WTO规则对低碳经济的约束与激励
|
摘要
在当下的国际政治与国际法中,《联合国气候变化框架公约》及《京都议定书》已经成为世界性的重要规则,绿色、环保、低碳、减排已经成为世界性话语,进入了各国政治、经济、外交、贸易、安全政策等领域。气候变化和生态环境问题正在上升为外交和国际关系的焦点、热点问题,并将长期持续。发展绿色经济、低碳经济,既是大国竞争的新焦点,也是维持、巩固、谋求大国地位的新起点。低碳经济在全球范围的兴起必将对世界政治、经济的发展格局产生深远的影响,中国必须打造和争取自己的低碳经济话语权。
WTO是塑造当前国际经济贸易秩序的主体建筑,是全球经济运行的重要制度和法律框架,因此,搞低碳经济,不能不研究WTO。WTO法对低碳经济措施的约束与激励,是一个具有理论新意和现实意义的问题,其研究及写作的意义毋庸置疑。本文选取主要的低碳经济措施——运用GATT第20条一般例外、碳关税、所得税优惠与补贴以及碳标记为研究对象,从制度、法律以及司法层面总结、梳理这些措施的运作机理,分析、探讨和展望它们在WTO法中如何运作,以及如何取得、发展其正当性,探讨WTO规则对低碳经济的约束与激励机制。本文分五章论述。
第一章导言主要概述了WTO规则对低碳经济约束与激励的情况。WTO规则对低碳经济存在着约束,体现在相同产品的传统界定标准,GATT第1条、第3条、20条序言的非歧视性要求,以及WTO所禁止和限制的补贴等。WTO规则对低碳经济的鼓励、激励体现在相同产品的PPMs环保型界定标准,GATT第20条环境例外,环境补贴,WTO对环境、人权等重要利益价值的倾向等。这些约束与激励的规则会通过本文的第二章至第五章,作深入探讨。
第二章主要探讨相同产品及GATT第20条一般例外与低碳经济问题。相同产品,是判断低碳经济措施是否符合国民待遇,是否构成歧视的出发点。传统界定相同产品的标准主要基于产品的物理性质和使用价值,很难与产品的碳含量产生联系。这是以碳含量为基础的低碳经济措施在WTO法中获得正当性的重要障碍。PPMs是界定相同产品的新兴标准,能使产品生产过程中对环境的影响进入到相同产品的考虑、判断因素之中。如果碳含量能够成为判断相同产品的标准,基于产品碳含量的不同而实施差别待遇的低碳经济措施则可以在WTO法中获得正当性。
GATT第20条一般例外也可以为低碳经济措施提供正当性。限制、禁止非低碳产品进口,往往要引用第20条(b),(d),(g)款。“necessary”一词是适用b,d款的前提。本章通过对necessary演进与发展的五个代表性案例——泰国限制香烟进口案、欧盟石棉案、韩国牛肉案、巴西翻新轮胎案、安提瓜诉美国赌博案的总结和梳理,探讨“必需”含义的演化和发展,指出近年来该用语适用条件逐渐宽泛,这对低碳经济是一种鼓励。(b)款和(g)款是人们所称的环境例外或绿色条款,本文分析了(b)款和(g)款的相互关系及适用,并分析了适用(g)款的的最新低碳经济案——欧盟和美国诉中国九种原材料出口案中的主要法律点。
第三章主题是碳关税问题。碳关税是一种碳税,也是一种边境调节税,由于在边境征收,因此被称作碳关税。征收碳关税有其经济学机理和环境治理法学机理。经济学的外部性理论认为,政府有必要采取税收措施,使环境成本内化。碳关税既有边境调节税的避免双重征税的功能,又有弥补被征碳税产品的国际竞争力的功能。从环境治理法学角度来说,征收碳关税的原因有三。第一,根据污染者付费原则,对高碳产品征收碳税符合环境治理要求。第二,根据共同但有区别责任原则,发达国家的减排责任重于发展中国家,在发达国家单方面征收碳税的情况下,税负重的能源企业为了逐利,会逐渐将能源产业转移到碳税负担小的(发展中)国家,从而发生碳泄漏现象。碳泄漏会降低全球减排成果。第三,作为环境治理第二代机制(市场机制)的具体措施,碳税不仅比环境治理的传统命令和控制机制更加灵活,更加节省成本,而且与市场机制的其他手段相比,如国际储备配额,更有利于环境成本内化,促进企业节能减排。
碳关税有一定程度的国际合法性。控制二氧化碳排放是《京都议定书》的重要内容,也是一国采取碳关税措施的国际环境法依据。征收碳关税对发达国家和发展中国家形成不同的经济动力和压力,国际社会两大阵营为此进行着政治博弈,碳关税处于经济、政治、法律等多种因素的纠结之中。近来有斯蒂格利茨等权威学者提出全球排放税与边境调节税措施,这是一个全新的提法和思路,值得我们深入探讨。
本章提出了我国在碳关税问题上的对策建议。我国可以自己征收碳关税,防止税收外流。同时,我国要在国际谈判中争取话语权,拖延碳关税的使用。
第四章主题为所得税优惠与补贴。美国外销公司税收待遇案(FSC),使所得税问题在WTO中凸显出来,所得税是否受GATT第3条管辖,属于补贴,成为理论探讨的一个前沿性问题。所得税优惠是许多国家促进、鼓励低碳经济发展的重大政策和重要激励措施,但是,这类税收优惠易于落入WTO禁止或限制的补贴。本章围绕“所得税优惠与补贴”这个主题,分三部分论述。第一部分概述了WTO法中补贴的概念和分类,重点阐述了禁止性补贴的判断标准。从补贴的方式看,税收优惠不是政府直接给予企业财政资助的直接补贴,而是通过各种优惠降低企业成本,间接使企业获利。所得税作为一种直接税,是否属于GATT第3条的范围,是一个值得探讨的问题。传统的WTO法理学认为,由于GATT规则仅适用于货物,而所得税与“产品”没有足够的联系,因此通常认为GATT第3条只适用于间接税,而不适用于所得税等直接税。从美国FSC案之后,学界开始论述所得税适用于GATT第3条,也有可能落入SCM协定补贴的范畴。
本章第二部分认为,直接税有可能适用于GATT第3.2条。而且,不论3.2条是否适用于直接税,如果直接税“影响”国内产品的“销售、标价出售、购买、运输、分销或使用”,则可以适用GATT第3.4条。因此,直接税极有可能属于GATT第3条国民待遇的适用范围。笔者建议可以借助环境补贴为所得税优惠补贴进行正当性辩护。
第三部分探讨低碳补贴的可行性问题。我国有必要对总体来说处于低水平的低碳技术和弱势的低碳企业进行低碳补贴。笔者建议从企业、技术、产业三个角度构建我国的低碳补贴制度。对于GATT第20条能否扩大适用于SCM协定,本文认为,GATT第20条能够扩大适用于SCM协定,这个结论会对所得税优惠补贴,以及其他的低碳补贴措施在WTO法中获得正当性提供重要的学理依据。
第五章主题是碳标记与低碳经济。碳标记是一种新兴的环保信息标志,通过在产品上标注其碳含量信息,引导消费者进行低碳环保型购物选择,从而影响经营者和生产者的经营方向和生产策略。碳标记的特点是自愿性而非强制性,是新一代环境保护机制,比传统的第一、二代机制,更加民主、透明。但是,信息标志的形式、功能、在环境政策中的作用,都决定了它对贸易有不可抵挡的影响。本章的建议是遵循三组平衡:(1)公益与私益的平衡;(2)主观偏好与客观评析的平衡;(3)地方效应、全球效应、域外效应的平衡。
In current international politics and law, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC)and the Kyoto Protocol have become worldwide important rules. Green economy, environmental protection, low-carbon have become worldwide words, and have entered into political, economic, diplomatic, commercial and security fields of most countries. Climate change and environment issues are becoming key and significant problems in diplomacy and international relationship. The competition between big powers concentrates on the development of green and low-carbon economy. Therefore, as a big and responsible country, China must make its own low-carbon strategy and have its say in the world.
WTO is the main structure of world trade, constituting the institutions and rules of the trade, so we can’t ignore the relationship between low-carbon economy and WTO. Incentive and restriction of WTO rules to low-carbon economy which this thesis studies is a new issue in both theory and practice. The thesis selects some main low-carbon measures——application of GATT Article XX, carbon tariff, income tax preference and subsidy, and carbon labeling as objects to study. The thesis analyses, discusses and forecasts how these measures are applied and justified in in terms of WTO rules and its judicial decisions.
Chapter I is introduction, it outlines the general situation of the WTO rules binding and encouraging low-carbon economy. In the sense of binding, the traditional defining of like product, the non-discrimination of GATT articleI, III and XX, forbidden and restricted subsidy are among such; and in the sense of encouraging, PPMs good for environment protection, GATT Article XX, environmental subsidy and WTO's respect to values of environment and human rights.
Chapter II talks about like product, GATT Article XX and low-carbon economy. Like product is the starting point in deciding whether a low-carbon measure is consistent with National Treatment Principle, or is discriminatory. Traditional criteria of like product is based on the physical property and use value of products, not considering carbon content of products, which is a key obstacle to low-carbon economy measures. PPMs is a new criterion of like product, which considers environment impacts of products in their production and process. If carbon content is able to become a criterion of like product, low-carbon economy measures, which implement different treatment because of different carbon content, can be justified in WTO rules.
We can also find legitimacy for low-carbon economy measures in GATT Article XX . When a WTO member prohibits or restricts non low-carbon products from importing, it will quote Article XX(b)(d)(g).“Necessary”is a important condition for quoting XX(b)(d)(g). This chapter uses five main cases to analyse and conclude the development and changes of“necessary”, including Thailand– Cigarettes(BISD 37S/200),European—Asbestos(DS135),Korea–Beef (DS161),Brazil–Retreaded Tyres(DS332),and United States—Gambling(DS285). Recently, the requirement of necessity is becoming broader, which is an encouragement of low-carbon economy. XX(b) and (g) are so called Environment Exception or Green Clause. The application of (b) and (g) , the relationship between the two clauses, and the legal points of the newest low-carbon economy case about (g)—China Affecting nine raw materials exports——are all analysed in this chapter.
Chapter III talks about carbon tariff. Carbon tariff is a kind of carbon tax, and also a kind of BTA (border tax adjustment) , which is imposed on the border, thus is named as carbon tariff. Imposing carbon tariff has economic theory and environment protection theory. to support.. According to Externality Theory, governments need to implement tax measures to internalise externalities. The function of carbon tariff is to avoid double taxation and to balance competitiveness between carbon-taxed products and non carbon-taxed products. From the view of environment protection law, we have three reasons to impose carbon tariff. First, according to the Polluter Pays Priciple, imposing carbon tax on high-carbon products is consistent with environment protection requirement. Second, according to Common-But-Differentiated Respons- ibilities, developed countries takes heavier mitigation burden than developing countries. If only developed countries implement carbon tax, some companies will transfer their energy industry to lower carbon tax burden countries to gain profits, thus carbon leakage takes place, which will cut down global mitigation effects. Third, carbon tariff is a particular measure of Market Mechanism, which is the second generation of environment protection mechanism. Compared with traditional Command- and–Control Mechanism, carbon tariff is more flexible and less costly. Compared with other measures in Market Mechanism, such as International Reserve Allowance, carbon tariff is more apt to internalize environment cost, and promote companies to mitigate.
Carbon tariff is more or less lawful in international law. Kyoto Protocol is the important international treaty for carbon tariff, which requires countries to control carbon dioxide mitigation. Carbon tariff means different economic impetus and pressure to different countries. Therefore, there is a political game between developed countries and developing countries, which makes carbon tariff have a variety of economic, political, and legal problems. Recently, some internationaly authoritative scholars, such as Joseph Stiglitz and Richard Cooper, proposed a totally new idea- global emission tax and border tax adjustment measure, which is new idea and approach, worth studying and researching.
This chapter suggests China should have its own standpoint on carbon tariff. First, China can levy carbon tax to avoid tax outflow. Second, China should have its say in international negotiations to delay the implement of carbon tariff. Last, China should guide right direction of public opinion, and admit that carbon tariff is an critical measure to develop low-carbon economy.
Chapter IV deals with income tax preference and subsidy. United States- Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC) case makes income tax problems prominent in WTO. Whether income tax is subject to GATT Article III, or is a subsidy, is a pioneer issue in academic field. Income tax favour is regarded as an important policy to promote low-carbon economy, however, this measure is apt to be defined as a prohibited subsidy. This Chapter addresses income tax preference and subsidy in three parts. Part One sketches out the definition and types of subsidy, and particularly criterion of prohibited subsidy. Viewed from angle of subsidy, tax favour preference is to reduce company’s costs and to make the company gain profits indirectly rather than a kind of profit that a government gives to a company directly. Income tax preference is a kind of direct tax, so whether it’s subject to GATT Article III, is an arguable issue. Traditional WTO jurisprudence argues, only“goods”can be subjected to GATT rules, therefore, GATT Article III only refers to indirect tax. We can not say income tax has enough contact with goods, neither can we say income tax belongs to the domestic tax under GATT Article III. After the case of FSC, there’s an argument that income tax can be subjected to GATT Article III in theory probably falls into the scope of subsidies in SCM.
Part Two argues that direct tax can be subjected to GATT Article III:2. Whether or not direct tax can be defined as the domestic tax under Article III:2, it can be subjected to Article III:4, only if it is affecting internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. Therefore, direct tax probably can be subjected to National Treatment of GATT Article III. The author suggests that we can make use of environment subsidy to defend income tax preference.
Part Three discusses the feasibility of low-carbon subsidy. China needs to subsidize its low-level low-carbon technology and subsidize weak and small business. The author suggests that China should structure its low-carbon supporting regime from three aspects of business enterprises, technology and industry. This thesis also argues that GATT Article XX can extend to SCM, so that income tax preference and other low-carbon subsidy measures can be lawful under Article XX.
Chapter V is about carbon labeling. Carbon labeling is a new kind of environment labeling, reflecting carbon content of products. It can guide consumers to purchase low-carbon products, thus affecting business direction, decision -making and strategy of producers. The new generation of environment protection mechanism -carbon labeling is voluntary rather than mandatory, and is more democratic and transparent in comparison with the two traditional environment protection mechanism. However, carbon label’s functions and effects have irresistible and significant impacts on trade. In imposing carbon-labels, we should keep to the three following balances: (i) public interests and private interests ; (ii) consumers’s values and objective assessment;(iii) regional effect, global effect and extraterritorial effect.
WTO是塑造当前国际经济贸易秩序的主体建筑,是全球经济运行的重要制度和法律框架,因此,搞低碳经济,不能不研究WTO。WTO法对低碳经济措施的约束与激励,是一个具有理论新意和现实意义的问题,其研究及写作的意义毋庸置疑。本文选取主要的低碳经济措施——运用GATT第20条一般例外、碳关税、所得税优惠与补贴以及碳标记为研究对象,从制度、法律以及司法层面总结、梳理这些措施的运作机理,分析、探讨和展望它们在WTO法中如何运作,以及如何取得、发展其正当性,探讨WTO规则对低碳经济的约束与激励机制。本文分五章论述。
第一章导言主要概述了WTO规则对低碳经济约束与激励的情况。WTO规则对低碳经济存在着约束,体现在相同产品的传统界定标准,GATT第1条、第3条、20条序言的非歧视性要求,以及WTO所禁止和限制的补贴等。WTO规则对低碳经济的鼓励、激励体现在相同产品的PPMs环保型界定标准,GATT第20条环境例外,环境补贴,WTO对环境、人权等重要利益价值的倾向等。这些约束与激励的规则会通过本文的第二章至第五章,作深入探讨。
第二章主要探讨相同产品及GATT第20条一般例外与低碳经济问题。相同产品,是判断低碳经济措施是否符合国民待遇,是否构成歧视的出发点。传统界定相同产品的标准主要基于产品的物理性质和使用价值,很难与产品的碳含量产生联系。这是以碳含量为基础的低碳经济措施在WTO法中获得正当性的重要障碍。PPMs是界定相同产品的新兴标准,能使产品生产过程中对环境的影响进入到相同产品的考虑、判断因素之中。如果碳含量能够成为判断相同产品的标准,基于产品碳含量的不同而实施差别待遇的低碳经济措施则可以在WTO法中获得正当性。
GATT第20条一般例外也可以为低碳经济措施提供正当性。限制、禁止非低碳产品进口,往往要引用第20条(b),(d),(g)款。“necessary”一词是适用b,d款的前提。本章通过对necessary演进与发展的五个代表性案例——泰国限制香烟进口案、欧盟石棉案、韩国牛肉案、巴西翻新轮胎案、安提瓜诉美国赌博案的总结和梳理,探讨“必需”含义的演化和发展,指出近年来该用语适用条件逐渐宽泛,这对低碳经济是一种鼓励。(b)款和(g)款是人们所称的环境例外或绿色条款,本文分析了(b)款和(g)款的相互关系及适用,并分析了适用(g)款的的最新低碳经济案——欧盟和美国诉中国九种原材料出口案中的主要法律点。
第三章主题是碳关税问题。碳关税是一种碳税,也是一种边境调节税,由于在边境征收,因此被称作碳关税。征收碳关税有其经济学机理和环境治理法学机理。经济学的外部性理论认为,政府有必要采取税收措施,使环境成本内化。碳关税既有边境调节税的避免双重征税的功能,又有弥补被征碳税产品的国际竞争力的功能。从环境治理法学角度来说,征收碳关税的原因有三。第一,根据污染者付费原则,对高碳产品征收碳税符合环境治理要求。第二,根据共同但有区别责任原则,发达国家的减排责任重于发展中国家,在发达国家单方面征收碳税的情况下,税负重的能源企业为了逐利,会逐渐将能源产业转移到碳税负担小的(发展中)国家,从而发生碳泄漏现象。碳泄漏会降低全球减排成果。第三,作为环境治理第二代机制(市场机制)的具体措施,碳税不仅比环境治理的传统命令和控制机制更加灵活,更加节省成本,而且与市场机制的其他手段相比,如国际储备配额,更有利于环境成本内化,促进企业节能减排。
碳关税有一定程度的国际合法性。控制二氧化碳排放是《京都议定书》的重要内容,也是一国采取碳关税措施的国际环境法依据。征收碳关税对发达国家和发展中国家形成不同的经济动力和压力,国际社会两大阵营为此进行着政治博弈,碳关税处于经济、政治、法律等多种因素的纠结之中。近来有斯蒂格利茨等权威学者提出全球排放税与边境调节税措施,这是一个全新的提法和思路,值得我们深入探讨。
本章提出了我国在碳关税问题上的对策建议。我国可以自己征收碳关税,防止税收外流。同时,我国要在国际谈判中争取话语权,拖延碳关税的使用。
第四章主题为所得税优惠与补贴。美国外销公司税收待遇案(FSC),使所得税问题在WTO中凸显出来,所得税是否受GATT第3条管辖,属于补贴,成为理论探讨的一个前沿性问题。所得税优惠是许多国家促进、鼓励低碳经济发展的重大政策和重要激励措施,但是,这类税收优惠易于落入WTO禁止或限制的补贴。本章围绕“所得税优惠与补贴”这个主题,分三部分论述。第一部分概述了WTO法中补贴的概念和分类,重点阐述了禁止性补贴的判断标准。从补贴的方式看,税收优惠不是政府直接给予企业财政资助的直接补贴,而是通过各种优惠降低企业成本,间接使企业获利。所得税作为一种直接税,是否属于GATT第3条的范围,是一个值得探讨的问题。传统的WTO法理学认为,由于GATT规则仅适用于货物,而所得税与“产品”没有足够的联系,因此通常认为GATT第3条只适用于间接税,而不适用于所得税等直接税。从美国FSC案之后,学界开始论述所得税适用于GATT第3条,也有可能落入SCM协定补贴的范畴。
本章第二部分认为,直接税有可能适用于GATT第3.2条。而且,不论3.2条是否适用于直接税,如果直接税“影响”国内产品的“销售、标价出售、购买、运输、分销或使用”,则可以适用GATT第3.4条。因此,直接税极有可能属于GATT第3条国民待遇的适用范围。笔者建议可以借助环境补贴为所得税优惠补贴进行正当性辩护。
第三部分探讨低碳补贴的可行性问题。我国有必要对总体来说处于低水平的低碳技术和弱势的低碳企业进行低碳补贴。笔者建议从企业、技术、产业三个角度构建我国的低碳补贴制度。对于GATT第20条能否扩大适用于SCM协定,本文认为,GATT第20条能够扩大适用于SCM协定,这个结论会对所得税优惠补贴,以及其他的低碳补贴措施在WTO法中获得正当性提供重要的学理依据。
第五章主题是碳标记与低碳经济。碳标记是一种新兴的环保信息标志,通过在产品上标注其碳含量信息,引导消费者进行低碳环保型购物选择,从而影响经营者和生产者的经营方向和生产策略。碳标记的特点是自愿性而非强制性,是新一代环境保护机制,比传统的第一、二代机制,更加民主、透明。但是,信息标志的形式、功能、在环境政策中的作用,都决定了它对贸易有不可抵挡的影响。本章的建议是遵循三组平衡:(1)公益与私益的平衡;(2)主观偏好与客观评析的平衡;(3)地方效应、全球效应、域外效应的平衡。
In current international politics and law, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC)and the Kyoto Protocol have become worldwide important rules. Green economy, environmental protection, low-carbon have become worldwide words, and have entered into political, economic, diplomatic, commercial and security fields of most countries. Climate change and environment issues are becoming key and significant problems in diplomacy and international relationship. The competition between big powers concentrates on the development of green and low-carbon economy. Therefore, as a big and responsible country, China must make its own low-carbon strategy and have its say in the world.
WTO is the main structure of world trade, constituting the institutions and rules of the trade, so we can’t ignore the relationship between low-carbon economy and WTO. Incentive and restriction of WTO rules to low-carbon economy which this thesis studies is a new issue in both theory and practice. The thesis selects some main low-carbon measures——application of GATT Article XX, carbon tariff, income tax preference and subsidy, and carbon labeling as objects to study. The thesis analyses, discusses and forecasts how these measures are applied and justified in in terms of WTO rules and its judicial decisions.
Chapter I is introduction, it outlines the general situation of the WTO rules binding and encouraging low-carbon economy. In the sense of binding, the traditional defining of like product, the non-discrimination of GATT articleI, III and XX, forbidden and restricted subsidy are among such; and in the sense of encouraging, PPMs good for environment protection, GATT Article XX, environmental subsidy and WTO's respect to values of environment and human rights.
Chapter II talks about like product, GATT Article XX and low-carbon economy. Like product is the starting point in deciding whether a low-carbon measure is consistent with National Treatment Principle, or is discriminatory. Traditional criteria of like product is based on the physical property and use value of products, not considering carbon content of products, which is a key obstacle to low-carbon economy measures. PPMs is a new criterion of like product, which considers environment impacts of products in their production and process. If carbon content is able to become a criterion of like product, low-carbon economy measures, which implement different treatment because of different carbon content, can be justified in WTO rules.
We can also find legitimacy for low-carbon economy measures in GATT Article XX . When a WTO member prohibits or restricts non low-carbon products from importing, it will quote Article XX(b)(d)(g).“Necessary”is a important condition for quoting XX(b)(d)(g). This chapter uses five main cases to analyse and conclude the development and changes of“necessary”, including Thailand– Cigarettes(BISD 37S/200),European—Asbestos(DS135),Korea–Beef (DS161),Brazil–Retreaded Tyres(DS332),and United States—Gambling(DS285). Recently, the requirement of necessity is becoming broader, which is an encouragement of low-carbon economy. XX(b) and (g) are so called Environment Exception or Green Clause. The application of (b) and (g) , the relationship between the two clauses, and the legal points of the newest low-carbon economy case about (g)—China Affecting nine raw materials exports——are all analysed in this chapter.
Chapter III talks about carbon tariff. Carbon tariff is a kind of carbon tax, and also a kind of BTA (border tax adjustment) , which is imposed on the border, thus is named as carbon tariff. Imposing carbon tariff has economic theory and environment protection theory. to support.. According to Externality Theory, governments need to implement tax measures to internalise externalities. The function of carbon tariff is to avoid double taxation and to balance competitiveness between carbon-taxed products and non carbon-taxed products. From the view of environment protection law, we have three reasons to impose carbon tariff. First, according to the Polluter Pays Priciple, imposing carbon tax on high-carbon products is consistent with environment protection requirement. Second, according to Common-But-Differentiated Respons- ibilities, developed countries takes heavier mitigation burden than developing countries. If only developed countries implement carbon tax, some companies will transfer their energy industry to lower carbon tax burden countries to gain profits, thus carbon leakage takes place, which will cut down global mitigation effects. Third, carbon tariff is a particular measure of Market Mechanism, which is the second generation of environment protection mechanism. Compared with traditional Command- and–Control Mechanism, carbon tariff is more flexible and less costly. Compared with other measures in Market Mechanism, such as International Reserve Allowance, carbon tariff is more apt to internalize environment cost, and promote companies to mitigate.
Carbon tariff is more or less lawful in international law. Kyoto Protocol is the important international treaty for carbon tariff, which requires countries to control carbon dioxide mitigation. Carbon tariff means different economic impetus and pressure to different countries. Therefore, there is a political game between developed countries and developing countries, which makes carbon tariff have a variety of economic, political, and legal problems. Recently, some internationaly authoritative scholars, such as Joseph Stiglitz and Richard Cooper, proposed a totally new idea- global emission tax and border tax adjustment measure, which is new idea and approach, worth studying and researching.
This chapter suggests China should have its own standpoint on carbon tariff. First, China can levy carbon tax to avoid tax outflow. Second, China should have its say in international negotiations to delay the implement of carbon tariff. Last, China should guide right direction of public opinion, and admit that carbon tariff is an critical measure to develop low-carbon economy.
Chapter IV deals with income tax preference and subsidy. United States- Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC) case makes income tax problems prominent in WTO. Whether income tax is subject to GATT Article III, or is a subsidy, is a pioneer issue in academic field. Income tax favour is regarded as an important policy to promote low-carbon economy, however, this measure is apt to be defined as a prohibited subsidy. This Chapter addresses income tax preference and subsidy in three parts. Part One sketches out the definition and types of subsidy, and particularly criterion of prohibited subsidy. Viewed from angle of subsidy, tax favour preference is to reduce company’s costs and to make the company gain profits indirectly rather than a kind of profit that a government gives to a company directly. Income tax preference is a kind of direct tax, so whether it’s subject to GATT Article III, is an arguable issue. Traditional WTO jurisprudence argues, only“goods”can be subjected to GATT rules, therefore, GATT Article III only refers to indirect tax. We can not say income tax has enough contact with goods, neither can we say income tax belongs to the domestic tax under GATT Article III. After the case of FSC, there’s an argument that income tax can be subjected to GATT Article III in theory probably falls into the scope of subsidies in SCM.
Part Two argues that direct tax can be subjected to GATT Article III:2. Whether or not direct tax can be defined as the domestic tax under Article III:2, it can be subjected to Article III:4, only if it is affecting internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. Therefore, direct tax probably can be subjected to National Treatment of GATT Article III. The author suggests that we can make use of environment subsidy to defend income tax preference.
Part Three discusses the feasibility of low-carbon subsidy. China needs to subsidize its low-level low-carbon technology and subsidize weak and small business. The author suggests that China should structure its low-carbon supporting regime from three aspects of business enterprises, technology and industry. This thesis also argues that GATT Article XX can extend to SCM, so that income tax preference and other low-carbon subsidy measures can be lawful under Article XX.
Chapter V is about carbon labeling. Carbon labeling is a new kind of environment labeling, reflecting carbon content of products. It can guide consumers to purchase low-carbon products, thus affecting business direction, decision -making and strategy of producers. The new generation of environment protection mechanism -carbon labeling is voluntary rather than mandatory, and is more democratic and transparent in comparison with the two traditional environment protection mechanism. However, carbon label’s functions and effects have irresistible and significant impacts on trade. In imposing carbon-labels, we should keep to the three following balances: (i) public interests and private interests ; (ii) consumers’s values and objective assessment;(iii) regional effect, global effect and extraterritorial effect.
引文
①曹宁.气候变化:中国的困境、机遇和对策[A].曹荣湘.全球大变暖:气候经济、政治与伦理.北京:社会科学文献出版社,2010:505—506.
①邓可祝.环境补贴研究[J].特区经济,2007(2):135.
①国际法中的特别法优先原则,是指如果一个条约的所有成员方同时又都是另一个特别法性质的条约的成员方,那么后者的效力将优于前者。参见那力,何志鹏.WTO与环境保护[M] .长春:吉林人民出版社,2002:178.
②WTO Appellate Body Report. United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products(US—Shrimp)[Z].WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted on 6 November 1998, paras 163-181.
①Jackson,John H..World Trade and the Law of GATT[M]. Indianapolis: The Bobbs–Merrill Company,1969:788.
②See Du, Ming Michael.Autonomy in Setting Appropriate Level of Protection under the WTO Law: Rhetoric or Reality?[J] . Journal of International Economic Law ,2010, 13(4):1078.
③See Sykes,Alan O..Domestic Regulation, Sovereignty, and Scientific Evidence Requirements:A Pessimistic View[A].Bermann,George A. andPetros C. Mavroidis (eds) .Trade and Human Health and Safety. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006: 257–270;Mavroidis,Gisele.A Critique of the WTO Jurisprudence on Necessary [J].International and Comparative Law Quarterly ,2010,59 (1):89.
①WTO Appellate Body Report.Korea– Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef (Korea– Beef) [Z] . WT/DS/161/AB/R, adopted on 11 December 2000, para 178.
②WTO Appellate Body Report.European Communities– Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products (EC– Asbestos) [Z] .WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted on 5 April 2001, para 172.
③WTO Appellate Body Report.Dominican Republic– Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes (Dominican Republic– Cigarettes) [Z] .WT/DS320/AB/R, adopted on 25April 2005, paras 60—72.
④WTO Appellate Body Report.Brazil– Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres (Brazil–Retreaded Tyres)[Z] .WT/DS332/AB/R, adopted on 3 Decemeber 2007, para 211. More detailed analysis , see Du,Ming Michael.Autonomy in Setting Appropriate Level of Protection under the WTO Law: Rhetoric or Reality?[J] . Journal of International Economic Law ,2010, 13(4): 1098–1102;also see McGrady,Benn.Necessity Exceptions in WTO Law:Retreaded Tyres , Regulatory Purpose and Cumulative Regulatory Measures[J].Journal of International Economic Law, 2008,12(1): 157–159.
①GATT Working Party Report .Border Tax Adjustments[Z].L/3464, BISD 18S/102, adopted on 2 December 1970,para 18.
②GATT Panel Report.EEC– Measures on Animal Feed Proteins[Z]. L/4599, BISD 25S/49, adopted on 14 March 1978,paras 4.1—4.2;GATT Panel Report.Japan - Customs Duties, Taxes and Labelling Practices on Imported Wines and Alcoholic Beverages[Z].L/6216, BISD 34S/83, adopted on 10 November 1987,para 5.6
③徐忆斌.WTO协定中的“同类产品”法律问题研究——以GATT第3条为中心[D].重庆:西南政法大学硕士学位论文,2005: 18.
④See Irish, M..Interpretation and Naming:The Harmonized System in Canadian Customs Tariff Law[J]. Canadian Yearbook of International Law, 1993, 31:90—91.
⑤卢锋著.经济学原理(中国版) [M].北京:北京大学出版社,2002:440.
①陈永钊.从加拿大诉欧盟石棉案看同类产品的认定[J].今日南国,2008(10):128.
②案件编号:DS23/R - 39S/206.
③案件编号:DS31 /R.对此案的具体讨论可以参见以下等文献:徐忆斌.“特征与比较”抑或“目的与效果”——G AT第3条“同类产品”认定标准之探证[J].求索,2007(6):109;杨小强.论“目的和效果”方法在同类服务认定中的适用[J].黑龙江省政法管理干部学院学报,2007(2):59.
④张弦,王浩宇.试析GATT第三条中“同类产品”概念的界定[J].知识经济,2008(9):18.
①See Jackson, John H..Legal Problems of International Economic Relations[M].4 th ed.West Group Press, 2007:500.
②WTO Appellate Body Report.Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages(Japan—Alcoholic Beverages II)[Z].WT/DS8/AB/R,WT/DS10/AB/R,WT/DS11/AB/R,adopted on 1 November 1996, para 21.
③牟文义.WTO对“相同产品”认定是否要引入PPMs标准[J].对外经贸实务,2009(2):36.
④参见那力,何志鹏.WTO与环境保护[M].长春:吉林人民出版社,2002: 305-306.
①孙法柏.相同产品与环境影响——以GATT第3条为核心[A].环境法治与建设和谐社会——全国环境资源法学研讨会(年会)论文集(第四册).2007: 1180.
②李语湘.PPMs标准下“相同产品”界定的法律问题:与WTO规则的冲突与协调[J].企业家天地,2009(7):138.
③闻亚鹏,肖涛.浅议PPM标准及我国的对策[A].适应市场机制的环境法制建设问题研究——中国法学会环境资源法学研究会(年会)论文集. 2002 :764.
④参见朱榄叶.世界贸易组织国际贸易纠纷案例评析[M].北京:法律出版社,2000:527—543.
⑤那力,李海英.WTO框架中的PPMs问题[J].法学论坛,2002(4):43.
⑥参见世界贸易组织法律事务部. WTO争端解决案件概要[M].朱榄叶译.北京:法律出版社,2009: 106—108;案件编号:WT/DS135/AB/R.
⑦朱榄叶.世界贸易组织国际贸易纠纷案例评析(1995——2002)(上册)[M] .北京:法律出版社,2004:
①参见世界贸易组织法律事务部.WTO争端解决案件概要[M].朱榄叶译.北京:法律出版社,2009:43—44.
②参见那力,何志鹏,王彦志.WTO与公共健康[M].北京:清华大学出版社,2005:217-218.
①吴洁,蒋琪.国际贸易中的碳标签[J].国际经济合作,2009(7):82—83.
②Bradly, J. Condon. Climate Change and Unresolved Issues in WTO Law[J]. Journal of International Economic Law,2009 ,12(4):909.
③GATT Panel Report.United States—Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages(US—Malt Beverages)[Z].DS23/R–39S/206, adopted on 19 June 1992, paras 5.71–5.73.
①参见那力.国际环境法[M] .北京:科学出版社,2005:126.
②本节内容来自作者和导师合作文章,已经发表于国内权威期刊《国际贸易》。那力,王淼. GATT第20条a、b、d款及GATS第14条的“必需”问题:变化与发展[J].国际贸易,2010(8):59—64.
①参见《关税与贸易总协定(GATT1947)》第20条.
②参见《服务贸易总协定(GATS)》第14条.
①GATT Panel Report. Thailand– Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes(Thailand– Cigarettes)[Z].BISD 37S/200, 223, adopted on 7 November 1990 ,para 74.
②WTO Appellate Body Report.European Communities– Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products(EC- Asbestos)[Z].WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted on 5 April 2001, para 164.
③Ibid , paras 166—169.
①WTO Appellate Body Report.United States–Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline(US–Gasoline) [Z].WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted on 20 May 1996,paras13—20.
①参见朱榄叶.世界贸易组织国际贸易纠纷案件评析[M].北京:法律出版社,2003:108.
②资料来源:全小莲,郑维炜.适用GATT第20条(d)款第一案——韩国牛肉案[J].学理论,2009(4):77—78.
①WTO Appellate Body Report.Korea–Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh,Chilled and Frozen Beef(Korea–Various Measures on Beef) [Z].WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, adopted on 10 January 2001,para168.
②Ibid,para171.
①WTO Panel Report.Brazil–Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres(Brazil–Retreaded Tyres)[Z].WT/DS332/R, adopted on 12 June 2007, para753.
②WTO Panel Report. Brazil–Retreaded Tyres [Z].WT/DS332/R, adopted on 12 June 2007,para172.
③Ibid,para154.
①WTO Appellate Body Report.United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services(US- Gambling)[Z].WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted on 20 April 2005, para 292.
②WTO Appellate Body Report. US- Gambling[Z].WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted on 20 April 2005, para 296.
③Ibid,para 301.
①WTO Appellate Body Report. EC—Asbestoss[Z] .WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted on 5 April 2001, para 157.
①See Bradly, J. Condon .Climate Change and Unresolved Issues in WTO Law [J].Journal of International Economic Law, 2009,12(4):911.
②高晓露.“绿色条款”在实践中的新发展与绿色贸易壁垒——从WTO争端解决实践看GATT第20条[J].信阳师范学院学报(哲学社会科学版),2003(4): 47.
③WTO Appellate Body Report.United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products(US—Shrimp)[Z].WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted on 6 November 1998,paras 128–131.
④WTO Appellate Body Report.US—Gasoline[Z]. WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted on 20 May 1996, paras 20–21.
①参见曾令良,陈卫东.论WTO一般例外条款(GATT第20条)与我国应有的对策[J].法学论坛,2001(4):37.
①WTO Appellate Body Report. US—Shrimp[Z].WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted on 6 November 1998, paras 163-181.
②巴西翻新轮胎案中,专家组认为,“很少有利益比保护人类健康免受威胁更‘关键’、更‘重要’,环境保护的重要性却不低于保护人类健康”。WTO Panel Report. Brazil—Retreaded Tyres[Z]. WT/DS332/R, adopted on 17 December 2007, para 7.108.
①资料来源:欧盟和美国诉中国限制九种原材料出口一案[EB/OL].(2011—07—06)[2011—07—28]. http://www.china-russia.org/news.php?id=6542
②孙韶华.WTO裁定中国原材料出口限制违规[N/OL].经济参考报,(2011—07—06)[2011—07—28]. http://www.cre-ol.com/_d271661829.htm
①宋一欣.碳税及其法律制度[EB/OL].(2010—11—18)[2011—05—02] . http://www.chinavalue.net/Blog/527723.aspx
②参见那力,何志鹏.WTO与环境保护[M] .长春:吉林人民出版社,2002:189.
③参见[澳]大卫·希尔曼,[澳]约瑟夫·韦恩·史密斯.气候变化的挑战与民主的失灵[M].武锡申,李楠译.北京:社会科学文献出版社,2009:134.
④金慧华.多边贸易体制下的碳税问题探析[J].社会科学,2009(1):97.
①参见谢来辉.欧盟应对气候变化的边境调节税:新的贸易壁垒[J].国际贸易问题,2008(2):70.
②李伟,张希良,周剑,何建坤.关于碳税问题的研究[J].税务研究,2008(3):21.
③陈秀梅.碳税与许可证交易的对比分析[J].番禺职业技术学院学报,2008(2):31.
①那力.WTO的边境调节税与反补贴:我国能源政策和法律必须考虑的两个国际性问题[A].资源节约型、环境友好型社会建设与环境资源法的热点问题研究——全国环境资源法学研讨会论文集. 2006:516.
②李静怡.环境税的短期与长期效应分析[J].山西财政税务专科学校学报,2010(1):26.
①国家环境保护局.人类共同的责任[M] .北京:中国环境科学出版社,1993:30.
①张曙霄,郭沛.“碳关税”的两重性分析[J].经济学家,2010(12):37.
②See J. Andrew Hoemer and Frank Miller. Carbon Taxes for Climate Protection in a Competitive World[R] . Swiss Federal Office for Foreign Economic Affairs, 1996:21.
③董京波.WTO框架下碳关税合法性探析——以GATT20条一般例外条款为中心[A] .国际经济法面临的新格局与新挑战:中国视角——中国国际经济法学会年会暨学术研讨会论文集(四).2010:1272.
④Warwick J.McKibbin ,Peter J.Wilcoxen.The Economic and Environmental Effects of Border Tax Adjustments for Climate Policy[C].Brookings Global Economy and Development Conference, Brookings Institution,Washington,DC.9 June 2008:24—25.
①参见谢来辉,陈迎.中国对碳关税问题过度担忧了吗?[J].国际经济评论,2010(4):139.
①See Burney, Nelson E.. CarbonTtax and Cap-and Trade Tools : Market-Based Approaches for Controlling Greenhouse Gases[M].New York : Nova Science Publishers, 2010:I.
①陈丹妮.限制和交易(cap-and-trade)[EB/OL] .(2009—03—25)[2011—06—01] . http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/language_tips/news/2009-03/25/content_7613949.htm
②詹艳.碳关税和碳税:何去何从?[J].湖南社会科学,2010(6):213.
③黄文旭.碳关税相关概念辨析[J].岭南学刊,2011(1):73.
①国际储备配额的法律依据是《2008年利伯曼—沃纳气候安全法案》,该法案规定,从2019年1月1日开始,美国环境保护署署长应建立国际储备配额项目,目的是,在国内产品实施了总量限制与交易的前提下,用以平衡同样能源强度的美国国内产品与进口产品之间的竞争力。该项目附将不同国家配额以清单形式列出,美国国内进口商只要购买了清单上国家的进口产品,就必须按照清单规定购买一定的国际储备配额,从而弥补美国国内适用总量限制与交易的生产商配额的交易价格。
②百度百科[EB/OL].[2011—06—07].http://baike.baidu.com/view/1935849.htm#1
③百度百科[EB/OL].[2011—06—07].http://baike.baidu.com/view/2830578.htm
④黄志雄.国际贸易新课题:边境碳调节措施与中国的对策[J].中国软科学,2010(1):1—2;李威.碳关税的国际法与国际机制研究[J].国际政治研究,2009(4):42—43;刘勇,朱瑜.碳关税与全球性碳排放交易体制的构建[A].国际经济法面临的新格局与新挑战:中国视角——中国国际经济法学会年会暨学术研讨会论文集(四). 2010:1305.
①陈秀梅.碳税与许可证交易的对比分析[J].番禺职业技术学院学报,2008(2):31.
②姜克隽,张玉卓,李来来,喻捷.碳税三问[J].商周刊,2009(24).
①2008年《气候安全法修正案》规定,美国即将向没有进行实质性减排的国家征收高额的碳关税;2009年《美国清洁能源和安全法》中规定的国际储备配额制度,与碳关税设计的目的异曲同工,美国官员和媒体直接将其称为碳关税条款。参见李威.碳关税的国际法与国际机制研究[J].国际政治研究,2009(4):42;在此之前,欧盟也提出过要求进口商购买排放配额的计划(ETS),但是至今此意愿并不明朗。参见本·席勒.欧盟ETS还能走多远[N/OL].刘洋/编译.中国能源报,2011—05—02(10)[2011—05—10].http://paper.people.com.cn/zgnyb/html/2011-05/02/content_809047.htm?div=-1
①钱慰曾.气候变暖危及人类的生存环境[EB/OL].(2006—01—27)[2011—06—08]. http://gb.cri.cn/8606/2006/01/27/1745@877922.htm
②PICC.Climate Change:The PICC 1990—1992 Assessment[R]. Island Press,1993.
③See Zhang, ZhongXiang and Assuncao ,Lucas. Domestic Climate Policies and the WTO[J].The World Economy,2004,127(3): 359—386.
①参见石广生.中国加入世界贸易组织知识读本(二)[M].北京:人民出版社,2001:499—500.
②案件编号:WT/DS58/AB/R.
③参见宋新刚.碳关税:世界经济发展的一把双刃剑[J].全国商情(理论研究),2009(22):120.
④参见李响.“碳关税”合法性分析及中国的对策[D].北京:外交学院硕士学位论文,2010:6.
⑤GATT1994附件I对3.2条进行具体解释,规定“只有在已税产品与未同样征税的直接竞争或替代产品之间存在竞争的情况下,方被视为与第二句的规定不一致。”也就是说,对相同产品必须相同征税;对与本国相同产品存在直接竞争或替代关系的进口产品,不得基于保护国内生产的目的,而不同征税。参见石广生.中国加入世界贸易组织知识读本(二)[M].北京:人民出版社,2001:503—504.
①See.Jackson, John H.. Legal Problems of International Economic Relations[M]. 4th ed. West Group Press, 2007:500—501.
②参见杨向东.WTO体制下的国民待遇原则研究[M].北京:中国政法大学出版社,2008:50—51.
①夏璐.国际法框架下“碳关税”合法性分析[J].法制与社会,2010(7):103—104.
①See Jackson, John H..Legal Problems of International Economic Relations[M].4 th ed.West Group Press, 2007:555;also see Charnovitz, Steve. The WTO’s Environmental Progress[J].Journal of International Economic Law , 2007,10 : 685.
②WTO Appellate Body Report.United States– Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline(US– Gasoline)[Z] .WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted on 20 May 1996, para129.
③WTO Appellate Body Report. United States– Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products(US– Shrimp)[Z].WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted on 6 November 1998, para153.
①美国汽油案中,将有关定性为“实质关联(substantial relationship)”,措施与保护目标之间并非“偶然的非故意的关系(incidentally or inadvertently)”。美国海虾案中,上诉机构认为,如果规制海虾捕捞的措施意图对海龟的伤害降到最低,那么该措施必须与保护海龟具有直接关联性(directly connected with )。See WTO Appellate Body Report. US– Gasoline[Z]. WT/DS2/AB/R , adopted on 20 May 1996, para 19;also see WTO Appellate Body Report. US– Shrimp[Z]. WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted on 6 November 1998, para 135.
②梁咏.WTO框架下碳关税可能引致的贸易争端与解决[J].法学,2010(7):81.
③参见李响.“碳关税”合法性分析及中国的对策[D].北京:外交学院硕士学位论文,2010: 13.
①何娟.碳关税:新的绿色贸易壁垒抑或WTO环境保护豁免[J].世界贸易组织动态与研究,2010(3):58.
②WTO Appellate Body Report. US– Shrimp[Z]. WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted on 6 November 1998, para 160.
①王慧.环境税合法性研究[D].重庆:西南政法大学博士学位论文,2009:123.
②WTO Appellate Body Report. US– Gasoline[Z]. WT/DS2/AB/R , adopted on 20 May 1996, paras.208-209.
③World Trade Organization.Taxes for Environmental Purposes[EB/OL]. [2011—04—02]. http://www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_backgrod_e/c3s3_e.htm
①Veel,Paul-Erik.Carbon Tariffs and the WTO:An Evaluation of Feasible Policies[J]. Journal of International Economic Law,2009, 12(3):753.
②刘琳.美国大打能源牌欲稳做世界经济领头羊[EB/OL].(2009—07—16)[2011—07—01] . http://www.nbd.com.cn/newshtml/20090716/20090716025424530.html
③刘惠荣,杨凡.《京都议定书》对我国碳税制度的影响[A].资源节约型、环境友好型社会建设与环境资源法的热点问题研究——全国环境资源法学研讨会论文集.2006:493.
④O’Connor ,Robert,Richard Bord,Brent Yarnal and Nancy W iefek. Who Wants to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emission? [J].Social Science Quarterly, 2002, 83(1): 1—17.
⑤参见裴长洪.对未来世界经济发展趋势的若干认识[J].中国经贸导刊,2010(1):12—14.
①奥巴马内达华大学讲话[EB/OL].(2010—07—09)[2011—05—09] . http://gb.cri.cn/27824/2010/07/11/107s2916278.htm
②沈可挺,李钢.碳关税对中国工业品出口的影响——基于可计算一般均衡模型的评估[J].财贸经济,2010(1):82.
①杨明珠.碳关税的法律解读与中国的立场[J].西南石油大学学报(社会科学版),2011(3):37.
①公司责任和广泛采纳的行业标准是ISO 14000,参见[英]帕特莎·波尼、艾伦·波义尔.国际法与环境(第二版)[M] .那力,王彦志,王小钢译.北京:高等教育出版社,2007:688.
②反对碳税的学者一般认为,碳税与碳排放交易相比,缺失灵活性与普遍性,不能顾及不同企业的减排成本与能力。碳排放交易市场作为新兴的金融市场,近几年迅猛发展,其交易方式灵活,可以采取配额交易或项目交易;交易环境公平透明。参见刘勇,朱瑜.碳关税与全球性碳排放交易体制的构建[A].国际经济法面临的新格局与新挑战:中国视角——中国国际经济法学会年会暨学术研讨会论文集(四).2010:1303;参见范晓波.碳排放交易的国际发展及其启示[A].国际经济法面临的新格局与新挑战:中国视角——中国国际经济法学会年会暨学术研讨会论文集(四). 2010:1287—1291.
③Stiglitz,Joseph.A New Agenda for Global Warming[J/OL].The Economists’Voice,2006,3(7)[2011—06—01].http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol3/iss7/art3
④Cooper,Richard.The Case for Charges on Greenhouse Gas Emissions[EB/OL]. Discussion Paper 2008—2010:Harvard Project on International Climate Agreement,2008[2011—06—02]. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/CooperWeb4.pdf
①参见下列文献:Stiglitz,J..Overcoming the Copenhagen Failure[EB/OL].2010[2011—07—02]. http://host.madison.com/ct/news/opinion/column/article_a43e6c32-ef98-5c38-9a64-ae22b5732127.html ;Krugman,P..The WTO Is Making Sense[EB/OL].(2009—06—26)[2011—07—02]. http:// krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/26/the-wto-is-making-sens;Krugman,P..Carbon Tariffs: The Legal Aspects[EB/OL].(2009—07—01)[2011—07—02]. http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/01/ carbon–tariffs-the-legal-aspects/ ;Krugman,P..Fetishizing Free Trade[EB/OL].(2009—09—11)[2011—07—02] http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/09/11/fetishizing-free-trade/.
②WTO and UNEP. Trade and Climate Change[R/OL] .2009[2011—07—01] . http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/flyer_trade_climate_change_e.pdf.
③经济学的文献中分析碳关税效应的模型通常是CGE模型。比较清晰的CGE模型分析可以参见:黄媛红,沈可挺.基于CGE模型的碳关税对中国工业品出口影响评估[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2009(19):202—206.
①谭浩俊.碳税不是一个“征”字了得[N].中华工商时报,2010—6—11(C10).
①田红莲.基于低碳经济的中国碳税实施研究[D].天津:天津大学硕士学位论文,2010:38.
②李静云.碳关税重压下中国该如何破“壁”?[N].中国环境报, 2009-08-20(005).
②李本.补贴与反补贴制度分析[M] .北京:北京大学出版社,2005:26.
③参见王妍.浅谈市场经济条件下的财政补贴[J].山西财经学院学报,1995(6):56.
①参见《补贴与反补贴措施协定(SCM协定)》第3条第1款.
②参见刘钢.WTO禁止性补贴、局限性及实施情况[N].国际商报,2 0 0 1—1 1—1 8(5).
③参见沈亚岚.WTO补贴和禁止性补贴定义之法律问题及对策[J].山西省政法管理干部学院学报, 2005 (3):9.
④案件编号:WT/DS273.
①案件编号:WT/DS387/1.
②参见龚柏华.WTO有关禁止性出口补贴规则研究——以中美“知名品牌产品出口补贴”W T O磋商案为视角[J].国际商务研究,2010(2):48.
③世界贸易组织法律事务部.WTO争端解决案件概要(1995——2007)[M] .朱榄叶译.北京:法律出版社,2009:115.
④参见李本.补贴与反补贴制度分析[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2005:44.
⑤参见《补贴与反补贴措施协定(SCM)》第5条.
①参见《补贴与反补贴措施协定(SCM)》第15条、脚注45.
②同上,第15条.
③李本.补贴与反补贴制度分析[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2005:44.
④同注②,第15条第7款.
①参见《补贴与反补贴措施协定(SCM)》注释46.
②同上,注释48.
③同上,注释12;GATT1994第23条.
④案件编号:WT/DS126/R.
⑤王懿.WTO框架下中国可诉性补贴法律问题研究[D].上海:上海交通大学硕士学位论文,2008: 8.
①参见《补贴与反补贴措施协定(SCM)》第6条第1款.
②同上,第6条第1款、第6条第2款.
③同上,第15条第3款.
④参见曹建明,陈治东.国际经济法专论(第3卷)[M].北京:法律出版社,2000: 473.
①参见《补贴与反补贴措施协定(SCM)》第11条第2款第4项.
②同上,第15条第4款.
③同上,第8条.
④参见宋和平.反倾销法律制度概论[M].北京:中国检察出版社,2003: 30.
⑤朱庆华.SCM协议不可诉补贴条款简析[J].世界贸易组织动态与研究,2007(2): 33—36.
⑥参见李本.补贴与反补贴制度分析[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2005: 50.
⑦参见[英]布瑞恩·麦克唐纳.世界贸易体制——从乌拉圭回合谈起[M].叶兴国等译.上海:上海人民出版社,2002: 109.
①参见李本.补贴与反补贴制度分析[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2005: 6—7.
②参见陈立虎.当代国际贸易法[M] .北京:法律出版社,2007: 381.
③参见杨解君.WTO下的中国行政法制变革[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2005: 211—212.
①陈立虎.当代国际贸易法[M] .北京:法律出版社,2007:381.
②汪尧田.国际贸易[M].上海:上海社会科学院出版社,1993:273.
①曹建明,贺小勇.世界贸易组织[M] .北京:法律出版社,1999:206-207.
②商务部.国别贸易投资环境报告[R/OL].(2005)[2010—05—11] .
①彭岳.中、美、墨三国税收补贴争端的法律分析[J].法商研究,2008(2):12.
②参见作者已发表的论文。王淼.美国外销公司税案对我国税收优惠、补贴的启示[J].求索,2011(2):160.
①[英]马修·林恩.空中对决——波音与空客市场大战[M] .北京:华夏出版社,2001:136.
②本节内容来自作者和导师合作文章,已经发表于《社会科学辑刊》。那力,王淼.低碳经济背景下WTO体系所得税优惠问题探析[J] .社会科学辑刊,2011(1):91—94.
③我国对低碳经济发展推出了大量税收优惠措施。可参见本文附录,以及媒体中的大量报道。
①此案英文简称为FSC,案件编号:WT/DS108.
①这个问题的论述来自于作者已经发表的文章。王淼.美国外销公司税案对我国税收优惠、补贴的启示[J].求索,2011(2):160.
②这一注释规定:“(e)段无意限制一成员方采取措施以避免其企业或其他成员方的企业从国外来源的收益被双重征税。”
③20世纪70年代初,欧共体与美国、美国与法国、美国与比利时、美国与荷兰之间发生四个税法案纠纷,经过GATT专家组的争端解决机制,直到1981年经过多方努力,GATT理事会才通过了关于这四个税法案的专家组报告。美国外国销售公司措施案与这四个税法案的案情有类似之处。四个税法案中均涉及到美国、法国、比利时与荷兰这四个国家对外国公司的免税待与出口补贴的关系。专家组根据1979年《补贴与反补贴守则》中关于出口补贴解释清单脚注2的规定,认定基于避免国际双重征税的目的,各国可以对外国公司给予免税待遇,这种免税待遇不属于出口补贴。脚注2解决了四个税法案的主要问题。参见朱榄叶.关税与贸易总协定国际贸易纠纷案例汇编[M] .北京:法律出版社,1995: 184—190.
④参见朱榄叶.世界贸易组织国际贸易纠纷案件评析[M].北京:法律出版社,2003:3.
①匡贤明.我国转轨时期的节约型社会建设与市场化改革[J].贵州财经学院学报,2007(5):14.
②韩文博.试论绿色财政[J].财政研究,2006(1):56.
①参见杨蓓,李霞.“绿色财政”初探[J] .四川财政,1998(6):7.
②参见曾纪发.构建我国绿色财政体系的战略思考[J].西部财会,2011(1):7.
③李树.经济绿色化发展与积极绿色财政政策的实施[J].经济问题探索,2002(4):52.
④参见李景华.试论绿色财政与可持续发展[J].山西能源与节能,2007(2):48.
⑤吴玉萍,董锁成.绿色财政政策——西部山川秀美的首选政策[J].开发研究,2001(1):27.
①姚爱萍认为,“环境补贴是指政府在经济主体因认识上的偏差或资金上的私有制不能有效进行环保投资的情况下,为了解决环保问题,或是出于政治、经济原因而对企业进行各种补贴,以帮助企业进行环保设备、环保工艺改进的一种政府行为。目前,环境补贴采取的形式主要有:支付现金、税收激励和豁免、政府环境保护投资或政府以优惠利率提供贷款等。”姚爱萍..环境补贴对国际贸易的影响及我国应采取的对策[J].世界贸易组织动态与研究,2005(4):29.邓可祝认为,“环境补贴是指行政主体基于改善环境,保护生态的目的而对私人给予的各种优惠。”邓可祝.环境补贴研究[J].特区经济,2007(2):135.
②Myers, N.and Kent, J. Perverse subsidies:How Tax Dollars Can Undercut Environment and the Economy[M].Washington(DC):Island Press, 2001.
③张贵萍.国外对华产品适用反补贴调查的法律思考[D].重庆:西南政法大学硕士学位论文,2009:25.
①参见姜双林.欧盟农业环境补贴法律制度的嬗变及其对中国的启示[J].法治研究,2008(6):3.
②黄河.论我国农业补贴法律制度的构建[J].法律科学,2007(1):108.
③参见姜双林.欧盟农业环境补贴法律制度的嬗变及其对中国的启示[J].法治研究,2008(6):7.
④WTO的SCM协定第8条有关不可诉补贴的规定有被废止之说,欧盟废止了不可诉补贴的规定,但是在其国家援助法里保留了环境补贴。参见赵世良.国际贸易中的环境补贴问题研究[D].长沙:湖南师范大学硕士学位论文,2009: 33,36,37.
⑤United States Department Of Agriculture( USDA).Various Policy Instruments For Various Ends[EB/OL] . (2001-01-25)[ 2011—05—28] .http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aer794/aer794b.pdf
①张时霖.美国农业绿色补贴计划[J].世界农业,2000(5):10.
①锡克.第三条道路[M].北京:人民出版社,1982: 164.
②纪良纲.市场机制缺陷的不同类型及其弥补[J].学术论坛,1990(3):61.
③郭连成.西方市场机制缺陷论及混合经济理论[J].国外社会科学,1999(5):46.
①参见王敏.跨国公司看好中国低碳市场[N].中国企业报,2009—12—3(002).
②参见官平.瞄准中国7万亿美元低碳市场[N].东方早报,2010—5—6(A37).
③参见专题报道.产学研合作助推低碳产业经济研究[J].中国科技产业,2011(3):59—61.
①王可达.低碳技术创新的意义及路径选择[J].探求,2011(2):69.
②路径依赖问题是保罗·大卫提出的,他认为:经济社会中一些偶然事件可能导致一种技术战胜另一种技术(即技术演进),但是一旦选择某一技术路线,它会持续到最终,即使另一种技术路线可能比该路线更为有效。孙丽芝.低碳技术创新面临的问题与对策探讨[J].机械管理开发,2011(1):139.
③参见孙丽芝.低碳技术创新面临的问题与对策探讨[J].机械管理开发,2011(1):139.
④王靖宇,史安娜.低碳技术扩散中政府管理的国际经验比较研究[J].华东经济管理,2011(5):19—20.
①毛荐其,王发明,陈雷.国外低碳经济发展:理论、实践及启示[J].山东工商学院学报,2011(1):3.
②参见孙小羽,臧新.中国出口贸易的能耗效应和环境效应的实证分析——基于混合单位投入产出模型[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2009(4):33—34.
①赵磊,冀峰.低碳技术在绿色建筑中的应用与构想[J].知识经济,2011(5):145.
②参见张显良.碳汇渔业与渔业低碳技术展望[J].中国水产,2011(5):9.
③于海珍,金起文,张玉松.资源型城市唐山发展低碳产业的路径研究[J].中国经贸导刊,2011(5):58.
④参见王军.我国低碳产业发展的问题与对策研究[J].理论学刊,2011(2):50.
⑤参见史达.我国建立低碳产业园区存在的问题[J].经济研究参考,2011(6):35.
①参见王广深,侯石安.《欧盟农业生态补贴政策的经验及启示》[J].经济纵横,2009(5):110.
②参见王发明,毛荐其.低碳技术:低碳经济发展的动力与核心[J].山东工商学院学报,2011(2):30.
③参见李丽平.国际贸易视角下的中国碳排放责任分析[J]..环境保护,2008(3): 43—49.
④参见黄栋.低碳技术创新与政策支持[J].中国科技论坛,2010(2):39—45.
①中国超越美国,成全球最大风电装机国[EB/OL].(2011—01—13)[2011—07—19]. http://www.chinamarket.com.cn/dataservice/energy/110113103315y3m.html; [2011—07—19] .www.tianya.cn/publicforum/content/no06/1/17855.
②2008年8月,中国财政部公布实施《风力发电设备产业化专项资金管理暂行办法》,规定对符合支持条件企业的首50台兆瓦级风电机组,按600元/千瓦的标准予以补助,补助资金主要用于新产品研发。“支持条件”,即中国风电企业生产的发电机中的国产零部件必须达到一定比例方能获得政府的财政支持,包括获得低价土地、低息贷款、特惠合同等。参见美称中国已同意停止风电补贴[EB/OL]. (2011—06—09)[2011—07—20].http://news.hexun.com/2011-06-09/130373597.html;段秀杰.美称中国屈
①参见林惠玲,卢蓉蓉.WTO新一轮谈判中美国在补贴与反补贴规则修改上的立场和建议[J].国际商务研究,2010(2):64—66.
①参见《补贴与反补贴措施协定(SCM)》第14条第1款地2项。
②WTO Appellate Body Report.Canada–Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft(Canada–Aircraft)[Z]. WT/DS70/AB/R,Paras. 157-158.
③薛狄.国际法对生物燃料问题的多维规制[D].长春:吉林大学博士学位论文,2010: 128.
①美国钢铁工人联合会(United Steelworkers)是北美最大的工会,包括美国和加拿大的85万名会员。该工会一直将中国作为最大竞争对手,将其工人失业问题、企业竞争力问题归咎于中国。互动百科[EB/OL].[2011—07—21]. http://www.hudong.com/wiki/%E7%BE%8E%E5%9B%BD%E9%92%A2%E9%93%81%E5%B7%A5%E4%BA%BA%E8%81%94%E5%90%88%E4%BC%9A .
②[2011—07—21].http://finance.qq.com/a/20091127/001792.htm.
③参见宋和平.反倾销法律制度概论[M].北京:中国检察出版社,2003:30.
④参见李本.WTO环境补贴政策的未来发展及中国的因应之策[J].华东师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2008(3):87;赵世良.国际贸易中的环境补贴问题研究[D].长沙:湖南师范大学硕士学位论文,2009: 18—19;Minute of the Regular Meeting . G/SCM/M/24[C].1—2 November 1999, para24;Minute of the Special Meeting .G/SCM/M/22[C].20 December 1999, para16.
①参见《补贴与反补贴措施协定(SCM)》第8条第2款第3项.
①参见林惠玲,卢蓉蓉.WTO新一轮谈判中美国在补贴与反补贴规则修改上的立场和建议[J].国际商务研究,2010(2):63,64,66.
③See Ahn,Dukgeun and Lee,Jieun.Countervailing Duty against China: Opening A Pandora’s Box In the WTO System?[J] .Journal of International Economic Law, 2011,24(7): 13.
①WTO Appellate Body Report. US– AD/CVD on China[Z].WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted on 25 March 2011,para49.of the World Trade Organisation Law of Domestic Regulations of Goods[J].Journal of World Trade,2002,36(5): 874–875.
①曹明德,王慧.从GATT第20条的解释看环境税的合法性[J].学习与探索,2010(5):132—136.
②参见那力,何志鹏.WTO与环境保护[M].长春:吉林人民出版社,2002: 199.
③参见陆凰腾.论WTO争端解决机构对SCM中“公共机构”认定标准——兼评“美国-对原产自中国某些产品反倾销反补贴案”[J].商品与质量,2011(1):71—72.
①沈满洪.论环境经济手段[J] .经济研究,1997(10):56.
①Hogan, L and Thorpe.Issues in food miles and carbon Labelling[R], ABARE research report, December 2009.
②参见李晓平,周定国,于艳春.利用生命周期评价法评价农作物秸秆人造板的环境特性[J].浙江林学院学报,2010(2):211.
①Geoffrey Beattie, Laura Sale. Explicit and Implicit Attitudes to Low and High Carbon Footprint Products[J]. International Journal of Environmental,Cultural, Economic & Social Sustainability, 2009,5: 191-206.
②Paul Upham,Leonie Dendler,Mercedes Bleda.Carbon Labelling of Grocery Products:Public Perceptions and Potential Emissions Reductions[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,2011,19:352.
③美国农业部下属的经济研究局研究表明,1995至1996年间以及2005至2006年间,营养标记由于其信息的复杂性,使用率下降了3%。Todd,Jessica E.and Variyam,Jayachandran N.. The Decline in Consumer Use of Food Nutrition Labels, 1995-2006[J].Food, Nutrition & Science, 2008,9: iii.
②参见邓立.WTO法律规则下的环境标识问题研究[D].济南:山东大学硕士学位论文,2006:8—9.
①Olga Nartova. Carbon Labelling:Moral, Economic and Legal Implications[EB/OL].September 2009 [2011—05—10] .http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridges/54294/
①Stephen Kinsella.Carbon Labelling of Holiday Travel[EB/OL]. [2011—05—11] . http://www.kinsella-consulting-engineers.co.uk/transport/carbonlabel.html
②Carbon Labelling and Restructuring Travel System:Involving Travel Agencies in Climate Change Mitigation[EB/OL].[2011—05—11] . http://www.climalptour.eu/content/?q=node/69
①综合报道.节能环保——海格成清洁燃料客车制造领航者[EB/OL].[2011—05—10] . http://auto.sohu.com/20090305/n262623158.shtml
②Bill Wason,Elke van Thuijl.Low Carbon Shipping, Transport & Market Incentive Programs[R/OL].USEPA ,November 2007[2011—05—20] . http://www.iee-library.eu/images/all_ieelibrary_docs/ml142%20cl.pdf
①See Lanjouw,Jean O. and Mody,Ashoka. Innovation and the International Diffusion of Environmentally Responsive Technology[J]. Research Policy,1996,25, 549–571.
②Edwards-Jones, G., Plassmann, K.,York, E. H., Hounsome, B.,Jones, D. L. , Milài Canals, L..Vulnerability of Exporting Nations to the Development of a Carbon Label in the United Kingdom[J].Environmental Science and Policy,2009,12(4):481—482.
③森林碳汇(Forest Carbon Sinks)是指森林植物吸收大气中的二氧化碳并将其固定在植被或土壤中,从而减少该气体在大气中的浓度。通俗地说,主要是指森林吸收并储存二氧化碳的多少,或者说是森林吸收并储存二氧化碳的能力。树木通过光合作用吸收了大气中大量的二氧化碳,减缓了温室效应。有资料说,森林面积虽然只占陆地总面积的1/3,但森林植被区的碳储量几乎占到了陆地碳库总量的一半。扩大森林覆盖面积是未来30—50年经济可行、成本较低的重要减缓措施。许多国家和国际组织都在积极利用森林碳汇应对气候变化。百度百科[EB/OL].[2011—05—15] . http://www.hudong.com/wiki/%E6%A3%AE%E6%9E%97%E7%A2%B3%E6%B1%87
①Ana Santillana.Should ASEAN Countries Embrace Carbon Labelling as a Means to Reduce Emissions?[EB/OL].June 2011 [2011—05—12] . http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/44/15/48240869.pdf
②Tina Beuchelt.Carbon Labels– Pitfalls for Developing Countries?[EB/OL].February 2011 [2011—05—11] .http://www.rural21.com/uploads/media/rural_2011_2_39-41_01.pdf
①See Kye, Cecelia. Environmental Law and the Consumer in the European Union[J]. Journal of Environmental Law, Oxford University Press,, 1995,7(1):33.
②Kiss, Alexandra, Shelton, Dinah. Manual of European Environmental Law [M].Cambridge :Grotius Publications, 1993:14.
①参见蔡静.公众获得环境信息权利的国际法研究[D].北京:中国政法大学硕士学位论文,2006:1.
①Hana Nyhof, Paul Hunt.Should We Implement a Mandatory Carbon Labelling Scheme for all Commodities?[EB/OL].20 September 2010 [2011—05—18].http://www.critic.co.nz/articles/588
①Mridul Chadha.How About A Global Carbon Labelling Law[EB/OL]. 29 March 2009 [2011—05—16].http://redgreenandblue.org/2009/03/29/how-about-a-global-carbon-labelling-law/
①Whitman, James Q. Consumerism Versus Producerism: A Study in Comparative Law[J]. Yale Law Journal , 2007, 117: 364-371.
①Rural Economy , Land Use Programme.Comparative Merits of Consuming Vegetables Produced Locally and Overseas: Fair and Evidence-Based Carbon Labelling[EB/OL].[2011—05—20] . http://www.relu.ac.uk/news/policy%20and%20practice%20notes/Edwards-Jones.pdf
①据美国能源信息署(Energy Information Administration,EIA)统计,2004年,发展中国家的碳排放已经超过了发达国家,并且呈上升趋势,到2030年,将超过77%。据此,美国认为,环境污染的历史责任属于发达国家,但发展中国家则是当代的环境污染者。在发达国家积极努力减排的同时,发展中国家较为沉默。See David Popp.International Technology Transfer, Climate Change, and the Clean Development Mechanism[J].Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 2011,5(1): 131.
①See Popp. Induced Innovation and Energy Prices[J]. American Economic Review,2002, 92 (1): 160–80.
②See Antoine Dechezlepre ?tre,Matthieu Glachant,Ivan Hasˇcˇic,Nick Johnstone,and Yann Me′nie `re.Invention and Transfer of Climate Change–Mitigation Technologies:AGlobal Analysis[J].Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 2011,5:118.
①Climate Change,Technology Transfer and Intellectual Property Rights[P/OL]. Switzerland:ICTSD, 2008,8:7[2011—05—11]. http://www.ictsd.org/
②Carbon Labelling Program Expanded [EB/OL]. [2011—05—11] . www.carbontrust.co.uk/news/press-centre/2009/pages/carbon-trust-work-with-korea.aspx
①Karen Ellis,Nicola Cantore, Jodie Keane, Leo Peskett, David Brown , Dirk Willem te Velde. Growth in a Carbon Constrained Global Economy[R/OL]. Overseas Development Institute , August 2010:19 [2011—05—20].
[1]曹荣湘.全球大变暖:气候经济、政治与伦理[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2010.
[2]史新峰.气候变化与低碳经济[M].北京:中国水利水电出版社,2010.
[3] [英]安东尼·吉登斯.气候变化的政治[M].曹荣湘译.北京:社会科学文献出版社,2009.
[4] [澳]大卫·希尔曼, [澳]约瑟夫·韦恩·史密斯.气候变化的挑战与民主的失灵[M].武锡申,李楠译.北京:社会科学文献出版社,2009.
[5]金乐琴.低碳经济发展一一市场失灵与产业政策创新[M].北京:中国环境科学出版社,2009.
[6]陈德敏.环境法原理专论[M].北京:法律出版社,2009.
[7]世界贸易组织法律事务部.WTO争端解决案件概要(1995——2007)[M].朱榄叶译.北京:法律出版社,2009.
[8]莫神星.节能减排机制法律政策研究[M].北京:中国时代经济出版社,2008.
[9] [英]帕特莎·波尼、艾伦·波义尔.国际法与环境(第二版)[M].那力,王彦志,王小钢译.北京:高等教育出版社,2007.
[10]陈立虎.当代国际贸易法[M].北京:法律出版社,2007.
[11]那力.国际环境法[M].北京:科学出版社,2005.
[12]那力,何志鹏,王彦志.WTO与公共健康[M].北京:清华大学出版社,2005.
[13]李本.补贴与反补贴制度分析[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2005.
[14]甘瑛.国际货物贸易中的补贴与反补贴问题研究[M].北京:法律出版社,2005.
[15]胡涛等.WTO与生态标志[M].北京:中国环境科学出版社,2005.
[16]朱榄叶.世界贸易组织国际贸易纠纷案例评析(1995——2002)(上册)[M] .北京:法律出版社,2004.
[17]吴继霞.当代环境管理的理念建构[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2003.
[18] [美]伊迪丝·布朗·韦斯等.国际环境法律与政策[M].北京:中信出版社,2003.
[19]赵细康.环境保护与产业国际竞争力:理论与实证分析[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社,2003.
[20]王传丽.国际贸易法[M].北京:中国政法大学出版社,2003.
[21]申进忠.WTO协调环境与贸易关系的理论与实践[M].北京:中国法制出版社,2003.
[22]韩立余.WTO案例及评析[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2002.
[23]那力,何志鹏.WTO与环境保护[M].长春:吉林人民出版社,2002.
[24]徐淑萍.贸易与环境的法律问题研究[M].武汉:武汉大学出版社,2002.
[25]夏青,于洁.环境标志[M].北京:中国环境科学出版社,2002.
[26] [美]约翰·H·杰克逊.世界贸易体制[M] .张乃根译.上海:复旦大学出版社,2001 .
[27]石广生.中国加入世界贸易组织知识读本(二)[M].北京:人民出版社,2001.
[28]陈安.国际经济法学[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2000 .
[29] [法]亚历山大·基斯.国际环境法[M].张若思编译.北京:法律出版社,2000.
[1]牟文义.WTO对“相同产品”认定是否要引入PPMs标准[J] .对外经贸实务,2009(2).
[2]孙法柏.相同产品与环境影响——以GATT第3条为核心[A].环境法治与建设和谐社会——全国环境资源法学研讨会(年会)论文集(第四册), 2007.
[3]徐忆斌.“特征与比较”抑或“目的与效果”——GATT第3条“同类产品”认定标准之探证[J].求索,2007(6).
[4]黄辉.PPMs标准与WTO规则的关系解析[J].亚太经济,2006(5).
[5]那力,李海英.WTO框架中的PPMs问题[J].法学论坛,2002(4).
[6]刘瑛.GATT第20条(a)款公共道德例外条款之研究——以“中美出版物和视听产品案”为视角[J].法商研究,2010(4).
[7]龚柏华.“中美出版物市场准入WTO案”援引GATT第20条“公共道德例外”的法律分析[J].世界贸易组织动态与研究,2009(10) .
[8]全小莲,郑维炜.适用GATT第20条(d)款第一案——韩国牛肉案[J].学理论,2009(4).
[9]刘勇,朱瑜.试论WTO法律框架内GATT第20条适用的若干可能性——以WTO与环保措施有关的争端解决实践为依据[J] .国际经贸探索,2002(3).
[10]曾令良,陈卫东.论WTO一般例外条款(GATT第20条)与我国应有的对策[J].法学论坛,2001(4).
[11]刘天姿,陈彬.“碳关税”措施在GATT/WTO体制中的合法性研究[J].国际经贸探索,2011(4).
[12]张曙霄,郭沛.“碳关税”的两重性分析[J].经济学家,2010(12).
[13]马其家.碳关税及中国的应对策略研究[J].社会科学战线,2010(11).
[14]梁咏.WTO框架下碳关税可能引致的贸易争端与解决[J].法学,2010(7).
[15]李传轩.应对气候变化的碳税立法框架研究[J].法学杂志,2010(6).
[16]王慧.美国气候安全法中的碳关税条款及其对我国的影响——兼论我国的诉讼对策[J].法商研究,2010(5).
[17]黄晓凤.“碳关税”壁垒对我国高碳产业的影响及应对策略[J].经济纵横,2010(3).
[18]郭毅,张硕.碳关税:责任督促还是贸易壁垒[J].WTO经济导刊,2009(9).
[19]夏先良.碳关税、低碳经济和中美贸易再平衡[J].国际贸易,2009(11).
[20]李威.碳关税的国际法与国际机制研究[J].国际政治研究,2009(4).
[21]龚柏华.WTO有关禁止性出口补贴规则研究——以中美“知名品牌产品出口补贴”W T O磋商案为视角[J].国际商务研究,2010(2).
[22]曹明德,王慧.从GATT第20条的解释看环境税的合法性[J].学习与探索,2010(5).
[23]彭岳.中、美、墨三国税收补贴争端的法律分析[J].法商研究,2008(2).
[24]龙英锋.美国“DISC”、”FSC”、”ETI”税收案的启示[J].税务与经济,2008(1).
[25]龙英锋.SCM协议中的国内税问题研究[J].涉外税务,2005(11).
[26]张玉卿.如何理解DSU的磋商———FSC案对“可获证据陈述的争论与裁决[J].WTO经济导刊,2005(6).
[27]李本.WTO环境补贴政策的未来发展及中国的因应之策[J].华东师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2008(3).
[28]李本.WTO环境补贴政策发展与PPP原则关系索隐[J].国际经贸探索,2008(6).
[29]朱庆华.SCM协议不可诉补贴条款简析[J].世界贸易组织动态与研究,2007(2).
[30]姜双林.欧盟农业环境补贴法律制度的嬗变及其对中国的启示[J].法治研究,2008(6).
[31]姚爱萍.环境补贴对国际贸易的影响及我国应采取的对策[J].世界贸易组织动态与研究,2005(4).
[32]朱榄叶.政府与企业共同面对——中国面临的补贴与反补贴问题研究[J].国际贸易,2005(4).
[33]欧福永,熊之才.我国加入WTO后补贴与反补贴问题法律对策研究[J].法制与社会发展,2001(4).
[34]杜群,王兆平.国外碳标识制度及其对我国的启示[J].中国政法大学学报,2011(1).
[35]帅传敏,吕婕,陈艳.食物里程和碳标签对世界农产品贸易影响的初探[J].对外经贸实务,2011(2).
[36]许蔚.碳标签.国际贸易壁垒的新趋势[J].经济研究导刊,2011(10).
[37]陈建国.环境标志与国际贸易规则[J].国际贸易问,2002(4).
[1]薛狄.国际法对生物燃料问题的多维规制[D].长春:吉林大学博士学位论文,2010.
[2]林惠玲.美国反补贴实体法律实施问题研究[D].上海:华东政法大学博士学位论文,2010.
[3]王慧.环境税合法性研究[D].重庆:西南政法大学博士学位论文,2009.
[4]甘瑛.国际货物贸易中的补贴与反补贴法律问题研究[D].厦门:厦门大学博士学位论文,2003.
[5]李响.“碳关税”合法性分析及中国的对策[D].北京:外交学院硕士学位论文,2010
[6]田红莲.基于低碳经济的中国碳税实施研究[D].天津:天津大学硕士学位论文,2010.
[7]张贵萍.国外对华产品适用反补贴调查的法律思考[D].重庆:西南政法大学硕士学位论文,2009.
[8]段玉娟.论《关税与贸易总协定》第三条中“同类产品”的认定标准[D].北京:中国政法大学硕士学位论文,2008.
[9]蔡静.公众获得环境信息权利的国际法研究[D].北京:中国政法大学硕士学位论文,2006.
[10]王莹.石棉案分析:GATT第20条、TBT协议与公共健康[D].吉林大学硕士学位论文,2004.
[1] Bradly, J Condon.Environmental Sovereignty and the WTO: Trade Sanctions and International Law[M].New York:Transnational Publishers, 2006.
[2] Horn, H. and Petros C. Mavroidis.The WTO Case Law of 2003[M] .Cambridge University Press, 2006.
[3] Jackson, John H.. Legal Problems of International Economic Relations[M].4th ed. West Group Press, 2007.
[4]————.The Jurisprudence of GATT and the WTO:Insights on Treaty Law and Economic Relations[M].Higher Education Press, 2002.
[5]————.The Jurisprudence of GATT&the WTO[M].Higher Education Press, 2002.
[6] Lang, Michael, Judith Herdin and Ines Hofbauer.WTO and Direct Taxation[M].Kluwer Law International, 2005.
[7] Pigou, A.C..A Study in Public Finance[M].3 rd ed. London:Macmillan, 1928.
[8] Rubini ,Luca.The Definition of Subsidy and State Aid[M].Oxford/New York:Oxford University Press,2009.
[9] Roosa, Stephen A.and Arun G.Jhaveri.Carbon Reduction:Politics, Strategies,and Technologies[M].The Fairmont Press, 2009.
[10] Sim , Stuart.The Carbon Footprint Wars:What might happen if we retreat from Globalization?[M].Edinburgh University Press , 2009.
[11] Sampson and Whalley.Trade and Environment[M].Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005.
[12] Sunstein ,Cass R.. Laws of Fear—Beyond the Precautionary Principle[M]. Cambridge University Press, 2005.
[1] Ahn ,Dukgeun and Jieun Lee.Countervailing Duty against China: Opening A Pandora’s Box In the WTO System?[J].Journal of International Economic Law,2011.
[2] Brenton , Paul, Gareth Edwards-Jones and Michael Friis Jensen.Carbon Labelling and Low-income Country Exports: A Review of the Development Issues[J].Development Policy Review, 2009, 27 (3).
[3] Bradly, J. Condon.Climate Change and Unresolved Issues in WTO Law[J]. Journal of International Economic Law, 2009 ,12.
[4] Cheyne , Ilona. Proportionality, Proximity and Environmental Labelling in WTO Law[J].Journal of International Economic Law ,2009 ,12.
[5] Charnovitz,Stev.The WTO’s Environmental Progress[J].Journal of International Economic Law, 2007,10 (3).
[6]——. The Law of Environmental PPMs in theWTO: Debunking the Myth of Illegality.Yale Journal of International Law, 2002, 59.
[7] Du , Ming Michael.Autonomy In Setting Appropriate Level of Protection under the WTO Law: Rhetoric or Reality?[J].Journal of International Economic Law , 2011 ,3.
[8] Green ,Andrew and Tracey Epps.The WTO, Science, and the Environment: Moving Towards Consistency[J].Journal of International Economic Law, 2007,10.
[9] Green , Andrew.Climate Change, Regulatory Policy and the WTO: How Constraining Are Trade Rules?[J].Journal of International Economic Law , 2005, 8(1).
[10] Hurtado,Carlos Lopez.Social Labelling and WTO Law[J].Journal of International Economic Law, 2002, 5(3).
[11] Horlick ,Gary N.and Peggy A.Clarke.WTO Subsidies Discipline During and after the Crisis[J].Journal of International Economic Law, 2010 ,11.
[12] Kapterian, Gisele.A Critique of the WTO Jurisprudence on Necessary[J]. International and Comparative Law Quarterly,2010,59 (1).
[13] Moon ,Gillian.Trade and Equality: A Relationship to Discover[J].Journal of International Economic Law ,2009,12(3).
[14] McGrady, Benn.Necessity Exceptions in WTO Law: Retreaded Tyres , Regulatory Purpose and Cumulative Regulatory Measures[J].Journal of International Economic Law , 2008 ,12.
[15] O'Neil ,Stacey R..Consuming for the Environment: A Proposal for Carbon Labels in the United States[J].California Western International Law Journal, 2009,39.
[16] Popp, David.International Technology Transfer, Climate Change, and the Clean Development Mechanism[J].Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 2011,5(1).
[17] Ponting , Cerys.Will Carbon Eco-labelling Engender a New Generation of Eco-warriors?[C]. IOP Conf. Series: Earth and Environmental Science ,2009,6.
[18] Regan, Donald H..The Meaning of‘‘Necessary’’in GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV: The Myth of Cost-Benefit Balancing[J]. World Trade Review, 2007, 6 (3).
[19] Reinhard, Quick and Christian Lau.Environmentally Motivated Tax Distinc- -tions and WTO Law:The European Commission's Green Paper on Integrated Product Policy in Light of the‘Like Product’and‘PPM’Debates[J].Journal of International Economic Law, 2003,6(2).
[20] Slater ,Valerie A. and Lisa W.Ross.Judicial Review Of The International Trade Commission's Determinations In Antidumping And Countervailing Duty Pro- -ceedings: An Overview Of Decisions In 2006[J]. Georgetown Journal of International Law, 2007.
[21] Vranes , Erich.The WTO and Regulatory Freedom:WTO Disciplines on Market Access,Non-Discrimination and Domestic Regulation Relating to Trade in Goods and Services[J].Journal of International Economic Law ,2009, 12(4).
[22] Weiler , J. H. H.. Comment on Brazil– Retreaded Tyres[J].World Trade Review, 2009, 8 (1).
[23] Zhao, Yuhong.Trade and Environment: Challenges After China's WTO Accession[J].Columbia Journal of Environmental Law, 2007(7).
[1] GATT Panel Report.Thailand– Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes(Thailand– Cigarettes)[Z].BISD 37S/200, 223, adopted on 7 November 1990.
[2] WTO Appellate Body Report.United States–Standards for Reformulated and ConventionalGasoline (US–Gasoline) [Z].WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted on 20 May 1996.
[3] WTO Appellate Body Report. United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products(US—Shrimp)[Z].WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted on 6 November 1998.
[4] WTO Appellate Body Report.Korea– Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef (Korea– Beef) [Z] .WT/DS/161/AB/R, adopted on 11 December 2000.
[5] WTO Appellate Body Report.United States—Tax Treatment for“Foreign Sales Corporations”(US-FSC)[Z]. WT/DS108/AB/R, adopted on 20 March 2000.
[6] WTO Appellate Body Report.European Communities– Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products (EC–Asbestos)[Z].WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted on 5 April 2001.
[7] WTO Appellate Body Report.United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services[Z].WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted on 20 April 2005.
[8] WTO Appellate Body Report.Brazil– Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres (Brazil–Retreaded Tyres)[Z] .WT/DS332/AB/R, adopted on 3 Decemeber 2007.
[9] WTO Appellate Body Report.United States– Definitive Anty-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China(US– AD/CVD onChina) [Z]. WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted on 11 March 2011.
①邓可祝.环境补贴研究[J].特区经济,2007(2):135.
①国际法中的特别法优先原则,是指如果一个条约的所有成员方同时又都是另一个特别法性质的条约的成员方,那么后者的效力将优于前者。参见那力,何志鹏.WTO与环境保护[M] .长春:吉林人民出版社,2002:178.
②WTO Appellate Body Report. United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products(US—Shrimp)[Z].WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted on 6 November 1998, paras 163-181.
①Jackson,John H..World Trade and the Law of GATT[M]. Indianapolis: The Bobbs–Merrill Company,1969:788.
②See Du, Ming Michael.Autonomy in Setting Appropriate Level of Protection under the WTO Law: Rhetoric or Reality?[J] . Journal of International Economic Law ,2010, 13(4):1078.
③See Sykes,Alan O..Domestic Regulation, Sovereignty, and Scientific Evidence Requirements:A Pessimistic View[A].Bermann,George A. andPetros C. Mavroidis (eds) .Trade and Human Health and Safety. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006: 257–270;Mavroidis,Gisele.A Critique of the WTO Jurisprudence on Necessary [J].International and Comparative Law Quarterly ,2010,59 (1):89.
①WTO Appellate Body Report.Korea– Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef (Korea– Beef) [Z] . WT/DS/161/AB/R, adopted on 11 December 2000, para 178.
②WTO Appellate Body Report.European Communities– Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products (EC– Asbestos) [Z] .WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted on 5 April 2001, para 172.
③WTO Appellate Body Report.Dominican Republic– Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes (Dominican Republic– Cigarettes) [Z] .WT/DS320/AB/R, adopted on 25April 2005, paras 60—72.
④WTO Appellate Body Report.Brazil– Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres (Brazil–Retreaded Tyres)[Z] .WT/DS332/AB/R, adopted on 3 Decemeber 2007, para 211. More detailed analysis , see Du,Ming Michael.Autonomy in Setting Appropriate Level of Protection under the WTO Law: Rhetoric or Reality?[J] . Journal of International Economic Law ,2010, 13(4): 1098–1102;also see McGrady,Benn.Necessity Exceptions in WTO Law:Retreaded Tyres , Regulatory Purpose and Cumulative Regulatory Measures[J].Journal of International Economic Law, 2008,12(1): 157–159.
①GATT Working Party Report .Border Tax Adjustments[Z].L/3464, BISD 18S/102, adopted on 2 December 1970,para 18.
②GATT Panel Report.EEC– Measures on Animal Feed Proteins[Z]. L/4599, BISD 25S/49, adopted on 14 March 1978,paras 4.1—4.2;GATT Panel Report.Japan - Customs Duties, Taxes and Labelling Practices on Imported Wines and Alcoholic Beverages[Z].L/6216, BISD 34S/83, adopted on 10 November 1987,para 5.6
③徐忆斌.WTO协定中的“同类产品”法律问题研究——以GATT第3条为中心[D].重庆:西南政法大学硕士学位论文,2005: 18.
④See Irish, M..Interpretation and Naming:The Harmonized System in Canadian Customs Tariff Law[J]. Canadian Yearbook of International Law, 1993, 31:90—91.
⑤卢锋著.经济学原理(中国版) [M].北京:北京大学出版社,2002:440.
①陈永钊.从加拿大诉欧盟石棉案看同类产品的认定[J].今日南国,2008(10):128.
②案件编号:DS23/R - 39S/206.
③案件编号:DS31 /R.对此案的具体讨论可以参见以下等文献:徐忆斌.“特征与比较”抑或“目的与效果”——G AT第3条“同类产品”认定标准之探证[J].求索,2007(6):109;杨小强.论“目的和效果”方法在同类服务认定中的适用[J].黑龙江省政法管理干部学院学报,2007(2):59.
④张弦,王浩宇.试析GATT第三条中“同类产品”概念的界定[J].知识经济,2008(9):18.
①See Jackson, John H..Legal Problems of International Economic Relations[M].4 th ed.West Group Press, 2007:500.
②WTO Appellate Body Report.Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages(Japan—Alcoholic Beverages II)[Z].WT/DS8/AB/R,WT/DS10/AB/R,WT/DS11/AB/R,adopted on 1 November 1996, para 21.
③牟文义.WTO对“相同产品”认定是否要引入PPMs标准[J].对外经贸实务,2009(2):36.
④参见那力,何志鹏.WTO与环境保护[M].长春:吉林人民出版社,2002: 305-306.
①孙法柏.相同产品与环境影响——以GATT第3条为核心[A].环境法治与建设和谐社会——全国环境资源法学研讨会(年会)论文集(第四册).2007: 1180.
②李语湘.PPMs标准下“相同产品”界定的法律问题:与WTO规则的冲突与协调[J].企业家天地,2009(7):138.
③闻亚鹏,肖涛.浅议PPM标准及我国的对策[A].适应市场机制的环境法制建设问题研究——中国法学会环境资源法学研究会(年会)论文集. 2002 :764.
④参见朱榄叶.世界贸易组织国际贸易纠纷案例评析[M].北京:法律出版社,2000:527—543.
⑤那力,李海英.WTO框架中的PPMs问题[J].法学论坛,2002(4):43.
⑥参见世界贸易组织法律事务部. WTO争端解决案件概要[M].朱榄叶译.北京:法律出版社,2009: 106—108;案件编号:WT/DS135/AB/R.
⑦朱榄叶.世界贸易组织国际贸易纠纷案例评析(1995——2002)(上册)[M] .北京:法律出版社,2004:
①参见世界贸易组织法律事务部.WTO争端解决案件概要[M].朱榄叶译.北京:法律出版社,2009:43—44.
②参见那力,何志鹏,王彦志.WTO与公共健康[M].北京:清华大学出版社,2005:217-218.
①吴洁,蒋琪.国际贸易中的碳标签[J].国际经济合作,2009(7):82—83.
②Bradly, J. Condon. Climate Change and Unresolved Issues in WTO Law[J]. Journal of International Economic Law,2009 ,12(4):909.
③GATT Panel Report.United States—Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages(US—Malt Beverages)[Z].DS23/R–39S/206, adopted on 19 June 1992, paras 5.71–5.73.
①参见那力.国际环境法[M] .北京:科学出版社,2005:126.
②本节内容来自作者和导师合作文章,已经发表于国内权威期刊《国际贸易》。那力,王淼. GATT第20条a、b、d款及GATS第14条的“必需”问题:变化与发展[J].国际贸易,2010(8):59—64.
①参见《关税与贸易总协定(GATT1947)》第20条.
②参见《服务贸易总协定(GATS)》第14条.
①GATT Panel Report. Thailand– Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes(Thailand– Cigarettes)[Z].BISD 37S/200, 223, adopted on 7 November 1990 ,para 74.
②WTO Appellate Body Report.European Communities– Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products(EC- Asbestos)[Z].WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted on 5 April 2001, para 164.
③Ibid , paras 166—169.
①WTO Appellate Body Report.United States–Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline(US–Gasoline) [Z].WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted on 20 May 1996,paras13—20.
①参见朱榄叶.世界贸易组织国际贸易纠纷案件评析[M].北京:法律出版社,2003:108.
②资料来源:全小莲,郑维炜.适用GATT第20条(d)款第一案——韩国牛肉案[J].学理论,2009(4):77—78.
①WTO Appellate Body Report.Korea–Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh,Chilled and Frozen Beef(Korea–Various Measures on Beef) [Z].WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, adopted on 10 January 2001,para168.
②Ibid,para171.
①WTO Panel Report.Brazil–Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres(Brazil–Retreaded Tyres)[Z].WT/DS332/R, adopted on 12 June 2007, para753.
②WTO Panel Report. Brazil–Retreaded Tyres [Z].WT/DS332/R, adopted on 12 June 2007,para172.
③Ibid,para154.
①WTO Appellate Body Report.United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services(US- Gambling)[Z].WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted on 20 April 2005, para 292.
②WTO Appellate Body Report. US- Gambling[Z].WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted on 20 April 2005, para 296.
③Ibid,para 301.
①WTO Appellate Body Report. EC—Asbestoss[Z] .WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted on 5 April 2001, para 157.
①See Bradly, J. Condon .Climate Change and Unresolved Issues in WTO Law [J].Journal of International Economic Law, 2009,12(4):911.
②高晓露.“绿色条款”在实践中的新发展与绿色贸易壁垒——从WTO争端解决实践看GATT第20条[J].信阳师范学院学报(哲学社会科学版),2003(4): 47.
③WTO Appellate Body Report.United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products(US—Shrimp)[Z].WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted on 6 November 1998,paras 128–131.
④WTO Appellate Body Report.US—Gasoline[Z]. WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted on 20 May 1996, paras 20–21.
①参见曾令良,陈卫东.论WTO一般例外条款(GATT第20条)与我国应有的对策[J].法学论坛,2001(4):37.
①WTO Appellate Body Report. US—Shrimp[Z].WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted on 6 November 1998, paras 163-181.
②巴西翻新轮胎案中,专家组认为,“很少有利益比保护人类健康免受威胁更‘关键’、更‘重要’,环境保护的重要性却不低于保护人类健康”。WTO Panel Report. Brazil—Retreaded Tyres[Z]. WT/DS332/R, adopted on 17 December 2007, para 7.108.
①资料来源:欧盟和美国诉中国限制九种原材料出口一案[EB/OL].(2011—07—06)[2011—07—28]. http://www.china-russia.org/news.php?id=6542
②孙韶华.WTO裁定中国原材料出口限制违规[N/OL].经济参考报,(2011—07—06)[2011—07—28]. http://www.cre-ol.com/_d271661829.htm
①宋一欣.碳税及其法律制度[EB/OL].(2010—11—18)[2011—05—02] . http://www.chinavalue.net/Blog/527723.aspx
②参见那力,何志鹏.WTO与环境保护[M] .长春:吉林人民出版社,2002:189.
③参见[澳]大卫·希尔曼,[澳]约瑟夫·韦恩·史密斯.气候变化的挑战与民主的失灵[M].武锡申,李楠译.北京:社会科学文献出版社,2009:134.
④金慧华.多边贸易体制下的碳税问题探析[J].社会科学,2009(1):97.
①参见谢来辉.欧盟应对气候变化的边境调节税:新的贸易壁垒[J].国际贸易问题,2008(2):70.
②李伟,张希良,周剑,何建坤.关于碳税问题的研究[J].税务研究,2008(3):21.
③陈秀梅.碳税与许可证交易的对比分析[J].番禺职业技术学院学报,2008(2):31.
①那力.WTO的边境调节税与反补贴:我国能源政策和法律必须考虑的两个国际性问题[A].资源节约型、环境友好型社会建设与环境资源法的热点问题研究——全国环境资源法学研讨会论文集. 2006:516.
②李静怡.环境税的短期与长期效应分析[J].山西财政税务专科学校学报,2010(1):26.
①国家环境保护局.人类共同的责任[M] .北京:中国环境科学出版社,1993:30.
①张曙霄,郭沛.“碳关税”的两重性分析[J].经济学家,2010(12):37.
②See J. Andrew Hoemer and Frank Miller. Carbon Taxes for Climate Protection in a Competitive World[R] . Swiss Federal Office for Foreign Economic Affairs, 1996:21.
③董京波.WTO框架下碳关税合法性探析——以GATT20条一般例外条款为中心[A] .国际经济法面临的新格局与新挑战:中国视角——中国国际经济法学会年会暨学术研讨会论文集(四).2010:1272.
④Warwick J.McKibbin ,Peter J.Wilcoxen.The Economic and Environmental Effects of Border Tax Adjustments for Climate Policy[C].Brookings Global Economy and Development Conference, Brookings Institution,Washington,DC.9 June 2008:24—25.
①参见谢来辉,陈迎.中国对碳关税问题过度担忧了吗?[J].国际经济评论,2010(4):139.
①See Burney, Nelson E.. CarbonTtax and Cap-and Trade Tools : Market-Based Approaches for Controlling Greenhouse Gases[M].New York : Nova Science Publishers, 2010:I.
①陈丹妮.限制和交易(cap-and-trade)[EB/OL] .(2009—03—25)[2011—06—01] . http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/language_tips/news/2009-03/25/content_7613949.htm
②詹艳.碳关税和碳税:何去何从?[J].湖南社会科学,2010(6):213.
③黄文旭.碳关税相关概念辨析[J].岭南学刊,2011(1):73.
①国际储备配额的法律依据是《2008年利伯曼—沃纳气候安全法案》,该法案规定,从2019年1月1日开始,美国环境保护署署长应建立国际储备配额项目,目的是,在国内产品实施了总量限制与交易的前提下,用以平衡同样能源强度的美国国内产品与进口产品之间的竞争力。该项目附将不同国家配额以清单形式列出,美国国内进口商只要购买了清单上国家的进口产品,就必须按照清单规定购买一定的国际储备配额,从而弥补美国国内适用总量限制与交易的生产商配额的交易价格。
②百度百科[EB/OL].[2011—06—07].http://baike.baidu.com/view/1935849.htm#1
③百度百科[EB/OL].[2011—06—07].http://baike.baidu.com/view/2830578.htm
④黄志雄.国际贸易新课题:边境碳调节措施与中国的对策[J].中国软科学,2010(1):1—2;李威.碳关税的国际法与国际机制研究[J].国际政治研究,2009(4):42—43;刘勇,朱瑜.碳关税与全球性碳排放交易体制的构建[A].国际经济法面临的新格局与新挑战:中国视角——中国国际经济法学会年会暨学术研讨会论文集(四). 2010:1305.
①陈秀梅.碳税与许可证交易的对比分析[J].番禺职业技术学院学报,2008(2):31.
②姜克隽,张玉卓,李来来,喻捷.碳税三问[J].商周刊,2009(24).
①2008年《气候安全法修正案》规定,美国即将向没有进行实质性减排的国家征收高额的碳关税;2009年《美国清洁能源和安全法》中规定的国际储备配额制度,与碳关税设计的目的异曲同工,美国官员和媒体直接将其称为碳关税条款。参见李威.碳关税的国际法与国际机制研究[J].国际政治研究,2009(4):42;在此之前,欧盟也提出过要求进口商购买排放配额的计划(ETS),但是至今此意愿并不明朗。参见本·席勒.欧盟ETS还能走多远[N/OL].刘洋/编译.中国能源报,2011—05—02(10)[2011—05—10].http://paper.people.com.cn/zgnyb/html/2011-05/02/content_809047.htm?div=-1
①钱慰曾.气候变暖危及人类的生存环境[EB/OL].(2006—01—27)[2011—06—08]. http://gb.cri.cn/8606/2006/01/27/1745@877922.htm
②PICC.Climate Change:The PICC 1990—1992 Assessment[R]. Island Press,1993.
③See Zhang, ZhongXiang and Assuncao ,Lucas. Domestic Climate Policies and the WTO[J].The World Economy,2004,127(3): 359—386.
①参见石广生.中国加入世界贸易组织知识读本(二)[M].北京:人民出版社,2001:499—500.
②案件编号:WT/DS58/AB/R.
③参见宋新刚.碳关税:世界经济发展的一把双刃剑[J].全国商情(理论研究),2009(22):120.
④参见李响.“碳关税”合法性分析及中国的对策[D].北京:外交学院硕士学位论文,2010:6.
⑤GATT1994附件I对3.2条进行具体解释,规定“只有在已税产品与未同样征税的直接竞争或替代产品之间存在竞争的情况下,方被视为与第二句的规定不一致。”也就是说,对相同产品必须相同征税;对与本国相同产品存在直接竞争或替代关系的进口产品,不得基于保护国内生产的目的,而不同征税。参见石广生.中国加入世界贸易组织知识读本(二)[M].北京:人民出版社,2001:503—504.
①See.Jackson, John H.. Legal Problems of International Economic Relations[M]. 4th ed. West Group Press, 2007:500—501.
②参见杨向东.WTO体制下的国民待遇原则研究[M].北京:中国政法大学出版社,2008:50—51.
①夏璐.国际法框架下“碳关税”合法性分析[J].法制与社会,2010(7):103—104.
①See Jackson, John H..Legal Problems of International Economic Relations[M].4 th ed.West Group Press, 2007:555;also see Charnovitz, Steve. The WTO’s Environmental Progress[J].Journal of International Economic Law , 2007,10 : 685.
②WTO Appellate Body Report.United States– Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline(US– Gasoline)[Z] .WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted on 20 May 1996, para129.
③WTO Appellate Body Report. United States– Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products(US– Shrimp)[Z].WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted on 6 November 1998, para153.
①美国汽油案中,将有关定性为“实质关联(substantial relationship)”,措施与保护目标之间并非“偶然的非故意的关系(incidentally or inadvertently)”。美国海虾案中,上诉机构认为,如果规制海虾捕捞的措施意图对海龟的伤害降到最低,那么该措施必须与保护海龟具有直接关联性(directly connected with )。See WTO Appellate Body Report. US– Gasoline[Z]. WT/DS2/AB/R , adopted on 20 May 1996, para 19;also see WTO Appellate Body Report. US– Shrimp[Z]. WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted on 6 November 1998, para 135.
②梁咏.WTO框架下碳关税可能引致的贸易争端与解决[J].法学,2010(7):81.
③参见李响.“碳关税”合法性分析及中国的对策[D].北京:外交学院硕士学位论文,2010: 13.
①何娟.碳关税:新的绿色贸易壁垒抑或WTO环境保护豁免[J].世界贸易组织动态与研究,2010(3):58.
②WTO Appellate Body Report. US– Shrimp[Z]. WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted on 6 November 1998, para 160.
①王慧.环境税合法性研究[D].重庆:西南政法大学博士学位论文,2009:123.
②WTO Appellate Body Report. US– Gasoline[Z]. WT/DS2/AB/R , adopted on 20 May 1996, paras.208-209.
③World Trade Organization.Taxes for Environmental Purposes[EB/OL]. [2011—04—02]. http://www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_backgrod_e/c3s3_e.htm
①Veel,Paul-Erik.Carbon Tariffs and the WTO:An Evaluation of Feasible Policies[J]. Journal of International Economic Law,2009, 12(3):753.
②刘琳.美国大打能源牌欲稳做世界经济领头羊[EB/OL].(2009—07—16)[2011—07—01] . http://www.nbd.com.cn/newshtml/20090716/20090716025424530.html
③刘惠荣,杨凡.《京都议定书》对我国碳税制度的影响[A].资源节约型、环境友好型社会建设与环境资源法的热点问题研究——全国环境资源法学研讨会论文集.2006:493.
④O’Connor ,Robert,Richard Bord,Brent Yarnal and Nancy W iefek. Who Wants to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emission? [J].Social Science Quarterly, 2002, 83(1): 1—17.
⑤参见裴长洪.对未来世界经济发展趋势的若干认识[J].中国经贸导刊,2010(1):12—14.
①奥巴马内达华大学讲话[EB/OL].(2010—07—09)[2011—05—09] . http://gb.cri.cn/27824/2010/07/11/107s2916278.htm
②沈可挺,李钢.碳关税对中国工业品出口的影响——基于可计算一般均衡模型的评估[J].财贸经济,2010(1):82.
①杨明珠.碳关税的法律解读与中国的立场[J].西南石油大学学报(社会科学版),2011(3):37.
①公司责任和广泛采纳的行业标准是ISO 14000,参见[英]帕特莎·波尼、艾伦·波义尔.国际法与环境(第二版)[M] .那力,王彦志,王小钢译.北京:高等教育出版社,2007:688.
②反对碳税的学者一般认为,碳税与碳排放交易相比,缺失灵活性与普遍性,不能顾及不同企业的减排成本与能力。碳排放交易市场作为新兴的金融市场,近几年迅猛发展,其交易方式灵活,可以采取配额交易或项目交易;交易环境公平透明。参见刘勇,朱瑜.碳关税与全球性碳排放交易体制的构建[A].国际经济法面临的新格局与新挑战:中国视角——中国国际经济法学会年会暨学术研讨会论文集(四).2010:1303;参见范晓波.碳排放交易的国际发展及其启示[A].国际经济法面临的新格局与新挑战:中国视角——中国国际经济法学会年会暨学术研讨会论文集(四). 2010:1287—1291.
③Stiglitz,Joseph.A New Agenda for Global Warming[J/OL].The Economists’Voice,2006,3(7)[2011—06—01].http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol3/iss7/art3
④Cooper,Richard.The Case for Charges on Greenhouse Gas Emissions[EB/OL]. Discussion Paper 2008—2010:Harvard Project on International Climate Agreement,2008[2011—06—02]. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/CooperWeb4.pdf
①参见下列文献:Stiglitz,J..Overcoming the Copenhagen Failure[EB/OL].2010[2011—07—02]. http://host.madison.com/ct/news/opinion/column/article_a43e6c32-ef98-5c38-9a64-ae22b5732127.html ;Krugman,P..The WTO Is Making Sense[EB/OL].(2009—06—26)[2011—07—02]. http:// krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/26/the-wto-is-making-sens;Krugman,P..Carbon Tariffs: The Legal Aspects[EB/OL].(2009—07—01)[2011—07—02]. http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/01/ carbon–tariffs-the-legal-aspects/ ;Krugman,P..Fetishizing Free Trade[EB/OL].(2009—09—11)[2011—07—02] http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/09/11/fetishizing-free-trade/.
②WTO and UNEP. Trade and Climate Change[R/OL] .2009[2011—07—01] . http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/flyer_trade_climate_change_e.pdf.
③经济学的文献中分析碳关税效应的模型通常是CGE模型。比较清晰的CGE模型分析可以参见:黄媛红,沈可挺.基于CGE模型的碳关税对中国工业品出口影响评估[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2009(19):202—206.
①谭浩俊.碳税不是一个“征”字了得[N].中华工商时报,2010—6—11(C10).
①田红莲.基于低碳经济的中国碳税实施研究[D].天津:天津大学硕士学位论文,2010:38.
②李静云.碳关税重压下中国该如何破“壁”?[N].中国环境报, 2009-08-20(005).
②李本.补贴与反补贴制度分析[M] .北京:北京大学出版社,2005:26.
③参见王妍.浅谈市场经济条件下的财政补贴[J].山西财经学院学报,1995(6):56.
①参见《补贴与反补贴措施协定(SCM协定)》第3条第1款.
②参见刘钢.WTO禁止性补贴、局限性及实施情况[N].国际商报,2 0 0 1—1 1—1 8(5).
③参见沈亚岚.WTO补贴和禁止性补贴定义之法律问题及对策[J].山西省政法管理干部学院学报, 2005 (3):9.
④案件编号:WT/DS273.
①案件编号:WT/DS387/1.
②参见龚柏华.WTO有关禁止性出口补贴规则研究——以中美“知名品牌产品出口补贴”W T O磋商案为视角[J].国际商务研究,2010(2):48.
③世界贸易组织法律事务部.WTO争端解决案件概要(1995——2007)[M] .朱榄叶译.北京:法律出版社,2009:115.
④参见李本.补贴与反补贴制度分析[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2005:44.
⑤参见《补贴与反补贴措施协定(SCM)》第5条.
①参见《补贴与反补贴措施协定(SCM)》第15条、脚注45.
②同上,第15条.
③李本.补贴与反补贴制度分析[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2005:44.
④同注②,第15条第7款.
①参见《补贴与反补贴措施协定(SCM)》注释46.
②同上,注释48.
③同上,注释12;GATT1994第23条.
④案件编号:WT/DS126/R.
⑤王懿.WTO框架下中国可诉性补贴法律问题研究[D].上海:上海交通大学硕士学位论文,2008: 8.
①参见《补贴与反补贴措施协定(SCM)》第6条第1款.
②同上,第6条第1款、第6条第2款.
③同上,第15条第3款.
④参见曹建明,陈治东.国际经济法专论(第3卷)[M].北京:法律出版社,2000: 473.
①参见《补贴与反补贴措施协定(SCM)》第11条第2款第4项.
②同上,第15条第4款.
③同上,第8条.
④参见宋和平.反倾销法律制度概论[M].北京:中国检察出版社,2003: 30.
⑤朱庆华.SCM协议不可诉补贴条款简析[J].世界贸易组织动态与研究,2007(2): 33—36.
⑥参见李本.补贴与反补贴制度分析[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2005: 50.
⑦参见[英]布瑞恩·麦克唐纳.世界贸易体制——从乌拉圭回合谈起[M].叶兴国等译.上海:上海人民出版社,2002: 109.
①参见李本.补贴与反补贴制度分析[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2005: 6—7.
②参见陈立虎.当代国际贸易法[M] .北京:法律出版社,2007: 381.
③参见杨解君.WTO下的中国行政法制变革[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2005: 211—212.
①陈立虎.当代国际贸易法[M] .北京:法律出版社,2007:381.
②汪尧田.国际贸易[M].上海:上海社会科学院出版社,1993:273.
①曹建明,贺小勇.世界贸易组织[M] .北京:法律出版社,1999:206-207.
②商务部.国别贸易投资环境报告[R/OL].(2005)[2010—05—11] .
①彭岳.中、美、墨三国税收补贴争端的法律分析[J].法商研究,2008(2):12.
②参见作者已发表的论文。王淼.美国外销公司税案对我国税收优惠、补贴的启示[J].求索,2011(2):160.
①[英]马修·林恩.空中对决——波音与空客市场大战[M] .北京:华夏出版社,2001:136.
②本节内容来自作者和导师合作文章,已经发表于《社会科学辑刊》。那力,王淼.低碳经济背景下WTO体系所得税优惠问题探析[J] .社会科学辑刊,2011(1):91—94.
③我国对低碳经济发展推出了大量税收优惠措施。可参见本文附录,以及媒体中的大量报道。
①此案英文简称为FSC,案件编号:WT/DS108.
①这个问题的论述来自于作者已经发表的文章。王淼.美国外销公司税案对我国税收优惠、补贴的启示[J].求索,2011(2):160.
②这一注释规定:“(e)段无意限制一成员方采取措施以避免其企业或其他成员方的企业从国外来源的收益被双重征税。”
③20世纪70年代初,欧共体与美国、美国与法国、美国与比利时、美国与荷兰之间发生四个税法案纠纷,经过GATT专家组的争端解决机制,直到1981年经过多方努力,GATT理事会才通过了关于这四个税法案的专家组报告。美国外国销售公司措施案与这四个税法案的案情有类似之处。四个税法案中均涉及到美国、法国、比利时与荷兰这四个国家对外国公司的免税待与出口补贴的关系。专家组根据1979年《补贴与反补贴守则》中关于出口补贴解释清单脚注2的规定,认定基于避免国际双重征税的目的,各国可以对外国公司给予免税待遇,这种免税待遇不属于出口补贴。脚注2解决了四个税法案的主要问题。参见朱榄叶.关税与贸易总协定国际贸易纠纷案例汇编[M] .北京:法律出版社,1995: 184—190.
④参见朱榄叶.世界贸易组织国际贸易纠纷案件评析[M].北京:法律出版社,2003:3.
①匡贤明.我国转轨时期的节约型社会建设与市场化改革[J].贵州财经学院学报,2007(5):14.
②韩文博.试论绿色财政[J].财政研究,2006(1):56.
①参见杨蓓,李霞.“绿色财政”初探[J] .四川财政,1998(6):7.
②参见曾纪发.构建我国绿色财政体系的战略思考[J].西部财会,2011(1):7.
③李树.经济绿色化发展与积极绿色财政政策的实施[J].经济问题探索,2002(4):52.
④参见李景华.试论绿色财政与可持续发展[J].山西能源与节能,2007(2):48.
⑤吴玉萍,董锁成.绿色财政政策——西部山川秀美的首选政策[J].开发研究,2001(1):27.
①姚爱萍认为,“环境补贴是指政府在经济主体因认识上的偏差或资金上的私有制不能有效进行环保投资的情况下,为了解决环保问题,或是出于政治、经济原因而对企业进行各种补贴,以帮助企业进行环保设备、环保工艺改进的一种政府行为。目前,环境补贴采取的形式主要有:支付现金、税收激励和豁免、政府环境保护投资或政府以优惠利率提供贷款等。”姚爱萍..环境补贴对国际贸易的影响及我国应采取的对策[J].世界贸易组织动态与研究,2005(4):29.邓可祝认为,“环境补贴是指行政主体基于改善环境,保护生态的目的而对私人给予的各种优惠。”邓可祝.环境补贴研究[J].特区经济,2007(2):135.
②Myers, N.and Kent, J. Perverse subsidies:How Tax Dollars Can Undercut Environment and the Economy[M].Washington(DC):Island Press, 2001.
③张贵萍.国外对华产品适用反补贴调查的法律思考[D].重庆:西南政法大学硕士学位论文,2009:25.
①参见姜双林.欧盟农业环境补贴法律制度的嬗变及其对中国的启示[J].法治研究,2008(6):3.
②黄河.论我国农业补贴法律制度的构建[J].法律科学,2007(1):108.
③参见姜双林.欧盟农业环境补贴法律制度的嬗变及其对中国的启示[J].法治研究,2008(6):7.
④WTO的SCM协定第8条有关不可诉补贴的规定有被废止之说,欧盟废止了不可诉补贴的规定,但是在其国家援助法里保留了环境补贴。参见赵世良.国际贸易中的环境补贴问题研究[D].长沙:湖南师范大学硕士学位论文,2009: 33,36,37.
⑤United States Department Of Agriculture( USDA).Various Policy Instruments For Various Ends[EB/OL] . (2001-01-25)[ 2011—05—28] .http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aer794/aer794b.pdf
①张时霖.美国农业绿色补贴计划[J].世界农业,2000(5):10.
①锡克.第三条道路[M].北京:人民出版社,1982: 164.
②纪良纲.市场机制缺陷的不同类型及其弥补[J].学术论坛,1990(3):61.
③郭连成.西方市场机制缺陷论及混合经济理论[J].国外社会科学,1999(5):46.
①参见王敏.跨国公司看好中国低碳市场[N].中国企业报,2009—12—3(002).
②参见官平.瞄准中国7万亿美元低碳市场[N].东方早报,2010—5—6(A37).
③参见专题报道.产学研合作助推低碳产业经济研究[J].中国科技产业,2011(3):59—61.
①王可达.低碳技术创新的意义及路径选择[J].探求,2011(2):69.
②路径依赖问题是保罗·大卫提出的,他认为:经济社会中一些偶然事件可能导致一种技术战胜另一种技术(即技术演进),但是一旦选择某一技术路线,它会持续到最终,即使另一种技术路线可能比该路线更为有效。孙丽芝.低碳技术创新面临的问题与对策探讨[J].机械管理开发,2011(1):139.
③参见孙丽芝.低碳技术创新面临的问题与对策探讨[J].机械管理开发,2011(1):139.
④王靖宇,史安娜.低碳技术扩散中政府管理的国际经验比较研究[J].华东经济管理,2011(5):19—20.
①毛荐其,王发明,陈雷.国外低碳经济发展:理论、实践及启示[J].山东工商学院学报,2011(1):3.
②参见孙小羽,臧新.中国出口贸易的能耗效应和环境效应的实证分析——基于混合单位投入产出模型[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2009(4):33—34.
①赵磊,冀峰.低碳技术在绿色建筑中的应用与构想[J].知识经济,2011(5):145.
②参见张显良.碳汇渔业与渔业低碳技术展望[J].中国水产,2011(5):9.
③于海珍,金起文,张玉松.资源型城市唐山发展低碳产业的路径研究[J].中国经贸导刊,2011(5):58.
④参见王军.我国低碳产业发展的问题与对策研究[J].理论学刊,2011(2):50.
⑤参见史达.我国建立低碳产业园区存在的问题[J].经济研究参考,2011(6):35.
①参见王广深,侯石安.《欧盟农业生态补贴政策的经验及启示》[J].经济纵横,2009(5):110.
②参见王发明,毛荐其.低碳技术:低碳经济发展的动力与核心[J].山东工商学院学报,2011(2):30.
③参见李丽平.国际贸易视角下的中国碳排放责任分析[J]..环境保护,2008(3): 43—49.
④参见黄栋.低碳技术创新与政策支持[J].中国科技论坛,2010(2):39—45.
①中国超越美国,成全球最大风电装机国[EB/OL].(2011—01—13)[2011—07—19]. http://www.chinamarket.com.cn/dataservice/energy/110113103315y3m.html; [2011—07—19] .www.tianya.cn/publicforum/content/no06/1/17855.
②2008年8月,中国财政部公布实施《风力发电设备产业化专项资金管理暂行办法》,规定对符合支持条件企业的首50台兆瓦级风电机组,按600元/千瓦的标准予以补助,补助资金主要用于新产品研发。“支持条件”,即中国风电企业生产的发电机中的国产零部件必须达到一定比例方能获得政府的财政支持,包括获得低价土地、低息贷款、特惠合同等。参见美称中国已同意停止风电补贴[EB/OL]. (2011—06—09)[2011—07—20].http://news.hexun.com/2011-06-09/130373597.html;段秀杰.美称中国屈
①参见林惠玲,卢蓉蓉.WTO新一轮谈判中美国在补贴与反补贴规则修改上的立场和建议[J].国际商务研究,2010(2):64—66.
①参见《补贴与反补贴措施协定(SCM)》第14条第1款地2项。
②WTO Appellate Body Report.Canada–Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft(Canada–Aircraft)[Z]. WT/DS70/AB/R,Paras. 157-158.
③薛狄.国际法对生物燃料问题的多维规制[D].长春:吉林大学博士学位论文,2010: 128.
①美国钢铁工人联合会(United Steelworkers)是北美最大的工会,包括美国和加拿大的85万名会员。该工会一直将中国作为最大竞争对手,将其工人失业问题、企业竞争力问题归咎于中国。互动百科[EB/OL].[2011—07—21]. http://www.hudong.com/wiki/%E7%BE%8E%E5%9B%BD%E9%92%A2%E9%93%81%E5%B7%A5%E4%BA%BA%E8%81%94%E5%90%88%E4%BC%9A .
②[2011—07—21].http://finance.qq.com/a/20091127/001792.htm.
③参见宋和平.反倾销法律制度概论[M].北京:中国检察出版社,2003:30.
④参见李本.WTO环境补贴政策的未来发展及中国的因应之策[J].华东师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2008(3):87;赵世良.国际贸易中的环境补贴问题研究[D].长沙:湖南师范大学硕士学位论文,2009: 18—19;Minute of the Regular Meeting . G/SCM/M/24[C].1—2 November 1999, para24;Minute of the Special Meeting .G/SCM/M/22[C].20 December 1999, para16.
①参见《补贴与反补贴措施协定(SCM)》第8条第2款第3项.
①参见林惠玲,卢蓉蓉.WTO新一轮谈判中美国在补贴与反补贴规则修改上的立场和建议[J].国际商务研究,2010(2):63,64,66.
③See Ahn,Dukgeun and Lee,Jieun.Countervailing Duty against China: Opening A Pandora’s Box In the WTO System?[J] .Journal of International Economic Law, 2011,24(7): 13.
①WTO Appellate Body Report. US– AD/CVD on China[Z].WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted on 25 March 2011,para49.of the World Trade Organisation Law of Domestic Regulations of Goods[J].Journal of World Trade,2002,36(5): 874–875.
①曹明德,王慧.从GATT第20条的解释看环境税的合法性[J].学习与探索,2010(5):132—136.
②参见那力,何志鹏.WTO与环境保护[M].长春:吉林人民出版社,2002: 199.
③参见陆凰腾.论WTO争端解决机构对SCM中“公共机构”认定标准——兼评“美国-对原产自中国某些产品反倾销反补贴案”[J].商品与质量,2011(1):71—72.
①沈满洪.论环境经济手段[J] .经济研究,1997(10):56.
①Hogan, L and Thorpe.Issues in food miles and carbon Labelling[R], ABARE research report, December 2009.
②参见李晓平,周定国,于艳春.利用生命周期评价法评价农作物秸秆人造板的环境特性[J].浙江林学院学报,2010(2):211.
①Geoffrey Beattie, Laura Sale. Explicit and Implicit Attitudes to Low and High Carbon Footprint Products[J]. International Journal of Environmental,Cultural, Economic & Social Sustainability, 2009,5: 191-206.
②Paul Upham,Leonie Dendler,Mercedes Bleda.Carbon Labelling of Grocery Products:Public Perceptions and Potential Emissions Reductions[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,2011,19:352.
③美国农业部下属的经济研究局研究表明,1995至1996年间以及2005至2006年间,营养标记由于其信息的复杂性,使用率下降了3%。Todd,Jessica E.and Variyam,Jayachandran N.. The Decline in Consumer Use of Food Nutrition Labels, 1995-2006[J].Food, Nutrition & Science, 2008,9: iii.
②参见邓立.WTO法律规则下的环境标识问题研究[D].济南:山东大学硕士学位论文,2006:8—9.
①Olga Nartova. Carbon Labelling:Moral, Economic and Legal Implications[EB/OL].September 2009 [2011—05—10] .http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridges/54294/
①Stephen Kinsella.Carbon Labelling of Holiday Travel[EB/OL]. [2011—05—11] . http://www.kinsella-consulting-engineers.co.uk/transport/carbonlabel.html
②Carbon Labelling and Restructuring Travel System:Involving Travel Agencies in Climate Change Mitigation[EB/OL].[2011—05—11] . http://www.climalptour.eu/content/?q=node/69
①综合报道.节能环保——海格成清洁燃料客车制造领航者[EB/OL].[2011—05—10] . http://auto.sohu.com/20090305/n262623158.shtml
②Bill Wason,Elke van Thuijl.Low Carbon Shipping, Transport & Market Incentive Programs[R/OL].USEPA ,November 2007[2011—05—20] . http://www.iee-library.eu/images/all_ieelibrary_docs/ml142%20cl.pdf
①See Lanjouw,Jean O. and Mody,Ashoka. Innovation and the International Diffusion of Environmentally Responsive Technology[J]. Research Policy,1996,25, 549–571.
②Edwards-Jones, G., Plassmann, K.,York, E. H., Hounsome, B.,Jones, D. L. , Milài Canals, L..Vulnerability of Exporting Nations to the Development of a Carbon Label in the United Kingdom[J].Environmental Science and Policy,2009,12(4):481—482.
③森林碳汇(Forest Carbon Sinks)是指森林植物吸收大气中的二氧化碳并将其固定在植被或土壤中,从而减少该气体在大气中的浓度。通俗地说,主要是指森林吸收并储存二氧化碳的多少,或者说是森林吸收并储存二氧化碳的能力。树木通过光合作用吸收了大气中大量的二氧化碳,减缓了温室效应。有资料说,森林面积虽然只占陆地总面积的1/3,但森林植被区的碳储量几乎占到了陆地碳库总量的一半。扩大森林覆盖面积是未来30—50年经济可行、成本较低的重要减缓措施。许多国家和国际组织都在积极利用森林碳汇应对气候变化。百度百科[EB/OL].[2011—05—15] . http://www.hudong.com/wiki/%E6%A3%AE%E6%9E%97%E7%A2%B3%E6%B1%87
①Ana Santillana.Should ASEAN Countries Embrace Carbon Labelling as a Means to Reduce Emissions?[EB/OL].June 2011 [2011—05—12] . http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/44/15/48240869.pdf
②Tina Beuchelt.Carbon Labels– Pitfalls for Developing Countries?[EB/OL].February 2011 [2011—05—11] .http://www.rural21.com/uploads/media/rural_2011_2_39-41_01.pdf
①See Kye, Cecelia. Environmental Law and the Consumer in the European Union[J]. Journal of Environmental Law, Oxford University Press,, 1995,7(1):33.
②Kiss, Alexandra, Shelton, Dinah. Manual of European Environmental Law [M].Cambridge :Grotius Publications, 1993:14.
①参见蔡静.公众获得环境信息权利的国际法研究[D].北京:中国政法大学硕士学位论文,2006:1.
①Hana Nyhof, Paul Hunt.Should We Implement a Mandatory Carbon Labelling Scheme for all Commodities?[EB/OL].20 September 2010 [2011—05—18].http://www.critic.co.nz/articles/588
①Mridul Chadha.How About A Global Carbon Labelling Law[EB/OL]. 29 March 2009 [2011—05—16].http://redgreenandblue.org/2009/03/29/how-about-a-global-carbon-labelling-law/
①Whitman, James Q. Consumerism Versus Producerism: A Study in Comparative Law[J]. Yale Law Journal , 2007, 117: 364-371.
①Rural Economy , Land Use Programme.Comparative Merits of Consuming Vegetables Produced Locally and Overseas: Fair and Evidence-Based Carbon Labelling[EB/OL].[2011—05—20] . http://www.relu.ac.uk/news/policy%20and%20practice%20notes/Edwards-Jones.pdf
①据美国能源信息署(Energy Information Administration,EIA)统计,2004年,发展中国家的碳排放已经超过了发达国家,并且呈上升趋势,到2030年,将超过77%。据此,美国认为,环境污染的历史责任属于发达国家,但发展中国家则是当代的环境污染者。在发达国家积极努力减排的同时,发展中国家较为沉默。See David Popp.International Technology Transfer, Climate Change, and the Clean Development Mechanism[J].Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 2011,5(1): 131.
①See Popp. Induced Innovation and Energy Prices[J]. American Economic Review,2002, 92 (1): 160–80.
②See Antoine Dechezlepre ?tre,Matthieu Glachant,Ivan Hasˇcˇic,Nick Johnstone,and Yann Me′nie `re.Invention and Transfer of Climate Change–Mitigation Technologies:AGlobal Analysis[J].Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 2011,5:118.
①Climate Change,Technology Transfer and Intellectual Property Rights[P/OL]. Switzerland:ICTSD, 2008,8:7[2011—05—11]. http://www.ictsd.org/
②Carbon Labelling Program Expanded [EB/OL]. [2011—05—11] . www.carbontrust.co.uk/news/press-centre/2009/pages/carbon-trust-work-with-korea.aspx
①Karen Ellis,Nicola Cantore, Jodie Keane, Leo Peskett, David Brown , Dirk Willem te Velde. Growth in a Carbon Constrained Global Economy[R/OL]. Overseas Development Institute , August 2010:19 [2011—05—20].
[1]曹荣湘.全球大变暖:气候经济、政治与伦理[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2010.
[2]史新峰.气候变化与低碳经济[M].北京:中国水利水电出版社,2010.
[3] [英]安东尼·吉登斯.气候变化的政治[M].曹荣湘译.北京:社会科学文献出版社,2009.
[4] [澳]大卫·希尔曼, [澳]约瑟夫·韦恩·史密斯.气候变化的挑战与民主的失灵[M].武锡申,李楠译.北京:社会科学文献出版社,2009.
[5]金乐琴.低碳经济发展一一市场失灵与产业政策创新[M].北京:中国环境科学出版社,2009.
[6]陈德敏.环境法原理专论[M].北京:法律出版社,2009.
[7]世界贸易组织法律事务部.WTO争端解决案件概要(1995——2007)[M].朱榄叶译.北京:法律出版社,2009.
[8]莫神星.节能减排机制法律政策研究[M].北京:中国时代经济出版社,2008.
[9] [英]帕特莎·波尼、艾伦·波义尔.国际法与环境(第二版)[M].那力,王彦志,王小钢译.北京:高等教育出版社,2007.
[10]陈立虎.当代国际贸易法[M].北京:法律出版社,2007.
[11]那力.国际环境法[M].北京:科学出版社,2005.
[12]那力,何志鹏,王彦志.WTO与公共健康[M].北京:清华大学出版社,2005.
[13]李本.补贴与反补贴制度分析[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2005.
[14]甘瑛.国际货物贸易中的补贴与反补贴问题研究[M].北京:法律出版社,2005.
[15]胡涛等.WTO与生态标志[M].北京:中国环境科学出版社,2005.
[16]朱榄叶.世界贸易组织国际贸易纠纷案例评析(1995——2002)(上册)[M] .北京:法律出版社,2004.
[17]吴继霞.当代环境管理的理念建构[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2003.
[18] [美]伊迪丝·布朗·韦斯等.国际环境法律与政策[M].北京:中信出版社,2003.
[19]赵细康.环境保护与产业国际竞争力:理论与实证分析[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社,2003.
[20]王传丽.国际贸易法[M].北京:中国政法大学出版社,2003.
[21]申进忠.WTO协调环境与贸易关系的理论与实践[M].北京:中国法制出版社,2003.
[22]韩立余.WTO案例及评析[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2002.
[23]那力,何志鹏.WTO与环境保护[M].长春:吉林人民出版社,2002.
[24]徐淑萍.贸易与环境的法律问题研究[M].武汉:武汉大学出版社,2002.
[25]夏青,于洁.环境标志[M].北京:中国环境科学出版社,2002.
[26] [美]约翰·H·杰克逊.世界贸易体制[M] .张乃根译.上海:复旦大学出版社,2001 .
[27]石广生.中国加入世界贸易组织知识读本(二)[M].北京:人民出版社,2001.
[28]陈安.国际经济法学[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2000 .
[29] [法]亚历山大·基斯.国际环境法[M].张若思编译.北京:法律出版社,2000.
[1]牟文义.WTO对“相同产品”认定是否要引入PPMs标准[J] .对外经贸实务,2009(2).
[2]孙法柏.相同产品与环境影响——以GATT第3条为核心[A].环境法治与建设和谐社会——全国环境资源法学研讨会(年会)论文集(第四册), 2007.
[3]徐忆斌.“特征与比较”抑或“目的与效果”——GATT第3条“同类产品”认定标准之探证[J].求索,2007(6).
[4]黄辉.PPMs标准与WTO规则的关系解析[J].亚太经济,2006(5).
[5]那力,李海英.WTO框架中的PPMs问题[J].法学论坛,2002(4).
[6]刘瑛.GATT第20条(a)款公共道德例外条款之研究——以“中美出版物和视听产品案”为视角[J].法商研究,2010(4).
[7]龚柏华.“中美出版物市场准入WTO案”援引GATT第20条“公共道德例外”的法律分析[J].世界贸易组织动态与研究,2009(10) .
[8]全小莲,郑维炜.适用GATT第20条(d)款第一案——韩国牛肉案[J].学理论,2009(4).
[9]刘勇,朱瑜.试论WTO法律框架内GATT第20条适用的若干可能性——以WTO与环保措施有关的争端解决实践为依据[J] .国际经贸探索,2002(3).
[10]曾令良,陈卫东.论WTO一般例外条款(GATT第20条)与我国应有的对策[J].法学论坛,2001(4).
[11]刘天姿,陈彬.“碳关税”措施在GATT/WTO体制中的合法性研究[J].国际经贸探索,2011(4).
[12]张曙霄,郭沛.“碳关税”的两重性分析[J].经济学家,2010(12).
[13]马其家.碳关税及中国的应对策略研究[J].社会科学战线,2010(11).
[14]梁咏.WTO框架下碳关税可能引致的贸易争端与解决[J].法学,2010(7).
[15]李传轩.应对气候变化的碳税立法框架研究[J].法学杂志,2010(6).
[16]王慧.美国气候安全法中的碳关税条款及其对我国的影响——兼论我国的诉讼对策[J].法商研究,2010(5).
[17]黄晓凤.“碳关税”壁垒对我国高碳产业的影响及应对策略[J].经济纵横,2010(3).
[18]郭毅,张硕.碳关税:责任督促还是贸易壁垒[J].WTO经济导刊,2009(9).
[19]夏先良.碳关税、低碳经济和中美贸易再平衡[J].国际贸易,2009(11).
[20]李威.碳关税的国际法与国际机制研究[J].国际政治研究,2009(4).
[21]龚柏华.WTO有关禁止性出口补贴规则研究——以中美“知名品牌产品出口补贴”W T O磋商案为视角[J].国际商务研究,2010(2).
[22]曹明德,王慧.从GATT第20条的解释看环境税的合法性[J].学习与探索,2010(5).
[23]彭岳.中、美、墨三国税收补贴争端的法律分析[J].法商研究,2008(2).
[24]龙英锋.美国“DISC”、”FSC”、”ETI”税收案的启示[J].税务与经济,2008(1).
[25]龙英锋.SCM协议中的国内税问题研究[J].涉外税务,2005(11).
[26]张玉卿.如何理解DSU的磋商———FSC案对“可获证据陈述的争论与裁决[J].WTO经济导刊,2005(6).
[27]李本.WTO环境补贴政策的未来发展及中国的因应之策[J].华东师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2008(3).
[28]李本.WTO环境补贴政策发展与PPP原则关系索隐[J].国际经贸探索,2008(6).
[29]朱庆华.SCM协议不可诉补贴条款简析[J].世界贸易组织动态与研究,2007(2).
[30]姜双林.欧盟农业环境补贴法律制度的嬗变及其对中国的启示[J].法治研究,2008(6).
[31]姚爱萍.环境补贴对国际贸易的影响及我国应采取的对策[J].世界贸易组织动态与研究,2005(4).
[32]朱榄叶.政府与企业共同面对——中国面临的补贴与反补贴问题研究[J].国际贸易,2005(4).
[33]欧福永,熊之才.我国加入WTO后补贴与反补贴问题法律对策研究[J].法制与社会发展,2001(4).
[34]杜群,王兆平.国外碳标识制度及其对我国的启示[J].中国政法大学学报,2011(1).
[35]帅传敏,吕婕,陈艳.食物里程和碳标签对世界农产品贸易影响的初探[J].对外经贸实务,2011(2).
[36]许蔚.碳标签.国际贸易壁垒的新趋势[J].经济研究导刊,2011(10).
[37]陈建国.环境标志与国际贸易规则[J].国际贸易问,2002(4).
[1]薛狄.国际法对生物燃料问题的多维规制[D].长春:吉林大学博士学位论文,2010.
[2]林惠玲.美国反补贴实体法律实施问题研究[D].上海:华东政法大学博士学位论文,2010.
[3]王慧.环境税合法性研究[D].重庆:西南政法大学博士学位论文,2009.
[4]甘瑛.国际货物贸易中的补贴与反补贴法律问题研究[D].厦门:厦门大学博士学位论文,2003.
[5]李响.“碳关税”合法性分析及中国的对策[D].北京:外交学院硕士学位论文,2010
[6]田红莲.基于低碳经济的中国碳税实施研究[D].天津:天津大学硕士学位论文,2010.
[7]张贵萍.国外对华产品适用反补贴调查的法律思考[D].重庆:西南政法大学硕士学位论文,2009.
[8]段玉娟.论《关税与贸易总协定》第三条中“同类产品”的认定标准[D].北京:中国政法大学硕士学位论文,2008.
[9]蔡静.公众获得环境信息权利的国际法研究[D].北京:中国政法大学硕士学位论文,2006.
[10]王莹.石棉案分析:GATT第20条、TBT协议与公共健康[D].吉林大学硕士学位论文,2004.
[1] Bradly, J Condon.Environmental Sovereignty and the WTO: Trade Sanctions and International Law[M].New York:Transnational Publishers, 2006.
[2] Horn, H. and Petros C. Mavroidis.The WTO Case Law of 2003[M] .Cambridge University Press, 2006.
[3] Jackson, John H.. Legal Problems of International Economic Relations[M].4th ed. West Group Press, 2007.
[4]————.The Jurisprudence of GATT and the WTO:Insights on Treaty Law and Economic Relations[M].Higher Education Press, 2002.
[5]————.The Jurisprudence of GATT&the WTO[M].Higher Education Press, 2002.
[6] Lang, Michael, Judith Herdin and Ines Hofbauer.WTO and Direct Taxation[M].Kluwer Law International, 2005.
[7] Pigou, A.C..A Study in Public Finance[M].3 rd ed. London:Macmillan, 1928.
[8] Rubini ,Luca.The Definition of Subsidy and State Aid[M].Oxford/New York:Oxford University Press,2009.
[9] Roosa, Stephen A.and Arun G.Jhaveri.Carbon Reduction:Politics, Strategies,and Technologies[M].The Fairmont Press, 2009.
[10] Sim , Stuart.The Carbon Footprint Wars:What might happen if we retreat from Globalization?[M].Edinburgh University Press , 2009.
[11] Sampson and Whalley.Trade and Environment[M].Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005.
[12] Sunstein ,Cass R.. Laws of Fear—Beyond the Precautionary Principle[M]. Cambridge University Press, 2005.
[1] Ahn ,Dukgeun and Jieun Lee.Countervailing Duty against China: Opening A Pandora’s Box In the WTO System?[J].Journal of International Economic Law,2011.
[2] Brenton , Paul, Gareth Edwards-Jones and Michael Friis Jensen.Carbon Labelling and Low-income Country Exports: A Review of the Development Issues[J].Development Policy Review, 2009, 27 (3).
[3] Bradly, J. Condon.Climate Change and Unresolved Issues in WTO Law[J]. Journal of International Economic Law, 2009 ,12.
[4] Cheyne , Ilona. Proportionality, Proximity and Environmental Labelling in WTO Law[J].Journal of International Economic Law ,2009 ,12.
[5] Charnovitz,Stev.The WTO’s Environmental Progress[J].Journal of International Economic Law, 2007,10 (3).
[6]——. The Law of Environmental PPMs in theWTO: Debunking the Myth of Illegality.Yale Journal of International Law, 2002, 59.
[7] Du , Ming Michael.Autonomy In Setting Appropriate Level of Protection under the WTO Law: Rhetoric or Reality?[J].Journal of International Economic Law , 2011 ,3.
[8] Green ,Andrew and Tracey Epps.The WTO, Science, and the Environment: Moving Towards Consistency[J].Journal of International Economic Law, 2007,10.
[9] Green , Andrew.Climate Change, Regulatory Policy and the WTO: How Constraining Are Trade Rules?[J].Journal of International Economic Law , 2005, 8(1).
[10] Hurtado,Carlos Lopez.Social Labelling and WTO Law[J].Journal of International Economic Law, 2002, 5(3).
[11] Horlick ,Gary N.and Peggy A.Clarke.WTO Subsidies Discipline During and after the Crisis[J].Journal of International Economic Law, 2010 ,11.
[12] Kapterian, Gisele.A Critique of the WTO Jurisprudence on Necessary[J]. International and Comparative Law Quarterly,2010,59 (1).
[13] Moon ,Gillian.Trade and Equality: A Relationship to Discover[J].Journal of International Economic Law ,2009,12(3).
[14] McGrady, Benn.Necessity Exceptions in WTO Law: Retreaded Tyres , Regulatory Purpose and Cumulative Regulatory Measures[J].Journal of International Economic Law , 2008 ,12.
[15] O'Neil ,Stacey R..Consuming for the Environment: A Proposal for Carbon Labels in the United States[J].California Western International Law Journal, 2009,39.
[16] Popp, David.International Technology Transfer, Climate Change, and the Clean Development Mechanism[J].Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 2011,5(1).
[17] Ponting , Cerys.Will Carbon Eco-labelling Engender a New Generation of Eco-warriors?[C]. IOP Conf. Series: Earth and Environmental Science ,2009,6.
[18] Regan, Donald H..The Meaning of‘‘Necessary’’in GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV: The Myth of Cost-Benefit Balancing[J]. World Trade Review, 2007, 6 (3).
[19] Reinhard, Quick and Christian Lau.Environmentally Motivated Tax Distinc- -tions and WTO Law:The European Commission's Green Paper on Integrated Product Policy in Light of the‘Like Product’and‘PPM’Debates[J].Journal of International Economic Law, 2003,6(2).
[20] Slater ,Valerie A. and Lisa W.Ross.Judicial Review Of The International Trade Commission's Determinations In Antidumping And Countervailing Duty Pro- -ceedings: An Overview Of Decisions In 2006[J]. Georgetown Journal of International Law, 2007.
[21] Vranes , Erich.The WTO and Regulatory Freedom:WTO Disciplines on Market Access,Non-Discrimination and Domestic Regulation Relating to Trade in Goods and Services[J].Journal of International Economic Law ,2009, 12(4).
[22] Weiler , J. H. H.. Comment on Brazil– Retreaded Tyres[J].World Trade Review, 2009, 8 (1).
[23] Zhao, Yuhong.Trade and Environment: Challenges After China's WTO Accession[J].Columbia Journal of Environmental Law, 2007(7).
[1] GATT Panel Report.Thailand– Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes(Thailand– Cigarettes)[Z].BISD 37S/200, 223, adopted on 7 November 1990.
[2] WTO Appellate Body Report.United States–Standards for Reformulated and ConventionalGasoline (US–Gasoline) [Z].WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted on 20 May 1996.
[3] WTO Appellate Body Report. United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products(US—Shrimp)[Z].WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted on 6 November 1998.
[4] WTO Appellate Body Report.Korea– Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef (Korea– Beef) [Z] .WT/DS/161/AB/R, adopted on 11 December 2000.
[5] WTO Appellate Body Report.United States—Tax Treatment for“Foreign Sales Corporations”(US-FSC)[Z]. WT/DS108/AB/R, adopted on 20 March 2000.
[6] WTO Appellate Body Report.European Communities– Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products (EC–Asbestos)[Z].WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted on 5 April 2001.
[7] WTO Appellate Body Report.United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services[Z].WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted on 20 April 2005.
[8] WTO Appellate Body Report.Brazil– Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres (Brazil–Retreaded Tyres)[Z] .WT/DS332/AB/R, adopted on 3 Decemeber 2007.
[9] WTO Appellate Body Report.United States– Definitive Anty-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China(US– AD/CVD onChina) [Z]. WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted on 11 March 2011.
© 2004-2018 中国地质图书馆版权所有 京ICP备05064691号 京公网安备11010802017129号 地址：北京市海淀区学院路29号 邮编：100083 电话：办公室：(+86 10)66554848；文献借阅、咨询服务、科技查新：66554700 |