税收权力论纲
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摘要
权力是社会科学的基本概念。税收是伴随国家产生出现的范畴。税收权力是综合税收与权力而提出的概念。税收权力应该是税收学的基本范畴,在税收体系之中应具有非常重要的地位。人们(社会)在解决了税收权力问题之后,才能开始制定税收制度、税收政策,组建税收机构。所以理解税收权力是理解税收制度、税收政策与税收机构的基础。而税收制度、税收政策又决定了人们的经济等行为,由此产生了税收效应。从动力学角度看,税收权力是税收体系的动力因素,税收权力研究属于税收动力学的领域,是理解税收现象不可缺少的理论基础与理论环节。忽视税收权力,不研究税收权力,就很难理解税收现象的产生来源,很难理解税收领域发展变化的原因。
但是传统税收研究对税收权力多有忽略,没有系统研究税收权力。作者认为,税收权力的系统研究对于推进税收理论的发展是必要的。传统税收理论难以解释税收现象,因为在人们理解税收的框架之中缺乏了税收权力这一环节,或者这一环节过于模糊。事实上,在每一种税收现象背后都有税收权力因素的存在,在税制改革、税务机构改革、税收征管改革、税收管理体制改革等等事件之中都存在着税收权力。传统税收研究对诸如税收制度如何建立,如何发展演化等基本问题都缺乏明确系统的理论框架。为了加深对税收制度的制定、执行与改革等的认识,需要研究税收制度背后的税收权力。
中国十多年前提出的税权范畴是与税收权力最为相关的范畴。但是税权范畴以及围绕其展开的相关研究存在着概念模糊、各种观点对立等问题(参见文献述评的分析),妨碍了人们对税权的深入认识。将税权之中的税收权力独立出来进行专门的研究,很可能是澄清税权研究之中的模糊与混乱,推进税权研究的出路所在。
税收权力研究的基本理论问题包括：税收权力是什么,税收权力是如何产生、建立与运行的,税收权力会带来什么效应,最优税收权力是否存在,具有怎样的特征,如何优化税收权力。
本文将研究的主要内容可以分成三个部分。第一部分是对税收权力机制的讨论,第二部分讨论税收权力的决定、效应与优化。第三部分是利用前面的理论研究中国现实税收权力,探索其优化的途径。
第1章,导论。本章包括论题的提出,文献述评,税收权力研究的理论与实践意义,研究方法,研究思路与逻辑结构,创新与不足六个方面。
第2章,税收权力机制分析。2.1节是权力的一般分析,研究了权力理论的基本问题,包括权力本质、特征、要素分类、形式、范围、权力与权利的关系等。这就为税收权力研究奠定了权力理论基础。2.2节分析税收权力机制,提出税收权力机制。从静态分析与动态分析两个方面对税收权力机制进行了系统研究。讨论了税收权力行为机制,提出税收权力机制由征税-用税机制与传导机制构成,税收权力是在税收权力主体与税收权力客体行为博弈之中实施的。
第3章税收权力的决定。在此之前,在3.1节先一般性地讨论是税收权力的产生,考察了税收权力产生的政治、经济与社会条件,丰富了传统关于税收起源问题的分析。3.2,3.3,3.4三节依次从政治、经济、社会三个侧面(每一个侧面都包含了权利、权力、制度、组织与行为的环节)研究税收权力的决定(每一个社会、国.家或政府如何建立税收权力,税收权力建立之后是如何运行),研究它们对税收立法权、税收执法权、税收司法权与税收使用权的影响。本章在3.5节之中,将它们综合起来,建立了税收权力决定的一个综合框架。税收权力综合决定框架的建立对税收权力机制的决定环节的丰富与展开,是税收权力理论建构的必要环节,也是实现建立具有解释能力的税收权力理论的关键步骤。
第4章分析税收权力效应。本章考虑税收规模与税收使用状况,分析税收权力对政治、经济、社会等的影响。4.1节讨论税收权力的政治效应。分别讨论了税收权力对政治权利、政治权力、政治制度、政治组织与政治行为的影响。对民主税收权力与专制税收权力政治效应的不同做了比较分析。最后,在4.1.5专门讨论了税收权力对政治稳定的影响。4.2节讨论税收权力的经济效应,包括税收权力对经济权利、税收制度、经济组织以及经济运行的影响。税收权力对经济运行的影响分为微观经济效应与宏观经济效应。在宏观经济效应方面,主要讨论了税收权力对经济增长的影响,提出了税收权力影响经济增长的AK模型。在4.2节的最后,对西方经济学关于税收效应认识的混乱与矛盾状况进行了深入分析,探索提出了这些问题的根源,提出从事前理性与事后非理性、自利动机与奥尔森集体行动逻辑来建立包含产权-税收-国家在内的逻辑自洽的经济理论的设想,因此这部分的讨论具有非常重要的理论意义。4.3节研究税收权力的社会效应。本节依次讨论了税收权力对社会权利、社会制度、社会组织、社会行为与社会发展的影响。在4.3.2之中讨论税收权力对社会制度的影响时,对税收权力对非正式制度即文化的影响做了较为丰富的讨论。在4.3.5之中讨论税收权力对社会发展的影响时,讨论了税收权力对社会关系的影响,其中对税收权力影响社会和谐状况的问题进行了相当全面的讨论。
第5章是最优税收权力分析。最优税收权力是税收权力优化的标准与目的。在5.1节对最优税收权力进行了一般分析,对最优税收权力进行了界定,提出了税收权力标准体系。5.2节讨论最优税收权力的宏观政治前提即税权均衡,5.3节从最优税收权力的供需对比角度最优税收权力的必要条件：税收权力供需均衡,5.4节讨论最优税收权力的运行状态,即公正与效率的最优权衡,5.5节从最优税收权力的行为均衡(博弈均衡)与机制设计方面对最优税收权力进行各方面的研究。
第6章,研究中国税收权力优化。6.1节考察中国税收权力发展历程,对中国税收权力的产生、中国封建社会的税收权力,近代中国税收权力以及解放后税收权力的发展历史进行了长程分析,特别是对封建社会税收权力的基本格局进行了概括与归纳。对解放后特别是改革开放之后中国税收权力的发展历程则进行了着重的讨论。6.2节是中国税收权力现状分析。对中国税收权力现状进行了系统的描述,对中国税收权力存在的基本问题进行了确认,并且分析了中国税收权力问题的原因,以及中国税收权力产生的效应。6.3节考察税收权力优化的国际经验,主要考察了其他国家与地区税收权力建设的一些先进经验。6.4节基于对问题的把握以及优化的理论探索,国际经验等讨论中国税收权力优化的基本对策,是全面系统的政策建议。本节提出了中国税收权力优化的基本原则,分别讨论了中国税收立法权、税收执法权、税收司法权与税收使用权优化的基本对策或建议。最后,在6.5节之中讨论了中国税收权力优化动力与前景,简单讨论了中国税收权力优化的现实基础、基本途径,与可能的力量。
本文的可能创新包括研究方法、理论观点与现实研究等方面的创新。
1.多学科综合研究方法
税收权力具有政治性、经济性与社会性,而传统税收理论仅偏重于经济属性的分析,对税收的政治性与社会性的分析很弱,其根源在于忽略了税收背后的权力因素,而权力是政治学与社会学研究的基本问题,因此需要引入政治学与社会学的理论与方法加强对税收政治属性与社会属性的研究,并且在此基础进行综合以把握税收权力的整体性。系统研究税收权力需要综合多学科理论对税收权力的认识。综合的基础是应用各学科的理论与方法研究税收权力所获得各个税收权力命题(判断),然后根据逻辑法则与系统论的思想,将这些命题分类、分层次联系起来,形成一个结构决定效应的综合机制系统。本文运用“结构-行为-效应”的新范式,以实现税收权力综合研究的目标。
2.提出税收权力博弈链概念,拓展了博弈分析博弈链是参与者之间具有权力-权利关系多个密切相关的博弈构成的整体。应用博弈链均衡分析方法,使得博弈论可以分析n-人博弈之中具有“权力-权利”关系的博弈结构。博弈链均衡要求博弈链之中的每一个博弈都同时达到均衡,从而每一个博弈均衡就可能彼此相互影响。博弈链分析方法能解决传统税收博弈只进行单一博弈均衡分析,税收博弈分析很难与优化分析结合的问题,拓展了博弈分析方法。本文应用博弈链研究了税收博弈,提出包括征纳税博弈,纳税用税博弈与用税征税博弈的税收权力博弈链,发现在普通假设之下可以求出税收权力博弈链的均衡策略。
在理论与观点方面,本文有如下可能的创新：
1.创立了税收权力机制的理论框架
文献述评显示税收权力研究至今是理论研究的盲区。本文将税收与权力相结合,从税收制度、税收管理等现象中抽象出税收权力概念,并且进一步从机制角度提出税收权力机制范畴,构建了税收权力机制的理论框架。
(1)静态分析方面,对税收本质与税收权力本质进行了深入的探讨。就税收本质而言,对学界关于税收本质的强制说与交换说评价的基础上,认为应该吸收各自合理之处,即：应该承认强制是税收的保障,而交换是税收价值的必要基础；由此提出税收本质是以强制力作为保障的为获得公共福利而对私人财产与收入进行的征收。就税收权力本质而言,应用权力本质的理论讨论分析税收权力本质,提出税收权力本质不是能力,也不是资源,认为税收权力的本质是一种以私人产权为基础,以强制能力为后盾,围绕税收而建立起来的不对称社会关系。将税收权力与机制相结合,提出了税收权力机制是税收权力要素之间相互作用、制约而形成的稳定的联系模式。
(2)动态分析方面,对税收权力机制作用过程进行了深入的探讨。税收权力机制包括课税机制与传导机制(信息机制、心理行为机制以及变量机制)与用税机制构成。这里拓展了Lewin行为模型,提出了税收权力主体与税收权力客体行为博弈决定税收权力运行与效应的模型。税收权力机制的作用过程可表示为“社会环境变量E→税收权力环境变量Et→税收权力主体与税收权力客体心理变量E1-2/P→税收权力主体与税收权力客体行为变量B1-2→博弈G(B1,B2)→政治、经济与社会变量”之间的作用过程。这个过程可以分为三个阶段,即决定阶段、实施阶段、效应形成阶段。于是税收权力运行就从社会环境影响税收权力,税收权力再反过来影响社会环境,形成一个完整的循环,这就是税收权力循环。税收权力循环的周而复始就构成税收权力周转。税收权力周转是具有重要理论意义的范畴,分析税收权力周转的状态可以评估税收权力的稳定性。
2.构建了税收权力决定理论
(1)提出“权利-权力-制度-组织-行为-绩效”的税收权力决定论范式。“权利-权力-制度-组织-行为-绩效”的范式是一种新的“结构-行为-绩效”范式。这里的结构包括“权利-权力-制度-组织”四个层次。从绩效开始从后向前逆推,绩效是由行为直接决定的。行为由主体组织实施。主体包括个体与组织两类形态,组织是个体的集合,这里只考虑组织对行为的影响。行为与组织的依据是制度(包括非正式制度)。组织依据制度建立与运行,组织内部也有规范成员行为的制度。制度由权力建立,而权力的根源是权利。因此权利对于绩效的影响是初始性的。从行为决定看,行为由权力、权利、制度、组织决定,不同的权利、权力、组织制度会导致不同的行为,应该从这四个方面综合考察行为的实施与变化。这个范式为税收权力的决定与效应带来了一个规范的论述结构或框架。
(2)税收权力决定包括税收权力的政治决定、经济决定与社会决定三个方面。在政治决定方面,提出不同的政治权利结构、政治权力状况、政治制度与政治组织都会影响税收权力的设立,政治行为对税收权力的影响是前面这个方面影响的综合；应用公共选择理论的中位投票人模型,建立了税收权力决定的中位投票人模型。在经济决定方面,综合分析了经济权利格局、经济制度、经济组织与经济行为对税收权力决定的影响,特别是研究了经济增长、经济波动对税收权力的影响。在社会决定方面,深入考察了社会权力、社会权利、社会制度与社会组织等社会因素对税收权力设立与运行状况的影响。最后,本文建立了社会环境系统决定税收权力的综合模型。
3.拓展了税收效应理论
提出并且论证了税收权力具有政治效应、经济效应与社会效应的观点,从而拓展了税收效应理论。
(1)政治效应的创新分析。本文提出税收权力政治效应就是税收权力能够影响政治权利、政治权力、政治制度、政治组织、政治行为与政治稳定。提出了如下一些可能的新观点：税收权力可能影响政党制度的演化；对税收权力对政治稳定的影响进行了系统的研究,将亨廷顿政治稳定理论在税收权力的政治稳定效应上进行了应用,发现其具有分析上的不确定性；良好的税收权力运行会鼓励人们的政治参与,促进政治发展。
(2)经济效应的创新分析。①提出了基于税收权力的经济增长模型。本文将税收对于经济增长的影响发展到税收权力对经济增长的影响,并且用历史事实来加以佐证。提出了基于税收权力的内生经济增长的AK模型,研究了税收权力对经济增长要素的影响机理。比较分析民主税收权力与专制税收权力对经济增长的不同影响,提出专制税收权力之下经济增长波动性很大,而民主税收权力使得经济增长相对稳定。②探讨了传统税收理论关于税收具有负效应观点的局限性。其局限性在于,该观点存在理性上的矛盾,不是逻辑自洽的。福利经济学第一定理暗含着零税均衡状态为最优的假设。因此这是一个零税乌托邦体系,实际上是一种无政府主义的政治哲学,它不认为税收对于维持整个社会健康运行是必要的。本文认为,应该贯彻机会主义假设,结合税收使用分析税收效应。如果根据事前理性的假设,则人类会建立具有正效应的税收权力；但是由于有限理性,可能导致关于税收的集体选择并非理想,事后证明是非理性的；或者由于奥尔森集体行动困境,导致人类难以组织有效的集体行动以致建立起不利于多数社会成员的税收权力与税收制度体系,从而导致税收体系无法带来正效应；或者理性的税收选择也由于税收权力主体的自利行为导致税收权力的异化与偏差,导致税收负效应出现。因此一般而言税收效应应该具有二重性。这就解决了税收效应的传统观点存在的理性矛盾,使税收效应理论在逻辑上更为自洽。
4.创建了最优税收权力分析体系
(1)对税收权力优化的核心问题——最优税收权力进行了系统的研究。提出了最优税收权力标准的体系：它包括税权均衡,税收权力供需均衡,税收权力运行最优税收权力行为均衡、以及最优税收权力效应标准等标准体系。
(2)税权均衡是最优税收权力的政治基础与前提。税权均衡要求税收权力具有正义性；税收权利最大化,包括最大化税收立法参与率；最优化监督税收权力运行权利等标准。税权均衡的制度实现方面提出了零基选举以消除既定权力机构对新时期税收权力设立的不利影响主张,以及其他一整套完善税收权利以消除税收权力异化,导致税权失衡的制度安排。
(3)税收权力供需均衡是在税权均衡前提下税收权力自身的均衡。最优税收权力要求税收权力供给与需求均衡,此时决定的税收负担就是最优宏观税负；要求税收权力缺口最小化,税收权力供需适应性最大化等。提出现实的与理想的税收权力供需均衡概念；认为税收权力优化需要基于理想的收入分配格局,即税收权力应该有利于形成最优的收入分配状况,追求以此为目标形成的税收权力供需均衡才是真正发挥了主观能动性的税收权力优化。
(4)将博弈论与效用分析相结合建立了最优税收权力的博弈链均衡体系。在一般的博弈链均衡基础上,最优税收权力博弈链的均衡分析将博弈链均衡分析与效用分析相结合,将激励相容约束、参与约束与预算平衡联系起来,根据通常的效用函数与公共产品生产函数,得到了最优税率解,最优工资与最优就业结构。最优税收权力博弈链均衡策略就是由这三个最优解决定的。最优税收权力博弈链均衡分析的基本结论是,赋予纳税人参与建立税收权力的权利,他们就会建立一个预算平衡的、可执行的、征税人与用税人获得必要激励的最优税收权力体系。这就是说最优税收权力应该基于博弈链均衡进行有关机制设计。这一结论的前提是赋予纳税人以建立、调整税收权力的权利。因此税收权力优化的机制设计需要建立在民主政治基础上。
在研究现实税收权力方面,本文可能的应用价值是：本文对中国税收权力进行了全面系统的分析。对中国税收权力的发展历史作了一个全景式的描述。从税收权力各环节描述了中国税收权力现状,依据最优税收权力理论把握中国税收权力存在的问题,剖析了税收权力问题的原因,考察了其影响,提出了税收权力的优化对策。在对策方面,强调从完善“政治权利-税收权利”角度优化税收权力。因为税收权力是一个包括税收立法、税收执法、税收司法与税收使用在内的权力体系,因此解决税收权力问题需要综合考虑各环节,使各环节相互配合。
从整体上说,本文的贡献可能在于,将曾经长期被隐藏在税收制度、税收管理背后的税收权力因素凸显出来,系统地阐述了税收权力与政治、经济与社会状况之间的联系与相互作用,这就从广度和深度两方面拓展了税收研究的视野。作者希望本文的思考能够引起研究者的注意,能够由此扩大税收研究的范围,获得更加科学的认识。
Power is a most basic concept in social sciences.Tax category emerged when State came into being. The concept of taxing power is put forward by synthesizing the tax category and the power concept.Taxing power should be a basic category in tax discipline and should possess a very important position in tax system. People (society) can begin to develop the tax system, tax policy, an establish tax agency only after having solved the issue of taxing power. So understand taxing power is necessary to understand tax system, tax policy and taxing power. Then tax system, tax policy determine people's taxes-economic behavior, which will result to tax effects. From the dynamic point of view, taxing power is the power factor of tax systems, is the dynamics for tax sciences, and we can not understand the tax history if we lack the theoretical basis of taxing power. Therefore, taxing power is essential link to understand tax phenomenon. If we ignore the taxing power, it is then difficult for us to understand the phenomenon of tax generation, the reasons for the development and changes of the taxation field.
But the taxing power concept is basically neglected in traditional tax research, and has not yet formed a systematic theory of taxing power. The author believes that the establishment of taxing power theory will be necessary and helpful to promot the development of tax theory. Traditional tax theory is very difficult to explain tax phenomenon because that the key link of taxing power is lacked or too vague in the scholars's framework of understanding tax.Taxing power is ignored to hidden behind thinking. In fact, there exists power factor behind each tax phenomenon--in the reform of tax system and tax policy and tax administration, tax evasion, tax resistance,etc. Traditional tax theory lacks clear theory on such basic issues as how the tax system come from,how the tax system is established. The author think the reason lies in lack of in-depth study of taxing power.To enhance the understanding of development, implementation and reform of tax system,we need to study the taxing power behind the tax system.
Tax regime category which was put forward ten years ago is the category closest to taxing power. But the category exists a lot of problem such as vagueness, contradictions, confusing, and so on (see the analysis of literature review), which has impeded people's understanding of tax regime in-depth.Therefore, we need conduct a special research on taxing power. Special studying of taxing power is a basic work necessary to accomplish task of explaining and understanding tax phenomenon. It is also a necessay work to clarify and change the fuzziness and confusing state in tax regime research, to promote the tax regime research.
To get systematic recognization of taxing power, we need study such basic issues as:what the taxing power is, with what characteristics is has,how the taxing power be generated and established, what effects will happen from taxing power, whether the optimal taxing power exists, and how to solve taxing power problems if them are faced with,and so on.
The main contents of this dissertation can be divided into three parts. The first part is the discussion of the mechanisms of taxing power, and the second section discusses the decision, effects and optimization of taxing power. The third part is the use of previous theoretical result to study Chinese taxing powers, and explore the optimal way to solve problems of Chinese taxing powers.
Chapter 1 is introduction. This chapter includes six aspects:the presentation of topics, the literature review, the theoretical and practical significance of taxing power research, research methods, the train of thinking and logic structure, innovation and inadequacy.
Chapter 2 is a set of analysis of mechanisms of taxing power.2.1 is a general analysis of the power to study the theory of the basic issues of power, including the nature of power, features, elements, classification, form, scope, relations between power and right. Thus a theoretical foundation is laid for the study of taxing power. 2.2 is the analysis of mechanism of taxing power,the taxing power mechanism is the power of the power of the elements, links and interconnected aspects, constraints and role of the principle. And from two aspects of the static analysis and dynamic analysis the taxing power mechanism is analyzed. Taxing power mechanism includes tax-levying mechanism and transmission mechanism with tax using mechanism.
Chapter 3 discusses the taxing power's decision. Discussion of the taxing power's decision is a expansion of taxing power mechanisms analysis,which set up a solid basis for understanding taxing power in-depth. Prior to this, in section 3.1 a general discussion of the first generation of taxing power, and holds taxing power have political, economic and social conditions of generation,thus enrich the traditional analysis of the origin of tax.Then discusses how each country or government authority to establish taxes, after the establishment of the taxing power how to run.This chapter, followed by section 3.2,3.3,3.4,study the taxing power's decision from political, economic, social factors's impact. Political, economic and social factors all contains right, power, institutional, organizational and behavioral contents, which build a systematic frame contains all these various aspects of impacts on determination of taxing power. Section 3.5 puts them together to establish a comprehensive decision model of taxing power, which suggests that political, economic and social factors influence taxing power, the structure of tax power, tax status and exercise of power. To establish a comprehensive decision model of taxing power is a first and great step and it is a necessary part of theory construction to achieve a taxing power theory.
Chapter 4 is discussion of effects of taxing power. By considering the size and using of tax, this chapter analyzes political,economic, and.social impact of taxing power. Section 4.1 discusses the political effect of taxing power. Taxing power can affects political rights, political power, political system, political organization and political behavior. The difference of political effects of autocratic and democratic taxing authority is made in a comparative method. Finally,4.1.5 is devoted to the discussion of impact on political stability of taxing power. Section 4.2 discusses the economic effects including the impacts of economic rights, economic systems, economic organizations and economic operation of taxing power. The impact on economic performance from taxing power is divided into micro-economic effects and macroeconomic effects. At the macroeconomic effects, the tax impact on economic growth authority mainly is discussed, AK growth model based on taxing power is raised. In the final part of section 4.2, the limitation of tax effect view in Western economics is analyzed in-depth, points out the existing contradictions and the utopian nature should be solved by recognize both positive and negative effects of the taxing power, and not blindly believe that it will bring negative effects of tax, 'that zero tax equals the optimal state. Section 4.3 studies the social effects of taxing power. This section discusses the impacts of social rights, social system, social organization, social behavior and social development from taxing power.And in 4.3.2, the impact on social system, social informal (cultural) system is discussed in detail. Discussion in 4.3.5 is impact on social development of taxing power, includes the impact on social relations,social harmony of taxing power, though brief, but very thorough discussion is made, and then discuss impacts on the population, including population size, population quality, population structure and population flows from taxing power. Impact of demographic situation and social relations from taxing powers belong to the overall impact on society, it sums up to effect on social development from taxing power.
Chapter 5 is the analysis of optimal taxing power which is criteria of taxing power optimization. In section 5.1, a general analysis on optimal taxing power is defined,and the standards of the optimal taxing power is proposed. After the macro-political premise of equilibrium between taxing powers and taxation rights, equilibrium of optimal taxing power supply and demand (static point of view), the optimal operating state of taxing power--the optimal tradeoff of justice and efficiency, optimal behavioral equilibrium (game equilibrium) and mechanism design of various aspects of optimal taxing powers are discussed in turn.
Section 5.2 discusses taxing regime equilibrium which is the political prerequisite of optimal taxing power, proposes that taxing regime equilibrium means equilibrium between state taxing powers and citizens'taxation rights. From the angle of human nature, bounded rationality, etc., the necessity of restricting taxing power with system implementation is discussed. In the realization of the institutional arrangement of taxing regime equilibrium, equilibrium between all kinds of citizen taxation rights and taxing legislative power is discussed. To prevent alienation of taxing legislative power, a thought of zero-base (neutral) election is especially proposed, which should be thought of vital importance.
Section 5.3 analyzes the optimal taxing power from the angle of equilibrium between supply and demand based on taxing regime equilibrium. In static analysis, the optimal taxing power must meet a balance between taxing power supply and demand. In this section, we firstly discuss concepts related with balance of taxing power supply and demand, among which main are taxing power supplies, taxing power demand and balance between supply and demand of taxing power. Then we study the taxing power optimization and disequilibrium taxing power, the actual equilibrium and ideal equilibrium of taxing power supply and demand is put forward and discussed,which will can further optimize taxing power.
5.4 section discusses the optimal tradeoff between justice and efficiency of state taxing power. This section suggest there may exist contradiction between operation efficiency and operation justice of taxing power, therefore it is necessary to make a optimal tradeoff. The solution should be tax basis, as highly effective as possible in the exercise of. taxing power without violation of operation justice. Thus we should apply to the principle of taking care of the weaks and keeping in reasonable caution, which means not toviolate justice and fair tax-using and to implement taxlevying power, judicial power and tax using power as highly effective as possible.
5.5 section analyzes the optimal taxing power from behavioral equilibrium. This section mainly adopts game analysis method, and combines it with utility analysis to establish an optimal equilibrium strategies of taxing power system, which is actually a design of optimal taxing power contract.
Chapter 6 is a research of optimization of Chinese taxing power. Using the theoretical framework established in previous chapters,this chapter devotes to study Chinese taxing power to explore the source of taxing power problems, to search for ways and solutions to optimize Chinese taxing power. This chapter is divided into 5 sections.
Section 6.1 investigates the development history of Chinese taxing power from the generation, through China's feudal society, and modern China,until post-liberation,thus makes a long-range analysis, especially summarize the basic pattern of feudal taxing power. The discussion mainly focuses on the development of Chinese taxing power after liberation, especially after the reform and opening.
Section 6.2 is analysis of the status quo of Chinese taxing power. Status quo of China taxing power is described systematically, the basic problems of the existing China taxing power confirmed, and the reasons of Chinese taxing power problems and effect of Chinese taxing power analyzed.
Section 6.3,the international experience of optimization of taxing power. It analyze and summarizes advanced experiences in construction of taxing power from other countries and regions. From aspects of tax legislative, tax law enforcement powers, tax jurisdiction,and tax-using power, outline of typical international experiences has been described in a roughly simple style.
Section 6.4 discuss method and treatments to solve the problem based on optimization theory.The set of countermeasures of taxing power optimization is a comprehensive systematic policy suggestions.Basic principles of optimization of taxing power are put forward in this section, and proposals to optimize Chinses tax legislative power and tax law enforcement power, tax judicial power and tax-using power are respectively discussed.
Finally, Section 6.5 discusses the dynamics and prospects of the optimization of Chinese taxing power among the optimal power, briefly discusses realistic basis,basic approaches, and possible dynamics.
Possible innovation may be classified to innovation of research methods and that of theoretical development:
1.Application of interdisciplinary research method into taxing power
Taxing powers have many features,so it is necessary to synthesize these multi-disciplinary intellectual knowledge of the taxing power into an entirety. Comprehensive study can be used to not only avoid improper simplification of understanding taxing power due to local analysis, but also to research relationship of taxing power and tax environment at the appropriate level. We need to build taxing power theory based on comprehensive multiple disciplines.
2.Concept of taxing power game chain is put forward to solve taxing power game equilibrium
While using the game theory method to research taxing power optimization, combining concept of initiative game and related game, the game chain concept is put forward and is used to analyze the optimization of taxing power. Using game chain analysis,we can advance the local game equilibrium of traditional game analysis into general game equilibrium among three and above people.
Possible innovation of theory and viewpoints may be listed as follows:
Literature review of tax regime study so far has displayed blind spots of the tax theoretical study. This paper combins politics, economics, sociology disciplines into taxing power study. The taxing power concept is abstracted from tax system, tax management phenomenon etc., and further proposes taxing power mechanism category from mechanism angles, to construct a theoretical framework of taxing power mechanism.
1. Establishing a theoretical framework of taxing power mechanism
(1) In static analysis, the understanding of tax nature is promoted. After absorption the reasonable components of tax nature theory exists in academic circle from coersion school and transaction school of tax nature,the author points that the coersion bases on the political force as backing is necessary to take resources from people who own private property, while nature of transaction is more necessary in order to satisfy public need. Thus tax in essence is taking resources from private people and organization to meet public need. The nature of taxing power is a kind of asymmetric social relations backed on compulsory ability. In the dynamic analysis, tax power mechanism which consist of tax-levying mechanism and transmission mechanism is proposed.The process of taxing power mechanism is divided into three stages of decision, implementation and effect formation. The process from the decision to effect formation makes a complete cycle which can be called as taxing power cycle. Round and round of taxing power cycle constitutes a'taxing power turnover.
(2) From the dynamic perspective, taxing power mechanism consists of two sub-systems:tax-levying mechanism and tax-using mechanism and transmission mechanism.Taxing power. transmission.mechanism includes information mechanism, psychological behavior mechanism as well as the variable mechanism.Here a newly expanded Lewin behavior model is put forward to explain the psychological behavior mechanism. The social role process of taxing power mechanism can be described as thus:"environment variable E→taxing power environment variable Et→psychological variables of taxing power subjects and taxing power objects E1-2/P→taxing power subject and object of taxing power behavioral variables Bl-2→game G (B1, B2)→political, economic, and social effects variables".So the whole process can be divided as three stages—decision stage, implementation stage and effects-forming stage.Hence from influence social environment to taxing power,return again ot influence social environment, to form a complete circle, which can be called as taxing power cycle.Round and round of taxing power cycle constitute taxing power turnover.Taxing power turnover is a theory category of significance, analysis of state taxing power flow can be used to assess the stability of the existing taxing power.
2.The theoretical framework of determination of taxing power is established and is of significance
(1) A new structure-behavior-performance paradigm is put forward to discuss taxing power determination
The "right-power-system- organization-conduct-performance" paradigm is a kind of new'structure-behavior-performance'paradigm,which the structure here means"right-power-system-organization"system.Tracking from performance to front right,the performances i.e. effects, is determined in the process of behaviors implementation; behaviors is implemented by organizations or individuals, organizations is a collection of individuals, but also operating units; organizations are established and operated according to systems (including culture); systems are established by powers, and the source of powers are rights. Therefore, the performance of the state taxing power is finally decided by rights. Right, power, system, organization and behavior all have political, economic and social content, which can make a normative discourse structure.
(2) The taxing decision of taxing power include three aspects of political decision, economic decision and social decision. In political decision, the dissertation holds that different political rights structure, political power status, political system and political organization will bring about differentl influences on establishment of taxing power, the effect of political behaviors is a comprehensive result from those several aspects mentioned above.Applying public choice theory, the median voter model of taxing power to decide is established. The economic decision of taxing power is actually influence of economic factors(including economic rights pattern, economic powers,economic systems, economic organizations and economic activities,economic development)on the establishment and operation of taxing power. Social decision of taxing power mainly studies the influence on taxing power from social rights,social power, social systems and social organizations,which will influence the establishment and operation of taxing power, and should not be ignored. After discussion of effects of various aspects, this chapter finally creates a synthetical decision model of taxing power from the angle of system.
3. The expansion of tax effect theory
taxing power effect has three aspects of political, economic and social effects thus expanding the traditional tax effect theory.
(1) Innovative alysis of political effects of taxing power
In this dissertation, tax power political effect is proposed to means the effect that taxing power can affect political rights, political power, political system, political organizations, political behavior and political stability. The political stability influence from taxing power is particularlly discussed.Applying Huntington's political stability theory in taxing power, and find that there exists some uncertainty in analysis and points for his political stability theory.
(2)Innovative analysis of economic effects
①This dissertation presents a model of endogenous economic growth,and advances to build endogenous economic growth of AK model based on taxing power, promotes economic growth model based on tax to that basded on taxing power, study the influence on economic growth factors from taxing power, and the influence mechanism.It compares the different influence from democratic taxing power and autocratic taxing power on economic growth, the author believes economic growth under autocratic taxing power is more volatile, and that under democratic taxing power power is more relatively stable.
②Second, the limitations of views of negative tax effect in new classic taxation theory is discussed, and point out that this view exists a rationality contradiction, and should not be accepted for self-consistent logic economic theory.The first theorem of welfare economics holds perfectly competitive equilibrium is the best pareto optimal equilibrium,which assumes zero-tax optimal economic state. This means a zero-tax utopia system, don't consider the possible positive value of tax for healthy operation of entire society, which is actually an anarchic political philosophy. We should implement actualist hypothesis and analyze the tax effects combining with tax using; puts forward rational view human will establish a positive effect of taxing power according to beforehand rationality; The taxing power bring about negative effects due to bounded rationality proved as afterward irationality, due to self-interest motive which lead taxing power to deviation and alienation, and difficult to organize effective collective action to avert tax deviation and alienation because of Olsenian collective action dilemma which can keep society in a rigid. Therefore tax effect is generally of duality. This would solve the rationality contradiction existing in traditional opinion of tax effect, and let taxation theory be more self-consistent logic.
4.Construction of theoretic analysis system of optimal taxing power
(1)The core of optimizing taxing powers-optimal taxing power is systematically studied. And optimal taxing power standards are raised as: equilibrium of tax regime, equilibrium of taxing power supply and demand, optimal running of taxing power, and optimal taxing power effect standard etc. Equilibrium of tax regime balance is the political basis of optimal taxing power. Perspective of supply and demand equilibrium of the taxing power, made the reality and the ideal balance between supply and demand concept of the taxing power; make optimal trade-off of taxing power fairness and exercise efficiency; with game theory and utility analysis combined,the optimal of taxing power is established based on game equilibrium system.
(2)The tax regime equilibrium is a political foundation and prerequisite for optimal taxing power. The tax regime equilibrium requires with justice; maximizing taxation rights, including participating proportion in taxation legislation,and optimization rights of supervising the running of taxing power, etc.System realization of tax regime equilibrium is proposed to held the zero-base election in new period to eliminate the adverse effect from given authority to the taxing power.
(3)Under the premise of tax regime equilibrium analysis, equilibrium of taxing power supply and demand is required for taxing power itself to the optimal taxing power, the tax burden decided while taxing power supply and demand meet to reach equilibrium is the optimal macro tax burden; the optimal taxing power need to minimize tax power gap between supply and demand. Concepts of real and ideal taxing power supply and demand equilibrium is proposed; optimization of taxing power should be realized on the basis of ideal pattern of income distribution, namely taxing power should promote the formation of optimal income distribution.
(4)With game theory and utility analysis combined,optimal taxing powers can be established in theory on the basis of game equilibrium. With game between taxcollectors and taxpayers, and game between taxpayers and taxusers and game between taxuser and taxcollectors combined, a new concept of taxing power game chain is proposed, which is proved to be necessary to establish optimal taxing power. With equilibrium of game chain and utility analysis combined, taking incentive compatible constraint, participation constraint and budget balance constraint into consideration, using common utility function and public product production function, the existence of solutions for the optimal tax rate is obtained, which shows that the optimal wage and optimal employment structure necessary for the optimal running of taxing power exist. Thus we find we can find optimal tax power game chain equilibrium through utility analysis.The basic conclusion of the optimal taxing power game chain equilibrium analysis is that--given taxpayers rights to establish taxing power, they will establish a budget-balanced, executable optimal tax power system, within which taxusers and taxcollectors can obtain necessary sufficient incentive. The optimal taxing power is built on the basis of all relatively independent games equilibrium.So basic ways to solve the problems of traditional tax game analysis is proposed,and achieve the optimal tax burden, the optimal wages of taxcollectors'and taxusers'and best employment structure through combination of game analysis and utility analysis, which is proved to be able to establish an executable, budget balancable operating mechanism of optimal taxing power.Mechanism of optimal taxing power should be designed on the necessary basis of political system and economic rights.
5.Possible Innovation in Positive and Countermeasure Research
This dissertation has carried a comprehensive systematic analysis to Chinese taxing power. It has made a panoram-like description on Chinese taxing power's historical development and present situation from its four links, determined the problems existing in Chinese taxing power according to optimal taxing power theory, analyzed the reasons and the influence of these problems,and proposed a set of optimizational countermeasures. In the countermeasure aspect, this dissertation emphasizes to optimize taxing power from the angle of optimizing "political rights-taxation right". Because the taxing power is a huge system including tax legislation, tax law enforcement, tax judicature and tax-using power, therefore we should solve these taxing power problems through a comprehensive consideration of various aspects and links and causing various them to coordinate mutually.
Overally speaking, the main contribution of this article possibly lies in that it highlights taxing power factor which has been hiddened behind taxation system and tax administration for a long time, and makes a systematic elaboration of relation between taxing power and political, economical and social condition, thus greatly expands the vision of tax research field. The author hopes that concerning thoughts developed in this article can bring to researcher's attention, and can expand the scope of tax research to obtain a more scientific understanding.
但是传统税收研究对税收权力多有忽略,没有系统研究税收权力。作者认为,税收权力的系统研究对于推进税收理论的发展是必要的。传统税收理论难以解释税收现象,因为在人们理解税收的框架之中缺乏了税收权力这一环节,或者这一环节过于模糊。事实上,在每一种税收现象背后都有税收权力因素的存在,在税制改革、税务机构改革、税收征管改革、税收管理体制改革等等事件之中都存在着税收权力。传统税收研究对诸如税收制度如何建立,如何发展演化等基本问题都缺乏明确系统的理论框架。为了加深对税收制度的制定、执行与改革等的认识,需要研究税收制度背后的税收权力。
中国十多年前提出的税权范畴是与税收权力最为相关的范畴。但是税权范畴以及围绕其展开的相关研究存在着概念模糊、各种观点对立等问题(参见文献述评的分析),妨碍了人们对税权的深入认识。将税权之中的税收权力独立出来进行专门的研究,很可能是澄清税权研究之中的模糊与混乱,推进税权研究的出路所在。
税收权力研究的基本理论问题包括：税收权力是什么,税收权力是如何产生、建立与运行的,税收权力会带来什么效应,最优税收权力是否存在,具有怎样的特征,如何优化税收权力。
本文将研究的主要内容可以分成三个部分。第一部分是对税收权力机制的讨论,第二部分讨论税收权力的决定、效应与优化。第三部分是利用前面的理论研究中国现实税收权力,探索其优化的途径。
第1章,导论。本章包括论题的提出,文献述评,税收权力研究的理论与实践意义,研究方法,研究思路与逻辑结构,创新与不足六个方面。
第2章,税收权力机制分析。2.1节是权力的一般分析,研究了权力理论的基本问题,包括权力本质、特征、要素分类、形式、范围、权力与权利的关系等。这就为税收权力研究奠定了权力理论基础。2.2节分析税收权力机制,提出税收权力机制。从静态分析与动态分析两个方面对税收权力机制进行了系统研究。讨论了税收权力行为机制,提出税收权力机制由征税-用税机制与传导机制构成,税收权力是在税收权力主体与税收权力客体行为博弈之中实施的。
第3章税收权力的决定。在此之前,在3.1节先一般性地讨论是税收权力的产生,考察了税收权力产生的政治、经济与社会条件,丰富了传统关于税收起源问题的分析。3.2,3.3,3.4三节依次从政治、经济、社会三个侧面(每一个侧面都包含了权利、权力、制度、组织与行为的环节)研究税收权力的决定(每一个社会、国.家或政府如何建立税收权力,税收权力建立之后是如何运行),研究它们对税收立法权、税收执法权、税收司法权与税收使用权的影响。本章在3.5节之中,将它们综合起来,建立了税收权力决定的一个综合框架。税收权力综合决定框架的建立对税收权力机制的决定环节的丰富与展开,是税收权力理论建构的必要环节,也是实现建立具有解释能力的税收权力理论的关键步骤。
第4章分析税收权力效应。本章考虑税收规模与税收使用状况,分析税收权力对政治、经济、社会等的影响。4.1节讨论税收权力的政治效应。分别讨论了税收权力对政治权利、政治权力、政治制度、政治组织与政治行为的影响。对民主税收权力与专制税收权力政治效应的不同做了比较分析。最后,在4.1.5专门讨论了税收权力对政治稳定的影响。4.2节讨论税收权力的经济效应,包括税收权力对经济权利、税收制度、经济组织以及经济运行的影响。税收权力对经济运行的影响分为微观经济效应与宏观经济效应。在宏观经济效应方面,主要讨论了税收权力对经济增长的影响,提出了税收权力影响经济增长的AK模型。在4.2节的最后,对西方经济学关于税收效应认识的混乱与矛盾状况进行了深入分析,探索提出了这些问题的根源,提出从事前理性与事后非理性、自利动机与奥尔森集体行动逻辑来建立包含产权-税收-国家在内的逻辑自洽的经济理论的设想,因此这部分的讨论具有非常重要的理论意义。4.3节研究税收权力的社会效应。本节依次讨论了税收权力对社会权利、社会制度、社会组织、社会行为与社会发展的影响。在4.3.2之中讨论税收权力对社会制度的影响时,对税收权力对非正式制度即文化的影响做了较为丰富的讨论。在4.3.5之中讨论税收权力对社会发展的影响时,讨论了税收权力对社会关系的影响,其中对税收权力影响社会和谐状况的问题进行了相当全面的讨论。
第5章是最优税收权力分析。最优税收权力是税收权力优化的标准与目的。在5.1节对最优税收权力进行了一般分析,对最优税收权力进行了界定,提出了税收权力标准体系。5.2节讨论最优税收权力的宏观政治前提即税权均衡,5.3节从最优税收权力的供需对比角度最优税收权力的必要条件：税收权力供需均衡,5.4节讨论最优税收权力的运行状态,即公正与效率的最优权衡,5.5节从最优税收权力的行为均衡(博弈均衡)与机制设计方面对最优税收权力进行各方面的研究。
第6章,研究中国税收权力优化。6.1节考察中国税收权力发展历程,对中国税收权力的产生、中国封建社会的税收权力,近代中国税收权力以及解放后税收权力的发展历史进行了长程分析,特别是对封建社会税收权力的基本格局进行了概括与归纳。对解放后特别是改革开放之后中国税收权力的发展历程则进行了着重的讨论。6.2节是中国税收权力现状分析。对中国税收权力现状进行了系统的描述,对中国税收权力存在的基本问题进行了确认,并且分析了中国税收权力问题的原因,以及中国税收权力产生的效应。6.3节考察税收权力优化的国际经验,主要考察了其他国家与地区税收权力建设的一些先进经验。6.4节基于对问题的把握以及优化的理论探索,国际经验等讨论中国税收权力优化的基本对策,是全面系统的政策建议。本节提出了中国税收权力优化的基本原则,分别讨论了中国税收立法权、税收执法权、税收司法权与税收使用权优化的基本对策或建议。最后,在6.5节之中讨论了中国税收权力优化动力与前景,简单讨论了中国税收权力优化的现实基础、基本途径,与可能的力量。
本文的可能创新包括研究方法、理论观点与现实研究等方面的创新。
1.多学科综合研究方法
税收权力具有政治性、经济性与社会性,而传统税收理论仅偏重于经济属性的分析,对税收的政治性与社会性的分析很弱,其根源在于忽略了税收背后的权力因素,而权力是政治学与社会学研究的基本问题,因此需要引入政治学与社会学的理论与方法加强对税收政治属性与社会属性的研究,并且在此基础进行综合以把握税收权力的整体性。系统研究税收权力需要综合多学科理论对税收权力的认识。综合的基础是应用各学科的理论与方法研究税收权力所获得各个税收权力命题(判断),然后根据逻辑法则与系统论的思想,将这些命题分类、分层次联系起来,形成一个结构决定效应的综合机制系统。本文运用“结构-行为-效应”的新范式,以实现税收权力综合研究的目标。
2.提出税收权力博弈链概念,拓展了博弈分析博弈链是参与者之间具有权力-权利关系多个密切相关的博弈构成的整体。应用博弈链均衡分析方法,使得博弈论可以分析n-人博弈之中具有“权力-权利”关系的博弈结构。博弈链均衡要求博弈链之中的每一个博弈都同时达到均衡,从而每一个博弈均衡就可能彼此相互影响。博弈链分析方法能解决传统税收博弈只进行单一博弈均衡分析,税收博弈分析很难与优化分析结合的问题,拓展了博弈分析方法。本文应用博弈链研究了税收博弈,提出包括征纳税博弈,纳税用税博弈与用税征税博弈的税收权力博弈链,发现在普通假设之下可以求出税收权力博弈链的均衡策略。
在理论与观点方面,本文有如下可能的创新：
1.创立了税收权力机制的理论框架
文献述评显示税收权力研究至今是理论研究的盲区。本文将税收与权力相结合,从税收制度、税收管理等现象中抽象出税收权力概念,并且进一步从机制角度提出税收权力机制范畴,构建了税收权力机制的理论框架。
(1)静态分析方面,对税收本质与税收权力本质进行了深入的探讨。就税收本质而言,对学界关于税收本质的强制说与交换说评价的基础上,认为应该吸收各自合理之处,即：应该承认强制是税收的保障,而交换是税收价值的必要基础；由此提出税收本质是以强制力作为保障的为获得公共福利而对私人财产与收入进行的征收。就税收权力本质而言,应用权力本质的理论讨论分析税收权力本质,提出税收权力本质不是能力,也不是资源,认为税收权力的本质是一种以私人产权为基础,以强制能力为后盾,围绕税收而建立起来的不对称社会关系。将税收权力与机制相结合,提出了税收权力机制是税收权力要素之间相互作用、制约而形成的稳定的联系模式。
(2)动态分析方面,对税收权力机制作用过程进行了深入的探讨。税收权力机制包括课税机制与传导机制(信息机制、心理行为机制以及变量机制)与用税机制构成。这里拓展了Lewin行为模型,提出了税收权力主体与税收权力客体行为博弈决定税收权力运行与效应的模型。税收权力机制的作用过程可表示为“社会环境变量E→税收权力环境变量Et→税收权力主体与税收权力客体心理变量E1-2/P→税收权力主体与税收权力客体行为变量B1-2→博弈G(B1,B2)→政治、经济与社会变量”之间的作用过程。这个过程可以分为三个阶段,即决定阶段、实施阶段、效应形成阶段。于是税收权力运行就从社会环境影响税收权力,税收权力再反过来影响社会环境,形成一个完整的循环,这就是税收权力循环。税收权力循环的周而复始就构成税收权力周转。税收权力周转是具有重要理论意义的范畴,分析税收权力周转的状态可以评估税收权力的稳定性。
2.构建了税收权力决定理论
(1)提出“权利-权力-制度-组织-行为-绩效”的税收权力决定论范式。“权利-权力-制度-组织-行为-绩效”的范式是一种新的“结构-行为-绩效”范式。这里的结构包括“权利-权力-制度-组织”四个层次。从绩效开始从后向前逆推,绩效是由行为直接决定的。行为由主体组织实施。主体包括个体与组织两类形态,组织是个体的集合,这里只考虑组织对行为的影响。行为与组织的依据是制度(包括非正式制度)。组织依据制度建立与运行,组织内部也有规范成员行为的制度。制度由权力建立,而权力的根源是权利。因此权利对于绩效的影响是初始性的。从行为决定看,行为由权力、权利、制度、组织决定,不同的权利、权力、组织制度会导致不同的行为,应该从这四个方面综合考察行为的实施与变化。这个范式为税收权力的决定与效应带来了一个规范的论述结构或框架。
(2)税收权力决定包括税收权力的政治决定、经济决定与社会决定三个方面。在政治决定方面,提出不同的政治权利结构、政治权力状况、政治制度与政治组织都会影响税收权力的设立,政治行为对税收权力的影响是前面这个方面影响的综合；应用公共选择理论的中位投票人模型,建立了税收权力决定的中位投票人模型。在经济决定方面,综合分析了经济权利格局、经济制度、经济组织与经济行为对税收权力决定的影响,特别是研究了经济增长、经济波动对税收权力的影响。在社会决定方面,深入考察了社会权力、社会权利、社会制度与社会组织等社会因素对税收权力设立与运行状况的影响。最后,本文建立了社会环境系统决定税收权力的综合模型。
3.拓展了税收效应理论
提出并且论证了税收权力具有政治效应、经济效应与社会效应的观点,从而拓展了税收效应理论。
(1)政治效应的创新分析。本文提出税收权力政治效应就是税收权力能够影响政治权利、政治权力、政治制度、政治组织、政治行为与政治稳定。提出了如下一些可能的新观点：税收权力可能影响政党制度的演化；对税收权力对政治稳定的影响进行了系统的研究,将亨廷顿政治稳定理论在税收权力的政治稳定效应上进行了应用,发现其具有分析上的不确定性；良好的税收权力运行会鼓励人们的政治参与,促进政治发展。
(2)经济效应的创新分析。①提出了基于税收权力的经济增长模型。本文将税收对于经济增长的影响发展到税收权力对经济增长的影响,并且用历史事实来加以佐证。提出了基于税收权力的内生经济增长的AK模型,研究了税收权力对经济增长要素的影响机理。比较分析民主税收权力与专制税收权力对经济增长的不同影响,提出专制税收权力之下经济增长波动性很大,而民主税收权力使得经济增长相对稳定。②探讨了传统税收理论关于税收具有负效应观点的局限性。其局限性在于,该观点存在理性上的矛盾,不是逻辑自洽的。福利经济学第一定理暗含着零税均衡状态为最优的假设。因此这是一个零税乌托邦体系,实际上是一种无政府主义的政治哲学,它不认为税收对于维持整个社会健康运行是必要的。本文认为,应该贯彻机会主义假设,结合税收使用分析税收效应。如果根据事前理性的假设,则人类会建立具有正效应的税收权力；但是由于有限理性,可能导致关于税收的集体选择并非理想,事后证明是非理性的；或者由于奥尔森集体行动困境,导致人类难以组织有效的集体行动以致建立起不利于多数社会成员的税收权力与税收制度体系,从而导致税收体系无法带来正效应；或者理性的税收选择也由于税收权力主体的自利行为导致税收权力的异化与偏差,导致税收负效应出现。因此一般而言税收效应应该具有二重性。这就解决了税收效应的传统观点存在的理性矛盾,使税收效应理论在逻辑上更为自洽。
4.创建了最优税收权力分析体系
(1)对税收权力优化的核心问题——最优税收权力进行了系统的研究。提出了最优税收权力标准的体系：它包括税权均衡,税收权力供需均衡,税收权力运行最优税收权力行为均衡、以及最优税收权力效应标准等标准体系。
(2)税权均衡是最优税收权力的政治基础与前提。税权均衡要求税收权力具有正义性；税收权利最大化,包括最大化税收立法参与率；最优化监督税收权力运行权利等标准。税权均衡的制度实现方面提出了零基选举以消除既定权力机构对新时期税收权力设立的不利影响主张,以及其他一整套完善税收权利以消除税收权力异化,导致税权失衡的制度安排。
(3)税收权力供需均衡是在税权均衡前提下税收权力自身的均衡。最优税收权力要求税收权力供给与需求均衡,此时决定的税收负担就是最优宏观税负；要求税收权力缺口最小化,税收权力供需适应性最大化等。提出现实的与理想的税收权力供需均衡概念；认为税收权力优化需要基于理想的收入分配格局,即税收权力应该有利于形成最优的收入分配状况,追求以此为目标形成的税收权力供需均衡才是真正发挥了主观能动性的税收权力优化。
(4)将博弈论与效用分析相结合建立了最优税收权力的博弈链均衡体系。在一般的博弈链均衡基础上,最优税收权力博弈链的均衡分析将博弈链均衡分析与效用分析相结合,将激励相容约束、参与约束与预算平衡联系起来,根据通常的效用函数与公共产品生产函数,得到了最优税率解,最优工资与最优就业结构。最优税收权力博弈链均衡策略就是由这三个最优解决定的。最优税收权力博弈链均衡分析的基本结论是,赋予纳税人参与建立税收权力的权利,他们就会建立一个预算平衡的、可执行的、征税人与用税人获得必要激励的最优税收权力体系。这就是说最优税收权力应该基于博弈链均衡进行有关机制设计。这一结论的前提是赋予纳税人以建立、调整税收权力的权利。因此税收权力优化的机制设计需要建立在民主政治基础上。
在研究现实税收权力方面,本文可能的应用价值是：本文对中国税收权力进行了全面系统的分析。对中国税收权力的发展历史作了一个全景式的描述。从税收权力各环节描述了中国税收权力现状,依据最优税收权力理论把握中国税收权力存在的问题,剖析了税收权力问题的原因,考察了其影响,提出了税收权力的优化对策。在对策方面,强调从完善“政治权利-税收权利”角度优化税收权力。因为税收权力是一个包括税收立法、税收执法、税收司法与税收使用在内的权力体系,因此解决税收权力问题需要综合考虑各环节,使各环节相互配合。
从整体上说,本文的贡献可能在于,将曾经长期被隐藏在税收制度、税收管理背后的税收权力因素凸显出来,系统地阐述了税收权力与政治、经济与社会状况之间的联系与相互作用,这就从广度和深度两方面拓展了税收研究的视野。作者希望本文的思考能够引起研究者的注意,能够由此扩大税收研究的范围,获得更加科学的认识。
Power is a most basic concept in social sciences.Tax category emerged when State came into being. The concept of taxing power is put forward by synthesizing the tax category and the power concept.Taxing power should be a basic category in tax discipline and should possess a very important position in tax system. People (society) can begin to develop the tax system, tax policy, an establish tax agency only after having solved the issue of taxing power. So understand taxing power is necessary to understand tax system, tax policy and taxing power. Then tax system, tax policy determine people's taxes-economic behavior, which will result to tax effects. From the dynamic point of view, taxing power is the power factor of tax systems, is the dynamics for tax sciences, and we can not understand the tax history if we lack the theoretical basis of taxing power. Therefore, taxing power is essential link to understand tax phenomenon. If we ignore the taxing power, it is then difficult for us to understand the phenomenon of tax generation, the reasons for the development and changes of the taxation field.
But the taxing power concept is basically neglected in traditional tax research, and has not yet formed a systematic theory of taxing power. The author believes that the establishment of taxing power theory will be necessary and helpful to promot the development of tax theory. Traditional tax theory is very difficult to explain tax phenomenon because that the key link of taxing power is lacked or too vague in the scholars's framework of understanding tax.Taxing power is ignored to hidden behind thinking. In fact, there exists power factor behind each tax phenomenon--in the reform of tax system and tax policy and tax administration, tax evasion, tax resistance,etc. Traditional tax theory lacks clear theory on such basic issues as how the tax system come from,how the tax system is established. The author think the reason lies in lack of in-depth study of taxing power.To enhance the understanding of development, implementation and reform of tax system,we need to study the taxing power behind the tax system.
Tax regime category which was put forward ten years ago is the category closest to taxing power. But the category exists a lot of problem such as vagueness, contradictions, confusing, and so on (see the analysis of literature review), which has impeded people's understanding of tax regime in-depth.Therefore, we need conduct a special research on taxing power. Special studying of taxing power is a basic work necessary to accomplish task of explaining and understanding tax phenomenon. It is also a necessay work to clarify and change the fuzziness and confusing state in tax regime research, to promote the tax regime research.
To get systematic recognization of taxing power, we need study such basic issues as:what the taxing power is, with what characteristics is has,how the taxing power be generated and established, what effects will happen from taxing power, whether the optimal taxing power exists, and how to solve taxing power problems if them are faced with,and so on.
The main contents of this dissertation can be divided into three parts. The first part is the discussion of the mechanisms of taxing power, and the second section discusses the decision, effects and optimization of taxing power. The third part is the use of previous theoretical result to study Chinese taxing powers, and explore the optimal way to solve problems of Chinese taxing powers.
Chapter 1 is introduction. This chapter includes six aspects:the presentation of topics, the literature review, the theoretical and practical significance of taxing power research, research methods, the train of thinking and logic structure, innovation and inadequacy.
Chapter 2 is a set of analysis of mechanisms of taxing power.2.1 is a general analysis of the power to study the theory of the basic issues of power, including the nature of power, features, elements, classification, form, scope, relations between power and right. Thus a theoretical foundation is laid for the study of taxing power. 2.2 is the analysis of mechanism of taxing power,the taxing power mechanism is the power of the power of the elements, links and interconnected aspects, constraints and role of the principle. And from two aspects of the static analysis and dynamic analysis the taxing power mechanism is analyzed. Taxing power mechanism includes tax-levying mechanism and transmission mechanism with tax using mechanism.
Chapter 3 discusses the taxing power's decision. Discussion of the taxing power's decision is a expansion of taxing power mechanisms analysis,which set up a solid basis for understanding taxing power in-depth. Prior to this, in section 3.1 a general discussion of the first generation of taxing power, and holds taxing power have political, economic and social conditions of generation,thus enrich the traditional analysis of the origin of tax.Then discusses how each country or government authority to establish taxes, after the establishment of the taxing power how to run.This chapter, followed by section 3.2,3.3,3.4,study the taxing power's decision from political, economic, social factors's impact. Political, economic and social factors all contains right, power, institutional, organizational and behavioral contents, which build a systematic frame contains all these various aspects of impacts on determination of taxing power. Section 3.5 puts them together to establish a comprehensive decision model of taxing power, which suggests that political, economic and social factors influence taxing power, the structure of tax power, tax status and exercise of power. To establish a comprehensive decision model of taxing power is a first and great step and it is a necessary part of theory construction to achieve a taxing power theory.
Chapter 4 is discussion of effects of taxing power. By considering the size and using of tax, this chapter analyzes political,economic, and.social impact of taxing power. Section 4.1 discusses the political effect of taxing power. Taxing power can affects political rights, political power, political system, political organization and political behavior. The difference of political effects of autocratic and democratic taxing authority is made in a comparative method. Finally,4.1.5 is devoted to the discussion of impact on political stability of taxing power. Section 4.2 discusses the economic effects including the impacts of economic rights, economic systems, economic organizations and economic operation of taxing power. The impact on economic performance from taxing power is divided into micro-economic effects and macroeconomic effects. At the macroeconomic effects, the tax impact on economic growth authority mainly is discussed, AK growth model based on taxing power is raised. In the final part of section 4.2, the limitation of tax effect view in Western economics is analyzed in-depth, points out the existing contradictions and the utopian nature should be solved by recognize both positive and negative effects of the taxing power, and not blindly believe that it will bring negative effects of tax, 'that zero tax equals the optimal state. Section 4.3 studies the social effects of taxing power. This section discusses the impacts of social rights, social system, social organization, social behavior and social development from taxing power.And in 4.3.2, the impact on social system, social informal (cultural) system is discussed in detail. Discussion in 4.3.5 is impact on social development of taxing power, includes the impact on social relations,social harmony of taxing power, though brief, but very thorough discussion is made, and then discuss impacts on the population, including population size, population quality, population structure and population flows from taxing power. Impact of demographic situation and social relations from taxing powers belong to the overall impact on society, it sums up to effect on social development from taxing power.
Chapter 5 is the analysis of optimal taxing power which is criteria of taxing power optimization. In section 5.1, a general analysis on optimal taxing power is defined,and the standards of the optimal taxing power is proposed. After the macro-political premise of equilibrium between taxing powers and taxation rights, equilibrium of optimal taxing power supply and demand (static point of view), the optimal operating state of taxing power--the optimal tradeoff of justice and efficiency, optimal behavioral equilibrium (game equilibrium) and mechanism design of various aspects of optimal taxing powers are discussed in turn.
Section 5.2 discusses taxing regime equilibrium which is the political prerequisite of optimal taxing power, proposes that taxing regime equilibrium means equilibrium between state taxing powers and citizens'taxation rights. From the angle of human nature, bounded rationality, etc., the necessity of restricting taxing power with system implementation is discussed. In the realization of the institutional arrangement of taxing regime equilibrium, equilibrium between all kinds of citizen taxation rights and taxing legislative power is discussed. To prevent alienation of taxing legislative power, a thought of zero-base (neutral) election is especially proposed, which should be thought of vital importance.
Section 5.3 analyzes the optimal taxing power from the angle of equilibrium between supply and demand based on taxing regime equilibrium. In static analysis, the optimal taxing power must meet a balance between taxing power supply and demand. In this section, we firstly discuss concepts related with balance of taxing power supply and demand, among which main are taxing power supplies, taxing power demand and balance between supply and demand of taxing power. Then we study the taxing power optimization and disequilibrium taxing power, the actual equilibrium and ideal equilibrium of taxing power supply and demand is put forward and discussed,which will can further optimize taxing power.
5.4 section discusses the optimal tradeoff between justice and efficiency of state taxing power. This section suggest there may exist contradiction between operation efficiency and operation justice of taxing power, therefore it is necessary to make a optimal tradeoff. The solution should be tax basis, as highly effective as possible in the exercise of. taxing power without violation of operation justice. Thus we should apply to the principle of taking care of the weaks and keeping in reasonable caution, which means not toviolate justice and fair tax-using and to implement taxlevying power, judicial power and tax using power as highly effective as possible.
5.5 section analyzes the optimal taxing power from behavioral equilibrium. This section mainly adopts game analysis method, and combines it with utility analysis to establish an optimal equilibrium strategies of taxing power system, which is actually a design of optimal taxing power contract.
Chapter 6 is a research of optimization of Chinese taxing power. Using the theoretical framework established in previous chapters,this chapter devotes to study Chinese taxing power to explore the source of taxing power problems, to search for ways and solutions to optimize Chinese taxing power. This chapter is divided into 5 sections.
Section 6.1 investigates the development history of Chinese taxing power from the generation, through China's feudal society, and modern China,until post-liberation,thus makes a long-range analysis, especially summarize the basic pattern of feudal taxing power. The discussion mainly focuses on the development of Chinese taxing power after liberation, especially after the reform and opening.
Section 6.2 is analysis of the status quo of Chinese taxing power. Status quo of China taxing power is described systematically, the basic problems of the existing China taxing power confirmed, and the reasons of Chinese taxing power problems and effect of Chinese taxing power analyzed.
Section 6.3,the international experience of optimization of taxing power. It analyze and summarizes advanced experiences in construction of taxing power from other countries and regions. From aspects of tax legislative, tax law enforcement powers, tax jurisdiction,and tax-using power, outline of typical international experiences has been described in a roughly simple style.
Section 6.4 discuss method and treatments to solve the problem based on optimization theory.The set of countermeasures of taxing power optimization is a comprehensive systematic policy suggestions.Basic principles of optimization of taxing power are put forward in this section, and proposals to optimize Chinses tax legislative power and tax law enforcement power, tax judicial power and tax-using power are respectively discussed.
Finally, Section 6.5 discusses the dynamics and prospects of the optimization of Chinese taxing power among the optimal power, briefly discusses realistic basis,basic approaches, and possible dynamics.
Possible innovation may be classified to innovation of research methods and that of theoretical development:
1.Application of interdisciplinary research method into taxing power
Taxing powers have many features,so it is necessary to synthesize these multi-disciplinary intellectual knowledge of the taxing power into an entirety. Comprehensive study can be used to not only avoid improper simplification of understanding taxing power due to local analysis, but also to research relationship of taxing power and tax environment at the appropriate level. We need to build taxing power theory based on comprehensive multiple disciplines.
2.Concept of taxing power game chain is put forward to solve taxing power game equilibrium
While using the game theory method to research taxing power optimization, combining concept of initiative game and related game, the game chain concept is put forward and is used to analyze the optimization of taxing power. Using game chain analysis,we can advance the local game equilibrium of traditional game analysis into general game equilibrium among three and above people.
Possible innovation of theory and viewpoints may be listed as follows:
Literature review of tax regime study so far has displayed blind spots of the tax theoretical study. This paper combins politics, economics, sociology disciplines into taxing power study. The taxing power concept is abstracted from tax system, tax management phenomenon etc., and further proposes taxing power mechanism category from mechanism angles, to construct a theoretical framework of taxing power mechanism.
1. Establishing a theoretical framework of taxing power mechanism
(1) In static analysis, the understanding of tax nature is promoted. After absorption the reasonable components of tax nature theory exists in academic circle from coersion school and transaction school of tax nature,the author points that the coersion bases on the political force as backing is necessary to take resources from people who own private property, while nature of transaction is more necessary in order to satisfy public need. Thus tax in essence is taking resources from private people and organization to meet public need. The nature of taxing power is a kind of asymmetric social relations backed on compulsory ability. In the dynamic analysis, tax power mechanism which consist of tax-levying mechanism and transmission mechanism is proposed.The process of taxing power mechanism is divided into three stages of decision, implementation and effect formation. The process from the decision to effect formation makes a complete cycle which can be called as taxing power cycle. Round and round of taxing power cycle constitutes a'taxing power turnover.
(2) From the dynamic perspective, taxing power mechanism consists of two sub-systems:tax-levying mechanism and tax-using mechanism and transmission mechanism.Taxing power. transmission.mechanism includes information mechanism, psychological behavior mechanism as well as the variable mechanism.Here a newly expanded Lewin behavior model is put forward to explain the psychological behavior mechanism. The social role process of taxing power mechanism can be described as thus:"environment variable E→taxing power environment variable Et→psychological variables of taxing power subjects and taxing power objects E1-2/P→taxing power subject and object of taxing power behavioral variables Bl-2→game G (B1, B2)→political, economic, and social effects variables".So the whole process can be divided as three stages—decision stage, implementation stage and effects-forming stage.Hence from influence social environment to taxing power,return again ot influence social environment, to form a complete circle, which can be called as taxing power cycle.Round and round of taxing power cycle constitute taxing power turnover.Taxing power turnover is a theory category of significance, analysis of state taxing power flow can be used to assess the stability of the existing taxing power.
2.The theoretical framework of determination of taxing power is established and is of significance
(1) A new structure-behavior-performance paradigm is put forward to discuss taxing power determination
The "right-power-system- organization-conduct-performance" paradigm is a kind of new'structure-behavior-performance'paradigm,which the structure here means"right-power-system-organization"system.Tracking from performance to front right,the performances i.e. effects, is determined in the process of behaviors implementation; behaviors is implemented by organizations or individuals, organizations is a collection of individuals, but also operating units; organizations are established and operated according to systems (including culture); systems are established by powers, and the source of powers are rights. Therefore, the performance of the state taxing power is finally decided by rights. Right, power, system, organization and behavior all have political, economic and social content, which can make a normative discourse structure.
(2) The taxing decision of taxing power include three aspects of political decision, economic decision and social decision. In political decision, the dissertation holds that different political rights structure, political power status, political system and political organization will bring about differentl influences on establishment of taxing power, the effect of political behaviors is a comprehensive result from those several aspects mentioned above.Applying public choice theory, the median voter model of taxing power to decide is established. The economic decision of taxing power is actually influence of economic factors(including economic rights pattern, economic powers,economic systems, economic organizations and economic activities,economic development)on the establishment and operation of taxing power. Social decision of taxing power mainly studies the influence on taxing power from social rights,social power, social systems and social organizations,which will influence the establishment and operation of taxing power, and should not be ignored. After discussion of effects of various aspects, this chapter finally creates a synthetical decision model of taxing power from the angle of system.
3. The expansion of tax effect theory
taxing power effect has three aspects of political, economic and social effects thus expanding the traditional tax effect theory.
(1) Innovative alysis of political effects of taxing power
In this dissertation, tax power political effect is proposed to means the effect that taxing power can affect political rights, political power, political system, political organizations, political behavior and political stability. The political stability influence from taxing power is particularlly discussed.Applying Huntington's political stability theory in taxing power, and find that there exists some uncertainty in analysis and points for his political stability theory.
(2)Innovative analysis of economic effects
①This dissertation presents a model of endogenous economic growth,and advances to build endogenous economic growth of AK model based on taxing power, promotes economic growth model based on tax to that basded on taxing power, study the influence on economic growth factors from taxing power, and the influence mechanism.It compares the different influence from democratic taxing power and autocratic taxing power on economic growth, the author believes economic growth under autocratic taxing power is more volatile, and that under democratic taxing power power is more relatively stable.
②Second, the limitations of views of negative tax effect in new classic taxation theory is discussed, and point out that this view exists a rationality contradiction, and should not be accepted for self-consistent logic economic theory.The first theorem of welfare economics holds perfectly competitive equilibrium is the best pareto optimal equilibrium,which assumes zero-tax optimal economic state. This means a zero-tax utopia system, don't consider the possible positive value of tax for healthy operation of entire society, which is actually an anarchic political philosophy. We should implement actualist hypothesis and analyze the tax effects combining with tax using; puts forward rational view human will establish a positive effect of taxing power according to beforehand rationality; The taxing power bring about negative effects due to bounded rationality proved as afterward irationality, due to self-interest motive which lead taxing power to deviation and alienation, and difficult to organize effective collective action to avert tax deviation and alienation because of Olsenian collective action dilemma which can keep society in a rigid. Therefore tax effect is generally of duality. This would solve the rationality contradiction existing in traditional opinion of tax effect, and let taxation theory be more self-consistent logic.
4.Construction of theoretic analysis system of optimal taxing power
(1)The core of optimizing taxing powers-optimal taxing power is systematically studied. And optimal taxing power standards are raised as: equilibrium of tax regime, equilibrium of taxing power supply and demand, optimal running of taxing power, and optimal taxing power effect standard etc. Equilibrium of tax regime balance is the political basis of optimal taxing power. Perspective of supply and demand equilibrium of the taxing power, made the reality and the ideal balance between supply and demand concept of the taxing power; make optimal trade-off of taxing power fairness and exercise efficiency; with game theory and utility analysis combined,the optimal of taxing power is established based on game equilibrium system.
(2)The tax regime equilibrium is a political foundation and prerequisite for optimal taxing power. The tax regime equilibrium requires with justice; maximizing taxation rights, including participating proportion in taxation legislation,and optimization rights of supervising the running of taxing power, etc.System realization of tax regime equilibrium is proposed to held the zero-base election in new period to eliminate the adverse effect from given authority to the taxing power.
(3)Under the premise of tax regime equilibrium analysis, equilibrium of taxing power supply and demand is required for taxing power itself to the optimal taxing power, the tax burden decided while taxing power supply and demand meet to reach equilibrium is the optimal macro tax burden; the optimal taxing power need to minimize tax power gap between supply and demand. Concepts of real and ideal taxing power supply and demand equilibrium is proposed; optimization of taxing power should be realized on the basis of ideal pattern of income distribution, namely taxing power should promote the formation of optimal income distribution.
(4)With game theory and utility analysis combined,optimal taxing powers can be established in theory on the basis of game equilibrium. With game between taxcollectors and taxpayers, and game between taxpayers and taxusers and game between taxuser and taxcollectors combined, a new concept of taxing power game chain is proposed, which is proved to be necessary to establish optimal taxing power. With equilibrium of game chain and utility analysis combined, taking incentive compatible constraint, participation constraint and budget balance constraint into consideration, using common utility function and public product production function, the existence of solutions for the optimal tax rate is obtained, which shows that the optimal wage and optimal employment structure necessary for the optimal running of taxing power exist. Thus we find we can find optimal tax power game chain equilibrium through utility analysis.The basic conclusion of the optimal taxing power game chain equilibrium analysis is that--given taxpayers rights to establish taxing power, they will establish a budget-balanced, executable optimal tax power system, within which taxusers and taxcollectors can obtain necessary sufficient incentive. The optimal taxing power is built on the basis of all relatively independent games equilibrium.So basic ways to solve the problems of traditional tax game analysis is proposed,and achieve the optimal tax burden, the optimal wages of taxcollectors'and taxusers'and best employment structure through combination of game analysis and utility analysis, which is proved to be able to establish an executable, budget balancable operating mechanism of optimal taxing power.Mechanism of optimal taxing power should be designed on the necessary basis of political system and economic rights.
5.Possible Innovation in Positive and Countermeasure Research
This dissertation has carried a comprehensive systematic analysis to Chinese taxing power. It has made a panoram-like description on Chinese taxing power's historical development and present situation from its four links, determined the problems existing in Chinese taxing power according to optimal taxing power theory, analyzed the reasons and the influence of these problems,and proposed a set of optimizational countermeasures. In the countermeasure aspect, this dissertation emphasizes to optimize taxing power from the angle of optimizing "political rights-taxation right". Because the taxing power is a huge system including tax legislation, tax law enforcement, tax judicature and tax-using power, therefore we should solve these taxing power problems through a comprehensive consideration of various aspects and links and causing various them to coordinate mutually.
Overally speaking, the main contribution of this article possibly lies in that it highlights taxing power factor which has been hiddened behind taxation system and tax administration for a long time, and makes a systematic elaboration of relation between taxing power and political, economical and social condition, thus greatly expands the vision of tax research field. The author hopes that concerning thoughts developed in this article can bring to researcher's attention, and can expand the scope of tax research to obtain a more scientific understanding.
引文
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②帕森斯又说：“当根据各种义务与集体目标的关系而使这些义务合法化时,在如果遇到顽抗就理所当然会有靠消极情境之采取强制实行的地方,权力是一种保证集体组织系统中个单位履行有约束力的义务的普遍化能力。”(权力社会学,罗德里克·马丁著,丰子义、张宁译,三联书店,第84页)这就将权力又看作是一种约束能力了。参见宋圭武《论权力》http://www.chinavalue.net/Article/Archive/2009/6/28/183111.html.
③朱启才,郭斐.权力在经济运行中的作用机制研究[J].经济研究导刊,2008,16:12-13.但是作者又认为,经济增长=权力·制度·f(生产要素)。这似乎又将权力独立于生产要素之外。
④《不列颠百科全书》,英文版,第14卷,第697页.
⑤(英)罗德里克·马丁.权力社会学[M].北京：三联书店1992,80.
①参见周永坤前书108页
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①其机理可参见尹音频著《资本市场税制优化研究》,中国财政经济出版社2006年6月第1版,第46页。
①参见康欣《税收征管效应的经济分析》,西南财经大学2008年博士论文。
②原模型内在因素与外部环境因素都设定为n种,笔者认为这两类因素的数量多少一般是不同的,因此本文采取了不同的记号,以表示二者因素的多少可能不同。
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①《新约全书.马太福音》第二十二章第二十一节。
②新教(清教)的“天职”一词的涵义,具有一种终身使命,一个特定的劳动领域的意义。这种天职概念为全部新教教派提供了核心教义,这种教义认为上帝所接受的唯一生活方式,不是用修道禁欲主义超越尘世的道德,而是完成每个人在尘世上的地位所赋予他的义务,这就是他的天职。“在任何场合,那种清教观念波及之处,都产生了有利于合理的资本主义经济生活发展的影响。这当然比单纯鼓励资本积累重要得多；它是促进那种生活发展的最重要的而且是唯一前后一致的影响力量。它是养育现代经济人的摇篮的护卫者。”韦伯认为,这种“一个人对天职富有责任”的独特观念,“乃是资产阶级文化的的社会伦理中最具代表性的东西,而且在某种意义上说,它是资产阶级文化的根本基础”。(见韦伯《新教伦理与资本主义精神》,三联书店1987年12月第1版,第38页。)
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①许良英.也谈阿克顿的名言：绝对权力绝对腐败http://club.kdnet.net/dispbbs.asp?boardid=1&id=3517289&page=1#3517289阿克顿这一经典论断的原文是："Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. "许良英认为,译成中文,应该是： “权力趋向腐败,绝对权力绝对腐败。”
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①参见：郎友兴.中国式的公民会议与地方治理：浙江省温岭市民主恳谈会的经验[A].2008年9月22-23日海峡两岸参与式地方治理学术研讨会论文；以及：陈奕敏.参与式预算的温岭模式[J].今日中国论坛[J],2008年第5期.
②蔡定剑： 《中国公共预算改革——透明化、法制化与民主化》,中国民商法律网2007-7-28.
③蔡定剑： 《中国公共预算改革——透明化、法制化与民主化》,中国民商法律网2007-7-28.
④蔡定剑： 《中国公共预算改革——透明化、法制化与民主化》,中国民商法律网2007-7-28.
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①财政部3月5日提请十一届全国人大四次会议审议《关于2010年中央和地方预算执行情况与2011年中央和地方预算草案的报告》,其中,2011年公共财政预算安排情况中明确：汇总中央预算和地方预算安排,全国财政收入89720亿元,加上从中央预算稳定调节基金调入1500亿元,可安排的收入总量为91220亿元：全国财政支出100220亿元。此外,据财政部网站消息,2010年汇总中央和地方基金收支,全国基金收入18704.49亿元,加上中央基金上年结转收入655.71亿元,可安排的全国基金收入总量为19360.2亿元；全国基金支出19360.2亿元。全国国有资本经营预算规模中央部分2010年420亿元。中国人力资源和社会保障部发言人尹成基2011年1月25日在新闻发布会上披露,2010年中国五项社会保险基金总收入18646.4亿元；五项社会保险基金总支出14810.9亿元。这几项加起来政府收入接近13万亿元。
②1991年之前数据来源：中国财政统计(1950-1991),科学出版社,1992年10月第一版。
③数据来源：中国税务年鉴(2009).
①数据来源：中国税务年鉴(2009)与中国统计年鉴(2008)
②吕冰洋、禹奎.我国税收负担的走势与国民收入分配格局的变动[J].财贸经济.2009,3:72-77.
③这就是将税权理解为国家税收权力与公民税收权利的综合。
①金人庆.中国当代税收要论.北京：人民出版社,2002.
②追问“阳光财政”——2009公民税权手册,传知行社会经济研究所2009年11月出品,第41页。
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①张建国.中国居民劳动报酬占GDP比重连降22年.新京报,2010年5月12日。
②日本《选择》周刊2009年6月号一篇题为“中国须抑制贪婪的市场主义”的文章认为,中国市场主义巨大成就的一个后果就是把社会主义进一步逼入了死角。共同富裕、社会福利、保护弱势群体等社会主义社会的目标被抛到了脑后。中国已经成为了可以与美国比肩的世界上贫富差距最大的国家。
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②张木生为《中国税务》杂志社社长。
③郑功成教授在2005年5月出版的《书摘》中著文指出,“改革开放以来,为了解决我国资金短缺的局面并促使国民经济持续发展,我们对投资者给予了多方面的保护,这种保护迅速提升了资本所有者的地位,而劳动者的地位却在不同程度地下降,在全球性的强资本弱劳工格局背景下,我国的劳动关系在近二十年尤其是近十年间发生了重大变化,劳动关系已经处于不和谐状态,劳资之间的冲突正在日益显性化。”
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①这是模仿康德先天综合判断与综合概念提出来的概念。康德提出了后天综合判断,但并没有明确提出后天综合概念这个术语。参见康德著,邓晓芒译,《纯粹理性批判》,人民出版社2004年版导言。
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④同上.
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②帕森斯又说：“当根据各种义务与集体目标的关系而使这些义务合法化时,在如果遇到顽抗就理所当然会有靠消极情境之采取强制实行的地方,权力是一种保证集体组织系统中个单位履行有约束力的义务的普遍化能力。”(权力社会学,罗德里克·马丁著,丰子义、张宁译,三联书店,第84页)这就将权力又看作是一种约束能力了。参见宋圭武《论权力》http://www.chinavalue.net/Article/Archive/2009/6/28/183111.html.
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②原模型内在因素与外部环境因素都设定为n种,笔者认为这两类因素的数量多少一般是不同的,因此本文采取了不同的记号,以表示二者因素的多少可能不同。
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①《新约全书.马太福音》第二十二章第二十一节。
②新教(清教)的“天职”一词的涵义,具有一种终身使命,一个特定的劳动领域的意义。这种天职概念为全部新教教派提供了核心教义,这种教义认为上帝所接受的唯一生活方式,不是用修道禁欲主义超越尘世的道德,而是完成每个人在尘世上的地位所赋予他的义务,这就是他的天职。“在任何场合,那种清教观念波及之处,都产生了有利于合理的资本主义经济生活发展的影响。这当然比单纯鼓励资本积累重要得多；它是促进那种生活发展的最重要的而且是唯一前后一致的影响力量。它是养育现代经济人的摇篮的护卫者。”韦伯认为,这种“一个人对天职富有责任”的独特观念,“乃是资产阶级文化的的社会伦理中最具代表性的东西,而且在某种意义上说,它是资产阶级文化的根本基础”。(见韦伯《新教伦理与资本主义精神》,三联书店1987年12月第1版,第38页。)
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①参见：郎友兴.中国式的公民会议与地方治理：浙江省温岭市民主恳谈会的经验[A].2008年9月22-23日海峡两岸参与式地方治理学术研讨会论文；以及：陈奕敏.参与式预算的温岭模式[J].今日中国论坛[J],2008年第5期.
②蔡定剑： 《中国公共预算改革——透明化、法制化与民主化》,中国民商法律网2007-7-28.
③蔡定剑： 《中国公共预算改革——透明化、法制化与民主化》,中国民商法律网2007-7-28.
④蔡定剑： 《中国公共预算改革——透明化、法制化与民主化》,中国民商法律网2007-7-28.
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①财政部3月5日提请十一届全国人大四次会议审议《关于2010年中央和地方预算执行情况与2011年中央和地方预算草案的报告》,其中,2011年公共财政预算安排情况中明确：汇总中央预算和地方预算安排,全国财政收入89720亿元,加上从中央预算稳定调节基金调入1500亿元,可安排的收入总量为91220亿元：全国财政支出100220亿元。此外,据财政部网站消息,2010年汇总中央和地方基金收支,全国基金收入18704.49亿元,加上中央基金上年结转收入655.71亿元,可安排的全国基金收入总量为19360.2亿元；全国基金支出19360.2亿元。全国国有资本经营预算规模中央部分2010年420亿元。中国人力资源和社会保障部发言人尹成基2011年1月25日在新闻发布会上披露,2010年中国五项社会保险基金总收入18646.4亿元；五项社会保险基金总支出14810.9亿元。这几项加起来政府收入接近13万亿元。
②1991年之前数据来源：中国财政统计(1950-1991),科学出版社,1992年10月第一版。
③数据来源：中国税务年鉴(2009).
①数据来源：中国税务年鉴(2009)与中国统计年鉴(2008)
②吕冰洋、禹奎.我国税收负担的走势与国民收入分配格局的变动[J].财贸经济.2009,3:72-77.
③这就是将税权理解为国家税收权力与公民税收权利的综合。
①金人庆.中国当代税收要论.北京：人民出版社,2002.
②追问“阳光财政”——2009公民税权手册,传知行社会经济研究所2009年11月出品,第41页。
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①张培森、吴小宇等.2000中国税务年鉴.
②王颖.我国宏观税负水平对税制改革的期望[J].合作经济与科技.2008,1：95-96.
③杜剑.我国征纳税成本研究[D].西南财经大学2008年博士论文.
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②征税必须讲成本2003-12-24. www.ctaxnews.com.cn
①罗春梅.关于预算调整的理论思考[J].中央财经大学学报.2004,2：5-8.
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③http://money.163.com/10/1221/08/60DP3HVJ002534M5.html2010-12-21 08:19:32
④专家谈人们对两会政治文明进程的新期待.网易2008年08月04日.来源：2006-02-27北京日报(北京)
①方赛迎.改革开放30年我国税法建设的回顾和展望：基于纳税人权利保护的视角[J].税务研究,2009年第1期.
①吕冰洋、禹奎.我国税收负担的走势与国民收入分配格局的变动[J].财贸经济.2009,3:72-77.
①张建国.中国居民劳动报酬占GDP比重连降22年.新京报,2010年5月12日。
②日本《选择》周刊2009年6月号一篇题为“中国须抑制贪婪的市场主义”的文章认为,中国市场主义巨大成就的一个后果就是把社会主义进一步逼入了死角。共同富裕、社会福利、保护弱势群体等社会主义社会的目标被抛到了脑后。中国已经成为了可以与美国比肩的世界上贫富差距最大的国家。
①魏文彪.提高劳动报酬占比,需要政府让利于民[N].经济参考报,2010年5月20日。
②张木生为《中国税务》杂志社社长。
③郑功成教授在2005年5月出版的《书摘》中著文指出,“改革开放以来,为了解决我国资金短缺的局面并促使国民经济持续发展,我们对投资者给予了多方面的保护,这种保护迅速提升了资本所有者的地位,而劳动者的地位却在不同程度地下降,在全球性的强资本弱劳工格局背景下,我国的劳动关系在近二十年尤其是近十年间发生了重大变化,劳动关系已经处于不和谐状态,劳资之间的冲突正在日益显性化。”
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