不同排污机制下发电能耗与排放成本优化模型研究
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摘要
发电行业既是优质清洁能源的创造者,也是一次能源消耗大户和污染排放大户,因而成为国家实施节能减排的重点领域。目前,推进我国发电行业降低能耗和排放主要依靠的是行政手段,包括政府在政策和法律法规的制定、节能减排工作的监管等方面。但目前我国政府对节能减排的行政干预的范围、方式、程度等都存在明显缺陷,主要表现在价格、财税政策等经济激励手段力度不够,法律法规缺失或不适应新形势发展的需要,能源环保管理体制不顺等。为更好的实现我国“十二五”节能减排目标,迫切需要建立发电行业建立排污长效激励机制,以促进企业参与减排的积极性和可持续发展、提高电力节能减排效率、实现电力资源的优化配置。以此为背景,本文主要研究发电能耗与排放的影响因素,以及不同排污机制如排污权交易机制、排污费税机制、排污合作机制下发电能耗与排放成本的一系列问题,并提出了相应的分析及优化方法。
协调电力产业链各环节的投入产出对降低发电能耗与排放具有重要意义。煤炭生产环节、发电环节、电网输配电环节、用户电力需求环节构成了电力产业链。运用系统动力学方法建立发电能耗与排放分析模拟模型,并对2010-2030年我国发电能耗与排放效果进行模拟仿真和预测分析,得到电力强度、用户电价、煤耗率和清洁能源发电比例是影响发电能耗与排放的四个重要因素的结论。有针对性地推进电力需求侧管理、引导客户科学合理用电,提高锅炉效率、降低发电煤耗率,调整电源结构、提高清洁能源发电比例等,既可节约煤炭等一次能源消耗量,又可以减少温室气体排放。
发电排污权交易是推动我国排污权交易市场发展、发展低碳电力的重要组成部分。建立计及排污权交易的发电能耗与排放优化模型,该模型以社会效用最大化为目标,考虑到电量约束、功率约束、排放约束、交易约束等条件,是对我国发电排污权交易市场的理论探索。以碳排放权交易为例,由于目前国内发电成本较高、国际碳交易价格水平较低,在我国碳排放权交易市场建立初期,建议通过采用发电权交易和排放权交易混合的交易模式平衡发电企业利润,增加发电企业参与排放权交易的积极性。
发电排污费税机制是促进发电企业降低能耗与排放的重要经济手段。在激励性排污费的研究中,为同时兼顾到企业效益和社会效益,建立燃煤发电企业能耗与排放两级优化模型,第一级优化模型将社会环境效益和发电节能效益最大化作为目标函数,第二级优化模型以各个发电企业的竞争利益最大化作为目标函数,以第一级模型的KKT条件作为约束。在排污税机制的研究中,建立燃煤发电企业排污税两级优化模型,第一级优化模型将燃煤发电企业成本最小化作为目标函数,第二级优化模型将社会福利最大化作为目标函数,同时引入排放绩效约束,按照总量控制原则分配得到排污指标。上述模型反应出的排污激励税费机制,既可以从总量上控制排放、节约能耗,又提高了燃煤发电企业进行排污治理的积极性。
发电侧和供电侧开展排污合作博弈是降低发电能耗与排放、提高发供电企业经济效益的重要途径。从发电侧与供电侧合作的角度,在供电公司参与提供可中断负荷下,建立发电侧燃料成本、备用成本和排污成本优化模型；然后,应用博弈论中求解多人合作博弈的Shapley值法,在发电侧与供电侧之间分配利润。双方的合作不仅可以提高利润,而且可以大大提高节能减排效率。
Power generation industry as the focus area of the national implementation of energy saving and emission reduction, is not only the creator of quality clean energy, but also the primary energy guzzler and pollution emitters. At present, promoting energy saving and emission reduction of China's power generation industry relies mainly on administrative measures, including the formulation of policies, laws and regulations and the supervision of energy saving work. There are still obvious defects on the scope, manner and extent of energy saving and emission reduction of government's administrative intervention, including insufficient price and fiscal policy incentives, lack of laws, regulations and energy environmental management system. For better realization of China's "the12th Five-Year" energy saving and emission reduction targets, there is an urgent need to establish the long-term emission incentive mechanisms to promote the enterprises participating in a positive and sustainable development, improve the efficiency of electricity energy saving and achieve the power resources optimization configurations. Against this background, this paper studies the impact factors of energy consumption and emissions of power generation, and series of issues on generation cost of energy consumption and emission under the mechanisms of emissions trading mechanism, emission charge and tax mechnism and emission cooperation mechanism, and raises analysis and optimization methods.
Coordination input-output relationship of power industrial chain has an important significance to achieve energy saving and emission reduction. Coal production, power generation, power transmission, power distribution and user demand form power industry chain. The generation energy consumption and emission analysis model is established with system dynamics method to simulate effects of energy consumption and emission in power industry chain from2010to2030. Analysis and simulation results showed that electricity strength, user price, coal consumption rate and the proportion of clean energy power generation were the four important influence factors of energy consumption and emission in power industry. Accordingly, there can be targeted to promote demand side management and guide customers to use electricity in scientific and rational ways, improve boiler efficiency and reduce coal consumption rate, adjust the power structure and improve the proportion of clean energy generation, which can both save coal consumption and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
The emissions right trading of generation is an important part of promoting the development of China's emissions trading market and the development of low-carbon electricity. Considering the emission right trading, the power generation energy consumption and emissions optimization model is established. As the goal of social utility maximization, the model takes into account the power amount constraints, power output constraints, emission constraints, trading constraints, which is the theoretical exploration of the emission rights trading market. However, during the carbon emission trading process, due to higher cost of domestic power generation and lower international carbon trading price level, it is recommended to mix power generation right trading and emission right trading to balance of power generation profits in the early establishment of China's carbon emissions trading market in order to increase the enthusiasm of participating transaction.
Generation emission charge and tax are the important economic means to promote power generation enterprises to participate in energy saving and emission reduction. In the emission fee research, considering enterprise benefits and social benefits, two stage optimization models of energy-consumption and emission were established. In the first stage model, maximums of the social environmental benefits and energy-saving effect were conducted as the objective functions. In the second stage model, maximums of power generation enterprises'profits were conducted as the objective functions with the constraints of KKT conditions of the first stage model. In the emission tax research, a two-stage optimization model for emission tax of coal-fired power plants was established. In the first stage model, minimums of the coal-fired power plants'cost were conducted. In the second stage model, maximums of the social welfare made of consumer surplus and producer surplus were conducted as the objective function. Emissions performance method was used to distribute the emission targets of coal-fired power plants in accordance with the principles of total amount control. The proposed marginal incentive emission tax and charge mechanism not only controlled emissions from the total amount, but also improved emissions treatment initiative of coal-fired power generation enterprises.
Emission cooperation of generation side and supply side is an important way to improve the efficiency of power generation energy saving and emission reduction and raise their profits. Based on cooperation, optimization models of the coal-consumption cost, reserve cost and emission cost of generators were given out considering interruptible loads provided by power supply companies. Then, the Shapley model, as a means of solving multiplayer cooperative game, was applied to allocate profits between the generators and power supply companies. Both sides' cooperation not only raises profits, but also improves the efficiency of energy saving and emission reduction.
协调电力产业链各环节的投入产出对降低发电能耗与排放具有重要意义。煤炭生产环节、发电环节、电网输配电环节、用户电力需求环节构成了电力产业链。运用系统动力学方法建立发电能耗与排放分析模拟模型,并对2010-2030年我国发电能耗与排放效果进行模拟仿真和预测分析,得到电力强度、用户电价、煤耗率和清洁能源发电比例是影响发电能耗与排放的四个重要因素的结论。有针对性地推进电力需求侧管理、引导客户科学合理用电,提高锅炉效率、降低发电煤耗率,调整电源结构、提高清洁能源发电比例等,既可节约煤炭等一次能源消耗量,又可以减少温室气体排放。
发电排污权交易是推动我国排污权交易市场发展、发展低碳电力的重要组成部分。建立计及排污权交易的发电能耗与排放优化模型,该模型以社会效用最大化为目标,考虑到电量约束、功率约束、排放约束、交易约束等条件,是对我国发电排污权交易市场的理论探索。以碳排放权交易为例,由于目前国内发电成本较高、国际碳交易价格水平较低,在我国碳排放权交易市场建立初期,建议通过采用发电权交易和排放权交易混合的交易模式平衡发电企业利润,增加发电企业参与排放权交易的积极性。
发电排污费税机制是促进发电企业降低能耗与排放的重要经济手段。在激励性排污费的研究中,为同时兼顾到企业效益和社会效益,建立燃煤发电企业能耗与排放两级优化模型,第一级优化模型将社会环境效益和发电节能效益最大化作为目标函数,第二级优化模型以各个发电企业的竞争利益最大化作为目标函数,以第一级模型的KKT条件作为约束。在排污税机制的研究中,建立燃煤发电企业排污税两级优化模型,第一级优化模型将燃煤发电企业成本最小化作为目标函数,第二级优化模型将社会福利最大化作为目标函数,同时引入排放绩效约束,按照总量控制原则分配得到排污指标。上述模型反应出的排污激励税费机制,既可以从总量上控制排放、节约能耗,又提高了燃煤发电企业进行排污治理的积极性。
发电侧和供电侧开展排污合作博弈是降低发电能耗与排放、提高发供电企业经济效益的重要途径。从发电侧与供电侧合作的角度,在供电公司参与提供可中断负荷下,建立发电侧燃料成本、备用成本和排污成本优化模型；然后,应用博弈论中求解多人合作博弈的Shapley值法,在发电侧与供电侧之间分配利润。双方的合作不仅可以提高利润,而且可以大大提高节能减排效率。
Power generation industry as the focus area of the national implementation of energy saving and emission reduction, is not only the creator of quality clean energy, but also the primary energy guzzler and pollution emitters. At present, promoting energy saving and emission reduction of China's power generation industry relies mainly on administrative measures, including the formulation of policies, laws and regulations and the supervision of energy saving work. There are still obvious defects on the scope, manner and extent of energy saving and emission reduction of government's administrative intervention, including insufficient price and fiscal policy incentives, lack of laws, regulations and energy environmental management system. For better realization of China's "the12th Five-Year" energy saving and emission reduction targets, there is an urgent need to establish the long-term emission incentive mechanisms to promote the enterprises participating in a positive and sustainable development, improve the efficiency of electricity energy saving and achieve the power resources optimization configurations. Against this background, this paper studies the impact factors of energy consumption and emissions of power generation, and series of issues on generation cost of energy consumption and emission under the mechanisms of emissions trading mechanism, emission charge and tax mechnism and emission cooperation mechanism, and raises analysis and optimization methods.
Coordination input-output relationship of power industrial chain has an important significance to achieve energy saving and emission reduction. Coal production, power generation, power transmission, power distribution and user demand form power industry chain. The generation energy consumption and emission analysis model is established with system dynamics method to simulate effects of energy consumption and emission in power industry chain from2010to2030. Analysis and simulation results showed that electricity strength, user price, coal consumption rate and the proportion of clean energy power generation were the four important influence factors of energy consumption and emission in power industry. Accordingly, there can be targeted to promote demand side management and guide customers to use electricity in scientific and rational ways, improve boiler efficiency and reduce coal consumption rate, adjust the power structure and improve the proportion of clean energy generation, which can both save coal consumption and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
The emissions right trading of generation is an important part of promoting the development of China's emissions trading market and the development of low-carbon electricity. Considering the emission right trading, the power generation energy consumption and emissions optimization model is established. As the goal of social utility maximization, the model takes into account the power amount constraints, power output constraints, emission constraints, trading constraints, which is the theoretical exploration of the emission rights trading market. However, during the carbon emission trading process, due to higher cost of domestic power generation and lower international carbon trading price level, it is recommended to mix power generation right trading and emission right trading to balance of power generation profits in the early establishment of China's carbon emissions trading market in order to increase the enthusiasm of participating transaction.
Generation emission charge and tax are the important economic means to promote power generation enterprises to participate in energy saving and emission reduction. In the emission fee research, considering enterprise benefits and social benefits, two stage optimization models of energy-consumption and emission were established. In the first stage model, maximums of the social environmental benefits and energy-saving effect were conducted as the objective functions. In the second stage model, maximums of power generation enterprises'profits were conducted as the objective functions with the constraints of KKT conditions of the first stage model. In the emission tax research, a two-stage optimization model for emission tax of coal-fired power plants was established. In the first stage model, minimums of the coal-fired power plants'cost were conducted. In the second stage model, maximums of the social welfare made of consumer surplus and producer surplus were conducted as the objective function. Emissions performance method was used to distribute the emission targets of coal-fired power plants in accordance with the principles of total amount control. The proposed marginal incentive emission tax and charge mechanism not only controlled emissions from the total amount, but also improved emissions treatment initiative of coal-fired power generation enterprises.
Emission cooperation of generation side and supply side is an important way to improve the efficiency of power generation energy saving and emission reduction and raise their profits. Based on cooperation, optimization models of the coal-consumption cost, reserve cost and emission cost of generators were given out considering interruptible loads provided by power supply companies. Then, the Shapley model, as a means of solving multiplayer cooperative game, was applied to allocate profits between the generators and power supply companies. Both sides' cooperation not only raises profits, but also improves the efficiency of energy saving and emission reduction.
引文
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