嵌入集团内部资本市场的企业资本配置行为及效率研究
|
摘要
面对有摩擦的外部资本市场,公司金融理论引入信息经济学、委托代理理论、行为金融学等分析工具,孕育出丰富的研究成果,这些研究基本以市场和企业两分法为假设前提,从经济学角度研究如何在不同企业之间有效配置资本。随着企业集团等中间型组织的不断发展,内部组织经济学逐渐兴起,该研究范式为解析公司金融的新组织问题提供了不同的分析路径,以信息和交易为关键概念,研究企业组织内部的资本配置及决策问题,在重塑理论假设的基础上拓展了公司金融理论的研究领域。
内部资本市场是企业集团的主要特征之一。集团总部通过内部资本市场将资金配置给各个成员企业,成员企业再通过自身的投资行动创造价值。集团总部的资本配置决策不仅关乎集团内部资金的使用效率,同时也影响依赖于集团内部资本流动的成员企业资本配置效率。本文基于中国转型时期的特定社会经济背景,结合运用内部组织经济学、公司治理分析方法理论阐述内部资本市场的演进路径与运作机制,选择中国上市公司作为检验样本,考虑上市公司处于企业集团的特殊地位,以融资与投资的联动关系作为展开分析的依据,实证研究集团内部资本市场作用下的上市公司资本配置行为及其效率问题,全文共分为七章,主要内容如下:
首先,综合内部组织经济学理论、公司金融理论和公司治理理论的分析方法,构建集团内部资本市场较全面的逻辑框架,提出集团内部资本市场的效率促进、共同保险、掏空与支持三大功能,并且不同形成路径企业集团其内部资本市场功能定位不同。在统一理论框架下解释有关的各类问题和假说,为后面的实证研究奠定理论基础。
然后,根据中国上市公司的实际情况,采用Ordered Logisitic回归方法建立了一个新的融资约束指数,运用面板数据估计方法实证检验集团组织形式及其内部资本市场与外部融资约束的替代关系。以此为基础,划分上市公司的外部融资约束状态,理论阐释集团内部资本配置对成员企业投资行为的作用机理,并经岭回归实证检验不同融资约束下企业的非效率投资行为。研究发现,具有基本金融功能的集团内部资本市场存在且发挥着一定功效,能替代和弥补外部资本市场的失效。对企业投资决策而言集团内部资本配置具有双向效应,既能弥补外部融资约束下的投资资金缺口,同时在外部融资不受限制时内部资本配置效率低下,未能有效抑制成员企业的过度投资行为。
最后,为探寻不同功能定位的集团内部资本市场通过不同的融投资机制所导致的经济后果,本文从业绩水平和盈余波动两方面刻画价值的静态和动态属性,结合集团内部资本市场效率与安全的理论分析,运用面板数据估计方法实证检验集团内部资本配置对成员企业的价值增长和持续稳定的影响作用。之后以陷入财务危机的成员企业为对象,运用Binary Logistic回归模型实证检验集团内部资本市场的安全功能,并进一步定量计算出集团成员企业陷入财务危机产生的外溢成本,考察影响财务危机外溢成本的相关因素。研究发现集团成员企业较其他上市公司的公司价值较优,表现在业绩增长和盈余稳定两方面,另一方面集团内部资本配置对成员企业业绩增长造成负面的影响。为减少成员企业财务危机的发生,可以增加控股股东的持股比例,充分发挥其利益协同效应,一旦集团成员企业陷入财务危机,对关联的成员企业存在明显的负面外部性影响,此时集团控股股东伸出“援助之手”对控制和化解集团内部财务风险具有积极意义。
Facing the imperfect external capital markets with frictions, introducing information economics, principal-agent theory and behavior finance as analysis tools,corporate finance has bred abundant outcomes. Based on market-firm dichotomy,these studies probed into the efficiency of capital allocation across different firms from economic angle. With the constant developments of middle organizations such as business group, organizations economic is springing up, giving a different analytical interpretation for organizations behavior in corporate finance. The new research paradigm studies inter-organizations how to make capital allocation decisions, taking information and transaction as the key concepts, which not only remodels the theory hypothesis, but also expands the research in the field of corporate finance.
Internal capital market is one of the main features of business group. Through internal capital markets, funds is allocated to group-affiliated firms leading by the group headquarters, then group-affiliated firms invests efficiently to create value. The capital allocation decisions of group headquarters determine the efficiency of internal funds allocation in the group,and also influence the capital investment decisions making by group-affiliated firms. Therefore, under differential social economic background during transition period, combining theoretical knowledge of inter-organizations economics and corporate governance theory, the paper theoretical explains the evolution ways and operation mechanisms of internal capital markets. Then according to the linkage between financing and investment , this project probes the investment behavior and its efficiency of listed companies with the influence of internal capital markets and demonstrates some empirical proof, which are much more systemic and more close to the corporate character. The paper contains seven chapters, the primary content is as follows:
Firstly, attempting to provide an integrated framework to introduce and compare these different empirical research, in the hope of helping enhance acdemics understanding of this field, the paper uses several methods of inter-organizations economics、corporate financing theory and corporate governance theory, and then put forward the opinion that efficiency、common insurance、tunneling and propping are three functions of internal capital markets in business group. In addition, it shows the three fucntions of different concentration, according to the differences existed between the patterns of business groups growth.
Secondly, considering chinese listed companys’situation, the paper uses ordered logisitic method to estimate the financial constraint. Based on panel data, it tests the substitute relation of internal capital market in business group and financial constraint. Thus it differentiates the degree of financial constraint, and theoretical analyzes the mechanism of group-affiliated firms’investment behavior under capital allocation in business group. Using the ridge regression to control the effect of multiple colinearity, empirical evidences shows that internal capital markets in group are a efficiency factor in allocating resources, accounting for the institutional voids that in turn lead to market imperfections and transfer costs. At the same time, it has identified several mechanisms by which the allocation of investment funds in an internal capital market can alleviate the financial constraints when group-affiliated firms less financially constrained or strengthens over-investment when group-affiliated firms more financially constrained, as compared to an external-capital-markets benchmark.
Lastly, to explore the different economic consequences under different functions of group’s internal capital market, caused by different financing and investment mechanisms, the paper discusses the value of group-affiliated firms baesd on integration of static and dynamic characterizations. After analyzing the efficiency and safety of internal capital markets, it empirically studies the impacts of internal funds allocation on group-affiliated firms’performance growth and stability using panel data. Moreover, the paper selects listed company which fall into financial distress as research object, and empirically explores factors affecting the probability of bankruptcy of business group using binary logistic method and bankrupt spillover costs, based on investigating the causes and conductive effects of the financial risk in business group.The results indicate that in one hand group affiliation has a positive and significant impact on listed companies’performance growth and earnings stability, on the other hand, internal capital allocation has affected the performance growth of group-affiliated firms. The paper also shows evidences that an affiliated firm becomes bankrupt actually results in large negative spillovers to member firms in the group. While large shareholder supports affiliated firms, which reduces overspread of financial risk and allows affiliated firms to commit to a lower likelihood of bankruptcy.
内部资本市场是企业集团的主要特征之一。集团总部通过内部资本市场将资金配置给各个成员企业,成员企业再通过自身的投资行动创造价值。集团总部的资本配置决策不仅关乎集团内部资金的使用效率,同时也影响依赖于集团内部资本流动的成员企业资本配置效率。本文基于中国转型时期的特定社会经济背景,结合运用内部组织经济学、公司治理分析方法理论阐述内部资本市场的演进路径与运作机制,选择中国上市公司作为检验样本,考虑上市公司处于企业集团的特殊地位,以融资与投资的联动关系作为展开分析的依据,实证研究集团内部资本市场作用下的上市公司资本配置行为及其效率问题,全文共分为七章,主要内容如下:
首先,综合内部组织经济学理论、公司金融理论和公司治理理论的分析方法,构建集团内部资本市场较全面的逻辑框架,提出集团内部资本市场的效率促进、共同保险、掏空与支持三大功能,并且不同形成路径企业集团其内部资本市场功能定位不同。在统一理论框架下解释有关的各类问题和假说,为后面的实证研究奠定理论基础。
然后,根据中国上市公司的实际情况,采用Ordered Logisitic回归方法建立了一个新的融资约束指数,运用面板数据估计方法实证检验集团组织形式及其内部资本市场与外部融资约束的替代关系。以此为基础,划分上市公司的外部融资约束状态,理论阐释集团内部资本配置对成员企业投资行为的作用机理,并经岭回归实证检验不同融资约束下企业的非效率投资行为。研究发现,具有基本金融功能的集团内部资本市场存在且发挥着一定功效,能替代和弥补外部资本市场的失效。对企业投资决策而言集团内部资本配置具有双向效应,既能弥补外部融资约束下的投资资金缺口,同时在外部融资不受限制时内部资本配置效率低下,未能有效抑制成员企业的过度投资行为。
最后,为探寻不同功能定位的集团内部资本市场通过不同的融投资机制所导致的经济后果,本文从业绩水平和盈余波动两方面刻画价值的静态和动态属性,结合集团内部资本市场效率与安全的理论分析,运用面板数据估计方法实证检验集团内部资本配置对成员企业的价值增长和持续稳定的影响作用。之后以陷入财务危机的成员企业为对象,运用Binary Logistic回归模型实证检验集团内部资本市场的安全功能,并进一步定量计算出集团成员企业陷入财务危机产生的外溢成本,考察影响财务危机外溢成本的相关因素。研究发现集团成员企业较其他上市公司的公司价值较优,表现在业绩增长和盈余稳定两方面,另一方面集团内部资本配置对成员企业业绩增长造成负面的影响。为减少成员企业财务危机的发生,可以增加控股股东的持股比例,充分发挥其利益协同效应,一旦集团成员企业陷入财务危机,对关联的成员企业存在明显的负面外部性影响,此时集团控股股东伸出“援助之手”对控制和化解集团内部财务风险具有积极意义。
Facing the imperfect external capital markets with frictions, introducing information economics, principal-agent theory and behavior finance as analysis tools,corporate finance has bred abundant outcomes. Based on market-firm dichotomy,these studies probed into the efficiency of capital allocation across different firms from economic angle. With the constant developments of middle organizations such as business group, organizations economic is springing up, giving a different analytical interpretation for organizations behavior in corporate finance. The new research paradigm studies inter-organizations how to make capital allocation decisions, taking information and transaction as the key concepts, which not only remodels the theory hypothesis, but also expands the research in the field of corporate finance.
Internal capital market is one of the main features of business group. Through internal capital markets, funds is allocated to group-affiliated firms leading by the group headquarters, then group-affiliated firms invests efficiently to create value. The capital allocation decisions of group headquarters determine the efficiency of internal funds allocation in the group,and also influence the capital investment decisions making by group-affiliated firms. Therefore, under differential social economic background during transition period, combining theoretical knowledge of inter-organizations economics and corporate governance theory, the paper theoretical explains the evolution ways and operation mechanisms of internal capital markets. Then according to the linkage between financing and investment , this project probes the investment behavior and its efficiency of listed companies with the influence of internal capital markets and demonstrates some empirical proof, which are much more systemic and more close to the corporate character. The paper contains seven chapters, the primary content is as follows:
Firstly, attempting to provide an integrated framework to introduce and compare these different empirical research, in the hope of helping enhance acdemics understanding of this field, the paper uses several methods of inter-organizations economics、corporate financing theory and corporate governance theory, and then put forward the opinion that efficiency、common insurance、tunneling and propping are three functions of internal capital markets in business group. In addition, it shows the three fucntions of different concentration, according to the differences existed between the patterns of business groups growth.
Secondly, considering chinese listed companys’situation, the paper uses ordered logisitic method to estimate the financial constraint. Based on panel data, it tests the substitute relation of internal capital market in business group and financial constraint. Thus it differentiates the degree of financial constraint, and theoretical analyzes the mechanism of group-affiliated firms’investment behavior under capital allocation in business group. Using the ridge regression to control the effect of multiple colinearity, empirical evidences shows that internal capital markets in group are a efficiency factor in allocating resources, accounting for the institutional voids that in turn lead to market imperfections and transfer costs. At the same time, it has identified several mechanisms by which the allocation of investment funds in an internal capital market can alleviate the financial constraints when group-affiliated firms less financially constrained or strengthens over-investment when group-affiliated firms more financially constrained, as compared to an external-capital-markets benchmark.
Lastly, to explore the different economic consequences under different functions of group’s internal capital market, caused by different financing and investment mechanisms, the paper discusses the value of group-affiliated firms baesd on integration of static and dynamic characterizations. After analyzing the efficiency and safety of internal capital markets, it empirically studies the impacts of internal funds allocation on group-affiliated firms’performance growth and stability using panel data. Moreover, the paper selects listed company which fall into financial distress as research object, and empirically explores factors affecting the probability of bankruptcy of business group using binary logistic method and bankrupt spillover costs, based on investigating the causes and conductive effects of the financial risk in business group.The results indicate that in one hand group affiliation has a positive and significant impact on listed companies’performance growth and earnings stability, on the other hand, internal capital allocation has affected the performance growth of group-affiliated firms. The paper also shows evidences that an affiliated firm becomes bankrupt actually results in large negative spillovers to member firms in the group. While large shareholder supports affiliated firms, which reduces overspread of financial risk and allows affiliated firms to commit to a lower likelihood of bankruptcy.
引文
[1] Myers S C, Majluf N S. Corporate Finance and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investor Do Not Have. Journal of Financial Economics. 1984, 13: 187-221.
[2] Myers S C. The Capital Structure Puzzle. Journal of Finance. 1984, 39(3): 575-592.
[3] Greenwald B, Stiglitz J E, Weiss A. Informational Imperfections in the Capital Market and Macroeconomic Fluctuations. American Economic Review. 1984, 74(2): 194-199.
[4] Asquith P, Jr. Mullins D. Equity issues and offering dilution. Journal of Financial Economics. 1986, 15(1-2): 61-89.
[5] Masulis R W, Korwar A N. Seasoned equity offerings : An empirical investigation. Journal of Financial Economics. 1986, 15(1-2): 91-118.
[6] Mikkelson W H, Partch M M. Valuation effects of security offerings and the issuance process. Journal of Financial Economics. 1986, 15(1-2): 31-60.
[7] Fazzari S M H R. Financing Constrains and Corporate Investment. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 1988: 201-219.
[8] Calomiris C W, Hubbard R G. Internal Finance and Investment: Evidence from the Undistributed Profits Tax of 1936-37. Journal of Business. 1995, 68(4): 443-482.
[9] Hubbard R G, Kashyap A K, Whited T M. International Finance and Firm Investment. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. 1995, 27(3): 683-701.
[10] Kaplan S N, Zingales L. Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Provide Useful Measures of Financing Constraints. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1997, 112(1): 169-215.
[11] Cleary S. The Relationship between Firm Investment and Financial Status. The Journal of Finance. 1999, 54(2): 673-692.
[12]罗琦,夏新平.融资约束抑或过度投资——中国上市企业投资—现金流敏感度的经验证据.中国工业经济. 2007(9): 103-110.
[13]连玉君,程建.投资—现金流敏感性:融资约束还是代理成本?.财经研究. 2007, 33(2): 37-46.
[14] Jensen M C, Meckling W H. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics. 1976, 3(4): 305-360.
[15] Jensen M C. Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers.American Economic Review. 1986, 76(2): 323-329.
[16] Jensen M C. The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems. Journal of Finance. 1993, 48(3): 831-880.
[17] Shleifer A, Vishny R W. Management entrenchment : The case of manager-specific investments. Journal of Financial Economics. 1989, 25(1): 123-139.
[18] Noe T H, Rebello M J, Wall L D. Managerial rents and regulatory intervention in troubled banks. Journal of Banking & Finance. 1996, 20(2): 331-350.
[19] Baker M. Career concerns and staged investment:Evidence from the venture capital industry. Unpublished working paper. 2000.
[20]李鑫.中国上市公司过度投资行为、程度与形成机理.山西财经大学学报. 2007(6): 107-111.
[21]安灵,刘星,白艺昕.股权制衡、终极所有权性质与上市企业非效率投资.管理工程学报. 2008, 22(2): 122-129.
[22]胡建平,干胜道.钱多办“坏”事:自由现金流量与过度投资.当代财经. 2007(11): 107-110.
[23] Grossman S J, Hart O D. The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration. 1986, 94(4): 691-719.
[24] Gertner R H, Scharfstein D S, Stein J C. Internal versus External Capital Markets. 1994, 109(4): 1211-1230.
[25] Hadlock C J, Ryngaert M, Thomas S. Corporate Structure and Equity Offerings: Are There Benefits to Diversification?. Journal of Business. 2001, 74(4): 613-635.
[26] Lins K V, Servaes H. Is Corporate Diversification Beneficial in Emerging Markets?. Financial Management. 2002, 31(2): 5-31.
[27] Stein J C. Internal Capital Markets and the Competition for Corporate Resources. The Journal of Finance. 1997, 52(1): 111-133.
[28] Matsusaka J G, Nanda V. Internal Capital Markets and Corporate Refocusing. Journal of Financial Intermediation. 2002, 11(2): 176-211.
[29] Lamont O. Cash Flow and Investment: Evidence from Internal Capital Markets. Journal of Finance. 1997, 52(1): 83-109.
[30] Shin H, Stulz R M. Are Internal Capital Markets Efficient?. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1998, 113(2): 531-552.
[31] Lewellen W G. A Pure Financial Rationale for the Conglomerate Merger. 1971, 26(2): 521-537.
[32] Berger P G, Ofek E. Diversification's effect on firm value. Journal of FinancialEconomics. 1995, 37(1): 39-65.
[33] Comment R, Jarrell G A. Corporate focus and stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics. 1995, 37(1): 67-87.
[34] Lee S, Park K, Shin H. The Very Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets: Evidence from Diversified Business Groups in Korea. CEI Working Paper Series. 2005(2005-7).
[35]卢建新.内部资本市场理论综述.中南财经政法大学学报. 2006(2): 24-30.
[36]杨棉之.多元化公司内部资本市场配置效率——国外相关研究述评与启示.会计研究. 2007(11): 44-49.
[37]钱雪松.企业内部资本配置文献综述.经济评论. 2008(3): 135-141.
[38]邵军,刘志远.企业集团内部资本市场对其成员企业融资约束的影响——来自中国企业集团的经验证据.中国会计评论. 2008, 6(3): 275-287.
[39]万良勇,魏明海.集团内部资本市场、银行债务与债权人保护.南方经济. 2009(1): 54-63.
[40] Milgrom P R. Employment Contracts, Influence Activities, and Efficient Organization Design. Journal of Political Economy. 1988, 96(1): 42-60.
[41] Milgrom P, Roberts J. An Economic Approach to Influence Activities in Organizations. The American Journal of Sociology. 1988, 94(Supplement: Organizations and Institutions: Sociological and Economic Approaches to the Analysis of Social Structure): 154-179.
[42] Meyer M A, Milgrom P, Roberts D J. Organizational Prospects, Influence Costs, and Ownership Changes. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy. 1992, 1(1): 9-35.
[43] Scharfstein D S, Stein J C. The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets: Divisional Rent-Seeking and Inefficient Investment. Journal of Finance. 2000, 55(6): 2537-2564.
[44] Rajan R, Servaes H, Zingales L. The Cost of Diversity: The Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment. Journal of Finance. 2000, 55(1): 35-80.
[45] Wulf J. Influence and inefficiency in the internal capital market. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2009, 72(1): 305-321.
[46] Brusco S, Panunzi F. Reallocation of corporate resources and managerial incentives in internal capital markets. European Economic Review. 2005, 49(3): 659-681.
[47] Matsusaka J G, Nanda V. Internal Capital Markets and Corporate Refocusing. Journal of Financial Intermediation. 2002, 11(2): 176-211.
[48] Houston J, James C, Marcus D. Capital market frictions and the role of internal capital markets in banking. Journal of Financial Economics. 1997, 46(2): 135-164.
[49] Scharfstein D. The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets II: Evidence from Diversified Conglomerates. 1998(6352).
[50] Stein J C. Chapter 2 Agency, information and corporate investment. Handbook of the Economics and Finance. 2003, Volume 1(Part 1): 111-165.
[51]杨棉之.内部资本市场、公司绩效与控制权私有收益——以华通天香集团为例分析.会计研究. 2006(12): 61-67.
[52] Leff N H. Industrial Organization and Entrepreneurship in the Developing Countries: The Economic Groups. Economic Development and Cultural Change. 1978, 26(4): 661-675.
[53] Granovetter M: Business groups. The Handbook of Economic Sociology, Princeton University Press, 1994, 453-475.
[54] Guillén M F. Business Groups in Emerging Economies: A Resource-Based View. The Academy of Management Journal. 2000, 43(3): 362-380.
[55] Williamson O E: Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. New York: Free Press., 1975.
[56] Coase R. The Nature of the Firm. Economica. 1937, 4(16): 386-405.
[57] Williamson O E. The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach. The American Journal of Sociology. 1981, 87(3): 548-577.
[58] Williamson O E. The Economic Institute of Capitalism. Free Press, 1985.
[59] Granovetter M. Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology. 1985, 91(3): 481.
[60]青木昌彦:比较制度分析.上海远东出版社, 2001.
[61] Keister L. Engineering growth: business group structure and firm performance in China's transition economy. American Journal of Sociology. 1998, 104(2): 404-440.
[62] Keister L: Chinese Business Groups. Oxford University Press, 2004.
[63] Ghemawat P, Khanna T. The Nature of Diversified Business Groups: A Research Design and Two Case Studies. Journal of Industrial Economics. 1998, 46(1): 35-61.
[64] Grossman S J, Hart O D. The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration. 1986, 94(4): 691-719.
[65] Hart O, Moore J. Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm. Journal of Political Economy. 1990, 98(6): 1119-1158.
[66] Hart O. Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications. Economic Journal.1995, 105(430): 678-689.
[67] Gertner R H, Scharfstein D S, Stein J C. Internal versus External Capital Markets. 1994, 109(4): 1211-1230.
[68] Tirole J: The Theory of Corporate Finance. Princeton University Press, 2005.
[69]陆军荣.企业内部资本市场:替代与治理.上海:复旦大学, 2005.
[70] Strachan H: Family and other business groups in economic development: The case of Nicaragua. Praeger Press, 1976.
[71] Caves R E, Uekusa M: Industrial organization in Japan. Brookings Institution, 1976.
[72] Houston J, James C, Marcus D. Capital market frictions and the role of internal capital markets in banking. Journal of Financial Economics. 1997, 46(2): 135-164.
[73] Khanna T, Yafeh Y. Business groups and risk sharing around the world. Journal of Business. 2005, 78(1): 301-340.
[74] Claessens S. Corporate Governance and Equity Prices: Evidence from the Czech and Slovak Republics. Journal of Finance. 1997, 52(4): 1641-1658.
[75] Claessens S, Djankov S, Fan J P H, et al: Ownership structure and corporate performance in East Asia. World Bank, 1998.
[76] Lins K V. Equity Ownership and Firm Value in Emerging Markets. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 2003, 38(01): 159-184.
[77] Meyer M A, Milgrom P, Roberts D J. Organizational Prospects, Influence Costs, and Ownership Changes. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy. 1992, 1(1): 9-35.
[78] Berle A A, Means G C: The Modern Corporation and Private Property. Commerce Clearing House, 1932.
[79]张祥建,徐晋.大股东控制的微观结构、激励效应与堑壕效应——国外公司治理前沿研究的新趋势.证券市场导报. 2007(10): 33-41.
[80] Claessens S, Djankov S, Lang L H P. The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations. Journal of Financial Economics. 2000, 58(1-2): 81-112.
[81] Joh S W, Ryoo S D. Evaluation of changes in the corporate governance system of Korean chaebols. 2000.
[82] Bertrand M, Mehta P, Mullainathan S. Ferreting Out Tunneling: An Application To Indian Business Groups. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2002, 117(1): 121-148.
[83] Faccio M, Lang L H P. The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations. Journal of Financial Economics. 2002, 65(3): 365-395.
[84] Prowse S D. Institutional investment patterns and corporate financial behavior in the United States and Japan. Journal of Financial Economics. 1990, 27(1): 43-66.
[85] Shleifer A, Vishny R W. Large Shareholders and Corporate Control. Journal of Political Economy. 1986, 94(3): 461-488.
[86] Barberis N, Maxim B, Andrei S, et al. How Does Privatization Work? Evidence from the Russian Shops. Journal of Political Economy. 1996, 104(4): 764-790.
[87] Cull R, Matesova J, Shirley M. Ownership and the Temptation to Loot: Evidence from Privatized Firms in the Czech Republic. Journal of Comparative Economics. 2002, 30(1): 1-24.
[88] Lucian B, Reinier K, George T. Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and the Dual Class Equity: The Creation and Agency Costs of Seperating Control from Cash Flow Rights. 1999(6951).
[89] Claessens S, Djankov S, Fan J P H, et al. Expropriation of Minority Shareholders in East Asia. 2000(2000-4).
[90] Wolfenzon D: A Theory of Pyramidal Structures. Harvard University, 1999.
[91] Khanna T, Yafeh Y. Business groups in emerging markets: Paragons or parasites?. Journal of Economic Literature. 2007, 45(2): 331-372.
[92] Claessens S, Fan J P, Lang L H. The benefits and costs of group affiliation: Evidence from East Asia. Emerging Markets Review. 2006, 7(1): 1-26.
[93] La Porta R, Lopez-De-Silanes F, Shleifer A. Corporate Ownership Around the World. The Journal of Finance. 1999, 54(2): 471-517.
[94] Claessens S, Djankov S, Fan J P H. Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings. Journal of Finance. 2002, 57(6): 2741-2771.
[95] Kee-Hong B, Jun-Koo K, Jin-Mo K. Tunneling or Value Added? Evidence from Mergers by Korean Business Groups. Journal of Finance. 2002, 57(6): 2695-2740.
[96] Nenova T. The value of corporate voting rights and control: A cross-country analysis. Journal of Financial Economics. 2003, 68(3): 325-351.
[97] Lucian A B. A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control. 1999(7203).
[98] Riyanto Y E, Toolsema L A. Tunneling and propping: A justification for pyramidal ownership. Journal of Banking and Finance. 2008, 32(10): 2178-2187.
[99] Almeida H, Wolfenzon D. Should business groups be dismantled? The equilibrium costs of efficient internal capital markets. Journal of Financial Economics. 2006, 79(1): 99-144.
[100]Johnson S, Porta R L, Lopezdesilanes F, et al. Tunneling. American Economic Review. 2000, 90(2): 22-27.
[101]Friedman E, Johnson S, Mitton T. Propping and tunneling. Journal of Comparative Economics. 2003, 31(4): 732-750.
[102]La Porta R, Lopez-De-Silanes F, Shleifer A, et al. Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation. The Journal of Finance. 2002, 57(3): 1147-1170.
[103]Armando G. Going Public without Governance: Managerial Reputation Effects. Journal of Finance. 2000, 55(2): 615-646.
[104]Modigliani F, Miller M H. The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment. The American Economic Review. 1958, 48(3): 261-297.
[105]Eisner R, Nadiri M I. Neoclassical Theory of Investment Behavior: A Comment. The Review of Economics and Statistics. 1970, 52(2): 216-222.
[106]Jorgenson D W. Capital Theory and Investment Behavior. The American Economic Review. 1963, 53(2): 247-259.
[107]Jorgenson D W, Stephenson J A. Issues in the Development of the Neoclassical Theory of Investment Behavior. The Review of Economics and Statistics. 1969, 51(3): 346-353.
[108]Lamont O, Polk C, Sa A-Requejo J U. Financial Constraints And Stock Return. The Review of Financial Studies. 2001, 14(2): 529-554.
[109]Kaplan S N, Zingales L. Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Provide Useful Measures of Financing Constraints. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1997, 112(1): 169-215.
[110]Baker M, Stein J C, Wurgler J. When Does The Market Matter? Stock Prices And The Investment Of Equity-Dependent Firms. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2003, 118(3): 969-1005.
[111]Cleary S. The Relationship between Firm Investment and Financial Status. The Journal of Finance. 1999, 54(2): 673-692.
[112]Gugler K. Corporate governance and investment. International Journal of the Economics of Business. 2003, 10(3): 261-289.
[113]刘端,陈收.股票价格对中国上市公司投资行为的影响——基于不同股权依赖型公司的实证.管理评论. 2006, 18(1): 31-36.
[114]Hoshi T, Kashyap A, Scharfstein D. The role of banks in reducing the costs of financial distress in Japan. Journal of Financial Economics. 1990, 27(1): 67-88.
[115]Deloof M. Internal Capital Markets, Bank Borrowing, and Financing Constraints:Evidence from Belgian Firms. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting. 1998, 25(7-8): 945-968.
[116]Shin H, Park Y S. Financing constraints and internal capital markets: Evidence from Korean 'chaebols'. Journal of Corporate Finance. 1999, 5(2): 169-191.
[117]Perotti E C, Gelfer S. Red barons or robber barons? Governance and investment in Russian financial-industrial groups. European economic review. 2001, 45(9): 1601-1617.
[118]黎来芳,黄磊,李焰.企业集团化运作与融资约束——基于静态和动态视角的分析.中国软科学. 2009(4): 98-106.
[119]李增泉,孙铮,王志伟.“掏空”与所有权安排——来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据.会计研究. 2004(12): 3-13.
[120]刘峰,贺建刚,魏明海.控制权、业绩与利益输送——基于五粮液的案例研究.管理世界. 2004(8): 102-110.
[121]Maestro M H, de Miguel A, Pindado J. Financial constraints: models and evidence from international data. SSRN eLibrary. 2001.
[122]樊纲,王小鲁,朱恒鹏:中国市场化指数——各省区市场化相对进程2006年度报告.经济科学出版社, 2007.
[123]Fazzari S M, Hubbard R G, Petersen B C, et al. Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 1988(1): 141-206.
[124]Huang Z S. Financial Constraints and Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity. SSRN eLibrary. 2002.
[125]Jensen M C. Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers. American Economic Review. 1986, 76(2): 323-329.
[126]Hoshi T, Kashyap A, Scharfstein D. The role of banks in reducing the costs of financial distress in Japan. Journal of Financial Economics. 1990, 27(1): 67-88.
[127]Hoshi T, Kashyap A, Scharfstein D. Corporate Structure, Liquidity, and Investment: Evidence from Japanese Industrial Groups. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1991, 106(1): 33-60.
[128]Lensink R, van der Molen R, Gangopadhyay S. Business groups, financing constraints and investment: the case of India. The Journal of Development Studies. 2003, 40(2): 93-119.
[129]Lee S, Park K, Shin H. The Very Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets: Evidence from Diversified Business Groups in Korea. 2005(2005-7).
[130]Brennan M J, Hughes P J. Stock Prices and the Supply of Information. Journal ofFinance. 1991, 45(5): 1665-1691.
[131]银莉,陈收.资本市场信息披露的行为经济解释.财经理论与实践. 2004, 25(4): 56-60.
[132]Khanna T, Palepu K. Is Group Affiliation Profitable in Emerging Markets? An Analysis of Diversified Indian Business Groups. The Journal of Finance. 2000, 55(2): 867-891.
[133]Claessens S, Fan J P, Lang L H. The benefits and costs of group affiliation: Evidence from East Asia. Emerging Markets Review. 2006, 7(1): 1-26.
[134]George R, Kabir R. Business groups and profit redistribution: A boon or bane for firms?. Journal of Business Research. 2008, 61(9): 1004-1014.
[135]邵军,刘志远.企业集团内部资本配置的经济后果——来自中国企业集团的证据.会计研究. 2008(04): 47-53.
[136]冯丽霞,肖一婷.内部资本市场超额价值创造研究——基于资源基础理论的思考.会计研究. 2008(4): 41-46.
[137]兰秋军,马超群,甘国君,等.中国股市弱有效吗?——来自数据挖掘的实证研究.中国管理科学. 2005, 13(4): 17-23.
[138]Deloof M, Verschueren I. Are Leases and Debt Substitutes? Evidence from Belgian Firms. Financial Management. 1999, 28(2): 91-95.
[139]Comment R, Jarrell G A. Corporate focus and stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics. 1995, 37(1): 67-87.
[140]Gramlich J D J D, Limpaphayomb P, Rheec S G. Taxes, keiretsu affiliation, and income shifting. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 2004, 37(2): 203-228.
[141]魏锋,孙晓铎.多元化经营对公司风险的影响分析.证券市场导报. 2008(6): 63-68.
[142]李焰,陈才东,黄磊.集团化运作、融资约束与财务风险——基于上海复星集团案例研究.管理世界. 2007(12): 117-135.
[143]Caves R E, Uekusa M: Industrial organization in Japan. Brookings Institution, 1976.
[144]Heiss F, K?ke J. Dynamics in Ownership and Firm Survival: Evidence from Corporate Germany. European Financial Management. 2004, 10(1): 167-195.
[145]Claessens S, Djankov S, Klapper L. Resolution of corporate distress in East Asia. Journal of Empirical Finance. 2003, 10(1-2): 199-216.
[146]Gopalan R, Nanda V, Seru A. Affiliated Firms and Financial Support: Evidence from Indian Business Groups. Journal of Financial Economics. 2007, 86(3): 759-795.
[147]Shumway T. Forecasting Bankruptcy More Accurately: A Simple Hazard Model.The Journal of Business. 2001, 74(1): 101-124.
[148]Altman E. Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy. The Journal of Finance. 1968, 23(4): 589-609.
[149]吕长江,韩慧博.财务困境、财务困境间接成本与公司业绩.南开管理评论. 2004, 7(3): 80-85.
[2] Myers S C. The Capital Structure Puzzle. Journal of Finance. 1984, 39(3): 575-592.
[3] Greenwald B, Stiglitz J E, Weiss A. Informational Imperfections in the Capital Market and Macroeconomic Fluctuations. American Economic Review. 1984, 74(2): 194-199.
[4] Asquith P, Jr. Mullins D. Equity issues and offering dilution. Journal of Financial Economics. 1986, 15(1-2): 61-89.
[5] Masulis R W, Korwar A N. Seasoned equity offerings : An empirical investigation. Journal of Financial Economics. 1986, 15(1-2): 91-118.
[6] Mikkelson W H, Partch M M. Valuation effects of security offerings and the issuance process. Journal of Financial Economics. 1986, 15(1-2): 31-60.
[7] Fazzari S M H R. Financing Constrains and Corporate Investment. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 1988: 201-219.
[8] Calomiris C W, Hubbard R G. Internal Finance and Investment: Evidence from the Undistributed Profits Tax of 1936-37. Journal of Business. 1995, 68(4): 443-482.
[9] Hubbard R G, Kashyap A K, Whited T M. International Finance and Firm Investment. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. 1995, 27(3): 683-701.
[10] Kaplan S N, Zingales L. Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Provide Useful Measures of Financing Constraints. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1997, 112(1): 169-215.
[11] Cleary S. The Relationship between Firm Investment and Financial Status. The Journal of Finance. 1999, 54(2): 673-692.
[12]罗琦,夏新平.融资约束抑或过度投资——中国上市企业投资—现金流敏感度的经验证据.中国工业经济. 2007(9): 103-110.
[13]连玉君,程建.投资—现金流敏感性:融资约束还是代理成本?.财经研究. 2007, 33(2): 37-46.
[14] Jensen M C, Meckling W H. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics. 1976, 3(4): 305-360.
[15] Jensen M C. Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers.American Economic Review. 1986, 76(2): 323-329.
[16] Jensen M C. The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems. Journal of Finance. 1993, 48(3): 831-880.
[17] Shleifer A, Vishny R W. Management entrenchment : The case of manager-specific investments. Journal of Financial Economics. 1989, 25(1): 123-139.
[18] Noe T H, Rebello M J, Wall L D. Managerial rents and regulatory intervention in troubled banks. Journal of Banking & Finance. 1996, 20(2): 331-350.
[19] Baker M. Career concerns and staged investment:Evidence from the venture capital industry. Unpublished working paper. 2000.
[20]李鑫.中国上市公司过度投资行为、程度与形成机理.山西财经大学学报. 2007(6): 107-111.
[21]安灵,刘星,白艺昕.股权制衡、终极所有权性质与上市企业非效率投资.管理工程学报. 2008, 22(2): 122-129.
[22]胡建平,干胜道.钱多办“坏”事:自由现金流量与过度投资.当代财经. 2007(11): 107-110.
[23] Grossman S J, Hart O D. The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration. 1986, 94(4): 691-719.
[24] Gertner R H, Scharfstein D S, Stein J C. Internal versus External Capital Markets. 1994, 109(4): 1211-1230.
[25] Hadlock C J, Ryngaert M, Thomas S. Corporate Structure and Equity Offerings: Are There Benefits to Diversification?. Journal of Business. 2001, 74(4): 613-635.
[26] Lins K V, Servaes H. Is Corporate Diversification Beneficial in Emerging Markets?. Financial Management. 2002, 31(2): 5-31.
[27] Stein J C. Internal Capital Markets and the Competition for Corporate Resources. The Journal of Finance. 1997, 52(1): 111-133.
[28] Matsusaka J G, Nanda V. Internal Capital Markets and Corporate Refocusing. Journal of Financial Intermediation. 2002, 11(2): 176-211.
[29] Lamont O. Cash Flow and Investment: Evidence from Internal Capital Markets. Journal of Finance. 1997, 52(1): 83-109.
[30] Shin H, Stulz R M. Are Internal Capital Markets Efficient?. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1998, 113(2): 531-552.
[31] Lewellen W G. A Pure Financial Rationale for the Conglomerate Merger. 1971, 26(2): 521-537.
[32] Berger P G, Ofek E. Diversification's effect on firm value. Journal of FinancialEconomics. 1995, 37(1): 39-65.
[33] Comment R, Jarrell G A. Corporate focus and stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics. 1995, 37(1): 67-87.
[34] Lee S, Park K, Shin H. The Very Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets: Evidence from Diversified Business Groups in Korea. CEI Working Paper Series. 2005(2005-7).
[35]卢建新.内部资本市场理论综述.中南财经政法大学学报. 2006(2): 24-30.
[36]杨棉之.多元化公司内部资本市场配置效率——国外相关研究述评与启示.会计研究. 2007(11): 44-49.
[37]钱雪松.企业内部资本配置文献综述.经济评论. 2008(3): 135-141.
[38]邵军,刘志远.企业集团内部资本市场对其成员企业融资约束的影响——来自中国企业集团的经验证据.中国会计评论. 2008, 6(3): 275-287.
[39]万良勇,魏明海.集团内部资本市场、银行债务与债权人保护.南方经济. 2009(1): 54-63.
[40] Milgrom P R. Employment Contracts, Influence Activities, and Efficient Organization Design. Journal of Political Economy. 1988, 96(1): 42-60.
[41] Milgrom P, Roberts J. An Economic Approach to Influence Activities in Organizations. The American Journal of Sociology. 1988, 94(Supplement: Organizations and Institutions: Sociological and Economic Approaches to the Analysis of Social Structure): 154-179.
[42] Meyer M A, Milgrom P, Roberts D J. Organizational Prospects, Influence Costs, and Ownership Changes. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy. 1992, 1(1): 9-35.
[43] Scharfstein D S, Stein J C. The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets: Divisional Rent-Seeking and Inefficient Investment. Journal of Finance. 2000, 55(6): 2537-2564.
[44] Rajan R, Servaes H, Zingales L. The Cost of Diversity: The Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment. Journal of Finance. 2000, 55(1): 35-80.
[45] Wulf J. Influence and inefficiency in the internal capital market. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2009, 72(1): 305-321.
[46] Brusco S, Panunzi F. Reallocation of corporate resources and managerial incentives in internal capital markets. European Economic Review. 2005, 49(3): 659-681.
[47] Matsusaka J G, Nanda V. Internal Capital Markets and Corporate Refocusing. Journal of Financial Intermediation. 2002, 11(2): 176-211.
[48] Houston J, James C, Marcus D. Capital market frictions and the role of internal capital markets in banking. Journal of Financial Economics. 1997, 46(2): 135-164.
[49] Scharfstein D. The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets II: Evidence from Diversified Conglomerates. 1998(6352).
[50] Stein J C. Chapter 2 Agency, information and corporate investment. Handbook of the Economics and Finance. 2003, Volume 1(Part 1): 111-165.
[51]杨棉之.内部资本市场、公司绩效与控制权私有收益——以华通天香集团为例分析.会计研究. 2006(12): 61-67.
[52] Leff N H. Industrial Organization and Entrepreneurship in the Developing Countries: The Economic Groups. Economic Development and Cultural Change. 1978, 26(4): 661-675.
[53] Granovetter M: Business groups. The Handbook of Economic Sociology, Princeton University Press, 1994, 453-475.
[54] Guillén M F. Business Groups in Emerging Economies: A Resource-Based View. The Academy of Management Journal. 2000, 43(3): 362-380.
[55] Williamson O E: Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. New York: Free Press., 1975.
[56] Coase R. The Nature of the Firm. Economica. 1937, 4(16): 386-405.
[57] Williamson O E. The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach. The American Journal of Sociology. 1981, 87(3): 548-577.
[58] Williamson O E. The Economic Institute of Capitalism. Free Press, 1985.
[59] Granovetter M. Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology. 1985, 91(3): 481.
[60]青木昌彦:比较制度分析.上海远东出版社, 2001.
[61] Keister L. Engineering growth: business group structure and firm performance in China's transition economy. American Journal of Sociology. 1998, 104(2): 404-440.
[62] Keister L: Chinese Business Groups. Oxford University Press, 2004.
[63] Ghemawat P, Khanna T. The Nature of Diversified Business Groups: A Research Design and Two Case Studies. Journal of Industrial Economics. 1998, 46(1): 35-61.
[64] Grossman S J, Hart O D. The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration. 1986, 94(4): 691-719.
[65] Hart O, Moore J. Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm. Journal of Political Economy. 1990, 98(6): 1119-1158.
[66] Hart O. Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications. Economic Journal.1995, 105(430): 678-689.
[67] Gertner R H, Scharfstein D S, Stein J C. Internal versus External Capital Markets. 1994, 109(4): 1211-1230.
[68] Tirole J: The Theory of Corporate Finance. Princeton University Press, 2005.
[69]陆军荣.企业内部资本市场:替代与治理.上海:复旦大学, 2005.
[70] Strachan H: Family and other business groups in economic development: The case of Nicaragua. Praeger Press, 1976.
[71] Caves R E, Uekusa M: Industrial organization in Japan. Brookings Institution, 1976.
[72] Houston J, James C, Marcus D. Capital market frictions and the role of internal capital markets in banking. Journal of Financial Economics. 1997, 46(2): 135-164.
[73] Khanna T, Yafeh Y. Business groups and risk sharing around the world. Journal of Business. 2005, 78(1): 301-340.
[74] Claessens S. Corporate Governance and Equity Prices: Evidence from the Czech and Slovak Republics. Journal of Finance. 1997, 52(4): 1641-1658.
[75] Claessens S, Djankov S, Fan J P H, et al: Ownership structure and corporate performance in East Asia. World Bank, 1998.
[76] Lins K V. Equity Ownership and Firm Value in Emerging Markets. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 2003, 38(01): 159-184.
[77] Meyer M A, Milgrom P, Roberts D J. Organizational Prospects, Influence Costs, and Ownership Changes. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy. 1992, 1(1): 9-35.
[78] Berle A A, Means G C: The Modern Corporation and Private Property. Commerce Clearing House, 1932.
[79]张祥建,徐晋.大股东控制的微观结构、激励效应与堑壕效应——国外公司治理前沿研究的新趋势.证券市场导报. 2007(10): 33-41.
[80] Claessens S, Djankov S, Lang L H P. The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations. Journal of Financial Economics. 2000, 58(1-2): 81-112.
[81] Joh S W, Ryoo S D. Evaluation of changes in the corporate governance system of Korean chaebols. 2000.
[82] Bertrand M, Mehta P, Mullainathan S. Ferreting Out Tunneling: An Application To Indian Business Groups. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2002, 117(1): 121-148.
[83] Faccio M, Lang L H P. The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations. Journal of Financial Economics. 2002, 65(3): 365-395.
[84] Prowse S D. Institutional investment patterns and corporate financial behavior in the United States and Japan. Journal of Financial Economics. 1990, 27(1): 43-66.
[85] Shleifer A, Vishny R W. Large Shareholders and Corporate Control. Journal of Political Economy. 1986, 94(3): 461-488.
[86] Barberis N, Maxim B, Andrei S, et al. How Does Privatization Work? Evidence from the Russian Shops. Journal of Political Economy. 1996, 104(4): 764-790.
[87] Cull R, Matesova J, Shirley M. Ownership and the Temptation to Loot: Evidence from Privatized Firms in the Czech Republic. Journal of Comparative Economics. 2002, 30(1): 1-24.
[88] Lucian B, Reinier K, George T. Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and the Dual Class Equity: The Creation and Agency Costs of Seperating Control from Cash Flow Rights. 1999(6951).
[89] Claessens S, Djankov S, Fan J P H, et al. Expropriation of Minority Shareholders in East Asia. 2000(2000-4).
[90] Wolfenzon D: A Theory of Pyramidal Structures. Harvard University, 1999.
[91] Khanna T, Yafeh Y. Business groups in emerging markets: Paragons or parasites?. Journal of Economic Literature. 2007, 45(2): 331-372.
[92] Claessens S, Fan J P, Lang L H. The benefits and costs of group affiliation: Evidence from East Asia. Emerging Markets Review. 2006, 7(1): 1-26.
[93] La Porta R, Lopez-De-Silanes F, Shleifer A. Corporate Ownership Around the World. The Journal of Finance. 1999, 54(2): 471-517.
[94] Claessens S, Djankov S, Fan J P H. Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings. Journal of Finance. 2002, 57(6): 2741-2771.
[95] Kee-Hong B, Jun-Koo K, Jin-Mo K. Tunneling or Value Added? Evidence from Mergers by Korean Business Groups. Journal of Finance. 2002, 57(6): 2695-2740.
[96] Nenova T. The value of corporate voting rights and control: A cross-country analysis. Journal of Financial Economics. 2003, 68(3): 325-351.
[97] Lucian A B. A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control. 1999(7203).
[98] Riyanto Y E, Toolsema L A. Tunneling and propping: A justification for pyramidal ownership. Journal of Banking and Finance. 2008, 32(10): 2178-2187.
[99] Almeida H, Wolfenzon D. Should business groups be dismantled? The equilibrium costs of efficient internal capital markets. Journal of Financial Economics. 2006, 79(1): 99-144.
[100]Johnson S, Porta R L, Lopezdesilanes F, et al. Tunneling. American Economic Review. 2000, 90(2): 22-27.
[101]Friedman E, Johnson S, Mitton T. Propping and tunneling. Journal of Comparative Economics. 2003, 31(4): 732-750.
[102]La Porta R, Lopez-De-Silanes F, Shleifer A, et al. Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation. The Journal of Finance. 2002, 57(3): 1147-1170.
[103]Armando G. Going Public without Governance: Managerial Reputation Effects. Journal of Finance. 2000, 55(2): 615-646.
[104]Modigliani F, Miller M H. The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment. The American Economic Review. 1958, 48(3): 261-297.
[105]Eisner R, Nadiri M I. Neoclassical Theory of Investment Behavior: A Comment. The Review of Economics and Statistics. 1970, 52(2): 216-222.
[106]Jorgenson D W. Capital Theory and Investment Behavior. The American Economic Review. 1963, 53(2): 247-259.
[107]Jorgenson D W, Stephenson J A. Issues in the Development of the Neoclassical Theory of Investment Behavior. The Review of Economics and Statistics. 1969, 51(3): 346-353.
[108]Lamont O, Polk C, Sa A-Requejo J U. Financial Constraints And Stock Return. The Review of Financial Studies. 2001, 14(2): 529-554.
[109]Kaplan S N, Zingales L. Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Provide Useful Measures of Financing Constraints. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1997, 112(1): 169-215.
[110]Baker M, Stein J C, Wurgler J. When Does The Market Matter? Stock Prices And The Investment Of Equity-Dependent Firms. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2003, 118(3): 969-1005.
[111]Cleary S. The Relationship between Firm Investment and Financial Status. The Journal of Finance. 1999, 54(2): 673-692.
[112]Gugler K. Corporate governance and investment. International Journal of the Economics of Business. 2003, 10(3): 261-289.
[113]刘端,陈收.股票价格对中国上市公司投资行为的影响——基于不同股权依赖型公司的实证.管理评论. 2006, 18(1): 31-36.
[114]Hoshi T, Kashyap A, Scharfstein D. The role of banks in reducing the costs of financial distress in Japan. Journal of Financial Economics. 1990, 27(1): 67-88.
[115]Deloof M. Internal Capital Markets, Bank Borrowing, and Financing Constraints:Evidence from Belgian Firms. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting. 1998, 25(7-8): 945-968.
[116]Shin H, Park Y S. Financing constraints and internal capital markets: Evidence from Korean 'chaebols'. Journal of Corporate Finance. 1999, 5(2): 169-191.
[117]Perotti E C, Gelfer S. Red barons or robber barons? Governance and investment in Russian financial-industrial groups. European economic review. 2001, 45(9): 1601-1617.
[118]黎来芳,黄磊,李焰.企业集团化运作与融资约束——基于静态和动态视角的分析.中国软科学. 2009(4): 98-106.
[119]李增泉,孙铮,王志伟.“掏空”与所有权安排——来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据.会计研究. 2004(12): 3-13.
[120]刘峰,贺建刚,魏明海.控制权、业绩与利益输送——基于五粮液的案例研究.管理世界. 2004(8): 102-110.
[121]Maestro M H, de Miguel A, Pindado J. Financial constraints: models and evidence from international data. SSRN eLibrary. 2001.
[122]樊纲,王小鲁,朱恒鹏:中国市场化指数——各省区市场化相对进程2006年度报告.经济科学出版社, 2007.
[123]Fazzari S M, Hubbard R G, Petersen B C, et al. Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 1988(1): 141-206.
[124]Huang Z S. Financial Constraints and Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity. SSRN eLibrary. 2002.
[125]Jensen M C. Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers. American Economic Review. 1986, 76(2): 323-329.
[126]Hoshi T, Kashyap A, Scharfstein D. The role of banks in reducing the costs of financial distress in Japan. Journal of Financial Economics. 1990, 27(1): 67-88.
[127]Hoshi T, Kashyap A, Scharfstein D. Corporate Structure, Liquidity, and Investment: Evidence from Japanese Industrial Groups. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1991, 106(1): 33-60.
[128]Lensink R, van der Molen R, Gangopadhyay S. Business groups, financing constraints and investment: the case of India. The Journal of Development Studies. 2003, 40(2): 93-119.
[129]Lee S, Park K, Shin H. The Very Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets: Evidence from Diversified Business Groups in Korea. 2005(2005-7).
[130]Brennan M J, Hughes P J. Stock Prices and the Supply of Information. Journal ofFinance. 1991, 45(5): 1665-1691.
[131]银莉,陈收.资本市场信息披露的行为经济解释.财经理论与实践. 2004, 25(4): 56-60.
[132]Khanna T, Palepu K. Is Group Affiliation Profitable in Emerging Markets? An Analysis of Diversified Indian Business Groups. The Journal of Finance. 2000, 55(2): 867-891.
[133]Claessens S, Fan J P, Lang L H. The benefits and costs of group affiliation: Evidence from East Asia. Emerging Markets Review. 2006, 7(1): 1-26.
[134]George R, Kabir R. Business groups and profit redistribution: A boon or bane for firms?. Journal of Business Research. 2008, 61(9): 1004-1014.
[135]邵军,刘志远.企业集团内部资本配置的经济后果——来自中国企业集团的证据.会计研究. 2008(04): 47-53.
[136]冯丽霞,肖一婷.内部资本市场超额价值创造研究——基于资源基础理论的思考.会计研究. 2008(4): 41-46.
[137]兰秋军,马超群,甘国君,等.中国股市弱有效吗?——来自数据挖掘的实证研究.中国管理科学. 2005, 13(4): 17-23.
[138]Deloof M, Verschueren I. Are Leases and Debt Substitutes? Evidence from Belgian Firms. Financial Management. 1999, 28(2): 91-95.
[139]Comment R, Jarrell G A. Corporate focus and stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics. 1995, 37(1): 67-87.
[140]Gramlich J D J D, Limpaphayomb P, Rheec S G. Taxes, keiretsu affiliation, and income shifting. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 2004, 37(2): 203-228.
[141]魏锋,孙晓铎.多元化经营对公司风险的影响分析.证券市场导报. 2008(6): 63-68.
[142]李焰,陈才东,黄磊.集团化运作、融资约束与财务风险——基于上海复星集团案例研究.管理世界. 2007(12): 117-135.
[143]Caves R E, Uekusa M: Industrial organization in Japan. Brookings Institution, 1976.
[144]Heiss F, K?ke J. Dynamics in Ownership and Firm Survival: Evidence from Corporate Germany. European Financial Management. 2004, 10(1): 167-195.
[145]Claessens S, Djankov S, Klapper L. Resolution of corporate distress in East Asia. Journal of Empirical Finance. 2003, 10(1-2): 199-216.
[146]Gopalan R, Nanda V, Seru A. Affiliated Firms and Financial Support: Evidence from Indian Business Groups. Journal of Financial Economics. 2007, 86(3): 759-795.
[147]Shumway T. Forecasting Bankruptcy More Accurately: A Simple Hazard Model.The Journal of Business. 2001, 74(1): 101-124.
[148]Altman E. Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy. The Journal of Finance. 1968, 23(4): 589-609.
[149]吕长江,韩慧博.财务困境、财务困境间接成本与公司业绩.南开管理评论. 2004, 7(3): 80-85.
© 2004-2018 中国地质图书馆版权所有 京ICP备05064691号 京公网安备11010802017129号 地址：北京市海淀区学院路29号 邮编：100083 电话：办公室：(+86 10)66554848；文献借阅、咨询服务、科技查新：66554700 |