instrumentarium, Case COMP/M.3083,, September2,2003;[2004]O.J.L109/1;
⑥Vodafone/Mannesmann, Case COMP/M.1795, Commission decision of April12,2000, para.58.
①TLP/Ermewa, Case COMP/M.5579, Commission decision of January22,2010.
②Alcatel/Finmeccanica/Alcatel Alenia Space&Telespazio, Case COMP/M.3680, Commission decision of April28,2005, para.117.
③NewsCorp/Telepiu, Case COMP/M.2876, Commission decision of April2,2003（2004O.J. L110/73）, paras.224,259.
①Alcatel/Finmeccanica/Alcatel Alenia Space&Telespazio, Case COMP/M.3680,April28,2005;[2005]O.J.C139/37; Piaggio/Aprilia, Case COMP/M.3570, November22,2004;[2005]O.J.C7/5;
②Axalto/Gemplus, Case COMP/M.3998, May19,2006, at Sections B.3and C.2.
①Gordon Blanke，The Use of Arbitration in EC Merger Control: Latest Decelopments，European CompetitionLaw Review,12,2007.
②Gordon Blanke，The Use of Arbitration in EC Merger Control: Latest Decelopments，European CompetitionLaw Review,12,2007.
③欧委会在一些案件决定中也曾明确提出仲裁庭应该基于承诺决定作出其有关争议解决的决定，参见Section F.12of the Commitments Letter attached to the Commission’s decision in Axalto/Gemplus,
①Gordon Blanke，The Use of Arbitration in EC Merger Control: Latest Decelopments，European CompetitionLaw Review,12,2007.
②Gordon Blanke，The Use of Arbitration in EC Merger Control: Latest Decelopments，European CompetitionLaw Review,12,2007.
①SEB/Moulinex, Case COMP/M.2621, Commission decision of November11,2003.
②Merger remedies review project: report for the fourth ICN annual conference(2005).
①Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
②Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
③DONG/Elsam/Energi E2, Case COMP/M.3868, Commission decision of March14,2006, para.24of the Annex.
④Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
①Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
②Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
①Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
②Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
①United States v. Unilever N.V.,1:11cv-00858, Final Judgment11(D.D.C.2011) and Notice of Extension ofTime.
②Hoechst/Rhone-Poulenc, Case Ⅳ/M.1378, Commission decision of January30,2004.
③Merger remedies review project: report for the fourth ICN annual conference(2005), Appendix I.
①Merger Remedies Study.
②Merger Remedies:Competition Comission Guidelines.
③Shell/Montecatini, Case Ⅳ/M.269, Commission decision of June8,1994(1994O.J. L332/48), paras.3-21,116.
④Siemens/VA Tech, Case COMP/M.3653, Commission decision of July13,2005.
⑤Commission decision of July13,2005，欧委会修改了一项决定，宣称交易与共同市场及欧洲经济公共体相融（2005O.J. L329/35）（修改了Bombardier/ADtranz, Case COMP/M.2139, Commission decision ofApril3,2001(2002O.J. L69/50)）.
①Notice of intention to release certain undertakings accepted by the Competition Commission pursuant to section82of the Enterprise Act2002, available at http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/
①United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,148F.2d416,65U.S.P.Q.6(2d Cir.1945).
②Bruno Zanettin, Cooperation Between Antitrust Agencies at the International Level, Hart Publishing,2002, pp22-25.
①Case Ⅳ/M.555, Commission decision of February28,1995.
②Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, Case Ⅳ/M.877, Commission decision of July30,1997(1997O.J. L336/16).
③Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust Regulation Across National Borders: The United States of Boeing versus theEuropean Union of Airbus, Brookings Rev., Winter1998, at31-32.
④Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust Regulation Across National Borders: The United States of Boeing versus theEuropean Union of Airbus, Brookings Rev., Winter1998, at30.
⑤General Electric/Honeywell, Case COMP/M.2220, Commission decision of July3,2001(2004O.J. L48/1).
①王晓晔：《反垄断法》，法律出版社2011年版，第418页。
①Case No Ⅳ/M.269, Shell/Montecatini, Commission Decision of8June1994,(OJ1994L332/48);Montedison/Shell, FTC Consent Order.
②Bruno Zanettin, Cooperation between Antitrust Agencies at the International Level, Hart Publishing,2002. p88.
③Commission Decision of24April1996,(OJ1996L294/10)
④Federal Mogul Corporation and T&N PLC, FTC Docket. No C-3836, Decision and Order,9December1998.
①FTC, Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, available atwww.ftc.gov/os/1998/9803/9810011.ana.htm.
②FTC Press Release, FTC Order Prevents Anticompetitive Effects from Pfizer’s Acquisition of Wyeth (Oct.14,2009).
③FTC Press Release, FTC Order Sets Conditions on Panasonic’s Acquisition of Sanyo (November24,2009).
④FTC Press Release, FTC Order Preserves Competition Threatened by Agilent’s Acquisition of Varian (May14,2010).
⑤Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America regardingthe application of their competition laws,23Sept.1991, reprinted in4Trade Reg. Rpt.(CCH)13,504, and OJ L95(27Apr.1995), corrected at OJ L131/38(15June1995).
①Mario Monti, The Commission Notice on Merger Remedies—One Year After, CERNA, Paris, January18,2002(Commission Press Release SPEECH/02/10of January18,2002).
②Exxon/Shell, Case Ⅳ/M.1137, Commission decision of July8,1998.
③WorldCom/MCI(Ⅱ),Case Ⅳ/M.1069, Commission decision of July8,1998(1999O.J. L116/1).
④Astra Zeneca/Novartis,Case COMP/M.1806, Commission decision of April16,2004.
⑤Metso/Svedala,Case COMP/M.2033, Commission decision of January24,2001(2004O.J. L88/1).
⑥Solvay/Montedison-Ausimont,Case COMP/M.2690, Commission decision of April9,2002.
⑦FTC Press Release, United States and European Union Antitrust Agencies Issue Revised Best practices forCoordinating Merger Reviews, Oct.14,2011.
⑧U.S.-EU Merger Working Group, Best Practices on Cooperation in Merger Investigations (2002).
①Krisztian Katona and John J, Parisi, The New, Improved Best Practices Guidelines for US/EC MergerEnforcement Coordination, Newsletter of the Merger&Acquisitions Committee of ABA, Fall2011.
①Eleanor M. Fox, Remedies and the Courage of Convictions in a Globalize World: How Globalization CorruptsRelief,80Tulane Law Review,571.
①Montedison S.p.A., et al., reported in119F.T.C.676(1995) and5Trade Reg. Rpt.(CCH)23,749;Shell/Montecatini, Commission Decision94/811/EC of8June1994, Case IV/M.0269, OJ L332/48(22Nov.1994), revised24June1996, OJ L294/10(19Nov.1996).
②Guinness/GrandMetropolitan, Case No IV/M.938, Commission Decision of15October1997[not yet reportedin Official Journal]; Guinness PLC, et al., FTC Dkt. No. C-3801, Decision and Order, Apr.17,1998, reported in5Trade Reg. Rpt.(CCH)24,359.
③ABB/Elsag Bailey, Case No IV/M.1339, Commission Decision of16Dec.1998; In the Matter of ABB AB andABB AG, FTC Dkt. No. C-3867, Decision and Order, Apr.22,1999, reported in5Trade Reg. Rpt.(CCH)24,552.
④Astra/Zeneca, Case No IV/M.1403, Commission Decision of26Feb.1999; Zeneca Group plc, FTC Dkt. No.C-3880, Decision and Order, June10,1999, reported in5Trade Reg. Rpt.(CCH)24,581.
①Guinness/Grand Metropolitan, Case Ⅳ/M.938, Commission Decision of15October1997,(OJ1998L288/24);Guinness PLC, et al., FTC Docket No. C-3801, Consent Order and Compliant,17April1998, reported in5TradeReg. Rep.
②Bill Baer,‘International Antitrust Policy’,1998Fordham Corporate Law Institute321.
③Halliburton/Dresser, Case No Ⅳ/M.1140, Commission Decision of6July1998(OJ1998C239/16); UnitedStates v. Halliburton Comp. and Dress Industries, Inc.
①Halliburton/Dresser, Case No Ⅳ/M.1140, Commission Decision of6July1998, at6.
②Submission by Mark W. Friend and Antonio F. Bavasso, Allen&Overy, in response to Advisory CommitteeMultijurisdictional Merger Review Case Study questionnaire re the Federal-Mogul/T&N transaction (April14,1999).
③Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America regardingthe application of their competition laws,23Sept.1991, reprinted in4Trade Reg. Rpt.(CCH)13,504, and OJ L95(27Apr.1995), corrected at OJ L131/38(15June1995).
①Commission Report, dated May11,1998, at5, available on the Homepage of the European Commission'sCompetition Directorate at http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg04/interna/en/rapport0598.pdf.
②1998Fordham Corp. L. Inst.(B. Hawk ed.1999), at295-6,325-26(remarks of Calvin S. Goldman), and332(remarks of Jacques Bourgeois).
③John J. Parisi, Enforcement Cooperation among Antitrust Authorities, before the IBC UK Conferences SixthAnnual London Conference on EC Competition Law,19May1999.
①International Competition Policy Advisory Committee, Final Report (2000).http://www.justice.gov/atr/icpac/finalreport.html
②WorldCom/MCI(Ⅱ),Case Ⅳ/M.1069, Commission decision of July8,1998(1999O.J. L116/1).
③Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Commission of the EuropeanCommunities Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws,23September1991.
④Report on Positive Comity——Making International Markets More Efficient Through ‘Positive Comity’ inCompetition Law Enforcement.
①Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America on theapplication of positive comity principles in the enforcement of their competition laws.
②Joel R. Paul,‘Comity in International Law’,(1991)32Harvard International Law Journal1,27.
③Bruno Zanettin, Cooperation Between Antitrust Agencies at the International Level, Hart Publishing,2002,p.183.
④International Chamber of Commerce, Commission on Law and Practices relating to Competition, Comments onEU-US Positive Comity Agreement,12March1997.
④Bruno Zanettin, Cooperation between Antitrust Agencies at the International Level, Hart Publishing,2002. p185.
①International Competition Policy Advisory Committee, Final Report (2000).http://www.justice.gov/atr/icpac/finalreport.html
②John J. Parisi, Enforcement Cooperation among Antitrust Authorities, before the IBC UK Conferences SixthAnnual London Conference on EC Competition Law,19May1999.
①John J. Parisi, Enforcement Cooperation among Antitrust Authorities, befor the IBC UK Conferences SixthAnnual London Conference on EC Competition Law,1999.
①中国世界贸易组织研究会竞争政策与法律专业委员会编：《中国竞争法律与政策研究报告2010年》，法律出版2010年版，第203页
①D. Geradin, Remedies in Network Industries: EC Competition Law vs. Sector-specific Regulation, IntersentiaPublishing (2004),57-59.
②Balto, D.A.(2001), Lessons from the Clinton Administration: the Evolving Approach to Merger Remedies, TheGeorge Washington Law Review,69(5/6).
①韩伟：《美国横向合并指南的最新修订及启示》，《现代法学》2011年第3期。
②韩伟：《美国横向合并指南的最新修订及启示》，《现代法学》2011年第3期。
①Merger remedies review project: report for the fourth ICN annual conference(2005).
①中国世界贸易组织研究会竞争政策与法律专业委员会：《中国竞争法律与政策研究报告2010》，法律出版社2010年版，第150页。
②Dina Kallay, U.S.-China Antitrust Cooperation: Onward and Upward, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, February2011(2).
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53. Elhaoge E. and Geradin D., Global Competition Law and Economics, Hart Publishing,2007.
54. Fran ois Lévêque and Howard Shelanski, Merger remedies in American and EuropeanUnion competition law, Cheltenham, Glos: E. Elgar Pub.,2003.
55. Gordon Blanke, The use and utility of international arbitration in EC commissionmerger remedies: a novel supranational paradigm in the making?, Groningen:Europa Law Pub.,2006.
56. Gormley, L.，Current and Future Perspectives on EC Competition Law，Kluwer LawInternational,1997.
57. Joe S. Bain, Barriers to New Competition, Harvard University Press,1956.
58. Mario Baldassarri and Luca Lambertini, Antitrust, regulation and competition,Palgrave Macmillan,2003.
59. Morgan T. D., Modern Antitrust Law and Its Origins, West Group,2005.
60. Phillip E. Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, Aspen Publishers,2009.
61. Peter Roth and Vivien Rose, European Community Law of Competition, OxfordUniversity Press2008.
62. Philip Marsden, Handbook of research in trans-Atlantic antitrust, Cheltenham:Edward Elgar Publishing Limited,2006.
63. Robert Pitofsky and Harvey J. Goldschmid and Diane P. Wood, Trade Regulation,Foundation Press,2003.
64. Rein Wesseling, The Modernization of E. C. competition law, Hart Publishing,2000.
65. Richard A. Epstein and Michael S. Greve, Competition Laws in Conflict, AEI Press,2004.
66. Richard Whish and David Bailey, Competition Law, Oxford,2012.
67. Simon Bishop and Mike Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts,Application and Measurement, Sweet&Maxwell,2010.
68. Simon J. Evenett and Alexander Lehmann and Benn Steil, Antitrust Goes Global,Brookings Institution Press,2000.
69. Stephen Davies and Bruce Lyons，Mergers and merger remedies in the EU: assessingthe consequences for competition, Cheltenham, UK; Horthampton, MA: Edward ElgarPublishing,2007.
70. Thomas Karier, Beyond Competition: the Economics of Mergers and Monopoly Power,M.E.Sharpe,1993.
71. Vinod Dhall：Competition law today: concepts, issues, and the law in practice,Oxford University Press,2007.
72. Wouter and Wils, P., Efficiency and justice in European antitrust enforcement,Hart Publishing,2008.
73. Ariel Ezrachi, Behavioral Remedies in EC Merger Control, World Competition2006.29(3), pp.459-479.
74. Alistair Lindsay, Behavioural remedies revisited: GE/Honeywell,4GlobalCompetition Review (2001), pp.24-26.
75. Albert A. Foer, Toward Guidelines for Merger Remedies, Case Western Reserve LawReview,52,2001.
76. Balto, D.A., Lessons from the Clinton Administration: the Evolving Approach toMerger Remedies, The George Washington Law Review,69(5/6),2001.
77. Clark, J. M., Toward a concept of workable competition, American Economic Review,1940(30), pp.241-256.
78. Carl Shapiro, The2010Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox inForty Years.77Antitrust law Journal,2010, p.26.
79. Carl Shapiro and Michael Sohn，"Crown Jewel" Provisions in Merger ConsentDecrees，12-FALL Antitrust27.
80. Casey R. Triggs, Shielding Consumers from Risk: FTC Divestiture Policy,17-FALLAntitrust75,2002.
81. David A. Balto, FTC Divestiture Policy: Standing up for Consumers,14-SUMAntitrust,2000.
82. David A. Heiner, Single-firm Conduct Remedies: Perspectives from the Defense,Antitrust Law Journal,2009.
83. David Went, The Acceptability of Remedies under the EC Merger Regulation:Structural versusBehavioral, European Competition Law Review,2006.27(8), pp.455-475.
84. Dennis W. Carlton and Mark Israel, Will the New Guidelines Clarify or ObscureAntitrust Policy?, Antitrust Source, Oct.2010, p.11.
85. Dennis W. Carlton, Revising the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Journal ofCompetition Law&Economics,6,2010.
86. Deborah L. Feinstein, Conduct Merger Remedies: Tried but not Tested,26-FALLAntitrust pp.5-7.
87. Dina Kallay, U.S.-China Antitrust Cooperation: Onward and Upward, CPI AntitrustChronicle, February2011(2).
88. Elai Katz and Lauren Perlgut, Appraising Crown Jewel Provisions in the UnitedStates, Canada, and Europe, Newsletter of the ABA Mergers&AcquisitionsCommittee, Vol. X,72(Fall2009).
89. Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust Regulation Across National Borders: The United Statesof Boeing versus the European Union of Airbus, Brookings Rev., Winter1998, pp.31-32.
90. Eleanor M. Fox, Remedies and the Courage of Convictions in a Globalize World:How Globalization Corrupts Relief,80Tulane Law Review, p.571.
91. Gordon Blanke，The Use of Arbitration in EC Merger Control: Latest Decelopments，European Competition Law Review,12,2007.
92. Joe Sims, Negotiated Merger Remedies: How well do They Solve CompetitionProblems?,69George Washington Law Review, p.932.
93. Jonas S Brueckner and Thomas Hoehn, Monitoring Compliance with MergerRemedies--the Role of the Monitoring Trustee, Competition Law International,September,2010.
94. Jeremy J. Calsyn, Patrick R. Bock, Merger control remedies: A more flexibleadministration?,24Antitrust (2010), p.15.
95. Katri Pass, Non-structural Remedies in EU Merger Control, European CompetitionLaw Review,2006.27(5), pp.209-216.
96. Lawrence G. Goldberg and Lawrence J. White, The Dynamics of Market Entry: TheEffects of Mergers and Acquisitions on Entry in the Banking Industry, Journalof Business4,2004.
97. Logan M. Breed and David J. Michnal, Merger Remedies: The DOJ’s New Guide toOld Differences with the FTC, Antitrust, Spring2005, pp.37-42.
98. Marleen Van Kerckhove, The EU Remedies Study: Toward Further TransatlanticConvergence in Merger Remedies?21-FALL Antitrust66,2006.
99. Margaret Sanderson and Ann Wallwork, Divestiture Relief in Merger Cases: anAssessment of the Canadian Experience, McGill Law Journal,38,1993.
100. Molly S. Boast, Federal Trade Commission Merger Remedies: Shattering theMyths, George Washington Law Review,69,2001.
101. Richard A. Epstein, Monopolization Follies: the Dangers of StructuralRemedies under Section2of the Sherman Act, Antitrust Law Journal,76,2009.
102. Simon Holmes and Sarah Turnbull, Remedies in Merger Cases: RecentDevelopments, European Competition Law Review,2002,23(10), pp.499-511.
103. Sosnick Stephen H., A critique of concepts of workable competition,Quarterly Journal of Economics,1958(72), pp.380-423.
104. Sims, J. and M. McFalls, Negotiated Merger Remedies: How Well do They SolveCompetition Problems?,The George Washington Law Review,69(5/6),2001.
105. Svend Alb k and Peter M llgaard and Per Baltzer Overgaard, Transparency andCoordinated Effects in European Merger Control, Journal of Competition Law&Economics,6,2010.
106. William Blumenthal, Reconciling the Debate over Merger Remedies: ADiscussant’s Proposed Decision Rule,69George Washington Law Review. p.978.
107. Werden, G., Economic evidence on the existence of collusion: Reconcilingantitrust law with oligopoly theory, Antitrust law Journal71, pp.719-800.
108. Webb, Robert L, Divestiture: A Prescription for Healthy Competition,Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Regional Economist1,2001.
109. William J. Baer and Ronald C. Redcay, Solving Competition Problems in MergerControl: The Requirements for an Effective Divestiture Remedy, GeorgeWashington Law Review,69,2001.
110. U.S. Federal Trade Commission, The Study of Divestiture Process,1999.
111. U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Statement of the Federal Trade Commission’sBureau of Competition on Negotiating Merger Remedies,2003.
112. U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Frequently Asked Questions about MergerConsent Order Provisions,2003.
113. U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division Policy Guide to MergerRemedies,2004.
114. U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division Policy Guide to MergerRemedies,2011.
115. U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Commentary on theHorizontal Merger Guidelines,2006.
116. U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal MergerGuidelines,2010.
117. ICPAC, Final Report to the Attorney General and Assitant Attorney Generalfor Antitrust,2000.
118. European Commission, Commission notice on remedies acceptable under CouncilRegulation (EC) No139/2004and under Commission Regulation (EC) No802/2004(2008/C267/01), OJ C267,22.10.2008.
119. European Commission, Best Practice Guidelines: The Commission’s ModelTexts for Divestiture Commitments and the Trustee Mandate under the EC MergerRegulation.
120. European Commission, Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergersunder the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations betweenundertakings,2004.
121. European Commission, Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergersunder the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations betweenundertakings,2008.
122. European Commission, Merger Remedies Study,2005.
123. UK Competition Commission, Merger Remedies: Competition CommissionGuidelines,2008.
124. UK Competition Commission, Understanding Past Merger Remedies: Report onCase Study Research,2008.
125. UK Competition Commission and the Office of Fair Trading, Merger AssessmentGuidelines,2010.
126. Canadian Competition Bureau, Information Bulletin on Merger Remedies inCanada,2006.
127. Canadian Competition Bureau, Merger Remedies Study,2011.
128. Australian Competition&Consumer Commission, Merger Guidelines,2008.
129. Korea Fair Trade Commission, Guidelines for M&A Remedies,2011.
130. OECD, Policy Roundtable Merger Remedies,2003.
131. ICN, Merger Remedies Review Project,2005.
①Fran ois Lévêque and Howard Shelanski, Merger remedies in American and European Union competition law,Cheltenham, Glos: E. Elgar Pub.,2003.
②韩伟：《后危机时代的竞争制度拓展——美国律协第58届反垄断法春季大会综述》，《经济法论丛》第20卷，武汉大学出版社2011年版，第349-352页。
③Stephen Davies&Bruce Lyons, Mergers and Merger Remedies in the EU, Cheltenham: Edward ElgarPublishing Limited,2007,
④韩立余：《经营者集中救济制度》，高等教育出版社2011年版。
②参见[美]乔治·J.施蒂格勒：《产业组织和政府管制》，潘振民译，上海三联书店1989年版，第3页。
③参见王晓晔：《企业合并中的反垄断问题》，法律出版社1996年版，第8—15页。
④参见王晓晔：《竞争法学》，社会科学文献出版社2007年版，第329页。
①单飞跃、卢代富等：《需要国家干预：经济法视域的解读》，法律出版社2005年版，第120-137页。
①韩伟：《美国横向合并指南的最新修订及启示》，《现代法学》2011年第3期。
②韩伟：《美国横向合并指南的最新修订及启示》，《现代法学》2011年第3期。
①A Study of the Commission’s Divestiture Process.
②Statement of the Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of Competition on Negotiating Merger Remedies.
③Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies.
④Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
⑤Best Practice Guidelines: The Commission’s Model Texts for Divestiture Commitments and the TrusteeMandate under the EC Merger Regulation.
⑥DG COMP, European Commission, Merger Remedies Study.
①Merger Remedies:Competition Comission Guidelines.
②Guidelines for M&A Remedies.
③Information Bulletin on Merger Remedies in Canada.
④Competition Bureau Merger Remedies Study.
①DG COMP, European Commission, Merger Remedies Study.
②Stephen Davies&Bruce Lyons, Mergers and Merger Remedies in the EU, Cheltenham: Edward ElgarPublishing Limited,2007, pp.13-17.
③[美]马西莫·莫塔：《竞争政策——理论与实践》，沈国华译，上海：上海财经大学出版社2006版，第224页。
④Merger remedies review project: report for the fourth ICN annual conference(2005).
⑤史建三等：《企业并购反垄断审查比较研究》，法律出版社2010年版，第317页。
①Stephen Davies&Bruce Lyons, Mergers and Merger Remedies in the EU,(Cheltenham: Edward ElgarPublishing Limited,2007), pp.41-43.
①Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies.
②A Study of the Commission’s Divestiture Process, available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/mergers.shtm
③Bayer/Aventis Crop Science, Case COMP/M.2547, Commission decision of April17,2002(2004O.J. L107/1),para.1145.
①Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies.
②Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies.
③Siemens/VA Tech, Case COMP/M.3653Commission decision of July13.
①Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
②Toshiba/Westinghouse, Case COMP/M.4153Commission decision of September19.
③Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
④Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies.
⑤Merger remedies review project: report for the fourth ICN annual conference(2005).
⑥Merger Remedies:Competition Comission Guidelines.
⑦Guidelines for M&A Remedies.
⑧Merger remedies review project: report for the fourth ICN annual conference(2005).
①参见王晓晔著：《欧共体竞争法》，中国法制出版社，2001年版，第338页。
②Merger remedies review project: report for the fourth ICN annual conference(2005).
①BSkyB/Kirch Pay TV, Case COMP/JV.37, Commission decision of March212000.
②Lufthansa/Swiss, Case COMP/M.3770, Commission decision of July4,2005, paras.191and199.
③Gaz de France/Suez, Case COMP/M.4180, Commission decision of November14,2006(2007O.J. L88/47),paras.1156-1160.
④Shell/DEA, Case COMP/M.2389, Commission decision of December20,2001(2003O.J. L15/35), Annex1-3.
⑤DaimlerChrysler/Deutsche Telekom, Case COMP/M.2903, Commission decision of April30,2003(2003O.J.L300/62), para.67.
①United States v.3D Systems Corp.,2002-2Trade Cas.73,738(D.D.C.2001).
②Piaggio/Aprilia, Case COMP/M.3570, Commission decision of November22,2004, paras.63-66.
③General Electric/Instrumentarium, Case COMP/M.3083, Commission decision of September2,2003(2004O.J.L109/1), para.347.
④NewsCorp/Premiere, Case COMP/M.5121, Commission decision of June25,2008para.103.
①Matra/Aerospatiale, Case Ⅳ/M.1309, Commission decision of April28,1999, para.76.
②Evraz/Highveld, Case COMP/M.4494, Commission decision of February20,2007.
③Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies.
①United States v. Comcast Corp.,1:11-cv-00106, Competitive Impact Statement3033(D.D.C2011).
②VEBA/VIAG, Case COMP/M.1673, Commission decision of June13,2000(2001O.J. L88/1), paras.215-225.
③Lagardere/Natexis/VUP, Case COMP/M.2978, Commission decision of January7,2004.
④Bombardier/ADtranz, Case Ⅳ/M.2139, Commission decision of April3,2001(2002O.J. L69/50), para.97.
①Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies.
②United States v. Northrop Grumman Corp.,1:02-cv-02432, Competitive Impact Statement18-19(D.D.C.2002).
③United States v. Ticketmaster Entm’t, Inc.,2010-2Trade Cas.77,113(D.D.C.2010).
④United States v. MCI Commc’ns Corp.,1994-2Trade Cas.70,730(D.D.C.1994)
⑤United States v. Ticketmaster Entm’t, Inc.,2010-2Trade Cas.77,113(D.D.C.2010).
①Guinness/Grand Metropolitan，Case Ⅳ/M.938, Commission decision of October15,1997(1998O.J. L288/24),paras.184-192.
②Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, Case Ⅳ/M.877, Commission decision of July30,1997(1997O.J. L336/16), para.54.
③Orkla/Chips, Case COMP/M.3658, Commission decision of March3,2005.
④Amer/Salomon, Case COMP/M.3765, Commission decision of October12,2005, paras.172-176.
①United States v. Aetna, Inc.,1999-2Trade Cas.72,730(N.D. Tex.1999).
②United States v. AlliedSignal, Inc.,2000-2Trade Cas.73,023(D.D.C.2000);
①Gotz Drauz, Remedies under the Merger Regulation,1996Fordham Corp. L. Inst.221(Barry E. Hawk, ed.1997).
①ENI/EDP/GDP, Case COMP/M.3440, Commission decision of December9,2004, para.913.
①Linde/BOC, Case IV/M.4141, Commission decision of June6,2006paras.255-256.
②Siemens/STET, Case IV/M.468, Commission decision of February17,1995(1995O.J. L161/27), para.62
③Case IV/M.1225, Commission decision of November25,1998(1999O.J. L254/9), para.101.
①Case COMP/M.5529, Commission decision of January21,2010, paras.176,181-187and654.
②Case COMP/M.5529, Commission decision of January21,2010, paras.182.
①Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
②Nordic Satellite Distribution, Case IV/M.490, Commission decision of July19.1995(1996O.J. L53/20), para.154.
①Case COMP/M.4439, Commission decision of June27,2007(2008O.J. C47/09), paras.1186-1226.
②Agfa-Gevaert/DuPont, Case Ⅳ/M.986, Commission decision of February11,1998(1998O.J. L211/22), paras.111-116.
③Germany v. Parliament and Council, Case C-380/03,2006E.C.R. Ⅰ-11573, para.144.
④easyJet v. Commission, Case T-177/04,2006E.C.R. Ⅱ-1931, para.133.
⑤BaByliss SA v. Commission, Case T-114/02,2003E.C.R. Ⅱ-1279, para.173.
①Alcatel/Finmeccanica/Alcatel Alenia Space&Telespazio, Case COMP/M.3680, Commission decision of April28,2005, paras.117-118and120-129.
②Bayer/Aventis Crop Science, Case COMP/M.2547, Commission decision of April17,2002(2004O.J. L107/1),para.1071.
③Apollo/Bakelite, Case COMP/M.3593, Commission decision of April11,2004, paras.159-163.
④Unilever/BestFoods, Case COMP/M.1990, Commission decision of September28,2000, para.177.
⑤Cytec/USB Surface Specialties, Case COMP/M.3558, Commission decision of December17,2004, para.42.
①Lesaffre/GBI UK, Case COMP/M.5020, Commission decision of July11,2008, para.60.
②Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
③ENI/EDP/GDP, Case COMP/M.3440, Commission decision of December9,2004, paras.610-913.
④EDP v. Commission, Case T-87/05,2005E.C.R.Ⅱ-3745, paras.62.65.72.102.
⑤Ryanair/Aer Lingus, Case COMP/M.4439, Commission decision of June27,2007(2008O.J. C47/09), paras.1227-1233.
⑥F. Lévêque and H. Shelanski (eds), Merger Remedies in American and European Union Competition Law,Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar,160-171.
①Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
②MCI WorldCom/Sprint, Case COMP/M.1741, Commission decision of June28.2000(2003O.J. L300/1), paras402,403.
③Royal Philips Electronics NV v. Commission, Case T-119/02,2003E.C.R.Ⅱ-1433, para.216.
①Group4Falck/Securicor, Case COMP/M.3396, Commission decision of May28,2004, para.148.
②TotalFina/Elf Aquitaine, Case IV/M.1628, Commission decision of February9,2000(2001O.J. L143/1),319,362.
①Lufthansa/Swiss, Case COMP/M.3770, Commission decision of July4,2005, para.202.
②尚明主编：《中华人民共和国反垄断法理解与适用》，法律出版社2007年版，第261页。
③Alison Jones&Brenda Sufrin, EC Competition Law, New York: Oxford University Press,2008, pp.1079-1080.
④Philip Marsden, Handbook of research in trans-Atlantic antitrust, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited,2006, pp.108-152.
⑤Policy Roundtables: Merger Remedies(2003), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/45/34305995.pdf
⑥Fran ois Lévêque&Howard Shelanski, Merger remedies in American and European Union competition law,(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited,2003), pp.129-134
⑦[美]马西莫·莫塔：《竞争政策——理论与实践》，沈国华译，上海：上海财经大学出版社2006版，第330页。
①Jeremy J. Calsyn, Patrick R. Bock,“Merger control remedies: A more flexible administration?”24Antitrust(2010), p.15
②ARD v. Commission, Case T-158/00,2003E.C.R.Ⅱ-3825, para.193.
③Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies.
④Lufthansa/SN AirHolding, Case COMP/M.5335.
⑤Ticketmaster/Live Nation Final Judgment., available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ticket.htm.
⑥Google/ITA Proposed Final Judgment, available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/google.html.
⑦PepsiCo Decision and Order. available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0910133/index.shtm.
①7U.S.C.§§291-92.
②Final Judgment in United States v. Dairy Farmers of America,2001-1Trade Cas.73,136(E.D. Pa.2000).
①Statoil/Conoco Phillips, Case COMP/M.4919, Commission decision of May17,2008.
②Statoil/Conoco Phillips, Case COMP/M.4919, Commission decision of May17,2008.
①Statoil/Conoco Phillips, Case COMP/M.4919, Commission decision of May17,2008.
②Statoil/Conoco Phillips, Case COMP/M.4919, Commission decision of May17,2008.
③Statoil/Conoco Phillips, Case COMP/M.4919, Commission decision of Mayt17,2008.
④Statoil/Conoco Phillips, Case COMP/M.4919, Commission decision of Mayt17,2008.
①Statoil/Conoco Phillips, Case COMP/M.4919, Commission decision of Mayt17,2008.
①Woolworths/Danks, Public Competition Assessment, available athttp://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/142.
②Woolworths/Danks, Public Competition Assessment, available athttp://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/142.
③Woolworths/Danks, Public Competition Assessment, available athttp://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/142.
①Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies.
①SEB/Moulinex, Case COMP/M.2621, Commission decision of January8,2002.
②Solvay/Montedison-Ausimont, Case COMP/M/2690, Commission decision of April9,2002, para.198.
③TotalFina/Elf Aquitaine, Case COMP/M.1628, Commission decision of February9,2000(2001, O.J. L143/1).
④Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
⑤SEB/Moulinex, Case COMP/M.2621, Commission decision of January8,2002.
⑥Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
⑦Mobil/JV Dissolution, Case COMP/M.1822, Commission dicision of February2,2000.
⑧Exxon/Mobil, Case Ⅳ/M.1383, Commission decision of September29,1999(2004O.J. L103/1), para.844.
⑨Exxon/Mobil, Case Ⅳ/M.1383, Commission decision of September29,1999(2004O.J. L103/1), para.844.
①Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies.
②FirstGroup PLC and Laidlaw International INC. Sell off School Bus Contract in Alaska to Resolve AntitrustConcerns, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2007/226377.htm
①Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
②Case M4187Metso/Aker Kvaerner.
③Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies.
④Statement of the Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of Competition on Negotiating Merger Remedies.
⑤A Study of the Commission’s Divestiture Process.
⑥K+S Aktiengesellschaft/Morton International Decision&Order，http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0910086/index.shtm
①Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
②Case M2544Masterfoods/Royal Canin.
①Logan M. Breed and David J. Michnal: Merger Remedies: the DOJ's New Guide to Old Differences with theFTC,19Antitrust,2005, p.37
②Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
③Frequently Asked Questions About Merger Consent Order Provisions.
①韩伟：《经营者集中附条件批准下的待剥离资产处置》，《中国社会科学院研究生院学报》2011年第5期。
②韩伟：《经营者集中附条件批准下的待剥离资产处置》，《中国社会科学院研究生院学报》2011年第5期。
③Merger Remedies Study.
①Order to Hold Separate and Maintain Assets, available athttp://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/c3938.shtm
②Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies.
①Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
②Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
③Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
①William Blumenthal,“Reconciling the Debate over Merger Remedies: A Discussant’s Proposed Decision Rule”,69George Washington Law Review.978.
②Casey R. Triggs,“Shielding Consumers from Risk: FTC Divestiture Policy”,17-FALL Antitrust75.
③Peter Roth QC and Vivien Rose, European Community Law of Competition, Oxford University Press (2008),731-732.
④Merger Remedies Study.
⑤William J. Baer, Prepared Remarks Before The Conference Board, Washington, D.C. October29,1996,available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/hsrspeec.shtm
⑥Joe Sims,“Negotiated Merger Remedies: How well do They Solve Competition Problems?”,69GeorgeWashington Law Review.932.
⑦尚明主编：《企业合并反垄断控制》，法律出版社2008年版，第87页。
①[德]曼弗里德·诺伊曼：《竞争政策——历史、理论及实践》，谷爱俊译，北京大学出版社2003年版，第162页。
①卫新江：《欧盟、美国企业合并反垄断规制比较研究》，北京大学出版社2005年版，第103页。
②Information Bulletin on Merger Remedies in Canada.
③Gordon Blanke, The use and utility of international arbitration in EC commission merger remedies, Groningen:Europa Law Publishing,2006, p.5.
①Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
①Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies.
②Verbund/Allianz, Case COMP/M.2947of11June2003.
③UK Competition Commission, Understanding past merger remedies: report on case study research, updatedAugust2008.
④See also Stéphanie Yon, Olivier Fréget, e-Competitions, No12542.
①Jonas S Brueckner and Thomas Hoehn, Monitoring Compliance with Merger Remedies--the Role of theMonitoring Trustee, Competition Law International, September,2010.
②Friesland Foods/Campina, Case COMP/M.5046, Commission decision of December17,2008para.1836.
①Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
①Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies.
②Elf Aquitaine-Thyssen/Minol, Case IV/M.235, Elf Aquitaine-Thyssen/Minol, September4,1992;[1992]O.J.C232/5.
③Telia/Sonera, Case COMP/M.2803, Telia/Sonera,July10,2002;[2002] O.J.C201/19.
④Reuters/Telerate, Case COMP/M.3692,May23,2005;[2005]O.J.C154/10.
⑤ARD v. Commission, Case T-158/00, September30，2003E.C.R. Ⅱ-3825, paras.295-297.
⑥Merger remedies review project: report for the fourth ICN annual conference(2005).
①L.G. R. di Brozolo,“Antitrust: A Paradigm of the Relations between Mandatory Rules and Arbitration-A FreshLook at the “Second Look’”[2004] Int. A. L. R.23at35.
①CaseT-158/00, ARD v Commission [2003]E.C.R.II-3825.
②C. J. Cook and C. S. Kerse, EC Merger Control (London: Sweet&Maxwell,2005),pp.299.
③Lufthansa/Eurowings, Case COMP/M.3940,,December22,2005.
④Alcan/Pechiney(II), Case COMP/M.3225,,September29,2003;[2003]O.J.C299/19.
⑤GE/Instrumentarium, Case COMP/M.3083,, September2,2003;[2004]O.J.L109/1;
⑥Vodafone/Mannesmann, Case COMP/M.1795, Commission decision of April12,2000, para.58.
①TLP/Ermewa, Case COMP/M.5579, Commission decision of January22,2010.
②Alcatel/Finmeccanica/Alcatel Alenia Space&Telespazio, Case COMP/M.3680, Commission decision of April28,2005, para.117.
③NewsCorp/Telepiu, Case COMP/M.2876, Commission decision of April2,2003（2004O.J. L110/73）, paras.224,259.
①Alcatel/Finmeccanica/Alcatel Alenia Space&Telespazio, Case COMP/M.3680,April28,2005;[2005]O.J.C139/37; Piaggio/Aprilia, Case COMP/M.3570, November22,2004;[2005]O.J.C7/5;
②Axalto/Gemplus, Case COMP/M.3998, May19,2006, at Sections B.3and C.2.
①Gordon Blanke，The Use of Arbitration in EC Merger Control: Latest Decelopments，European CompetitionLaw Review,12,2007.
②Gordon Blanke，The Use of Arbitration in EC Merger Control: Latest Decelopments，European CompetitionLaw Review,12,2007.
③欧委会在一些案件决定中也曾明确提出仲裁庭应该基于承诺决定作出其有关争议解决的决定，参见Section F.12of the Commitments Letter attached to the Commission’s decision in Axalto/Gemplus,
①Gordon Blanke，The Use of Arbitration in EC Merger Control: Latest Decelopments，European CompetitionLaw Review,12,2007.
②Gordon Blanke，The Use of Arbitration in EC Merger Control: Latest Decelopments，European CompetitionLaw Review,12,2007.
①SEB/Moulinex, Case COMP/M.2621, Commission decision of November11,2003.
②Merger remedies review project: report for the fourth ICN annual conference(2005).
①Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
②Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
③DONG/Elsam/Energi E2, Case COMP/M.3868, Commission decision of March14,2006, para.24of the Annex.
④Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
①Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
②Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
①Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
②Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No139/2004and underCommission Regulation (EC) No802/2004.
①United States v. Unilever N.V.,1:11cv-00858, Final Judgment11(D.D.C.2011) and Notice of Extension ofTime.
②Hoechst/Rhone-Poulenc, Case Ⅳ/M.1378, Commission decision of January30,2004.
③Merger remedies review project: report for the fourth ICN annual conference(2005), Appendix I.
①Merger Remedies Study.
②Merger Remedies:Competition Comission Guidelines.
③Shell/Montecatini, Case Ⅳ/M.269, Commission decision of June8,1994(1994O.J. L332/48), paras.3-21,116.
④Siemens/VA Tech, Case COMP/M.3653, Commission decision of July13,2005.
⑤Commission decision of July13,2005，欧委会修改了一项决定，宣称交易与共同市场及欧洲经济公共体相融（2005O.J. L329/35）（修改了Bombardier/ADtranz, Case COMP/M.2139, Commission decision ofApril3,2001(2002O.J. L69/50)）.
①Notice of intention to release certain undertakings accepted by the Competition Commission pursuant to section82of the Enterprise Act2002, available at http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/
①United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,148F.2d416,65U.S.P.Q.6(2d Cir.1945).
②Bruno Zanettin, Cooperation Between Antitrust Agencies at the International Level, Hart Publishing,2002, pp22-25.
①Case Ⅳ/M.555, Commission decision of February28,1995.
②Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, Case Ⅳ/M.877, Commission decision of July30,1997(1997O.J. L336/16).
③Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust Regulation Across National Borders: The United States of Boeing versus theEuropean Union of Airbus, Brookings Rev., Winter1998, at31-32.
④Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust Regulation Across National Borders: The United States of Boeing versus theEuropean Union of Airbus, Brookings Rev., Winter1998, at30.
⑤General Electric/Honeywell, Case COMP/M.2220, Commission decision of July3,2001(2004O.J. L48/1).
①王晓晔：《反垄断法》，法律出版社2011年版，第418页。
①Case No Ⅳ/M.269, Shell/Montecatini, Commission Decision of8June1994,(OJ1994L332/48);Montedison/Shell, FTC Consent Order.
②Bruno Zanettin, Cooperation between Antitrust Agencies at the International Level, Hart Publishing,2002. p88.
③Commission Decision of24April1996,(OJ1996L294/10)
④Federal Mogul Corporation and T&N PLC, FTC Docket. No C-3836, Decision and Order,9December1998.
①FTC, Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, available atwww.ftc.gov/os/1998/9803/9810011.ana.htm.
②FTC Press Release, FTC Order Prevents Anticompetitive Effects from Pfizer’s Acquisition of Wyeth (Oct.14,2009).
③FTC Press Release, FTC Order Sets Conditions on Panasonic’s Acquisition of Sanyo (November24,2009).
④FTC Press Release, FTC Order Preserves Competition Threatened by Agilent’s Acquisition of Varian (May14,2010).
⑤Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America regardingthe application of their competition laws,23Sept.1991, reprinted in4Trade Reg. Rpt.(CCH)13,504, and OJ L95(27Apr.1995), corrected at OJ L131/38(15June1995).
①Mario Monti, The Commission Notice on Merger Remedies—One Year After, CERNA, Paris, January18,2002(Commission Press Release SPEECH/02/10of January18,2002).
②Exxon/Shell, Case Ⅳ/M.1137, Commission decision of July8,1998.
③WorldCom/MCI(Ⅱ),Case Ⅳ/M.1069, Commission decision of July8,1998(1999O.J. L116/1).
④Astra Zeneca/Novartis,Case COMP/M.1806, Commission decision of April16,2004.
⑤Metso/Svedala,Case COMP/M.2033, Commission decision of January24,2001(2004O.J. L88/1).
⑥Solvay/Montedison-Ausimont,Case COMP/M.2690, Commission decision of April9,2002.
⑦FTC Press Release, United States and European Union Antitrust Agencies Issue Revised Best practices forCoordinating Merger Reviews, Oct.14,2011.
⑧U.S.-EU Merger Working Group, Best Practices on Cooperation in Merger Investigations (2002).
①Krisztian Katona and John J, Parisi, The New, Improved Best Practices Guidelines for US/EC MergerEnforcement Coordination, Newsletter of the Merger&Acquisitions Committee of ABA, Fall2011.
①Eleanor M. Fox, Remedies and the Courage of Convictions in a Globalize World: How Globalization CorruptsRelief,80Tulane Law Review,571.
①Montedison S.p.A., et al., reported in119F.T.C.676(1995) and5Trade Reg. Rpt.(CCH)23,749;Shell/Montecatini, Commission Decision94/811/EC of8June1994, Case IV/M.0269, OJ L332/48(22Nov.1994), revised24June1996, OJ L294/10(19Nov.1996).
②Guinness/GrandMetropolitan, Case No IV/M.938, Commission Decision of15October1997[not yet reportedin Official Journal]; Guinness PLC, et al., FTC Dkt. No. C-3801, Decision and Order, Apr.17,1998, reported in5Trade Reg. Rpt.(CCH)24,359.
③ABB/Elsag Bailey, Case No IV/M.1339, Commission Decision of16Dec.1998; In the Matter of ABB AB andABB AG, FTC Dkt. No. C-3867, Decision and Order, Apr.22,1999, reported in5Trade Reg. Rpt.(CCH)24,552.
④Astra/Zeneca, Case No IV/M.1403, Commission Decision of26Feb.1999; Zeneca Group plc, FTC Dkt. No.C-3880, Decision and Order, June10,1999, reported in5Trade Reg. Rpt.(CCH)24,581.
①Guinness/Grand Metropolitan, Case Ⅳ/M.938, Commission Decision of15October1997,(OJ1998L288/24);Guinness PLC, et al., FTC Docket No. C-3801, Consent Order and Compliant,17April1998, reported in5TradeReg. Rep.
②Bill Baer,‘International Antitrust Policy’,1998Fordham Corporate Law Institute321.
③Halliburton/Dresser, Case No Ⅳ/M.1140, Commission Decision of6July1998(OJ1998C239/16); UnitedStates v. Halliburton Comp. and Dress Industries, Inc.
①Halliburton/Dresser, Case No Ⅳ/M.1140, Commission Decision of6July1998, at6.
②Submission by Mark W. Friend and Antonio F. Bavasso, Allen&Overy, in response to Advisory CommitteeMultijurisdictional Merger Review Case Study questionnaire re the Federal-Mogul/T&N transaction (April14,1999).
③Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America regardingthe application of their competition laws,23Sept.1991, reprinted in4Trade Reg. Rpt.(CCH)13,504, and OJ L95(27Apr.1995), corrected at OJ L131/38(15June1995).
①Commission Report, dated May11,1998, at5, available on the Homepage of the European Commission'sCompetition Directorate at http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg04/interna/en/rapport0598.pdf.
②1998Fordham Corp. L. Inst.(B. Hawk ed.1999), at295-6,325-26(remarks of Calvin S. Goldman), and332(remarks of Jacques Bourgeois).
③John J. Parisi, Enforcement Cooperation among Antitrust Authorities, before the IBC UK Conferences SixthAnnual London Conference on EC Competition Law,19May1999.
①International Competition Policy Advisory Committee, Final Report (2000).http://www.justice.gov/atr/icpac/finalreport.html
②WorldCom/MCI(Ⅱ),Case Ⅳ/M.1069, Commission decision of July8,1998(1999O.J. L116/1).
③Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Commission of the EuropeanCommunities Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws,23September1991.
④Report on Positive Comity——Making International Markets More Efficient Through ‘Positive Comity’ inCompetition Law Enforcement.
①Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America on theapplication of positive comity principles in the enforcement of their competition laws.
②Joel R. Paul,‘Comity in International Law’,(1991)32Harvard International Law Journal1,27.
③Bruno Zanettin, Cooperation Between Antitrust Agencies at the International Level, Hart Publishing,2002,p.183.
④International Chamber of Commerce, Commission on Law and Practices relating to Competition, Comments onEU-US Positive Comity Agreement,12March1997.
④Bruno Zanettin, Cooperation between Antitrust Agencies at the International Level, Hart Publishing,2002. p185.
①International Competition Policy Advisory Committee, Final Report (2000).http://www.justice.gov/atr/icpac/finalreport.html
②John J. Parisi, Enforcement Cooperation among Antitrust Authorities, before the IBC UK Conferences SixthAnnual London Conference on EC Competition Law,19May1999.
①John J. Parisi, Enforcement Cooperation among Antitrust Authorities, befor the IBC UK Conferences SixthAnnual London Conference on EC Competition Law,1999.
①中国世界贸易组织研究会竞争政策与法律专业委员会编：《中国竞争法律与政策研究报告2010年》，法律出版2010年版，第203页
①D. Geradin, Remedies in Network Industries: EC Competition Law vs. Sector-specific Regulation, IntersentiaPublishing (2004),57-59.
②Balto, D.A.(2001), Lessons from the Clinton Administration: the Evolving Approach to Merger Remedies, TheGeorge Washington Law Review,69(5/6).
①韩伟：《美国横向合并指南的最新修订及启示》，《现代法学》2011年第3期。
②韩伟：《美国横向合并指南的最新修订及启示》，《现代法学》2011年第3期。
①Merger remedies review project: report for the fourth ICN annual conference(2005).
①中国世界贸易组织研究会竞争政策与法律专业委员会：《中国竞争法律与政策研究报告2010》，法律出版社2010年版，第150页。
②Dina Kallay, U.S.-China Antitrust Cooperation: Onward and Upward, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, February2011(2).
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