基于词典排序的群体理性聚合分析
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摘要
社会选择理论中一个重要的研究领域就是如何实现群体理性决策。阿罗定理的结论否定了理想化条件下群体理性决策的存在,却并未否定符合特定社会现实条件下的群体理性决策。因为群体理性的必要性具有重要的理论与实践意义：如何实现群体理性不仅是社会选择理论研究的重要内容,而且是社会现实的要求。
此外,阿罗定理还为评价具体聚合法则是否能够形成群体理性决策提供了标准。该标准包含两个层次：一是该聚合法则下是否能够形成群体决策。二是由该聚合法则形成的群体决策是否理性,’即群体偏好聚合过程是否满足阿罗定理中的几个条件。根据该标准,就能够对特定的聚合法则与社会实际作出合理性评价。
词典排序聚合法则就是一种在个体偏好序存在等级差异的条件下形成群体决策的有效方法。但是,词典排序聚合方法实现群体决策的代价是个体偏好序之间必须存在等级差异,这反映了群体决策过程中存在独裁性质,由此形成的群体决策也并非理性。通过对家族影响下中国基层选举中的群体决策形成特征的分析,阐明了应用词典排序方法研究中国基层选举具有重要的理论意义,它切合了中国基层选举的实际。
为了增强词典排序聚合方法的刻画能力,在词典排序偏好聚合方法的算法与规则基础上,给出了基于模态逻辑建立的群体偏好聚合逻辑GPL。应用该逻辑语。能够对词典排序聚合法则以及中国基层选举中的特点进行逻辑刻画,为拓展词典排序聚合法则的适用范围做好准备,也为深入分析中国农村基层选举中的特征奠定了理论基础。
通过家族势力对选举影响的形式刻画表明,词典排序方法在特定条件下是实现群体决策的有效方法,但与真正的群体理性决策存在差异,由它形成的群体决策也不能被称为理性的。家族势力对农村基层选举的影响的结果就体现这一点。尽管家族对选举的影响存在几种情况,有些带有明显的独裁性质,有些则推动了选举结果的产生,仅从表面现象难以辨别其优劣。通过群体偏好聚合逻辑GPL对其的刻画与分析,为我们清晰地揭示了现象背后的本质：只要存在群体成员之间话语权的等级差异,即使能够形成群体决策,但也是非理性的。
引入基于词典排序的GPL对中国农村基层选举中家族势力影响的分析,使以往对复杂社会现象模糊的解释变得清晰而准确,更能深入的认识到这些现象的本质。要真正实现基层选举过程的合理性,选举结果的理性,必须消除各种形式的个体成员话语权之间的等级差,真正做到选民之间的平等。
本文总共五章。第一章为绪论。第二章为中国基层选举中的群体理性聚合特征。通过对存在家族影响的中国基层选举中的特征的分析,提出更切合中国基层选举实际的群体理性聚合方法——词典排序方法。第三章为基于词典排序的群体理性聚合方法。从优先图、优先算子等基本概念入手,介绍词典排序方法的基本算法与法则,以阐明典排序聚合思想及其在实现群体决策中的积极作用,并分析了词典排序方法对家族影响下的农村基层选举过程进行了形式刻画的意义。第四章为基于词典排序的偏好聚合逻辑GPL及应用。这部分内容在词典排序方法基础上,讨论了基于模态逻辑的偏好聚合逻辑系统GPL,并对词典排序群体决策法则以及家族影响下群体决策过程进行了逻辑刻画。第五章为讨论与展望。
An important research field of Social Choice Theory was how to achieve the rational decision group. Arrow theory denial of rational decision group under the condition of idealized, but did not deny the rational group decision under the condition of social reality. Because social needed group rationality:how to realied the group rationality was not only important content of Social Choice Theory, but also the requirement of social reality.
In addition, Arrow theory provided a standard for evaluation specific aggregation law. The standard contained two aspects:one is the aggregation rule whether can form the group decision; The second was it whether rational formed by the aggregation law group decision. That is to say, the group preference aggregation process whether meet in our the theorem several conditions. According to the standard, we willed be able to evaluation specific law.
Lexicographic order was a kind of effective method law for form of group decision. However, the price was individual preference order must existing level difference, which reflected dictatorial in the group decision process. And it was not rational decision group by the law. Through the family under the influence of Chinese grassroots election group decision the analysis of characteristics of the form, and expounds the application study of Chinese dictionary sorting method the election has important theoretical significance, it was the election with China's actual.
In ordered to lexicographic order power of expression, gave the Group Preference Logic based on the algorithm and the rules of lexicographic order method. And analysis of basic characteristics of the election of China by the GPL. Purpose was further analysis of the Chinese countryside basic features in the election laid a theoretical foundation.
Through the power of the influence of family election form that depict, lexicographic order method in a particular case was to realize the effective method of group decision, however, This and the real group the rational decision different, formed by its group decision and cannot be called a rational. Family power of the influence of rural grassroots election results will reflect this. Although the family in the effect of several kinds of elections, some have obvious dictatorial, some were pushing the election results of generation, only to discern from the surface phenomenon their quality. All in all, as long as there is between members of the group discourse level difference, is irrational.
Introducing GPL analysis election of China, making the analysis to social phenomenon become clearer, more in-depth understanding the nature of the phenomenon.
There are five main parts in this paper. Chapter Two we analyze the rational aggregation characteristics of election of China. Then Chapter three we analyze the basic rules of lexicographic order. Next, Chapter Four, we introduce a logic representation for group preference aggregation. And we also have some discussions towards its impacts on the characteristics of election of China and lexicographic order law. At last, we study the problems around game solutions.
此外,阿罗定理还为评价具体聚合法则是否能够形成群体理性决策提供了标准。该标准包含两个层次：一是该聚合法则下是否能够形成群体决策。二是由该聚合法则形成的群体决策是否理性,’即群体偏好聚合过程是否满足阿罗定理中的几个条件。根据该标准,就能够对特定的聚合法则与社会实际作出合理性评价。
词典排序聚合法则就是一种在个体偏好序存在等级差异的条件下形成群体决策的有效方法。但是,词典排序聚合方法实现群体决策的代价是个体偏好序之间必须存在等级差异,这反映了群体决策过程中存在独裁性质,由此形成的群体决策也并非理性。通过对家族影响下中国基层选举中的群体决策形成特征的分析,阐明了应用词典排序方法研究中国基层选举具有重要的理论意义,它切合了中国基层选举的实际。
为了增强词典排序聚合方法的刻画能力,在词典排序偏好聚合方法的算法与规则基础上,给出了基于模态逻辑建立的群体偏好聚合逻辑GPL。应用该逻辑语。能够对词典排序聚合法则以及中国基层选举中的特点进行逻辑刻画,为拓展词典排序聚合法则的适用范围做好准备,也为深入分析中国农村基层选举中的特征奠定了理论基础。
通过家族势力对选举影响的形式刻画表明,词典排序方法在特定条件下是实现群体决策的有效方法,但与真正的群体理性决策存在差异,由它形成的群体决策也不能被称为理性的。家族势力对农村基层选举的影响的结果就体现这一点。尽管家族对选举的影响存在几种情况,有些带有明显的独裁性质,有些则推动了选举结果的产生,仅从表面现象难以辨别其优劣。通过群体偏好聚合逻辑GPL对其的刻画与分析,为我们清晰地揭示了现象背后的本质：只要存在群体成员之间话语权的等级差异,即使能够形成群体决策,但也是非理性的。
引入基于词典排序的GPL对中国农村基层选举中家族势力影响的分析,使以往对复杂社会现象模糊的解释变得清晰而准确,更能深入的认识到这些现象的本质。要真正实现基层选举过程的合理性,选举结果的理性,必须消除各种形式的个体成员话语权之间的等级差,真正做到选民之间的平等。
本文总共五章。第一章为绪论。第二章为中国基层选举中的群体理性聚合特征。通过对存在家族影响的中国基层选举中的特征的分析,提出更切合中国基层选举实际的群体理性聚合方法——词典排序方法。第三章为基于词典排序的群体理性聚合方法。从优先图、优先算子等基本概念入手,介绍词典排序方法的基本算法与法则,以阐明典排序聚合思想及其在实现群体决策中的积极作用,并分析了词典排序方法对家族影响下的农村基层选举过程进行了形式刻画的意义。第四章为基于词典排序的偏好聚合逻辑GPL及应用。这部分内容在词典排序方法基础上,讨论了基于模态逻辑的偏好聚合逻辑系统GPL,并对词典排序群体决策法则以及家族影响下群体决策过程进行了逻辑刻画。第五章为讨论与展望。
An important research field of Social Choice Theory was how to achieve the rational decision group. Arrow theory denial of rational decision group under the condition of idealized, but did not deny the rational group decision under the condition of social reality. Because social needed group rationality:how to realied the group rationality was not only important content of Social Choice Theory, but also the requirement of social reality.
In addition, Arrow theory provided a standard for evaluation specific aggregation law. The standard contained two aspects:one is the aggregation rule whether can form the group decision; The second was it whether rational formed by the aggregation law group decision. That is to say, the group preference aggregation process whether meet in our the theorem several conditions. According to the standard, we willed be able to evaluation specific law.
Lexicographic order was a kind of effective method law for form of group decision. However, the price was individual preference order must existing level difference, which reflected dictatorial in the group decision process. And it was not rational decision group by the law. Through the family under the influence of Chinese grassroots election group decision the analysis of characteristics of the form, and expounds the application study of Chinese dictionary sorting method the election has important theoretical significance, it was the election with China's actual.
In ordered to lexicographic order power of expression, gave the Group Preference Logic based on the algorithm and the rules of lexicographic order method. And analysis of basic characteristics of the election of China by the GPL. Purpose was further analysis of the Chinese countryside basic features in the election laid a theoretical foundation.
Through the power of the influence of family election form that depict, lexicographic order method in a particular case was to realize the effective method of group decision, however, This and the real group the rational decision different, formed by its group decision and cannot be called a rational. Family power of the influence of rural grassroots election results will reflect this. Although the family in the effect of several kinds of elections, some have obvious dictatorial, some were pushing the election results of generation, only to discern from the surface phenomenon their quality. All in all, as long as there is between members of the group discourse level difference, is irrational.
Introducing GPL analysis election of China, making the analysis to social phenomenon become clearer, more in-depth understanding the nature of the phenomenon.
There are five main parts in this paper. Chapter Two we analyze the rational aggregation characteristics of election of China. Then Chapter three we analyze the basic rules of lexicographic order. Next, Chapter Four, we introduce a logic representation for group preference aggregation. And we also have some discussions towards its impacts on the characteristics of election of China and lexicographic order law. At last, we study the problems around game solutions.
引文
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2同上,第8页。
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①徐玖平,陈建中编著.群决策理论与方法及实现[M].北京：清华大学出版社,2009,第3页。
①罗云峰,肖人彬著.社会选择的理论与进展[M].北京：科学出版社,2003,第4-18页。
① (美)安东尼·唐斯著,姚洋译.民主的经济理论[M].上海人民出版,,2005,第4-5页。
①(美)安东尼·唐斯著,姚洋译.民主的经济理论[M].上海人民出版社,2005,第4-5页。
①(美)曼瑟尔,奥尔森著,陈郁译.集体行动的逻辑[M].上海：上海人民出版社,1995,第‘29页。
①杨云彪.公民的选举[M].北京：中国大百科全书出版社,2008,第216页。
①(美)曼瑟尔,奥尔森著,苏长和译.权利与繁荣[M].上海：：海人民出版社,2005,第75页。
①(美)曼瑟尔,奥尔森著,陈郁译.集体行动的逻辑[M].上海：上海人民出版社,1995,第12页。
①(美)曼瑟尔,奥尔森著,陈郁译.集体行动的逻辑[M].上海：上海人民出版社,1995,第46页。
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1[美)曼瑟尔,奥尔森著,陈郁译.集体行动的逻辑[M].上海：上海人民出版社1995年版.第71页。
2同上,第8页。
①(美)曼瑟尔,奥尔森著,陈郁译.集体行动的逻辑[M].上海：上海人民出版社1995年版,第71页。
②同上,第264-265页。
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